Downing v. United Auto Racing Ass'n

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Terry Downing was injured during a midget car race that was held on premises operated by defendants United Auto Racing Association (UARA) and Aaron Willis (Willis) (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants). The plaintiff’s injuries occurred when a car driven by defendant Robert Guess (Guess) overturned on the racetrack and struck plaintiff, who was standing just off the track in an area unprotected by a guardrail. A jury found that Guess was not negligent in his driving of the car, and he is not a party to this appeal. The jury determined that the actions of defendants UARA and Willis with respect to their maintenance of the track amounted to willful and wanton misconduct, and awarded plaintiff $1.5 million in damages. The jury also found that plaintiff was 59% comparatively negligent in causing his own injuries and reduced the award by this percentage, for a net damages award of $615,000.

Defendants UARA and Willis raise numerous issues on appeal. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that: (1) the evidence of record supports the jury’s determination that the actions of these defendants constituted willful and wanton misconduct; (2) a release signed by plaintiff was properly excluded from evidence; (3) the advent of -comparative negligence does not abolish the distinction between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton misconduct; (4) the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard certain testimony from the plaintiff’s expert was sufficient to cure any prejudice to the defendants arising from such testimony; (5) the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard hearsay testimony from one of plaintiff’s occurrence witnesses was adequate to prevent any prejudice to the defendants; (6) there was no error in any of the trial court’s rulings with respect to testimony provided by plaintiff’s experts at trial; (7) defendants are not entitled to a new trial because of allegedly improper testimony regarding the scope of plaintiff’s injuries; and (8) there were no cumulative errors that entitle defendants to a new trial.

Plaintiff also cross-appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict, claiming that his ordinary negligence could not offset defendants’ liability for willful and wanton acts. We conclude that, in light of the adoption of comparative fault, a jury may consider a plaintiff’s ordinary negligence to reduce the amount of damages assessed for a defendant’s willful and wanton acts.

In accordance with these determinations, we affirm.

Plaintiff was injured on August 12, 1978, during a midget car race at Joliet Memorial Stadium. Defendant Willis leased the track to promote, organize and supervise such races. Under the agreement, defendant Willis was to provide a safe, adequate, and properly prepared track for the races, including personnel to supervise activities near the track and in the pit area. Defendant UARA agreed to sanction races held by defendant Willis at the stadium.

At the time of his injury, plaintiff was a member of a pit crew for Richard Pole (Pole), a midget car driver. Plaintiff helped others in the crew to prepare the car and push it onto the track. As plaintiff waited on the track for the car to be pushed into a warm-up race, he noticed that the car being driven by Guess bicycled in the turns nearer to plaintiff. “Bicycling” occurs when the car’s inner wheels lose contact with the track surface.

According to plaintiff’s trial testimony, Guess’ car bicycled approximately two feet off the asphalt in these turns. After Guess’ car passed through the turns, plaintiff and other members of the crew pushed Pole’s car onto the track to participate in the warm-up race. Thereafter, plaintiff began to walk off the track toward the pit area. He was accompanied by George Boban (Boban), who was also a pit crew member for Pole. Both plaintiff and Boban noted that Guess’ car again bicycled a few feet in the air when the car made the two turns at the far end of the track. Plaintiff testified that he mentioned to Boban, and to David Valentino (Valentino), a pit crew member for another driver who was nearby, that Guess’ car should be blackflagged off the track. “Blackflag” occurs when the racing steward waves a black flag to a driver to signal to the driver that his car should leave the track. Valentino also testified at trial that he noticed that Guess’ car bicycled when making turns around the track.

Boban and Valentino testified that they were standing with plaintiff in the grassy area near the track when they noticed Guess’ car bicycling in turns on the track. Also, Boban and Valentino testified that Guess’ car bicycled both during warm-up laps, where the cars are running at a reduced speed, and during hot laps, where the cars are making trial runs at full speed. However, plaintiff testified that he believed Guess’ car was operating a warm-up lap when he first noticed the bicycling, but that he did not know whether Guess was operating during a hot lap when Guess’ car repeated its bicycling around the track.

It was established at trial that a racing steward controlled whether the cars were racing a warm-up lap or a hot lap. To indicate a warm-up lap, the steward would wave a yellow flag. To indicate a hot lap, the steward would wave a green flag. In addition, there was a light signal at the far end of the track, away from the pit area, that would show a yellow or green light depending upon the signals given by the racing steward.

During the time that plaintiff, Boban, and Valentino noticed Guess’ car bicycling at the far end of the track, they were located in a grassy area off the track between the pit and the straightaway. A guardrail separated the track from the pit area at the turns at this end of the track, and there was a fence along the track straightaway. Boban, Valentino, and plaintiff all testified that they were aware that it was dangerous to remain in this area during a hot lap.

Plaintiff testified at trial that because he believed that the bicycling of Guess’ car created a hazardous condition on the track, he concluded that Guess’ car should be removed from the race. In an effort to find a race official to blackflag Guess' car, plaintiff began to walk away from Boban and Valentino. He walked in the grassy strip along the track, away from the guardrail, in the direction of the fence along the straightaway. Plaintiff did not watch Guess’ car as it continued on the track.

Boban and Valentino testified that as Guess’ car reached the turns nearer to the pit area, the car again bicycled. It then flipped over and began skidding toward the area where plaintiff, Boban, and Valentino were located. Although Boban and Valentino avoided injury, plaintiff was struck by the car and pinned against the fence next to the track straightaway. He sustained injuries requiring extensive surgery and lengthy post-operative care.

Plaintiff contended that defendants UARA and Willis were guilty of willful and wanton conduct because they (1) failed to extend the guardrail near the pit area and (2) failed to provide a pit steward to ensure that persons did not remain in the exposed area near the pit. In addition, plaintiff claimed that defendant UARA was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct because it failed to blackflag Guess’ car off the track once it began to bicycle.

To support his contentions, plaintiff produced evidence at trial to show that defendants were aware that the area where plaintiff had been located was dangerous because it exposed persons standing there to the risk of being hit by cars driven on the track. Plaintiff’s expert at trial, Dr. John Fitch, stated that the guardrail along the pit area should have been extended toward the straightaway to minimize this hazard. Dr. Fitch also testified that, as an alternative to a guardrail, defendants should have placed a steward in the area where plaintiff was located at the time he was injured, who would be responsible for preventing persons from remaining in that vicinity. Dr. Fitch also stated that the defendant UARA should have blackflagged Guess’ car off the track before it bicycled, lost control, and spun into plaintiff. Dr. Fitch testified that either an extended guardrail, the presence of a steward to warn plaintiff off the area unprotected by a guardrail, or the removal of Guess’ car probably would have prevented plaintiff’s injuries.

Defendants presented evidence to show that none of the alternatives suggested by plaintiff was reasonably necessary and that none would have prevented plaintiff’s injuries. Testimony from experts detailed these points. Defendants also presented testimony to establish that they had warned pit crew members, including plaintiff, not to stand in the area where the plaintiff’s injuries occurred.

Based upon this evidence, the jury returned a verdict against defendants UARA and Willis. It awarded plaintiff $1.5 million in damages, reduced to $615,000 for plaintiff’s comparative fault, which the jury assessed at 59%. The trial court entered judgment in conformity with this verdict. Defendants UARA and Willis appeal, and plaintiff cross-appeals.

I

Defendants argue that the jury’s finding of willful and wanton misconduct was not supported by the evidence of record. They contend that the trial court should have granted their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted when all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504; Bausback v. K mart Corp. (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 325, 550 N.E.2d 1269.) A motion for a new trial is properly allowed when the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Marin v. American Meat Packing Co. (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 302, 562 N.E.2d 282.

Willful and wanton acts are those which, under the circumstances of the particular case, exhibit reckless disregard for the safety of others, including the failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent an impending danger. (Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc. (1946), 394 Ill. 569, 583, 69 N.E.2d 293; see also Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 497, 518, 544 N.E.2d 733; O’Brien v. Township High School District 214 (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 462, 469, 415 N.E.2d 1015; Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447.) To establish that a defendant was guilty of willful and wanton conduct, plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that his conduct posed a high probability of serious physical harm to others. (Albers v. Community Consolidated No. 204 School (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1085, 508 N.E.2d 1252.) The evidence must disclose that defendant was reckless, not merely careless, in his disregard of the danger created by the circumstances. (Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447.) Whether a defendant’s acts amounted to willful and wanton conduct is a question to be resolved by the finder of fact, based upon the particular circumstances of each individual case. Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447; Soucie v. Drago Amusements Co. (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 348, 495 N.E.2d 997; Barth v. Board of Education (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 266, 490 N.E.2d 77.

A review of the record reveals sufficient basis to justify the jury’s verdict that defendants UARA and Willis were willful and wanton. Plaintiff produced evidence that showed defendants were aware that the exposed area near the pit presented a substantial risk of serious injury to persons who stood there, and that defendants knew pit crew members were often located in the vicinity during warm-up and hot laps. The testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Dr. John Fitch, established that defendants should have either extended the guardrail near the pit area, or secured the presence of a pit steward who would be responsible for preventing pit crew members from standing in the area. Dr. Fitch also testified that defendant UARA, in addition to these alternatives, should have had Guess’ car blackflagged off the track before it bicycled, lost control, and spun into plaintiff. Dr. Fitch testified that in his opinion, the defendants’ failure to extend the guardrail, or require the presence of a pit steward, was an utter disregard for the safety of pit crew members. The plaintiff’s expert gave similar testimony with respect to defendant UARA’s failure to black-flag Guess’ car. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that this evidence was insufficient to prove that defendants’ omissions constituted willful and wanton conduct. It is not the province of this court, on appeal from a jury verdict, to reweigh the evidence of record or to question the validity of the opinions stated by the plaintiff’s expert. See, e.g., Doser v. Savage Manufacturing & Sales, Inc. (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 176.

Defendants do not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to their knowledge that the exposed area between the guardrail and the fence was hazardous to pit crew members who stood in that location. Instead, defendants argue that the jury could not find them liable for willful and wanton misconduct, because the defendants warned pit crew members not to stand in the exposed area during hot laps, and because they provided light signals at the far end of the track, visible to pit crew members, to indicate whether the cars were running a warm-up lap or a hot lap. Defendants also note that their opportunity to have plaintiff removed from the exposed area prior to his injury lasted only a few seconds and was too short a period of time in which to prevent plaintiff from remaining in the exposed area. Defendants further observe that plaintiff was fully aware of the hazards associated with his staying in the exposed area near the pit. On these bases, the defendants urge that the jury could not find defendants willful and wanton on any of the grounds alleged by the plaintiff.

We are unable to find defendants’ arguments sufficient ground to disturb the jury’s verdict. As defendants concede, defendants were aware that the exposed area remained hazardous to pit crew members and required a warning to pit crew members to avoid the area. Defendants also acknowledge that because of the hazardous nature of the exposed area near the pit, light signals at the far end of the track were intended to show whether the cars were running warm-up laps or hot laps. Plaintiff’s expert testified that, in his opinion, the defendants’ warnings and light signals were insufficient to adequately protect plaintiff, in view of the high degree of risk of serious bodily harm created by the exposed area near the pit. Plaintiff’s expert stated that because of the likelihood of serious bodily injury associated with the exposed vicinity near the pit, defendants should have either extended the guardrail near the pit area or provided a pit steward to prevent pit crew members from remaining in the exposed area near the pit. Plaintiffs expert testified that the probability of serious bodily injury also required that defendant UARA should have blackflagged Guess’ car before it bicycled, lost control, and spun into plaintiff. It was the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert that each of these alternatives probably would have been sufficient to avoid plaintiff’s injuries, in spite of the short period of time he remained in the exposed area prior to his being struck by Guess’ car. The defendants’ knowledge that a short time was required for a midget car to complete a lap on the track, and that injury could occur within seconds, was further indication that these additional alternatives should have been pursued by the defendants in order to lessen the high degree of serious bodily injury created by the exposed area near the pit. It was the jury’s responsibility to assess the weight to be given to the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, and to determine whether defendants’ warnings were sufficient under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, we are not empowered to usurp this jury function. (See Doser v. Savage Manufacturing & Sales, Inc. (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 176.) In addition, the plaintiff’s understanding of the scope of harm associated with remaining in the exposed area near the pit was considered by the jury with respect to plaintiff's comparative fault, and we cannot say upon review that the jury’s apportionment of comparative fault between the parties was erroneous as a matter of law.

Defendants essentially argue that, because the defendants undertook some acts to provide for the safety of pit crew members in the exposed area by warning them about the hazards and by providing light signals to alert them to whether the cars were running a warmup lap or a hot lap, defendants’ failure to undertake additional steps could not be deemed willful and wanton. Defendants note that there are Illinois cases in which the defendants’ provision of some safety measures led the courts to conclude that the defendants were not liable for willful and wanton misconduct for their failure to provide other or additional safety measures. See Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10 (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447; Holsapple v. Casey Community Unit School District C-1 (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 391, 510 N.E.2d 499; Turner v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 331, 341 N.E.2d 488.

However, in none of these cases did the plaintiff’s expert testify that the failure to provide an additional safety measure was, in the expert’s opinion, an utter disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. In the instant cause, the plaintiff's expert identified two alternatives, i.e., the extension of the guardrail near the pit or the provision of a pit steward near the exposed area of the track, that defendants could have undertaken in order to protect plaintiff from the dangers created by the open area between the pit and the straightaway. Plaintiff’s expert identified a third alternative that should have been performed by defendant UARA, i.e., to have Guess’ car blackflagged off the track before it bicycled, lost control, and spun into plaintiff. Plaintiff’s expert further testified that the failure to undertake any of these steps was, in his opinion, an utter disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.

This critical distinction renders factually inapposite the cases cited by defendants in the instant cause. It was the jury’s task to determine whether, under the facts of this case, the defendants’ failure to provide additional safety measures amounted to willful and wanton misconduct. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the defendants were not willful and wanton merely because they undertook the safety measures upon which the defendants rely in this appeal. Defendants’ position asks this court to ignore the testimony of plaintiff’s expert to the effect that the measures undertaken by defendants were substantially inadequate, that the provision of one or more of the safety measures enumerated by the plaintiff’s expert probably would have prevented plaintiff’s injuries, and that defendants’ failure to undertake one or more of these safety measures evidenced an utter disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. Our scope of review does not grant us such authority. See Doser v. Savage Manufacturing and Sales, Inc. (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 176.

Defendants also claim that the jury’s verdict was erroneous, because plaintiff produced no evidence to show that defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that the existing safety features were unreasonably dangerous. Specifically, defendants assert that plaintiff produced no evidence of any prior accidents or complaints, or industry custom or practice, regarding the existing safety measures at the track. However, the cases cited by defendants do not hold that proof of industry custom or practice, or proof of prior incidents or complaints, is a prerequisite in all instances to support a finding of willful and wanton conduct (see Holsapple v. Casey Community Unit School District C-1 (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 391, 510 N.E.2d 499; Keller v. Mols (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 235, 509 N.E.2d 584; Del Muro v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 473, 464 N.E.2d 772; Mathis v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 385 N.E.2d 780), and a jury’s finding of willful and wanton acts has been upheld in the absence of evidence that defendants had received prior complaints or notice of accidents regarding the dangerous condition created by the defendants’ conduct. (See, e.g., Soucie v. Drago Amusements Co. (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 348, 495 N.E.2d 997; Barth v. Board of Education (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 266, 490 N.E.2d 77.) It was the province of the fact finder to consider the absence of prior complaint, prior accidents, and the absence of industry standard or custom, in reaching its determination of whether defendants’ actions constituted willful and wanton conduct. Upon review, we cannot conclude that defendants’ argument in this regard is sufficient ground to disturb the jury’s verdict against them.

Defendants also contend that the jury’s determination was not supported by the record because plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Fitch, testified on cross-examination that he did not know, with certainty, whether an extended guardrail would have prevented the accident. Although an expert’s opinion may not be based on speculation or conjecture, “an expert opinion couched in terms of probabilities *** is not improper or inadmissible. [Citation.]” (Rodrian v. Seiber (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 504, 507, 551 N.E.2d 772.) In the case at bar, the record reflects that Dr. Fitch stated on direct examination that an extended guardrail probably would have prevented plaintiff’s injuries. Consequently, the testimony of Dr. Fitch was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict against defendants, on the ground that defendants’ failure to provide an extended guardrail proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

In light of these considerations, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.

II

Defendants urge that they should receive a new trial because the trial court committed reversible error when it denied defendants’ motion to pursue their affirmative defense that defendants were not liable because plaintiff had executed a release relieving defendants of liability for injuries sustained at the track. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

Generally, a release does not bar plaintiff’s maintenance of an action alleging willful and wanton misconduct by the defendants. This rule is based on the determination that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff cannot exculpate or indemnify a defendant for the defendant’s willful and wanton acts. (See Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc. (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 533 N.E.2d 941; Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc. (1986), 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409; Third Swansea Properties, Inc. v. Ockerlund Construction Co. (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 894, 354 N.E.2d 148; see also Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881; Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 362, 247 N.E.2d 886.) In light of this precedent, the trial court properly denied defendants’ request to pursue their affirmative defense that plaintiff’s execution of a release precluded plaintiff’s recovery from defendants for willful and wanton misconduct.

Defendants argue that the trial court’s ruling was in error, because Illinois courts have recognized the validity of a release in cases involving injuries sustained as a result of a race car accident. However, the cases cited by defendants are inapposite, because they pertained to suits alleging negligence, rather than those alleging willful and wanton acts. (See Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 82, 413 N.E.2d 1252; Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Association, Inc. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30; see also Provence v. Doolin (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 271, 414 N.E.2d 786.) We decline defendants’ invitation to create an exception for exculpatory clauses involving racetrack accidents on the theory that Illinois law has a deleterious, chilling effect on the sport of car racing.

Defendants also argue that they should have been permitted to cross-examine plaintiff regarding the contents of the release in order to show that plaintiff had assumed the risk of injuries at the track. Initially, defendants contend that the release was relevant to the question of plaintiff’s implied primary assumption of the risk.

Under implied primary assumption of the risk, the plaintiff’s conduct is deemed an implicit assumption of all of the risk arising from a certain activity. As a result, under implied primary assumption of the risk, a plaintiff may relieve a defendant of any duty to the plaintiff to be free from ordinary negligence. See Goad v. Evans (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 283, 547 N.E.2d 690; Clark v. Rogers (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 484 N.E.2d 867; Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d 1037.

Implied primary assumption of the risk is similar to an express assumption of the risk. Under express assumption of the risk, a plaintiff has explicitly, usually in writing, agreed to relieve the defendant of liability for any injuries arising from an activity. However, an express assumption of the risk does not preclude a plaintiff’s suit for willful and wanton misconduct, because public policy dictates that a plaintiff cannot absolve a defendant of liability for the defendant’s willful and wanton acts. (See, e.g., Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc. (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 597, 533 N.E.2d 941.) In light of this public policy, we conclude that an implied primary assumption of the risk, similar to an express assumption of the risk, should not bar a plaintiff’s action for injuries due to willful and wanton acts of a defendant. (Falkner, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 604.) Accordingly, the release was not admissible to show that plaintiff’s actions amounted to an implicit, primary assumption of the risks of injury arising from his participation in the midget car race.

Defendants also argue that they should have been permitted to offer the release to prove plaintiff’s implied secondary assumption of the risk. Implied secondary assumption of the risk occurs when a plaintiff, by his conduct, has assumed certain consequences from his participation in an activity. Implied secondary assumption of the risk is a damage-reducing factor considered as an element of comparative fault. See Simpson v. General Motors Corp. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 146, 483 N.E.2d 1; Corlett v. Caserta (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 403, 562 N.E.2d 257; Wheeler v. Roselawn Memory Gardens (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 193, 543 N.E.2d 1328; Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d 1037.

Defendants fully cross-examined plaintiff regarding his understanding of the hazards associated with his remaining in the exposed area of the track between the pit area and the straightaway, and defendants acknowledge that the area was hazardous to anyone who remained there. Defendants do not demonstrate in what respect plaintiff’s trial testimony contradicted his written acknowledgment, in the release, that the exposed area near the pit was dangerous. As a result, we are unable to conclude that defendants’ lack of cross-examination of plaintiff regarding the provision in the release should warrant a new trial.

In addition, the record shows that prior to trial, the court expressly reserved ruling on whether defendants should be permitted to cross-examine plaintiff regarding a provision in the release wherein plaintiff recognized the hazards associated with the exposed area near the pit, in order to show that plaintiff’s implied secondary assumption of the risk should act as an offset under comparative fault. However, during their cross-examination of plaintiff, defendants did not renew their request to question plaintiff regarding this provision in the release. Defendants’ failure to renew their request constituted a waiver of this argument and cannot be asserted on appeal. See, e.g., Morris v. Illinois State Board of Education (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 51, 555 N.E.2d 725.

Ill

Defendants also assert that they should have been permitted to pursue their affirmative defense that plaintiff was precluded from any recovery because of his execution of the release, because the rule regarding unenforceability of a release with respect to willful and wanton conduct is no longer supported by Illinois precedent. Defendants contend that the advent of comparative negligence has abolished the distinction between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton acts, and that liability for willful and wanton misconduct remains viable only in the context of punitive damages.

To support this argument, defendants note that prior to Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, Illinois law held that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred any recovery from the defendant who had committed acts of ordinary negligence. To circumvent the harsh effects of this rule, it was held that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence did not prevent recovery for the defendant’s willful and wanton conduct. (See Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 10.) Defendants also note that Illinois courts have recognized that the rule permitting recovery when the plaintiff’s acts were negligent and the defendant’s conduct willful and wanton was “cumbersome and difficult to apply” (Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 10), and not a matter with which the average juror was readily familiar. (Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d at 431-32.) In addition, defendants observe that there is a “thin line” between simple negligence and willful and wanton acts, citing Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, 35, 330 N.E.2d 509, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mendenhall (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61, 517 N.E.2d 341, Barth v. Board of Education (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 266, 276,