State v. Brimage

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

We are again presented with issues relating to Section 12 of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to 36A-1 (hereinafter “CDRA”). Under N.J.S.A 2C:35-12 (“Section 12”), a prosecutor may, through a negotiated plea agreement or post-conviction agreement with a defendant, waive the mandatory minimum sentence specified for any offense under the CDRA. To satisfy the constitutional requirements of the separation of powers doctrine, N.J. Const, art. III, ¶ 1, this Court in State v. Vasquez held that prosecutorial discretion under Section 12 must be subject to judicial review for arbitrary and capricious action. 129 N.J. 189, 195-96, 609 A.2d 29 (1992). To further that review, the Court held that prosecutors must adhere to written guidelines governing plea offers and state on the record their reasons for *4 waiving or not waiving the parole disqualifíer in any given ease. Ibid.

In response to that holding, the Attorney General promulgated plea agreement guidelines. See Directive Implementing Guidelines Governing Plea-Bargaining and Discretionary Decisions in Drug Prosecutions Involving Mandatory Terms, from Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General, to the Director, Division of Criminal Justice and All County Prosecutors (Sept. 15, 1992) (hereinafter “Guidelines” or “1992 Guidelines”). Those Guidelines were subsequently amended by the Attorney General’s 1997 Supplemental Directive and then were again amended by the Uniformity Directive in 1998; however, the essential provisions of the Guidelines remain the same. See Attorney General’s Supplemental Directive For Prosecuting Cases Under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, from Peter Verniero, Attorney General, to All County Prosecutors (January 6, 1997) (hereinafter “Supplemental Directive”); Attorney General Directive To Enhance Uniformity in Sentencing Under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (January 15, 1998) (hereinafter “Uniformity Directive”), Although the Guidelines prescribe statewide minimum plea offers, they also direct each county prosecutors office to adopt its own written plea agreement policy, which may include standard plea offers that are more stringent than the statewide minimums provided by the Attorney General. Guidelines, supra, §§ 3-4.

Defendant asserts, therefore, that the Guidelines have resulted in variant plea-bargaining policies among the counties. According to defendant, the Guidelines fail to channel prosecutorial discretion adequately under Section 12 and instead result in unjustifiable intercounty disparity in sentencing. More specifically, he argues that his sentence of four years with the presumptive statutory requirement of three years parole ineligibility should have been vacated because if he had committed the same offense in some other counties he would have received a lesser sentence.

We must determine whether the Attorney General’s Plea-Bargaining Guidelines are adequate to satisfy the separation of *5 powers doctrine, as enunciated in Vasquez, supra, and to meet the statutory goals of uniformity in sentencing.

I.

On May 12, 1995, the Franklin Township Police, armed with a search warrant, conducted a search of the Brimage residence. According to defendant’s statements at the plea hearing, during the search defendant turned over to the police eighteen bags of cocaine totaling about six grams. The police arrested defendant and several other individuals who were present at the time. Defendant stated at the plea hearing that he had purchased the cocaine in New Brunswick and intended to resell it in Franklin Township. Defendant’s residence was within 1000 feet of Franklin Township High School.

In September 1995, defendant was indicted under the CDRA for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(3); possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:35-7; and possession of a controlled dangerous substance, contrary to NJ.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(l), all third degree offenses. Four other individuals, including at least two family members, were also charged in the last count.

According to the presentence report, defendant was twenty at the time of arrest and living in his grandparents’ home with his grandparents, mother, and siblings. Defendant had not previously been arrested for an indictable offense, but he had three prior juvenile adjudications, the last when he was fourteen years old.

The Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office offered, in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea, to recommend the presumptive sentence for a third degree crime — four years incarceration — plus the mandatory three-year period of parole ineligibility specified in N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 for the school zone offense. The prosecutor proffered the following reasons for not waiving the parole ineligibility term of N.J.S.A 2C:35-7: the proofs available to sustain a conviction of defendant were very strong, including defendant’s *6 taped confession that he intended to sell cocaine for profit; defendant did not offer to cooperate in any other drug-related investigations; and the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office had sufficient resources to litigate this matter, unlike various other counties that were plagued with a lack of resources or with case management problems.

Defendant moved for additional discovery from the State, requesting a copy of the applicable written guidelines governing plea offers for school zone offenses adopted by Somerset County. The State responded that the County, rather than promulgating its own guidelines, had adopted the Guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General. The State further asserted that that adoption satisfied the requirement that each county adopt a written plea agreement policy. In view of the State’s response, the trial court declared defendant’s application for discovery moot. Defendant then accepted' the prosecutor’s original plea agreement offer and pled guilty to all counts in the indictment, although he reserved the right to challenge the validity of the Guidelines and the applicability of the mandatory three-year parole disqualifier to his case. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea.

In March 1996, the court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion for waiver of the mandatory minimum sentence. Defendant argued that the standard plea offer required by the Attorney General’s Guidelines for a school zone offense was the minimum offer stated therein — probation conditioned on 864 days in county jail — and that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not making that offer to defendant. Defendant also maintained that the disparity in plea offers among the various counties based on the Guidelines was unjustifiable. The State, however, argued that the standard plea offer under the Guidelines included the statutory mandatory period of parole ineligibility and that statewide uniformity in such matters was not required. Finding that nonwaiver of the mandatory parole disqualifier was standard policy in Somerset County for school zone cases and that the Guidelines’ lesser plea offer was only applicable when the proseeu *7 tor in Ms discretion decided to waive that disqualifier, the court demed defendant’s motion.

In the same proceeding, the court held a sentencing hearing. Observing that defendant had been adjudicated a delinquent on three separate occasions, that he had previously been on probation, and that he was still committing crimes, the court found four aggravating factors against defendant: the risk of committing another offense, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(3); defendant’s prior criminal record as a juvenile, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(6); the need to deter defendant and other drug dealers, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(9); and imposition of a fine or penalty without a prison term would be seen as just another cost of doing business, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(11). The court found only one mitigating factor, the negative influence of older family members on defendant, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(b)(13). After merging counts one and three into count two, the court sentenced defendant to four years imprisonment with three years of parole ineligibility, in accordance with the prosecutors recommendation. The court also imposed the requisite fines and a six-month driver’s license suspension.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, wMch was heard by an excessive sentencing panel. In a brief, three-sentence order, the Panel affirmed defendants sentence, finding that on the record the sentence was not manifestly excessive, unduly pumtive, nor an abuse of discretion. The panel, however, declined to address the disparity issue witMn the confines of a single case. We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 149 N.J. 33, 692 A.2d 47 (1997).

II.

We begin our analysis by reviewing the applicable CDRA statutes, the background beMnd the creation of the Attorney General’s Guidelines (namely, the challenges to the statute on separation of powers grounds), the current status of the Guidelines and their resulting intereounty disparity, and finally, the statutory goals of uniformity in sentencing.

*8 A.

N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (“Section 7”) requires a mandatory minimum custodial sentence between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, but no less than three years for those convicted of dispensing or possessing with the intent to distribute drugs within a school zone, and no less than one year for those convicted of the same offense with less than one ounce of marijuana. Upon signing this legislation, Governor Thomas H. Kean emphasized the strong posture of the statute, stating: “This is a declaration of war and, in this war, we will take prisoners.” Office of the Governor, News Release (April 15, 1987). That firm stance comports with the Legislature’s intention, as stated in its Declaration of Policy and Legislative Findings for the CDRA, to “provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders.” N.J.S.A 2C:35-1.1(e); accord State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 8, 618 A.2d 294 (1993); Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 197, 609 A.2d 29. To foster that policy, the Legislature included in the CDRA mandatory periods of parole ineligibility for various crimes. See, e.g., N.J.S.A 2C:35-3 (providing twenty-five year parole bar for leaders of narcotics trafficking network); N.J.S.A 2C:35-6 (ordering minimum five-year parole bar for person convicted of employing juveniles in drug distribution scheme); N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 (including strict parole bar for school zone offenses).

Despite the nondiscretionary nature of N.J.S.A 2C:35-7, that section, like other mandatory parole bar provisions in the CDRA, contemplates exceptions to its rule as provided by N.J.S.A 2C:35-12 (“Section 12”). Section 12 allows a prosecutor to waive the period of parole ineligibility imposed under Section 7 as part of a plea or post-conviction agreement with a defendant. Because mandatory sentences usually do not permit judicial or prosecutorial discretion, the unique Section 7 and Section 12 sentencing scheme has been characterized as “a hybrid, combining mandatory and discretionary features and delegating sentencing authority to *9 both the courts and the prosecutors.” Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 199, 609 A.2d 29.

The primary purpose of the Section 12 waiver provision is to provide an incentive for defendants, especially lower and middle level drug offenders, to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the war against drugs. State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402, 408-09, 621 A.2d 1 (1993); Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 204, 609 A.2d 29; Assembly Judiciary Committee, Commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, at 26 (Nov. 23,1987) (explaining that “[o]ne of the key objectives of this section and the act is to provide persons engaged in illicit drug activities with strong incentives to cooperate with law enforcement to overcome the perceived and substantial risks associated with turning State’s evidence and exposing their superiors, suppliers and affiliates”). Another goal of N.J.S.A 2C:35-12, as enunciated in the Department of Law and Public Safety’s report on the CDRA, is to encourage plea bargaining so as not to plague the courts with too many defendants who, without any incentive to plead guilty, demand jury trials and thus overburden and backlog the system. Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice, A Law Enforcement Response to Certain Criticisms of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, at 22-23, 25-26 (Sept. 17,1990). That view of Section 12 is consistent with one of the Legislature’s stated goals in enacting the CDRA, namely, the minimization of pretrial delay and the prompt disposition of criminal charges. N.J.S.A 2C:35-1.1.

To achieve the Legislature’s specific goal of encouraging cooperation and turning State’s evidence and to prevent sentencing courts from undermining the effectiveness of prosecutors’ strategies, N.J.S.A 2C:35-12 requires the sentencing court to enforce all agreements reached by the prosecutor and a defendant under that section and prohibits the court from imposing a lesser term of imprisonment than that specified in the agreement. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12; Bridges, supra, 131 N.J. at 410, 621 A.2d 1; State v. Stewart, 136 N.J. 174, 182, 642 A.2d 942 (1994). That shift in *10 sentencing power from the judiciary to the prosecutor is uncommon. As stated by the Court in Vasquez, supra:

The delegation of sentencing power to the prosecutor is itself exceptional. The delegation of sentencing power to modify statutory sentencing standards is highly unusual. The power in the prosecutor directly or indirectly to mandate a minimum prison term is extraordinary.

[129 N.J. at 204, 609 A.2d 29 (citations omitted).]

B.

As a result of the atypical grant of sentencing power to the prosecutor in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, that statute has been the subject of various constitutional challenges on separation of powers grounds. See, e.g., State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216, 231-32, 678 A.2d 634 (1996); Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J at 195-96, 609 A.2d 29; State v. Peters, 129 N.J 210, 218, 609 A.2d 40 (1992).

We first considered the interaction of Section 7 and Section 12 in the companion cases of Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. 189, 609 A.2d 29, and Peters, supra, 129 N.J. 210, 609 A.2d 40. In Vasquez, supra, although ultimately ruling on the applicability of the mandatory parole ineligibility term to resentencing, this Court addressed for the first time the constitutional validity of Section 12. 129 N.J. at 192, 195, 609 A.2d 29. In that case, we upheld the transfer of sentencing authority under Section 12, but stated that judicial oversight was “mandated to protect against arbitrary and capricious prosecutorial decisions.” Id. at 196, 609 A.2d 29. To enable judicial review, we required prosecutors to state on the record their reasons for waiving or not waiving the parole disqualifier in any given case and to promulgate written guidelines governing their exercise of discretion. Id. at 195-96, 609 A.2d 29. The Court held that, if those conditions were met, the statute would withstand scrutiny under the separation of powers doctrine, and only those defendants who showed “clearly and convincingly that the exercise of discretion was arbitrary and capricious would be entitled to relief.” Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 196, 609 A.2d 29. We maintained those same requirements in Peters, supra, 129 N.J. at 218, 609 A.2d 40.

*11 In reaching our decision in Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 195, 609 A.2d 29, we relied on our previous decision in State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992). Lagares, supra, involved the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s power to invoke the extended sentence requirement under N.J.S.A 2C:43-6(f). 127 N.J. at 23, 601 A.2d 698. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) requires a court to impose an extended term with a period of parole ineligibility for repeat drug offenders, the provision only takes effect upon the application of the prosecutor. Ibid. Furthermore, once the prosecutor decides to apply for an extended sentence, the sentencing judge has no discretion to reject the application. Id. at 31, 601 A.2d 698. According to the Court, the “infirmity in Section 6f is the prosecutor’s sole discretion to select, without standards and without being subject to the court’s review, which defendants will receive an increased sentence or enjoy favorable treatment.” Id. at 28, 601 A.2d 698. Therefore, to pass constitutional scrutiny, the Court required that prosecutorial decisions under Section 6f be subject to judicial review for arbitrariness, that prosecutors state on the record their reasons for seeking an extended sentence, and that “guidelines be adopted to assist prosecutorial decision-making.” Id. at 28-32, 601 A.2d 698; Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 195, 609 A.2d 29.

Lagares based that decision, in turn, on previous decisions of this Court in State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989), State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) (Leonardis II), State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976) (Leonardis I), and Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). 127 N.J. at 28-31, 601 A.2d 698. We held in Leonardis I, supra, that prosecutorial discretion in dismissing charges against certain defendants and admitting them into pretrial intervention (PTI) programs must be subject to uniform written guidelines and judicial review of the prosecutor’s written statement of reasons. 71 N.J. at 119, 121, 363 A.2d 321; Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 28-29, 601 A.2d 698. Similarly, we held in Monks, supra, that the parole board had to provide a statement of reasons to inmates who had been denied parole in order to meet *12 the needs of simple fairness. 58 N.J. at 246, 277 A.2d 193; Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 29-30, 601 A.2d 698. This Court stated in Leonardis II, supra, that although deference should be given to prosecutor’s determinations, “the prosecutor is not immune from the ban against arbitrariness in governmental decision-making.” 73 N.J. at 377, 381, 375 A.2d 607; Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 29, 601 A.2d 698. Furthermore, in Warren, supra, we prohibited the use of “negotiated sentence” plea agreements because of the importance of judicial responsibility in sentencing. 115 N.J. at 449, 558 A.2d 1312; Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 30, 601 A.2d 698.

Underlying the Court’s decisions in the guidelines cases was also a concern for uniformity in sentencing. The Leonardis I Court identified the disparity allowed between counties as one of two major deficiencies of Rule 3:28, the rule governing PTI, and suggested that that disparity had constitutional implications. Leonardis I, supra, 71 N.J. at 120-21, 363 A.2d 321. The Lagares Court emphasized the statutory basis for the goal of uniformity in sentencing, finding it to be the overarching purpose of the Code of Criminal Justice. 127 N.J. at 31, 601 A.2d 698. The Court concluded: “Without standards the prosecutorial decision-making process remains unguided, and the danger of uneven application of enhanced sentences increases significantly. Such results upset the principal goal of the Code of Criminal Justice to insure sentencing uniformity.” Ibid, (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365, 471 A.2d 370 (1984)). In Warren, supra, we stressed that prosecutorial influence on the judicial role could impede the goals of sentencing uniformity. 115 N.J. at 449, 558 A.2d 1312. We stated that “[individual prosecutors with distinctive perceptions of the gravity of particular offenses and offenders, and responsive to a very different constituency from that of the judiciary, would add undue variability, inevitable inconsistency, and greater disparity to the sentencing process.” Ibid. Finally, in Vasquez, supra, we affirmed the importance of uniformity in the plea agreement process. 129 N.J. at 196, 609 A.2d 29. We stated that the promulgation of standards would “prevent the legislative goal of *13 uniformity in sentencing from being undermined by unreviewable prosecutorial discretion.” Ibid.

In summary, the Vasquez/Lagares line of cases held that judicial review of prosecutorial decisions through uniform written guidelines was necessary not only to meet the requirements of the separation of powers doctrine, but also to comport with the statutory goal of increasing uniformity in sentencing.

C.

The Guidelines

In response to this Courts ruling in Vasquez, supra, on September 15, 1992 the Attorney General promulgated plea agreement guidelines for charges brought under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act. 1 Those original 1992 Guidelines governed at the time of defendant’s plea.

Recognizing the various goals of the Legislature in enacting the CDRA as well as the intentions of the Court in Vasquez, supra, the Introduction to the 1992 Guidelines states:

In order to satisfy the principal goal of the Legislature to ensure a uniform, consistent and predictable sentence for a given offense, these decisions require that the prosecutorial decision-making process must be guided by uniform standards that channel the exercise of discretion and reduce the danger of uneven application. The formulation of uniform standards is required by Directive 9.1 of the Attorney General’s Statewide Action Plan for Narcotics Enforcement (1988), which called for development of statewide guidelines governing prosecutorial charging discretion and plea negotiations.

[Guidelines, supra, § I (citations omitted) (emphasis added).]

The Introduction also emphasizes that the purpose of Section 12 is to provide incentives to defendants to cooperate with the State *14 and recognizes that “swiftness” of punishment is also an important goal. Ibid.

The Guidelines continue by asserting that the “specified mandatory term of imprisonment and minimum term of parole ineligibility” should be treated as norms and that prosecutors “should exercise caution and reluctance in deciding whether to waive the minimum sentence or parole ineligibility.” Id. § II.l. More specifically, in Section II.3 of those Guidelines, the Attorney General requires that all plea agreements for a CDRA offense impose on defendants a mandatory minimum term of incarceration, except where the agreement is or was necessary to obtain cooperation of “substantial value” to the State. Id. § II.3. That term must be a state prison term, except in the case of a school zone offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Ibid. The 1992 version of the Guidelines provides that the “minimum term of imprisonment for a school zone offense shall include the imposition of 364 days incarceration in a county jail as a condition of probation,” unless the violation involves distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute less than one ounce of marijuana in a school zone, in which case the prison term may be waived entirely. Ibid. The 1992 Guidelines are also specific in their mandate of a three-year term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole for defendants who distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, a controlled dangerous substance while actually on school property, or one year in a case involving less than one ounce of marijuana, unless there are compelling reasons to justify a lesser term. Id. § II.6. In Section II.9, the Guidelines specify various requirements for cooperation agreements. Id. § II.7, 9. Finally, in Section II.5, the Guidelines outline criteria for deciding whether to approve or disapprove a plea agreement that incorporates an upward or downward departure from any plea agreement policy. Id. § II.5.

Despite those specific provisions in the Guidelines, Section II.4 directs each county prosecutor’s office to adopt and implement its own written policy governing plea and post-conviction agreements, *15 using the Guidelines as a model, and suggests that the counties may also promulgate their own “standardized plea offers for typical cases and offenders.” Id. § II.4. The Guidelines state that the counties, in formulating those plea offers, may consider certain factors such as the nature and extent of the drug distribution and use problem, the number and type of drug arrests in the jurisdiction, and the backlog of drug and non-drug cases in the courts. Ibid. They should also consider the seriousness of the offense, the role of the actor in the crime, the amount of time that has passed since the offense was committed, whether the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense, and the amount of resources already expended on the particular case. Ibid. Finally, Section II.4 specifically states that “[njothing contained in these guidelines shall preclude a prosecutor from adopting more stringent policies or standardized plea offers consistent with the needs, resources and enforcement priorities of each county.” Ibid. Thus, by its very language, Section II.4 of the Guidelines permits different counties to adopt disparate and varying plea offer policies. Not only does consideration of the numerous factors listed in Section II.4 assure different results in localities with differing conditions, but the Guidelines themselves direct each county to adopt their own individual standards and procedures.

Although the Introduction to the Guidelines recognizes the need to “guard against sentencing disparity,” the Guidelines actually generated such disparity. Id. § I. The intercounty disparity created by the Guidelines is evidenced in the actual policies that have been adopted throughout the jurisdictions. The affidavit of Robert A. Gaynor, an Assistant Deputy Public Defender in Somerset County, estimated, as of March 1996, the plea offers that a person in defendant’s situation would have received in different counties, based on each county’s plea policies as they existed at that time. Although the standard plea offer in Gloucester and Hudson Counties would have been probation with 364 days in jail, the pre-indictment offer in Mercer and Salem Counties was one year without parole. Meanwhile, the plea in Camden and Cumberland Counties would have been three years flat and three to *16 five years flat, respectively. Even the counties that purported, at that time, to have adopted the Attorney General’s Guidelines without modification differed in their potential offers. Ocean and Bergen Counties provided in 1996 for probation conditioned on 364 days in jail; Sussex in 1996 required three years imprisonment, one without parole; and Somerset, the county in this case, provided four years, three without parole.

The Supplemental Directive

Subsequent to Brimage’s plea, the Attorney General issued additional guidelines in its 1997 Supplemental Directive; however, the Supplemental Directive fails to limit the discretion authorized by Section II.4 and thus maintains the resulting intercounty disparity. The Supplemental Directive was developed in response to Governor Christine Todd Whitman’s Drug Enforcement, Education and Awareness Program, which required the Attorney General to issue new, revised guidelines concerning prosecutorial charging, case disposition, and plea bargaining policies to ensure that the CDRA is aggressively and uniformly enforced in court. Governor’s Drug Enforcement, Education and Awareness Program, at iv (Oct. 8,1996). The Supplemental Directive mandates, among other requirements, that each county reduce its plea policies to writing and review the policies at least once a year; that downward departures shall not be permitted except as provided in the Attorney General’s Guidelines; that both downward and upward departures and all cooperation agreements shall be memorialized in writing; that the prosecutor shall seek imposition of the appropriate Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction penalties and driver’s license suspensions pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:35-15 to -16; and that offenders may be sentenced to treatment in lieu of imprisonment only if they meet a long list of explicit conditions. Supplemental Directive, supra, § III.1-4, 6(a) — (b), 9(a). However, the Supplemental Directive declares that the previous Guidelines, except as expressly provided, are “hereby reaffirmed,” and “shall remain in full force and effect.” Id. § II. Thus, while the Directive states that the Guidelines are “intended *17 and shall hereinafter be interpreted to establish drug prosecution .policies that must be followed by every county prosecutor’s office,” the Directive nevertheless permits each county to adopt its own standards pursuant to Section II.4. Id. § II.

Just as occurred under the 1992 Guidelines, the discretion allowed by the Supplemental Directive also led to actual disparity in the plea offer policies adopted by various counties. As of May 1997, for school zone cases where the offense did not oecurr on school property, some counties provided a list of standard plea offers based on the nature of defendants criminal history and the amount or nature of drugs involved in the crime (Mercer and Middlesex Counties); another established two standard plea offers, one for all cases involving less than one ounce of marijuana and one for all other cases (Morris County); and still others adopted policies reiterating the language in Section II.3 of the Attorney General’s 1992 Guidelines, which states that the minimum term of imprisonment shall be probation conditioned on 364 days in county jail (Ocean and Atlantic Counties).

The Uniformity Directive

On January 15, 1998, the Attorney General issued its most recent amendments to the plea agreement Guidelines. Those amendments resulted from this Court’s mandate in State v. Gerns,