864 N.E.2d 227 (2007) 224 Ill.2d 274

Marguerite FORSYTHE et al., Appellees,
v.
CLARK USA, INC., Appellant.

No. 101570.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 16, 2007.

*230 John C. Berghoff, Jr., Michele Odorizzi, of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, LLP, Chicago, for appellant.

Philip H. Corboy, Edward G. Willer, of Corboy & Demetrio, P.C., William R. Quinlan, James Niewiara, of Quinlan and Carrol, Martin J. Healy, Jr., David P. Huber, Chicago, for appellees.

Francis K. Tennant, of Wolf & Tennant, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

On March 13, 1995, Michael F. Forsythe and Gary Szabla, mechanics at a refinery owned and operated by Clark Refining and Marketing (Clark Refining), were killed. The estate of each decedent received payment from Clark Refining pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)). In 1996 and 1997, plaintiffs Marguerite Forsythe and Elizabeth Szabla, as special administrators of the estates of their late husbands, filed suits against Clark Refining and other defendants. Subsequently, plaintiffs added Clark Refining's parent company, Clark USA, as a defendant.

Clark USA is the only defendant involved in this appeal. At the close of discovery, the trial court granted Clark USA's motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002)). The trial court did not state its reasoning. Plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded. 361 Ill.App.3d 642, 297 Ill.Dec. 119, 836 N.E.2d 850. Following that decision, defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315).

We granted defendant's petition to consider two issues: first, whether a parent company can be held liable under a theory of direct participant liability for controlling its subsidiary's budget in a way that led to a workplace accident; second, if such a theory is recognized, whether the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' *231 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5 (West 2002)) immunizes a parent company from liability.

BACKGROUND

Clark Refining operated an oil refinery in Blue Island, Illinois. Defendant is Clark Refining's parent company and sole shareholder. On March 13, 1995, decedents were on their lunch break when a fire broke out at the refinery, killing them both. The fire was apparently caused when other Clark Refining employees attempted to replace a valve on a pipe without ensuring that flammable materials within the pipe had been depressurized. Plaintiffs claim that those employees were not maintenance mechanics and were not trained or qualified to perform the work they were attempting.

Plaintiffs' allegations of liability center around defendant's overall budgetary strategy. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendant breached a duty to use reasonable care in imposing its business strategy on Clark Refining by (1) "requiring [Clark Refining] to minimize operating costs including costs for training, maintenance, supervision and safety," (2) "requiring [Clark Refining] to limit capital investments to those which would generate cash for the refinery thereby preventing [Clark Refining] from adequately reinforcing the walls of the lunchroom or relocating the lunchroom to a safe position within the refinery," and (3) "failing to adequately evaluate the safety and training procedures in place at the Blue Island Refinery." Moreover, plaintiffs allege that defendant's strategy of capital cutbacks forced Clark Refining to have unqualified employees act as maintenance mechanics which, in turn, led to the fire that killed the decedents. This, plaintiffs argue, constitutes proximate cause.

In support of its motion for summary, judgment, defendant contended that it owed no duty to either decedent by virtue of its status as a mere holding company, which was connected to Clark Refining only as a shareholder. Defendant submitted evidence to prove that Clark Refining owned and operated the refinery while defendant itself had no control over the day-to-day operations. Plaintiffs countered that defendant was directly responsible for creating conditions that precipitated the accident.

In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited evidence that defendant's directors created and approved Clark Refining's budget, striving to "position itself as a low cost refiner and marketer" with the goal of replenishing defendant's cash reserve by "decreas[ing] capital spending * * * to minimum sustainable levels" through the institution of a "survival mode" business plan. Plaintiffs also produced evidence that the boards of directors of Clark Refining and defendant met simultaneously. Moreover, plaintiffs relied upon evidence that the belt-tightening budget created by Clark Refining was overseen by Paul Melnuk, who served as defendant's president as well as chief executive officer of Clark Refining.

The trial court granted summary judgment without explanation. Subsequently, plaintiffs appealed and the appellate court reversed and remanded, rejecting a claim by defendant that it was entitled to immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act. The appellate court held that "plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise an issue of material fact as to whether defendant directly participated in creating conditions within the refinery which led to the deadly fire." 361 Ill.App.3d at 655, 297 Ill.Dec. 119, 836 N.E.2d 850. One justice dissented, finding that plaintiffs presented no evidence of separate acts, attributable *232 solely to defendant, by which defendant directly caused the injuries in this case. 361 Ill.App.3d at 658, 297 Ill.Dec. 119, 836 N.E.2d 850 (McNulty, J., dissenting).

ANALYSIS

Section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but simply to determine if one exists. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 335, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). In reviewing a summary judgment disposition, this court will construe the record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill.2d 418, 423-24, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460 (1998). Moreover, it must be noted that summary judgment dispositions "should not be allowed unless the moving party's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt." Jackson, 185 Ill.2d at 424, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460. If the undisputed material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent inferences, or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact. Jackson, 185 Ill.2d at 424, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460. This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Roth v. Opiela, 211 Ill.2d 536, 542, 286 Ill.Dec. 57, 813 N.E.2d 114 (2004).

I. Direct Participant Liability

To state a cause of action for negligence, plaintiffs must show that defendant owed and breached a duty of care, proximately causing the plaintiffs injury. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 114, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). The threshold issue in this case is the existence of a duty, which is a question of law for the court to decide. Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill.2d 331, 340, 278 Ill.Dec. 340, 798 N.E.2d 724 (2003). As we have recently stated, the "touchstone of this court's duty analysis is to ask whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff." Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 436, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006), citing Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill.2d 179, 186, 262 Ill.Dec. 815, 766 N.E.2d 1118 (2002). Four factors inform this inquiry: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of injury, (2) the likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing the burden upon the defendant. Marshall, 222 Ill.2d at 436-37, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048.

Before undertaking our analysis, we note, as did the parties and the appellate court, that the theory of direct participant liability presented here has not previously been addressed in Illinois. It has been addressed in other states and throughout the federal courts, however. We will consider this authority where appropriate in our analysis.

Plaintiffs argue that defendant demanded Clark Refining operate its refinery pursuant to an overall business strategy that it knew would adversely affect safety by forcing reductions in training and maintenance. Indeed, plaintiffs contend that defendant actively and directly mandated unreasonable cuts in Clark Refining's budget in order to carry out its strategy. This *233 strategy was outlined in Clark USA business records calling for a "survival mode" business philosophy accomplished through "reduced capital spending," "reduced working capital investment," and "reduced operating expense level." Plaintiffs allege that this "survival mode" strategy was mandated, despite the fact that defendant knew or should have known that the only feasible budget cuts would come from safety, maintenance, and training expenses. This, plaintiffs' conclude, constitutes direct participation by defendant in the harm caused. As such, plaintiffs contend the appellate court correctly found that defendant owed them a duty based on the direct participant theory and not on the legal relationship of defendant to its subsidiary.

Defendant contends that unless the standards for piercing the corporate veil are met, a parent company cannot be held liable for the negligence of its subsidiary. Attendant to that rule is the principle that a parent company does not owe a duty to third parties to supervise or control the conduct of its subsidiary to ensure that the subsidiary acts with reasonable care. Clark Refining owed a nondelegable duty to its employees to provide them with a safe workplace while defendant, as a parent, owed no duty whatsoever to ensure that Clark Refining met its obligations.

Additionally, even if direct liability is a recognized theory of recovery, defendant argues that the simple task of setting financial goals and employing an overall strategy to meet those goals is not improper but, instead, is "consistent with the parent's investor status" and thus "should not give rise to direct liability." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1889, 141 L.Ed.2d 43, 62 (1998). Because its conduct was always consistent with its investor status, defendant claims, there is no basis to treat it as a direct participant in the negligence alleged herein.

While the Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is a general principle * * * deeply `ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation * * * is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries" (Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61, 118 S.Ct. at 1884, 141 L.Ed.2d at 55-56, quoting W.O. Douglas & C. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193 (1929)), a significant body of case law supports the direct participant theory of liability urged by the plaintiffs. Some of that authority relies on the 1929 article quoted above and written, in relevant part, by then-Professor William O. Douglas.

Douglas noted that liability has been imposed in "instances where the parent is directly a participant in the wrong complained of." 39 Yale L.J. at 208. In such instances, "the use of the latent power incident to stock ownership to accomplish a specific result made the parent a participator in or doer of the act," specifically evident where "there was interference in the internal management of the subsidiary; an overriding of the discretion of the managers of the subsidiary." 39 Yale L.J. at 209. Douglas stated further that "direct intervention or intermeddling by the parent in the affairs of the subsidiary and more particularly in the transaction involved, to the disregard of the normal and orderly procedure of corporate control carried out through the election of the desired directors and officers of the subsidiary and the handling by them of the direction of its affairs, seems to have been determinative in some cases to holding the parent liable." 39 Yale L.J. at 218.

The United States Supreme Court quoted the Douglas & Shanks article approvingly in Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64-65, 118 S.Ct. at 1886, 141 L.Ed.2d at 58 ("As Justice *234 (then-Professor) Douglas noted almost 70 years ago, derivative liability cases are to be distinguished from those in which `the alleged wrong can seemingly be traced to the parent through the conduit of its own personnel and management' and `the parent is directly a participant in the wrong complained of.' [Citation.] In such instances, the parent is directly liable for its own actions"). The Court noted that the simple fact that directors of a parent corporation serve as directors of its subsidiary does not, standing alone, expose the parent corporation to liability for its subsidiary's acts. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69-70, 118 S.Ct. at 1888, 141 L.Ed.2d at 60-61. The Court went on to state, however, that "the acts of direct operation that give rise to parental liability must necessarily be distinguished from the interference that stems from the normal relationship between parent and subsidiary," and "[t]he critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility." Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 71-72, 118 S.Ct. at 1889, 141 L.Ed.2d at 62.

Similarly, in Esmark, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.1989), the Seventh Circuit, in a case dealing with a potential violation of the National Labor Relations Act, cited Douglas & Shanks' article extensively and noted that Judge Learned Hand also recognized that a parent corporation could be held liable for the actions of its subsidiaries if the parent directly supervised the conduct of a specific transaction. In Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.1929), Judge Hand wrote that such liability "normally must depend upon the parent's direct intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and officers." Relying on that authority, the Seventh Circuit held that "a parent corporation may be held liable for the wrongdoing of a subsidiary where the parent directly participated in the subsidiary's unlawful actions." Esmark, 887 F.2d at 756.

Moreover, the court held that "[w]here the parent specifically directs the actions of its subsidiary, using its ownership interest to command rather than merely cajole," the possibility of direct liability is present and will be imposed "where a parent disregards the separate legal personality of its subsidiary (and the subsidiary's own decisionmaking `paraphernalia'), and exercises direct control over a specific transaction." Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757. The court described this as a "transaction-specific" theory of direct participation, citing numerous cases where parent companies have been held liable for misconduct by their subsidiaries. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 756 (collecting cases); see, e.g., L.B. Industries, Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam); United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1060 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1986) ("A shareholder may be liable if he is a `central figure' in a corporation's tortious conduct"); Cher v. Forum International, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir.1982); D.L. Auld Co. v. Park Electrochemical Corp., 553 F.Supp. 804, 808 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (denying summary judgment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff presented a claim that the defendant participated in the patent infringement perpetrated by its subsidiary); International Union, United Auto Workers v. Cardwell Manufacturing Co., 416 F.Supp. 1267, 1283-84, 1287-89 (D.Kan. 1976) (court found a parent liable for breach of bargaining agreement by subsidiary where parent specifically directed the subsidiary to disregard obligations under the NLRA); State v. Ole Olsen, Ltd., 35 *235 N.Y.2d 979, 980, 365 N.Y.S.2d 528, 528-29, 324 N.E.2d 886, 886 (1975) (holding a corporate officer liable not on account of his being an officer of the corporate defendant but as an active individual participant in the wrongdoing); Cooper v. Cordova Sand & Gravel Co., 485 S.W.2d 261, 271-72 (Tenn.App.1971); My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 619, 233 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1968) (holding that while common ownership and management will not ordinarily give rise to liability, liability may be imposed where there is active and direct participation by one corporation in the affairs of another or where there is "confused intermingling" of the activities of the two corporations); Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. Hansen, 174 Wash. 193, 198, 24 P.2d 604, 606 (1933). Under this "transaction-specific" theory, shareholders or parent corporations are not held directly liable for their own independently wrongful acts but, instead, for their actions against third-party interests through the agency of subsidiaries. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 756. Accordingly, the court held that a parent corporation can be liable for interposing a guiding hand in the transactions of its subsidiary. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 756.

Plaintiffs also cite other cases approving of direct liability. In Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir.1999), the Seventh Circuit, again interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, evinced its continuing support for direct participant liability when it cited Esmark, Bestfoods, and Kingston Dry Dock to state "that limited liability does not protect a parent corporation when the parent is sought to be held liable for its own act, rather than merely as the owner of the subsidiary that acted." Similarly, in Pearson v. Component Technology Corp., the Third Circuit, interpreting federal law, stated that "[a]lthough not often employed * * * it has long been acknowledged that parents may be `directly' liable for their subsidiaries' actions when the `alleged wrong can seemingly be traced to the parent through the conduit of its own personnel and management,' and the parent has interfered with the subsidiary's operations in a way that surpasses the control exercised by a parent as an incident of ownership." Pearson, 247 F.3d 471, 486-87 (3d Cir.2001), citing Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64, 118 S.Ct. at 1886, 141 L.Ed.2d at 58, quoting 39 Yale L.J. at 207. Likewise, in Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 663 (6th Cir.1979), the Sixth Circuit, interpreting Kentucky law, implicitly indicated its recognition of direct liability when it stated that "a parent is not immune from tort liability to its subsidiary employees for its own, independent acts of negligence."

The Indiana Supreme Court, in Commissioner of Department of Environmental Management v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 559, 563 (Ind.2001), also accepted direct participant liability when it held a defendant's sole officer and shareholder liable for violations of Indiana environmental laws and stated that "an individual, though acting in a corporate capacity * * * may be individually liable * * * as a direct participant under general legal principles." Additionally, the Iowa Supreme Court accepted a direct participant theory of liability when it held that a member of a limited liability corporation could be sued because it had undertaken to perform management services for the corporation and allegedly performed those services negligently. Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Cooperative Ass'n, 679 N.W.2d 598, 605 (Iowa 2004). Other courts have also accepted the theory of direct participant liability. See, e.g., United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 n. 9 (8th Cir.1995) (interpreting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the court *236 held that "a parent corporation may be directly liable for activities carried out ostensibly by its subsidiary if the parent corporation, in effect, actually operated the subsidiary's facility by having the authority to control and actually or substantially controlling the facility"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir.1990) (parent corporation can be held directly liable if actively involved in the affairs of its subsidiary); Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 345, 347, 354 (M.D.N.C.1995) (direct participant liability could be maintained against a parent company for breach of warranty). Taken together, these cases make evident the substantial weight of authority supporting recognition of this theory of liability.

In opposition to plaintiffs' theory, defendant contends that a parent corporation owes no duty to supervise its subsidiary's conduct for the benefit of third parties. Defendant cites Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill.2d 433, 452, 290 Ill.Dec. 504, 821 N.E.2d 1078 (2004), where this court noted its recognition of the general rule that "one has no duty to control the conduct of another to prevent him from causing harm to a third party, absent a special relationship with either the person causing the harm or the injured party." Building on that point, defendant argues that courts have uniformly rejected the argument that the parent-subsidiary relationship qualifies as the kind of "special relationship" necessary to give rise to a duty to supervise or control the conduct of the subsidiary. In re Birmingham Asbestos Litigation, 619 So.2d 1360 (Ala.1993). Supporting this contention, defendant cites Joiner v. Ryder System Inc., 966 F.Supp. 1478 (C.D.Ill.1996), where the district court applied Illinois law and concluded that a duty could not be predicated either on the parent's ability to control its subsidiary or on its actual exercise of control:

"RSI — as every parent corporation does — obviously has the power to control its subsidiaries. In fact, RSI owns them and RSI can `force' them to do anything it wants. That power, by itself, however, does not impose a duty upon RSI. Only if RSI abused the power — by exerting too much control — could it be held liable for the conduct of its subsidiaries as an alter ego." Joiner, 966 F.Supp. at 1490.

Additionally, defendant contends that direct participant claims virtually identical to those raised here were rejected by two state appellate decisions, one from Texas and one from California. In Coastal Corp. v. Torres, 133 S.W.3d 776 (Tex.App.2004), refinery employees injured in an explosion brought a negligence action against the refinery's parent company. The employees alleged that "`through central budgetary authority exercised by Coastal's corporate officers * * * Coastal * * * assumed control over maintenance, turnaround, and inspection matters at the plant,'" limited expenditures, and "controlled and influenced its subsidiary in a way that directly resulted in appellees' injuries." Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 777, 779. The Coastal Corp. court noted that the plaintiffs in that case alleged "negligent control of the budget, not negligent control over details of specific operational activities," and eventually found that the parent company had no duty as a matter of Texas law to "approve budgets for its subsidiaries in order to assure that the subsidiaries repair defects on their premises." Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 779, 782.

Similarly, in Waste Management Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego, 119 Cal. App.4th 105, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 69 Cal. Comp. Cas. 759 (2004), plaintiffs brought an action against a parent company for negligently controlling its subsidiary's budget *237 such that the subsidiary was prevented from replacing and repairing trash trucks. The court recognized direct participant liability and stated that "the parent may owe a duty arising out of obligations independent of the parent subsidiary relationship." Waste Management, 119 Cal.App.4th 105, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 69 Cal. Comp. Cas. at 762. The court went on to hold, however, that "[n]egligently controlling or intentionally mismanaging a subsidiary's budget does not create a duty on the part of the parent corporation to ensure safety or prevent injuries to the subsidiary's employees." Waste Management, 119 Cal. App.4th 105, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 69 Cal. Comp. Cas. at 763.

As defendant points out, Coastal Corp. and Waste Management stand for the proposition that mere budgetary mismanagement is not enough to support direct participant liability. Additionally, however, the Coastal Corp. court noted that "it is apparent that liability is imposed when there is specific control over the activity that caused the accident." Coastal Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 779. Similarly, the Waste Management court stated that the plaintiffs' case failed because they could not show that the parent company "directed and authorized the manner in which the subsidiary conducted its business." (Emphasis in original). Waste Management, 119 Cal.App.4th 105, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 69 Cal. Comp. Cas. at 763. In other words, these courts found that a viable claim of liability under the direct participant theory cannot rest solely upon budgetary mismanagement, but budgetary mismanagement can make up one part of a viable claim, in conjunction with the direction or authorization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken. The Joiner decision echoes this sentiment. There, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the parent/defendant, noting significantly that the parent/defendant did "not get involved in the day-to-day activities or management of the subsidiaries." Joiner, 966 F.Supp. at 1490. Based upon this analysis, we conclude that budgetary mismanagement, accompanied by the parent's negligent direction or authorization of the manner in which the subsidiary accomplishes that budget, can lead to a valid cause of action under the direct participant theory of liability.

Considering the above, we hold that direct participant liability is a valid theory of recovery under Illinois law. Where there is evidence sufficient to prove that a parent company mandated an overall business and budgetary strategy and carried that strategy out by its own specific direction or authorization, surpassing the control exercised as a normal incident of ownership in disregard for the interests of the subsidiary, that parent company could face liability. The key elements to the application of direct participant liability, then, are a parent's specific direction or authorization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken and foreseeability. If a parent company specifically directs an activity, where injury is foreseeable, that parent could be held liable. Similarly, if a parent company mandates an overall course of action and then authorizes the manner in which specific activities contributing to that course of action are undertaken, it can be liable for foreseeable injuries. We again stress, though, that allegations of mere budgetary mismanagement alone do not give rise to the application of direct participant liability.

Our finding is supported by the policy-based factors courts use to determine whether a duty exists. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d at 436-37, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (the factors are (1) the rea