566 N.E.2d 1283 (1990) 142 Ill.2d 54 153 Ill.Dec. 177

Arthur FUMAROLO et al., Appellants,
v.
The CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

No. 69558.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 30, 1990. Rehearing Denied February 4, 1991.

*1285 Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago (Louis P. Vitullo, Roderick A. Palmore and Jane Z. Bohrer, of counsel), and Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P.C., Chicago (Ronald S. Cope, David Lincoln Ader and John F. Donahue, of counsel), for appellants.

Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago (C. Richard Johnson, Joseph R. Lundy, Gabriel M. Rodriguez, Mary K. Walter, Kevin D. Evans and Frith C. Crandall, of counsel), and Patricia J. Whitten, Iris E. Sholder, William J. Quinlan and John L. Wren, Chicago, for appellee Chicago Bd. of Educ, et al.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., and Jennifer A. Keller and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Comptroller of the State of Illinois, et al.

Kelly R. Welsh, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Ruth M. Moscovitch and L. Anita Richardson, of counsel), for intervenor-appellee Mayor of the City of Chicago.

*1286 David F. Graham, Geraldine M. Alexis, Jonathan K. Baum and James A. Huttenhower, of Sidley & Austin, Chicago, for intervenor-appellee South Side Schoolwatch, et al.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, individuals serving as principals, an individual serving as a subdistrict superintendent in the Chicago public school system and individuals who are registered voters and property owners-taxpayers in the City of Chicago, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, challenging the constitutionality of the Chicago School Reform Act (the Act) (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-1.01 et seq.). The complaint named as defendants the board of education of the City of Chicago, the board's general superintendent, the Chicago School Finance Authority, and the Attorney General, the Comptroller and the Treasurer of the State of Illinois. Richard M. Daley, the mayor of the City of Chicago, and South Side Schoolwatch, a citizens group interested in school reform, were given leave to intervene as defendants. The plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion to voluntarily dismiss their complaint under section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure and from an order subsequently entered by the trial court granting summary judgment for the defendants. We granted the plaintiff's motion for a direct appeal to this court under our Rule 302(b) (107 Ill.2d R. 302(b)).

The record shows that, as in most large cities, Chicago has serious problems in its public school system. The Chicago School Reform Act was enacted in 1988 in an attempt to resolve certain of the problems. The Act makes significant changes in school governance and administration by decentralizing the school system and by imposing primary responsibility for local school governance on parents, community residents, teachers and school principals. The plaintiff's do not dispute the need for change in the Chicago public school system, but they challenge the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that sections of the statute violate the Federal and State constitutional assurances of equal protection and due process. The plaintiff's, who are registered voters and taxpayers in the City of Chicago, allege that the Act's voting scheme for electing members of the local school councils violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions because it denies an equal vote in local school council elections to large portions of the electorate. The other plaintiff's, the principals and subdistrict superintendent, contend that by eliminating tenure for principals and subdistrict superintendents and substituting therefor four-year contracts, which may or may not be renewed, the legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract rights vested in them. Under preceding statutory law and policy of the Chicago board of education, principals and subdistrict superintendents had "permanent" tenure. They also contend that this new condition of employment deprives them of property without due process of law.

THE REFORM ACT

A brief overview of the contested portions of the Act will be necessary. We begin by observing that the parties do not cite any comparable statute and we are not aware of any legislation similarly structuring a public school system. It is also appropriate for us to state that the wisdom or unwisdom of legislative action in determining the means to be adopted to resolve an existing social problem is not for the judiciary to decide. Legislation will be upheld unless it is in violation of some constitutional limitation. Stewart v. Brady (1921), 300 Ill. 425, 435, 133 N.E. 310; see also People v. Valdez (1980), 79 Ill.2d 74, 83-84, 37 Ill.Dec. 297, 402 N.E.2d 187; People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill.2d 209, 215, 347 N.E.2d 146.

Local School Councils

Although the board of education retains many general administrative powers and responsibilities, its powers and responsibilities under the Act have been substantially altered. To place increased authority for individual school decisions at the individual *1287 school level, the Act provides for the creation of a local school council for each grammar school and each high school in the Chicago public school system (there are 539 schools in the Chicago public school system). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-2.1.) The local school council is composed of the school principal and 10 elected members. The elected members are: six parents of currently enrolled students who are elected by parents of currently enrolled students, two residents of the attendance area served by the school who are elected by the residents of that area (except in multiarea districts—districts which draw and admit students from more than a single attendance area—where the community residents to be elected are elected by the parents of currently enrolled students, the principal of the multiarea school and the school staff (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, pars. 34-1.1, 34-2.1(b))) and two teachers of the school who are elected by the school staff. Each local school council elects the principal who will serve at the school for a contract period of four years and may retain the principal for another four-year period when the contract expires. Should a principal not be retained, the local school council will select a new principal. The local school council also develops specific performance criteria for its principal and has responsibility for approving the budget plan drawn up and administered by the principal. In addition, the local school council has substantial advisory responsibilities.

Subdistrict Councils

The Act creates 11 subdistrict councils. Each local school council elects one of its parent or nonparent resident members to sit on a subdistrict council. Each subdistrict council performs various advisory functions (e.g., promoting and coordinating communication among local school councils, promoting and coordinating training of local school councils), elects and evaluates for retention the subdistrict school superintendent and is responsible for electing one of its members to sit on the school board nominating commission.

School Board Nominating Commission

The school board nominating commission is composed of 11 members elected from each subdistrict council and five members appointed by the mayor. The nominating commission, in an open public forum, interviews candidates for seats on the board of education and presents the mayor with a slate of three qualified candidates for each vacant seat on the board. The mayor selects one of the candidates for each seat from this list. The Act provides that there are to be 15 members on the board of education. An interim board of education was created by the Act until the mayor should appoint candidates as provided by the Act. A permanent board of education has now been selected under the Reform Act.

Principals

The principal of each school is given responsibility for administering and supervising the educational operation of the school and for developing the school's budget and improvement plan. Under the Act, principals are employed under four-year, renewable performance contracts. The local school council is responsible for determining whether a principal's contract will be renewed. Under the Act, the terms of persons currently serving as principals expire on either June 30, 1990, or June 30, 1991 (the date to be determined by lottery), and unless such contract is renewed by the local school council, the employment of such person as a principal terminates.

The Complaint

The plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 17, 1989, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. On May 24, 1989, the defendants served the plaintiffs with notice that they intended to file a motion on May 30 for leave to file a motion for summary judgment and to ask the trial court to set an expedited briefing schedule and a hearing date. On May 26, 1989, the defendants filed their answer to the complaint. The parties appeared before the trial judge on May 30, 1989, and the judge entered an order allowing the defendants to file a motion for summary judgment and supporting briefs by June 28, *1288 1989. The judge also ordered the plaintiffs to respond to the motion by July 28, 1989, and the defendants to reply by August 14, 1989.

On June 26, 1989, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the circuit court to voluntarily dismiss their complaint under section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1009), stating that they wished to file a complaint in the United States district court. On June 28, 1989, pursuant to the previous order, the defendants filed their summary judgment motions. On June 30, 1989, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their complaint. On August 1, 1989, the defendants requested and were granted leave to amend their answer to include a counterclaim for declaratory judgment upholding the constitutionality of the Act. The trial court, concluding that the Act was constitutional, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on August 29, 1989.

The foregoing presents two questions for this appeal. First, whether the trial court erred in not granting the plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss their complaint, and, second, if the motion for voluntary dismissal was properly denied, whether the Act is constitutional.

Motion for Voluntary Dismissal—The Constitutionality of the Reform Act Is Properly Before the Court

The plaintiffs argue that the issue of the constitutionality of the Act was not properly before the trial court and they urge this court to reverse the judgment. The plaintiffs contend they had an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss their claim and that the trial court should have granted their motion pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1009). Section 2-1009 provides:

"The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each such party's attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause."

Under this section, a plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss prior to trial or hearing was held to be absolute. See, e.g., Johnson v. United National Industries, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 181, 184, 81 Ill.Dec. 375, 466 N.E.2d 1177 (where the court stated, "it is well established that plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss * * * prior to trial, and the court has no discretion to deny this motion for dismissal").

A modification of this rule was announced, however, by this court in Gibellina v. Handley (1989), 127 Ill.2d 122, 129 Ill.Dec. 93, 535 N.E.2d 858. In Gibellina, the court held that when there is a motion, potentially dispositive of the case, before the court prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the trial court has discretion as to whether or not to grant the motion for voluntary dismissal. The plaintiffs argue that no potentially dispositive motion was pending before the court on June 26 when they made their motion for a voluntary dismissal because the defendants had not yet filed their motion for summary judgment. They argue that the only motion on file on May 30 was a motion for leave to file a summary judgment motion and to set a briefing schedule. Although the defendants asked that the court set a date for the filing of the motion for summary judgment, no such motion was actually on file with the circuit clerk on May 30. The plaintiffs contend, therefore, that Gibellina was inapplicable and that the trial court was required to grant their motion.

The defendants respond that the court had, and properly exercised, discretion under Gibellina in denying the motion to dismiss because their summary judgment motion, a motion potentially dispositive of the case, was before the court as of May 30, 1989.

The trial court in concluding it had discretion to deny the motion to voluntarily dismiss stated:

"When [this court] set a briefing schedule and also entertained the oral motions for summary judgment, which were, of course, widely discussed before this court, and the record will so reflect, that therefore, a dispositive motion was, in *1289 fact, for all intents and purposes, on file. And, accordingly, in this court's discretion, your request is denied."

The plaintiffs' rejoinder is that under Gibellina the actual filing of a potentially dispositive motion marks the point at which the right to voluntary dismissal is no longer absolute. Because there was no actual filing here until two days after the motion to dismiss was made, the modification in Gibellina, they argue, is inapplicable.

The plaintiffs advance too formalistic and rigid an interpretation of Gibellina. The decisive factor in Gibellina was not that the defendant had actually filed a potentially dispositive motion, but was instead that the defendant had put a potentially dispositive motion before the court prior to the filing of the section 2-1009 motion. As this court said in Gibellina, "the trial court may hear and decide a motion which has been filed prior to a section 2-1009 motion when that motion, if favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition of the case." (Emphasis in original.) (Gibellina, 127 Ill.2d at 138, 129 Ill.Dec. 93, 535 N.E.2d 858.) In Gibellina, the court's expressed concern was to prevent the undue delay and abuse of judicial resources that occur when a plaintiff dismisses a case "in the face of" a potentially dispositive motion which would dispose of the action. (Gibellina, 127 Ill.2d at 137, 129 Ill.Dec. 93, 535 N.E.2d 858.) As this court put it, "[i]t has become clear that the allowance of an unrestricted right to dismiss and refile an action in the face of a potentially dispositive motion is not only increasing the burden on the already crowded dockets of our courts, but is also infringing on the authority of the judiciary to discharge its duties fairly and expeditiously." (Gibellina, 127 Ill.2d at 137, 129 Ill.Dec. 93, 535 N.E.2d 858.) See also O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, where this court held that a plaintiff could not dismiss under section 2-1009 in order to avoid a dismissal for his failure to exercise due diligence in obtaining service of process, as required by Supreme Court Rule 103. The court noted that countenancing such a maneuver would cause justice to be "truly and unnecessarily delayed." O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill.2d 273, 97 Ill.Dec. 449, 492 N.E.2d 1322.

Although the defendants had not yet actually filed their summary judgment motion, it is clear that a potentially dispositive motion was, as the trial court said, for all intents and purposes, before the court. The motion to voluntarily dismiss was plainly made "in the face of" a potentially dispositive motion and was used to "avoid a potential decision on the merits." The purpose of the defendants' appearance on May 30 was to advise the court and the plaintiffs that they were seeking a prompt resolution of the issue by summary judgment. It is clear from the record that the judge and the parties understood that there was to be a motion for summary judgment and that the motion and brief would be filed on June 28. In various proceedings after May 30, the trial court and the parties made references to the summary judgment motion. If the trial court had allowed the motion to dismiss, it certainly would have seriously jeopardized, if not prevented, a prompt resolution of the case on the merits. There was a prompt resolution of the case by the trial court on August 29.

The trial court did not err in holding that a potentially dispositive motion was before the court prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' motion for a voluntary dismissal and under Gibellina v. Handley the court clearly had discretion to deny the plaintiffs' motion for a voluntary dismissal.

Plaintiffs' Constitutional Challenges

The plaintiffs contend that even if the trial court had properly denied their motion to dismiss, it erred in holding the Act constitutional. They argue that the Act violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions in that the voting scheme for electing local school council members (1) violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution by depriving certain citizens of a vote equal to that of other citizens, (2) abridges free and equal elections as guaranteed by article III, section 3, of the constitution of Illinois, (3) fails to ensure the integrity of the election process, uniformity *1290 of elections and facilitation of voting by qualified persons, and (4) violates the Federal Voting Rights Act.

The plaintiffs also contend that the provisions regarding employment of school principals and subdistrict superintendents under contracts for four-year, renewable periods (1) are an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract under article I, section 10, of the Federal Constitution and article I, section 16, of the constitution of Illinois and (2) are a violation of due process because they deprive the plaintiffs of valuable and substantive property rights under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and article I, section 2, of the constitution of Illinois. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Act violates equal protection because it discriminates in favor of teachers on the question of continued employment.

The Voting Scheme for Electing Local School Councils Violates Equal Protection

The plaintiffs (registered voters and taxpayers) first state that the Act's voting scheme for electing local school council members as provided in section 34-2.1 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-2.1) violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution under the fourteenth amendment and article I, section 2, and article III, section 3, of the constitution of Illinois because voters who are otherwise qualified to vote, but do not currently have children attending Chicago schools, are denied a vote in local school council elections that is equal to that of voters who do have children in attendance at the public schools.

The fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution provides that the State shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.) Article I, section 2, of the constitution of Illinois, like the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, provides that the State shall not deny any person "equal protection of the laws." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2.) Article III, section 3, provides that "[a]ll elections shall be free and equal." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 3.) Because the equal protection guarantees in article I, section 2, and the "free and equal" requirements of article III, section 3, of the constitution of Illinois are in effect those of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, our conclusion as to the claim of a Federal violation will dispose of the claim of a violation of the State Constitution as well. As the court stated in Goldstein v. Mitchell (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 474, 485, 98 Ill.Dec. 792, 494 N.E.2d 914, "[There is] no precedent indicating that the Illinois Constitution calls for more than the Federal Constitution in relation to equal protection safeguards." See also People v. Francis (1968), 40 Ill.2d 204, 239 N.E.2d 129.

Section 34-2.1(a) of the Act provides:

"Each local school council shall consist of the principal of the attendance center [school] served by the local school council and 10 elected members, 6 of whom shall be parents of students currently enrolled at the attendance center served by the local school council * * *, 2 of whom shall be community residents residing within the attendance area established for the attendance center served by the local school council * * * and 2 of whom shall be teachers employed at the attendance center served by the local school council elected by the entire school staff." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 34-2.1(a).)

Section 34-2.1(b) states the voter eligibility requirement for participation in the local school council elections. Section 34-2.1(b) provides:

"Only parents of students enrolled at the attendance center [school] served by the local school council shall be eligible to vote for the parents to be elected to that local school council, only school staff employed at the attendance center served by the local school council shall be eligible to vote for teachers to be elected to that local school council and only community residents residing within the attendance area established for the attendance center served by a local school council shall be eligible to vote for the community *1291 residents to be elected to that local school council; provided, however, that with respect to community residents to be elected to the local school council of a multi-area school, only the parents of students enrolled at that multi-area school, the principal of such multi-area school and the school staff employed at such multi-area school shall be eligible to vote for the community residents to be elected to the local school council serving that multi-area school." Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34-2.1(b).

The plaintiffs argue that the Act's differentiated allocation of votes among parents, community residents and teachers in local school council elections impermissibly interferes with their fundamental right to have an equal voice in an election involving a governmental matter of general interest, namely, the operation of local schools. Under the Act, community residents who reside in multiarea districts and do not have children in attendance at the public schools are unable to vote for any local school council members. Community residents in single district attendance centers who do not have children in attendance in a public school are entitled to vote for only two members of the council. Parents, however, who have children in the school, are entitled to vote for six members of the council. The defendants, in response, contend that a voting scheme which results in differentiated treatment of voters will not be found to violate constitutional assurances of equal protection if the voters given the weighted vote have a greater interest in and are more greatly benefited by the particular activities of the governmental unit which is the subject of the election.

From an analysis of the Act and from the argument of the plaintiffs, it is clear that the local school councils are elected by citizens who have different voting powers, i.e., with votes of unequal weight. The one person, one vote rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, which we will discuss, means that a person is entitled to have his or her vote regarded as equal to every other voter's vote. The one person, one vote rule has been held to be applicable in elections of governmental bodies or units which exercise general governmental powers. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County (1968), 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45; Hadley v. Junior College District (1970), 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45; Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583; Board of Estimate v. Morris (1989), 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717.

When a statute provides for an inequality in voting power, a question arises as to whether there has been a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. When the means used by a legislature to achieve a legislative goal impinges upon a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, a court will examine a claim that there was a violation of the constitutional right to equal protection under a standard of strict scrutiny. (Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. at 626, 89 S.Ct. at 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d at 589.) Under a standard of strict scrutiny, the court must conclude that the means employed by the legislature to achieve the stated goal were necessary to advance a compelling State interest. Too, the statute must be narrowly tailored, that is, the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of the legislative goal. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. at 626, 89 S.Ct. at 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d at 589.

The trial court here did not analyze the legislation under the strict scrutiny test; rather, it applied the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, the court simply inquires whether the method or means employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. (Ball v. James (1981), 451 U.S. 355, 371, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 1821, 68 L.Ed.2d 150, 163.) The trial court held that local school councils were special limited-purpose bodies that did not exercise general governmental powers and that their elections, therefore, did not have to comply with the one person, one vote rule. The trial court stated that giving parents of children currently attending *1292 the public schools a weighted vote was rationally related to the legislative goal of improving the school system because parents were more greatly affected by and interested in the local school council's decisions.

The trial court erred in finding that the local school councils did not exercise general governmental powers and in its resulting decision to apply the rational basis test, instead of strict scrutiny. The trial court looked to the absence of a power to tax, issue bonds, and similar considerations, in reaching its conclusion, but did not consider the broad and important powers vested in the local school councils and it mistakenly judged the councils to be but advisory bodies.

In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that each voter is entitled to have his or her vote given weight equal to that of every other voter. (Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506.) The holding in Reynolds has become known as the one person, one vote rule. The right to vote in an election of general interest is a fundamental right and any legislation which operates to impair a person's right to vote on grounds other than residency, age or citizenship, can only stand if it can survive a strict scrutiny analysis. (Hill v. Stone (1975), 421 U.S. 289, 95 S.Ct. 1637, 44 L.Ed.2d 172; see also Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506; Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583.) In Hill v. Stone, the Supreme Court found a statutory election scheme for a local bond election to be in violation of equal protection because it diluted the vote of those citizens who did not own property subject to local taxation. The statute created a dual box system of voting under which all registered voters cast a ballot in one box and citizens who owned property subject to local taxation cast an additional ballot in a second box. In order for the bond issue to pass, it had to receive a majority of the overall vote and a majority of the vote cast by the property owners. The court stated that because this election was one of general interest (that is, the issue was not one of special limited purpose), any restriction on a qualified voter's ability to cast an equal vote could not stand unless the district or State could demonstrate a compelling State interest for the restriction. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. at 297, 95 S.Ct. at 1643, 44 L.Ed.2d at 179.

The one person, one vote rule established in Reynolds has been held to be applicable to elections of local governmental bodies which exercise "general governmental powers." (Avery v. Midland County (1968), 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45.) In Avery, the petitioner, a taxpayer and voter in Midland County, Texas, sued the Midland County commissioners court, alleging that the election of the members of the commissioners court from districts of substantially unequal population violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The commissioners court, the Court stated, was a general governing body with power to perform various functions in the governance of the county, including setting tax rates, issuing bonds, preparing the budget and appointing county officials, and was, therefore, subject to the one person, one vote rule.

On the local level, the one person, one vote principle has been applied by the Supreme Court to elections for school board members. (Hadley v. Junior College District (1970), 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45; Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583.) In Hadley, the Court stated:

"If [a] person's vote is given less weight * * * his right to equal voting participation is impaired just as much when he votes for a school board member as when he votes for a state legislator. While there are differences in the powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the right of each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process." (Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. at 55, 90 S.Ct. at 794, 25 L.Ed.2d at 50.)

In Hadley, the plaintiffs, residents and taxpayers of the Kansas City school district, *1293 challenged the constitutionality of a statutory scheme for electing trustees to sit on the board of the local consolidated junior college district. Under the plan, the Kansas City school district was allowed to elect only 50% of the trustees even though it had 60% of the total number of students in the district. Because the board performed important governmental functions, such as levying and collecting taxes, issuing bonds with certain restrictions and hiring and firing teachers, the Court held that the one person, one vote principle should be applied. Although the powers vested in the board were not as broad as those of the Midland County commissioners in Avery, the Court held that the trustees performed "important governmental functions" within the district