Burke v. Harman

A Navajo chief’s blanket, first phase, Ute style, is a rare and beautiful object because of its historical and ethnographic significance, as well as its art; all of which add to the blanket’s great value. Such blankets were handwoven by Navajo women before 1850. The plaintiff, John Burke, acquired such a blanket by purchase for $115 from an antique mall in Lincoln. He sold the blanket to the defendant, Kenneth Harman, for $1,000. Harman sold the blanket to an individual in New York for *312 $290,000. Burke has sued Harman for $289,000, claiming that Harman falsely or negligently misrepresented the blanket as a substantially less valuable Mexican weaving.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

John Burke resides in Ithaca, Nebraska, and his work is primarily wood carvings of Native Americans, mountainmen, early American historical figures, Civil War figures, and the like. In order to lend authenticity to his work, Burke engages in some collecting of historical artifacts involving his subject matter, which he studies and then typically sells or trades when he is finished with them. Burke teaches his wood-carving art throughout the United States and has published several how-to books on the subject.

Kenneth Harman holds a bachelor of arts degree in education and has taught first grade at Arnold Elementary School in Lincoln for over 23 years. Harman says that he has been a collector since he was 10 years old. Initially, he collected toys, and he eventually completed a collection of high quality Lehmann toys made in Germany, which is now on display in Nuremberg, Germany. In the late 1980’s, Harman began collecting Indian baskets. He has also collected advertising signs and comic strip toys. Prior to the transaction at issue here, Harman had owned a total of 12 weavings, which he believed to be Native American. All of those weavings were rugs rather than blankets, and the most expensive was purchased from Daphne Deeds for $4,250. Harman tried to sell that rug in New Mexico without success and ultimately traded it for an Indian basket from the Morning Star Gallery. Three of the other weavings which he acquired turned out to be Mexican rather than Indian, which he returned to the sellers. Mexican weavers have done, and continue to do, imitations of the Navajo weavings, and these imitations are much less valuable than the Navajo weavings. One of the first guideposts in determining the value of a Southwestern weaving is to determine whether the weaving is Indian or a Mexican “knock-off.” Harman estimated that of the eight weavings he owned at the time of the transaction in question with Burke, he had paid $1,200 to $1,400 for all of them.

Harman has a reference library of some consequence in his home dealing with collecting and collectibles. His library *313 included at least two reference books which displayed pictures of Navajo chief’s blankets, first phase, Ute style. The books are entitled “Weaving of the Southwest,” by Marian Rodee, and “The Navajo Weaving Tradition 1650 to the Present,” by Alice Kaufman and Christopher Selser. He also had copies of American Indian Art magazine, which reported on the sale of several chief’s blankets. Prior to the transaction at issue, Harman had sent one of the other weavings he had acquired to Sara Alexanian of Albuquerque, New Mexico, who works with her husband in the cleaning, buying, and selling of rugs and blankets, including Navajo textiles, but she returned the weaving to Harman because it was Mexican and therefore not worth her time or his money. Alexanian explained that the Navajo blankets were much more finely woven than rugs and were used as trade items with other tribes and as wearing apparel.

The story of the particular Navajo chief’s blanket involved in this case began before 1850, when it was handwoven in the Ute style by a Navajo woman. The Ute Indians, with whom the Navajos traded, preferred the ivory, chocolate brown (natural colors from the wool), and indigo (naturally dyed) stripe pattern seen on this blanket — hence the name “Ute style.” The name indicates a particular and recognizable style of chief’s blanket. According to Alexanian, the term “first phase” means that it was woven before there were white settlers in the Southwest.

The history of the blanket involved in this case, at least for us, begins on July 1, 1993, when Burke attended the opening of St. George’s Antique Mall in Lincoln. Burke was the second customer in line to enter the business. There, he purchased the blanket for $115. It had a price tag of $115 on it from its owner, Tedd Whipple of Grand Island, who had placed it at the mall for sale. On the tag, Whipple described it as a “1930’s Southwest wool handwoven throw.” Burke testified that the blanket was placed on the floor in front of the fireplace at his home. On August 1, a houseguest, William Hackett, inquired about the rug. Burke indicated that he did not know anything of its background or origin. Burke and Hackett discussed the matter and concluded that some effort should be made to determine its age and origin, and in that regard, Harman’s name occurred to Burke. Burke and Harman had known each other since early *314 1993, when Harman had called Burke about some items Burke had displayed for sale at the Antique Market in Lincoln. As a result, the two men met, and Harman purchased items from Burke.

Burke, Hackett, and the blanket proceeded to Harman’s residence on August 1, 1993, after Burke had called Harman about looking at the blanket. There is a sharp conflict about the time of day on August • 1 when the meeting took place. Burke recounts that it was at 8 o’clock in the evening and that he left about 8:30. Burke supports his timeframe with his phone records, which show a call to Harman at 7:30 p.m. for 4 minutes at a cost of 24 cents. Under Burke’s testimony, this is the premeeting phone call to Harman approximately 30 minutes before arrival at Harman’s house. Harman concedes that Burke called before bringing the blanket to his house but asserts that Burke arrived around 1 p.m.

The meeting time is important because of other inferences which might flow therefrom. For example, the record establishes a long distance phone call from Harman’s residence to Whipple on the night of August 1 at 8:28 p.m., which, according to Burke and Hackett, would have been within minutes of their departure. Whipple testified that in this conversation with Harman there was no suggestion that the weaving was of Mexican origin or that Harman did not know what kind of weaving it was. According to Whipple, he remembered Harman using the words “ ‘early Navajo rug’ ” in that conversation. Harman’s timeframe is important to his defense, because he relates that after buying the weaving he attempted to identify the weaving, which included calling St. George’s that day to find out who had placed it there, waiting for a return call with that information, looking at his reference books, and only calling Whipple after getting his name from St. George’s. But Harman’s evidence is that St. George’s closes at 8 p.m. and that he could not have gotten that information if the meeting occurred when Burke said it did. In short, Burke says his time-frame shows that Harman did not have to research anything about the weaving, because Harman knew from the outset that the weaving was an extremely valuable Native American blanket. On the other hand, Harman says his timeframe and what he *315 did shows that he did not know what the weaving was and that he undertook a number of steps to find out.

After 1,100 pages of testimony, several videotaped depositions, and three boxes of exhibits, the essence of the case still comes down to the conflicting versions of the conversation at Harman’s home on August 1, 1993, regardless of the time of day that it occurred. When the meeting took place, what Harman did or did not do thereafter, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom arguably support each party’s version of the conversation, depending upon what is concluded about the underlying facts. At the simplest level, Burke’s lawsuit asks the questions: “What did Harman know, and when did he know it?”

Burke’s version of the meeting is that after Harman rolled out the blanket for examination, Harman told Burke that it was Mexican and that in Sante Fe it was worth $1,500 to $2,000. Harman offered Burke $500 plus two Indian Skookum dolls for the weaving. When Burke refused that offer, Harman offered $1,000 cash, which Burke accepted. Burke had also brought an Indian basket along, which Burke sold to Harman for $250. Harman admits in his testimony that he was asked by Burke, “What do you think it is?” But he relates that he told Burke that it could be Mexican or Indian and that he gave no opinion as to its value except in reference to its condition in relation to the rug he had acquired from Deeds, Harman saying that Burke’s weaving was in poorer condition. Harman testified that he liked the weaving and that he asked what Burke wanted for it, to which Burke responded with, “ ‘What will you give me?’ ” Harman responded by offering Burke $500 in cash plus the two Indian Skookum dolls which he had lying on the table, preparing to pack them to take to Santa Fe. Harman related that Burke did not think the dolls were worth the $500 asserted by Harman. Harman testified that he then said, “ ‘I’ll give you a thousand dollars for your blanket.’ ” According to Harman, Burke’s response was, “ ‘Hell, yes. I’ll sell it for $1,000.’ ” Harman paid Burke $1,250 in cash for the blanket and the basket, and Burke and Hackett left.

The blanket was identified as a Navajo chief’s blanket, first phase, Ute style. Howard Grimmer, the former owner of Morning Star Gallery in Santa Fe, which handles valuable *316 Indian artifacts, put the matter in perspective when he testified that even if a person had $500,000 in a checking account and wanted to buy a first phase blanket on a particular day, he did not think that anyone could do it, because the blankets are very rare, and there are only a “handful of them in public hands and those only move occasionally.” Harman sold the blanket a year after he got it from Burke to an individual in New York for $290,000. The parties have stipulated that on August 1, 1993, the blanket Burke sold to Harman had a “fair market value of $290,000.” Additional facts from the record will be provided as necessary in our discussion of the issues raised by the appeal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The case was apparently tried on the fourth amended petition (petition), as that is the only petition in our transcript. That petition alleges that Harman represented to Burke that he had knowledge and expertise in reference to Native American artifacts, including weavings, and that Harman represented to Burke after examination of the weaving that it was not of Native American origin but was a Mexican blanket with a value in the area of $1,500 to $2,000. The petition alleges that those representations were false, as the blanket was of Native American origin with a value in excess of $250,000, which facts “were suppressed or concealed by [Harman] with the intention that [Burke] be [misled] as to the true condition of the property; that [Burke] was reasonably so [misled] and suffered damages as a result. . . .”

The petition further alleges that when Harman made the affirmative representations to Burke, Harman “either knew the statements and representations were false, or said statements were made recklessly by [Harman] without knowledge of their truth, but represented to [Burke] as positive assertions.” Alternatively, Burke pleads that the proposed transaction was one where Harman had a pecuniary interest and supplied false information to Burke which Burke justifiably relied upon and that Harman “failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information” about the origin of the blanket and its value. Burke further alleges that the representations *317 of Harman were made with the intent that Burke rely upon them and as an inducement for Burke to sell the blanket to Harman and that, as a result, Burke has been damaged in the sum of $289,000.

Harman’s answer to the petition preserved his demurrer that a cause of action based upon neither fraudulent misrepresentation nor negligent misrepresentation was stated and, additionally, that Burke had not “pled the proper measure of damages.” As affirmative defenses, Harman alleged that Burke was contributorily negligent in failing to use ordinary care to independently research the origin and value of the blanket and that such contributory negligence was the cause of any damage. As a second affirmative defense, Harman alleges that it is the trade and custom of buyers and sellers of antiques to make their own independent determinations of value and not to rely upon the valuation of a buyer. The third affirmative defense alleges that prior to August 1, 1993, Burke had contacted Harman approximately a dozen times about buying or trading for antique items owned by Burke and that a course of dealing had been established where each person independently arrived at prices and values for the goods they were buying, selling, or trading.

Trial before a jury in the district court for Lancaster County began on May 13, 1996, and the jury returned its verdict in favor of Harman on May 21. The trial court submitted the case to the jury only on the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, outlining that the plaintiff must prove by a greater weight of the evidence that (1) Harman made the claimed representation; (2) the representation was false; (3) the representation was made fraudulently; (4) when the representation was made, the intent was that Burke would rely upon it; (5) Burke did rely upon the representation; (6) Burke’s reliance was reasonable; and (7) the representation was the proximate cause of some damage to Burke and the nature and extent of the damage.

In the instructions on effect of findings, the court instructed the jury that if Burke had met his burden of proof, the verdict must be for him in the amount of $289,000. No affirmative defenses were submitted to the jury. After Burke’s motion for new trial was denied, a timely appeal was filed to this court.

*318 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Burke assigns that the trial court erred (1) in granting Harman’s motion for a partial directed verdict as to Burke’s claim based on negligent misrepresentation; (2) in refusing to allow the use of the deposition of Ralph Soloman Silverheels; and (3) in denying Burke’s proposed jury instructions (a) on presentation of videotape testimony, (b) that contributory negligence is not a defense to fraudulent misrepresentation, (c) on negligent misrepresentation, and (d) on reliance. As his fourth assignment of error, Burke claims that the lower court erred in instructing the jury by giving inconsistent instructions and failed to properly instruct on the issues of justifiable reliance and whether contributory negligence is a defense to fraudulent misrepresentation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To establish reversible error from a court’s failure to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden of showing that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s failure to give the tendered instruction. State v. Kinser, 252 Neb. 600, 567 N.W.2d 287 (1997); Kent v. Crocker, 252 Neb. 462, 562 N.W.2d 833 (1997).

On questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach independent conclusions irrespective of the decision made by the court below. State v. McBride, 252 Neb. 866, 567 N.W.2d 136 (1997).

A party against whom a motion for directed verdict or a motion to dismiss is directed is entitled to have all relevant evidence accepted or treated as true, every controverted fact as favorably resolved, and every beneficial inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. Burns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 231 Neb. 844, 438 N.W.2d 485 (1989).

ANALYSIS

Silverheels’ Deposition.

On February 20, 1996, the deposition of Ralph Soloman Silverheels was taken in Albany, Oregon, at the instance of *319 Burke. Burke’s counsel and a court reporter were present in Albany with Silverheels, and Harman’s counsel participated by telephone from Lincoln. Silverheels described himself as a “[N]ative American fine art dealer” and said that he had an antique store in Omaha at the time the transaction concerning the weaving took place. The general substance of Silverheels’ testimony was that he had become acquainted with both Burke and Harman through antique trading. In the past, before the transaction which is the subject of this litigation took place, Harman had contacted Silverheels to inquire whether he had good weavings and baskets, in particular whether he had any first phase, second phase, or third phase weavings, or any older Hopi weavings.

Silverheels also testified that Harman had been in his store looking at weavings and, in particular, had examined a third phase weaving in the summer of 1993. Silverheels testified that he first heard about Harman’s acquisition of the first phase weaving when an acquaintance told him that Harman had obtained a “very, very nice Navajo weaving” and was looking to sell it for $350,000 to $450,000. Silverheels and Harman talked by phone, and they discussed how Harman had obtained this weaving, as well as a price for the weaving. In particular, Silverheels testified:

He [Harman] had told me that he had bought a first phase chief’s blanket and that he had come onto it with great luck, that — excuse my language, a dumb fat fucker that had bought it at an antique — like a fle[a] market or an antique store, that he told him it was Mexican, and that he gave him a thousand bucks for it, told him it was worth two thousand.

Silverheels indicated to Harman that he would like to see it. According to Silverheels, Harman left a photograph of the weaving in Silverheels’ store when Silverheels was absent from the store. Silverheels testified that his nephew received the photo and wrote “ ‘Photograph of first phase Ute Navajo blanket’ ” with Harman’s phone number on the back of the photograph. By the time Silverheels contacted Harman about the weaving after seeing the photograph, Harman had already sold it.

*320 Under cross-examination at his deposition, Silverheels refused to answer approximately 20 questions posed by Harman’s counsel. Summarized and reorganized, the specific questions he refused to answer were: (1) his father’s last name, (2) his mother’s last name, (3) the name on his birth certificate, (4) the city in California where he went to high school, (5) the year he graduated from college, (6) the college he graduated from, (7) specifics of his military career, (8) whether he still owned his former house in Omaha, (9) whether he was wounded in the line of duty as a police officer, (10) his current residential address, (11) the address of his nephew who worked in his Omaha store, (12) whether he told anyone in Omaha he was the grandson of Tonto from “The Lone Ranger,” (13) whether he told people in Omaha that he was a lawyer in California, (14) whether he had represented himself as the chief of an Indian tribe, (15) specifics about Putgrand Auction and Silverheels’ lawsuit against Heartland Estates and Bill Kauffman, (16) when his name legally became Ralph Soloman Silverheels, (17) whether he has been known by any name other than Silverheels, (18) the significance of June 6, 1980, (19) the name of his shop in Arizona, and (20) the tribe of which he is a member.

Several times after refusing to answer a specific question, Silverheels offered to explain to a judge why he would not answer, adamantly insisting that the judge would rule in his favor, and asserted, “The United States government . . . allow[ed] [him] the privilege [not to answer] by [C]ongress.” He also stated that he would be more than willing to come to Lincoln to testify. At the close of the deposition, Harman’s counsel stated that he was planning to make either a motion to compel Silverheels to answer the questions he refused to answer or a motion to strike his entire deposition testimony. The record before us reveals that Harman’s counsel opted for the latter option, because in a motion in limine filed before trial, Harman asked the court to exclude

all testimony of Ralph Soloman Silverheels contained in his deposition of February 20, 1996 for the reason that: a. The witness indicated in his deposition that he is willing to appear and he is therefore not “unavailable” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-804(2)(a);

*321 b. The defendant was deprived of his right to effectively cross-examine the witness at his deposition by the witness’s refusal to answer appropriate questions; and

c. The probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403.

In a journal entry, the trial judge ruled that Silverheels’ deposition would be excluded at trial because the questions he refused to answer did not “relate to mere collateral or cumulative matters,” but, instead, were “highly relevant” credibility issues and that Silverheels’ refusal to answer unfairly deprived Harman of his right to cross-examination. Because the motion in limine concerning Silverheels’ testimony was sustained, there was no mention of Silverheels in the trial record other than when Burke unsuccessfully offered the deposition at trial. During cross-examination of Harman, the following exchange took place between Burke’s counsel and Harman:

Q. Okay. Mr. Harman, did you ever tell an antique dealer in Omaha that you purchased a chiefs blanket from a big dumb fat so and so?

A. No, I certainly did not.

Q. Are you aware of anyone, other than . .. Burke, who contends that you made such a statement to a dealer in Omaha?

A. No.

Harman also testified on both direct and cross-examination regarding the people he contacted after he obtained the blanket from Burke, and Silverheels was not one of the people Harman admitted contacting.

Burke argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit any of the deposition of Silverheels merely because the witness failed to answer collateral background questions.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-804 (Reissue 1995) states in relevant part:

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 27-403, the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

*322 (a) Testimony given as a witness ... in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or a different proceeding, at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest similar to those of the party against whom now offered.

Unavailability is defined in part by § 27-804(l)(e) as including situations when the declarant “[i]s absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.” Additionally, Neb. Ct. R. of Discovery 32(a)(3)(B) (rev. 1996) contains a more precise definition of unavailability: “[T]he witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing, or out of the state, or beyond the subpoena power of the court, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1227 (Reissue 1995) provides that a witness in a civil trial cannot be compelled to attend a trial outside of the state where he or she is served with a subpoena or at a location more than 100 miles from his or her residence.

Silverheels lived in Oregon, well outside of the reach of a subpoena from the Nebraska trial court. Although Harman’s motion asserted Silverheels was “available” as a ground for excluding this deposition, the trial court did not rely on that ground in excluding the deposition. Harman’s brief in this court does not assert that Silverheels was “available.” Harman did assert at oral argument that Silverheels was “available,” because Silverheels said he would return to Lincoln to testify. But we are cited to no authority that such a statement at deposition makes the witness “available,” nor have we found any authority on our own for this proposition. Rather, § 25-1227 and rule 32(a)(3)(B) make distance and whether the witness can be reached by the court’s subpoena power the conclusive test of “availability,” unless the proponent of the testimony “arranges” the witness’ unavailability — and there is no claim or evidence of such here.

It has been held that rule 32, in most cases, will not create different conditions for admissibility than does § 27-804. Maresh v. State, 241 Neb 496, 489 N.W.2d 298 (1992). *323 Moreover, an occurrence witness, as Silverheels would be, is not required to travel more than 100 miles to attend trial pursuant to subpoena. See id. Thus, we are satisfied that Silverheels, who lived in Oregon, was unavailable to testify as contemplated by § 27-804(2)(a) and rule 32(a)(3)(B).

The deposition was taken via stipulation, and no claim is raised under § 27-804 that it was not in accordance with Nebraska law, or Oregon law for that matter. That the parties and their motives were the same in both the deposition and trial cannot be disputed. Thus, the only question remaining on whether the deposition was admissible under § 27-804(2)(a) is whether Harman had the opportunity to develop Silverheels’ testimony through cross-examination when Silverheels refused to answer the questions we have outlined earlier. The district court’s ruling was that Harman’s counsel did not.

Because we find it clear that Silverheels’ deposition was admissible under § 27-804(2)(a) and rule 32 unless the opportunity to cross-examine was unduly denied, an analysis of cases dealing with the effect of a witness’ refusal to answer questions during cross-examination must be undertaken to determine whether the deposition was admissible in whole or in part despite the fact that Silverheels did not answer all questions put to him on cross-examination.

In a somewhat similar case involving the use of deposition testimony at trial, U.S. v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988), a government witness refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination in her deposition, and her lawyer answered other cross-examination questions for her. The witness was deposed in France, where she was being held in custody by French police for drug smuggling. The deposition was taken pursuant to French law. The prosecution successfully introduced the deposition under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), which is essentially the same as our § 27-804(2)(a). On appeal, the defendant argued that the witness’ refusal to answer certain questions denied him the opportunity for cross-examination in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals held that “[a]lthough [the witness] failed to answer some questions, and although her lawyer responded to a few others on [her] behalf, those flaws did not render the testimony inherently unre *324 liable. Rather, they affected the weight to be accorded to the witness’ answers, which was a question for the trier of fact.” 855 F.2d at 955.

Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that under the federal equivalent to § 27-804(2)(a), opportunity and motive to cross-examine the witness are the important factors, not the actual extent of cross-examination. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, Etc., 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).

The seminal case on the issue of the effect of a witness’ refusal to answer questions during cross-examination is United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 822, 84 S. Ct. 60, 11 L. Ed. 2d 55. In Cardillo, a government witness invoked his privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination. He had testified on direct examination that he had given the defendant money to buy stolen furs, but on cross-examination, he refused to answer questions about the source of that money. The court set forth three categories to consider in determining whether a witness’ failure to answer questions on cross-examination requires striking all or part of his testimony. The court described these categories as follows:

The first would be one in which the answer would have been so closely related to the commission of the crime that the entire testimony of the witness should be stricken. The second would be a situation in which the subject matter of the testimony was connected solely with one phase of the case in which event a partial striking might suffice. The third would involve collateral matters or cumulative testimony concerning credibility which would not require a direction to strike and which could be handled (in a jury case) by the judge’s charge if questions as to the weight to be ascribed to such testimony arose.

Id. at 613. In Cardillo, the court struck the entire testimony of this witness because the questions the witness refused to answer fell into the first category of testimony.

A different government witness in Cardillo had testified about the specifics of the crimes attributable to the defendant and then also refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination. However, the questions this witness refused to *325 answer were about the current charges pending against this witness and his past criminal record. The court first noted that

reversal need not result from every limitation of permissible cross-examination and a witness’ testimony may, in some cases, be used against a defendant, even though the witness invokes his privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination. In determining whether the testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege . . . may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him.

Id. at 611. The court then held that the district court did not err in refusing to strike the testimony of this witness, because the questions he refused to answer “related solely to his credibility as a witness and had no relation to the subject matter of his direct examination.” Id.

The Cardillo analysis and rules have been applied in civil trials as well. In Board of Trustees v. Hartman, 246 Cal. App. 2d 756, 55 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1966), a witness, by deposition, refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination. The defendant was a professor who was challenging his firing for violating the education code’s provisions for moral fitness because he had helped a former student obtain a divorce in Mexico and then married the student in Mexico the same day. He had also previously been involved with a woman named Frances, with whom he had lived while married to another woman. At trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce the deposition testimony of Frances, who was outside the state at the time of trial. The defendant objected because Frances had refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination about whether she had blackmailed the defendant. After quoting from Cardillo, the court held that because the testimony was cumulative and only *326 related to the credibility of the witness, it was not error to refuse to strike the testimony.

Another civil case, Air Et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1985), involved stockholders suing for breach of a contract to purchase their stock. On appeal after a plaintiffs’ verdict, the defendant argued that the district court erred in allowing one of the plaintiffs to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions asked on cross-examination concerning his alleged nonpayment of Belgium income taxes. After noting that “[o]nly if the alleged error was prejudicial may we find it an adequate basis for reversal,” the court held:

Issues concerning a party’s credibility are generally collateral. United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1963). While it is true that a plaintiff may not attempt to deny defendants all opportunities to obtain potentially damaging information, assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions on collateral issues is not improper. [Citations omitted.] Where evidence sought on cross-examination relates only to credibility, a party may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. . . .

. . . Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing [the witness] to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.

Id. at 496. But see Magyar v. United Fire Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court did not abuse its discretion in striking plaintiff’s testimony as sanction for giving nonresponsive and evasive answers), cert. denied 484 U.S. 851, 108 S. Ct. 151, 98 L. Ed. 2d 107. The Nebraska Supreme Court has followed the Cardillo rule in State v. Bittner, 188 Neb. 298, 196 N.W.2d 186 (1972), where the defendant claimed his right to confrontation was denied when the trial court apparently upheld a self-incrimination claim when questions were asked about whether a witness had engaged in prostitution. The Bittner court held: “The restricted questioning dealt only with a collateral matter bearing solely on the credibility of the witness, not upon facts brought out on direct examination, and not on facts pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id. at 301-02, 196 N.W.2d at 189.

*327 Additionally, “[t]he test [e]nunciated in Cardillo has been followed by nearly all federal circuits and the courts of most states.” Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 589, 660 A.2d 986, 1032 (1995) (Davis, J., dissenting) (rejecting court’s holding that prior testimony of codefendant was admissible at defendant’s trial where codefendant was unavailable for cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996).

Although the cases involving this issue frequently arise from the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, it does not appear that assertion of the privilege is a prerequisite to the admission of the deposition testimony when there are unanswered cross-examination questions. See U.S. v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, we observe that Silverheels stated: “I refuse to answer any personal questions on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment that it might endanger my family or my property. You better speak to a judge; you are going too far.”

We digress to note that Silverheels’ statement above is not entirely accurate, because he did not refuse to answer all personal questions. Examination of the deposition reveals that Silverheels answered a good number of personal questions. For example, he provided the name of his corporations in both Nebraska and Oregon, the location of his business and its phone number in Oregon, the name of the person from whom he first heard about Harman’s having acquired the rug, the reason why he and his family moved to Oregon, the fact that he had been in the military, his major in college as Indian art and law enforcement, his father’s first name and his mother’s first name, and the fact that he was formerly a police officer. But, as we have earlier stated, there were questions that Silverheels would not answer in the deposition.

In Negrete-Gonzales, the defendants were on trial for conspiring to sell cocaine. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that if the jury believed the defendants’ witness Medina, “it would have had to acquit Negrete and Mendoza on all three counts.” Id. at 1279. When the government asked her to identify her source of cocaine on cross-examination, Medina refused, stating it would jeopardize the lives of her children. *328 She would say only that neither Negrete nor Mendoza provided her with the drugs. Based on the refusal to name her source, the court granted the government’s motion to strike her entire testimony. The Ninth Circuit, citing its previous decision in United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983), stated that striking a witness’ entire testimony is an extreme remedy, not to be lightly imposed. The Ninth Circuit in Negrete-Gonzales found that the identity of the unknown supplier was “only peripherally related to [Medina’s] direct testi