Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court

Opinion

Introduction

Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. (Suzuki), defendant below, by the petition here seeks a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its order *1478 denying Suzuki’s motion to quash service of process and to enter an order granting that motion.

Facts

Suzuki is a Japanese corporation which is named as a defendant in an action now pending in the superior court entitled Peggy Armenia v. Bellflower Suzuki, et al., case No. BCV 003277.

Peggy Armenia, the plaintiff in that action and the real party in interest in this proceeding, allegedly sustained personal injuries while operating a 1984 Suzuki four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle. Ms. Armenia filed a complaint for products liability and negligence against a number of defendants, including Suzuki.

Plaintiff purported to effect service of process upon Suzuki by sending the summons, together with copies of the complaint, certificate of assignment and amendment to the complaint, via registered mail to Suzuki’s ofiice in Hamamatsu, Japan. These documents, which actually were received by Suzuki, were not translated into Japanese.

Suzuki moved to quash service of process, asserting that service was improper under the provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure as well as the provisions of the Hague Convention. In support of its motion to quash, Suzuki filed the declaration of Hidetoshi Asakura, a partner with the law firm of Graham & James, licensed to practice law in Japan and California.

In his declaration, Mr. Asakura expounded on the acceptable methods of service of process in Japan and concluded that plaintiff here had failed to conform to these methods, and thereby had also failed to conform to the requirements of the Hague Convention for service of process in the Convention’s signatory states. Plaintiff did not contest the information contained in Mr. Asakura’s declaration, but relied instead on the First District’s decision in Shoei Kako, Co. v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 808 [109 Cal.Rptr. 402].

The superior court refused to grant the motion to quash service, and rightly so, in light of the holding in Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937] (which holds that a lower court which refuses to follow a binding precedent of a higher court is acting in excess of jurisdiction), and because there has been no holding contrary to that of Shoei Kako in this or any other appellate district.

*1479 We, however, are not bound by the holding in Shoei Kako, particularly because it was based in part on a unique factual record before that court, a record which differs substantially from that now before us. Therefore, as explained below, we hold that the service of process described above was not effective, and we shall grant the petition for writ of mandate.

Discussion

In 1969, the United States signed the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361-367, T.I.A.S. 6638) (the Hague Convention or the Convention). (See appen. A.) Japan became a signatory to the Convention in 1970.

The Convention provides several acceptable methods for service of process abroad. These methods are: (1) service through the receiving country’s designated “Central Authority” for service of foreign process (art. 5); (2) delivery by the Central Authority to an addressee who accepts service “voluntarily” so long as the method used is not incompatible with the law of the receiving state (art. 5); (3) service through diplomatic or consular agents of the sending state (art. 8); (4) service through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the receiving state (art. 10, subdivisions (b) and (c)); and (5) service as permitted by the internal law of the receiving state for documents coming from abroad (art. 19).

Real party in interest urges that there is yet another method of service of process which meets the requirements of the Convention, to wit, service by registered mail as allowed by California Code of Civil Procedure sections 413.10 1 and 4 1 5.30 2 and article 10, subdivision (a) of the Convention, which provides that “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with—(a) the freedom to send judicial docu *1480 merits, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, . . .” According to real party in interest and the court in Shoei Kako, this section of the Convention allows service of process by mail.

The Shoei Kako court analyzed the issue of the interpretation of the section, concluding that the Convention permitted signatories to exclude the methods of service outlined in articles 8 and 10 by filing objections to them. Japan objected to article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c), which provide for service via the judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the receiving state. Japan, however, did not object to article 10, subdivision (a). Downplaying the fact that article 10, subdivision (a) specifically refers to the sending of judicial documents rather than the service of such documents, the Shoei Kako court interpreted article 10, subdivision (a), like article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c), as also referring to the service of process by mail. According to that court, “The reference to ‘the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad’ would be superfluous unless it was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service. The mails are open to all.” (Id., 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 821.) Therefore, it concluded that Japan’s failure to object specifically to subdivision (a) meant such service was acceptable.

The Shoei Kako court also relied on article 15 of the Convention to hold that service by registered mail was proper. Article 15 provides, in relevant part, “Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that—(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or [1|] (b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention, and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend. . . .” (Italics added.) According to the Shoei Kako court, the record before it indicated that Japan’s internal law allowed service by mail with evidence of delivery as an effective mode of service of process, and the record also indicated that the defendant in the case before it had actually received the summons and complaint by “a method provided for by [the] Convention,” i.e., service by registered mail, the Shoei Kako court having determined that service by registered mail was a method allowed under article 10, subdivision (a).

Here, the record before us indicates that Japan does not have an internal legal system which allows service of process by registered mail. As indicated by the declaration of Mr. Asakura, and confirmed by a law review article *1481 entitled Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant (Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant (1985) 25 Santa Clara L.Rev. 555, 576-579), Japan, unlike California, does not allow either attorneys or lay people to serve process by mail. To effectuate service of process through the mail, the court clerk stamps the outside of the envelope containing the required documents with a notice of special service (tokubetsu sootatsu) and the mail carrier acts as a special officer of the court by recording proof of delivery on a special proof of service form and returning this proof of service to the court. Significantly, real party in interest did not contravert these facts when she opposed Suzuki’s motion to quash.

Given the fact that Japan itself does not recognize a form of service sufficiently equivalent to America’s registered mail system, it is extremely unlikely that Japan’s failure to object to article 10, subdivision (a) was intended to authorize the use of registered mail as an effective mode of service of process, particularly in light of the fact that Japan specifically objected to the much more formal modes of service by Japanese officials which were available in article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c). Instead, it seems much more likely that Japan interpreted article 10, subdivision (a) as allowing only the transmission of judicial documents, rather than the service of process. This interpretation is all the more reasonable given the fact that the Convention persistently refers to “service” as opposed to “send,” e.g., “forward documents, for the purpose of service” (art. 9, italics added); “transmission of judicial documents for service” (art. 14, italics added); and “transmitted abroad for the purpose of service” (arts. 15 and 16, italics added), in contrast to “the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, . . .” (art. 10, subd. (a), italics added). It is a well-recognized canon of statutory interpretation that words in a statute or similar enactment are to be given their common and ordinary meaning (see In re Quinn (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 473, 482 [110 Cal.Rptr. 881]), and that every word and phrase used is presumed to have a meaning and to perform a useful function. (Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326, 334 [136 Cal.Rptr. 421].) To interpret the phrase “to send” as used in article 10, subdivision (a) of the Convention to mean “to serve” would fly in the face of both these rules; the common and ordinary meaning of “to send” is “to cause to be conveyed by an intermediary to a destination” or “to dispatch, as by mail or telegraph” (see “send,” The American Heritage Diet, of the English Language (1969) p. 1179) not “to serve,” and the fact the Convention’s drafters used both the phrase “to send” and the phrase “service of process” indicates they intended each phrase to have a different meaning and function.

Real party in interest relies on various cases which do not interpret “to send” as we do, including the recent case of Ackermann v. Levine (2d Cir. *1482 1986) 788 F.2d 830, which cites Shoei Kako with approval, and which, as did the court in Shoei Kako, interprets “to send” as meaning “to serve.”

In Ackermann, German plaintiffs served a summons and complaint on a New York defendant by registered mail. The Second Circuit held that service of process by registered mail was effective under article 10, subdivision (a) of the Hague Convention, because (1) the use of the word “send” in that subdivision was intended to mean “service” (id., at p. 839), and (2) the United States had not objected to the use of “postal channels” under article 10, subdivision (a) as it could have chosen to do. (Ttf.) 3 The Ackermann court also noted with approval several other cases which had held that Japan, too, had not objected to mail “service” under article 10, subdivision (a). (Id., at p. 840, citing Zisman v. Sieger (N.D.Ill. 1985) 106 F.R.D. 194; Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (E.D.Va. 1984) 597 F.Supp. 1082, 1085-1086, citing Shoei Kako; and Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp. (D.D.C. 1984) 589 F.Supp. 1182, 1206 [78 A.L.R.Fed. 119], citing Shoei Kako.)

The result in Ackermann, as in the cases to which the Ackermann court referred with approval, turns on the interpretation of the word “send” as meaning “serve.” As noted above, this interpretation simply does not make sense. The Ackermann court relied on a treatise which concluded that the use of the word “send” rather than the otherwise consistently used “service” “ ‘must be attributable to careless drafting.’ ” (Id., at p. 839, quoting 1 Ristau, International Judicial Assistance (Civil and Commercial) § 4-28 at pp. 165-167.) However, whether the phrase “to send” was used because of careless drafting or not, it appears that Japan understood it to mean “to send,” not “to serve,” as it is implausible that a country which does not use basic postal channels for service of process by its own nationals on their fellows, and which objected to the more rigorous methods of service set out in article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c), would have failed to object to subdivision (a) if it had understood that section to relate to service of process.

Ackermann has been cited with approval by a recent opinion from the Central District of California, Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics (C.D.Cal. 1987) 671 F.Supp. 1525. We think the following discussion of the Newport Components case makes it even more apparent why we have decided not to follow the Shoei Kako and Ackermann line of cases.

*1483 In Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics the district court was faced with the same issue raised here. Noting that there was a split among the courts as to the meaning of article 10, subdivision (a), the Newport Components court cast its lot with the Ackermann line of cases, without any independent discussion of the import of subdivision (a)’s use of the verb “to send,” and after finding the following reasoning from Shoei Kako particularly persuasive:

“ ‘If it be assumed that the purpose of the convention is to establish one method to avoid the difficulties and controversy attendant to the use of other methods . . . , it does not necessarily follow that other methods may not be used if effective proof of delivery can be made.’” (Id., at p. 1542, quoting Shoei Kako, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 821, italics added by Newport Components court.)

We, however, do not find this reasoning persuasive. If the signatories’ intent was to establish a particular method of service to avoid the controversy attendant on the use of other methods, and if signatories were allowed, as they were, to object to particular modes of service, then it makes no sense to allow private litigants to by-pass the agreed-upon methods and to use other methods, even methods to which some signatories objected, even if effective proof of delivery using such alternate and objected-to methods can be made.

Furthermore, the decision in Newport Components was additionally based upon that court’s belief that resort to the Hague Convention “need not ‘be utilized first in every case,’ ” and that direct mail service is allowable unless the defendant can demonstrate that such service represents an intrusion on Japanese sovereignity. (Id., quoting In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (8th Cir. 1986) 782 F.2d 120, 123-125, and relying on Societe Nationale Industrielle v. U.S. Dist. Court (9th Cir. 1986) 788 F.2d 1408.) However, the Newport Components court’s reliance on Societe Nationale Industrielle v. U. S. Dist. Court and In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale is misplaced, as both cases involve the Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 7444 (Convention on the Taking of Evidence) (whose text is found in the note following 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (Supp. 1985)), which, while also known as “The Hague Convention,” is not the same treaty as the convention here which specifically deals with service of documents, including service of process. As pointed out in Societe Nationale Industrielle v. U.S. Dist. Court, supra, the reason that resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be had in the first instance, rather than to the Convention on the Taking of Evidence, is because federal law “normally governs discovery of documents from foreign parties subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts even when the documents are located *1484 abroad. [Citation.] When a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the production of documents effectively occurs in the United States and not in the country where the documents are initially located. [Citation.]” (Id., at pp. 1410-1411, italics added.) “[T]he better rule . . . , is that when the district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant [then] the Hague Convention does not apply to the production of evidence. . . .” (In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, supra, 782 F.2d 120, at p. 124, italics added.)

In other words, the cases relied on by the Newport Components court merely hold that the Convention on the Taking of Evidence is not the only means of obtaining discovery from a foreign defendant once the district court has obtained jurisdiction over the defendant. It does not follow from these cases that the methods contained in the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents are not the exclusive means of obtaining that initial personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant via service of process.

In sum, we do not find the Ackermann line of cases persuasive, and therefore take the position taken by other commentators and courts that service of process by registered mail is not one of the methods authorized by the Convention for service of process on Japanese defendants. (See, e.g., Routh, Litigation Between Japanese and American Parties, in Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Japan and East Asia (Hailey ed. 1978) pp. 188, 190-191 (“[s]ome questions have been raised as to whether section 10(a) of the Convention allows service of process by mail. In my opinion it does not. The question of service by mail is not addressed by the Convention; it merely discusses the right to send subsequent judicial documents by mail. Any other process would be a rather illogical result, as the Convention sets up a rather cumbersome and involved procedure for service of process; and if this particular provision allowed one to circumvent the procedure by simply sending something through the mail, the vast bulk of the Convention would be useless. . . .” (fn. omitted); Reynolds v. Koh (1985) 109 App.Div.2d 97 [490 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297-298]; Ormandy v. Lynn (1984) 122 Misc.2d 954 [472 N.Y.S.2d 274, 274-275]; Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (S.D.Miss. 1986) 111 F.R.D. 464; Mommsen v. The Toro Co. (S.D.Iowa 1985) 108 F.R.D. 444; Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chem. Serv. (M.D.La. 1984) 100 F.R.D. 775.) This holding compels the corollary holding, based on the fact that a California court may not exercise jurisdiction in violation of an international treaty (Dr. Ing H. C. F. Porsche A. G. v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 760 [177 Cal.Rptr. 155]), that Suzuki is entitled to have its motion to quash service of process granted.

*1485 Disposition

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion to quash service of process and to enter a new and different order granting the motion.

Campbell, P. J., and Dabney, J., concurred.

*1486 Appendix Rule 4 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 104 Subd. (c). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(2), added subd. (c) and deleted prior provision reading “By Whom Served. Service of process shall be made by a United States marañal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve process shall be made freely. Service of process may also be made by a person authorized to serve process in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the district court is held or in which service is made.” Subd. (d). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(3XA), substituted the heading “Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served” for “Summons: Personal Service”. Subd. (dX5). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(4), substituted “sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail" for “delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint". Subd. (dXT). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(3)(B), struck out par. (7) which read “Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state”, the latter provision covered in subd. (cX2XQ of this rule. Subd. (e). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(5), substituted in the heading “Summons" for “Same". Subd. (g). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(6), substituted in second sentence “deputy United States marshal” and “such person” for “his deputy” and "he” and inserted third sentence “If service is made under subdivision (cX2XQ(ii) of this rule, return shall be made by the sender’s filing with the court the acknowledgment received pursuant to such subdivision.”. Subd. (j). Pub.L. 97-462, § 2(7), added subd. <i>. Effective Date of 1983 Amendment. Amendment by Pub.L. 97-462 effective 45 days after Jan. 12, 1983, see section 4 of Pub.L. 97-462, set out as an Effective Date of 1983 Amendment note under section 2071 of this title. Convention On The Service Abroad Op Judicial And Extrajudicial Documents In Civil Or Commercial Matters The States signatory to the present Convention, Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time, Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure, Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the following provisions: Article 1 The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. This Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.. CHAPTER I—JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS Article 2 Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive requests for service coming from other contracting States and to proceed in conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6. Each State shall organize the Central Authority in conformity with its own law. Article 3 The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the State in which the documents originate shall forward to the Central Authority of the State addressed a request conforming to the model annexed to the present Convention, without any requirement of legalization or other equivalent formality. The document to be served or a copy thereof shall be annexed to the request. The request and the document shall both be furnished in duplicate. Article 4 If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply with the provisions of the present Convention it shall promptly inform the applicant and specify its objections to the request Article 5 The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either— (a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or

*1487 105 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 (b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed. Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily. If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed. That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be served with the document Article 6 The Central Authority of the State addressed or any authority which it may have designated for that purpose, shall complete a certifícate in the form of the model annexed to the present Convention. The certifícate shall state that the document has been served and shall include the method, the place and the date of service and the person to whom the document was delivered. If the document has not been served, the certificate shall set out the reasons which have prevented service. The applicant may require that a certificate not completed by a Central Authority or by a judicial authority shall be countersigned by one of these authorities. The certificate shall be forwarded directly to the applicant. Article 7 The standard terms in the model annexed to the present Convention shall in all cases be written either in French or in English. They may also be written in the official language, or in one of the official languages, of the State in which the documents originate. The corresponding blanks shall be completed either in the language of the State addressed or in French or in English. Article 8 Each contracting State shall be free to effect service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application of any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents. Any State may declare that it is opposed to such service within its territory, unless the document is to be served upon a national of the State in which the documents originate. Article 9 Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward documents, for the purpose of service, to those authorities of another contracting State which are designated by the latter for this purpose. Each contracting State may, if exceptional circumstances so require, use diplomatic channels for the same purpose. Article 10 Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with— (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, (b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. (c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. Article 11 The present Convention shall not prevent two or more contracting States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial documents, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding articles and, in particular, direct communication between their respective authorities. Article 12 The service of judicial documents coming from a contracting State shall not give rise to any payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for the services rendered by the State addressed. The applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by— (a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under the law of the State of destination, (b) the use of a particular method of service.

*1488 Rule 4 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 106 Article 13 Where a request for service complies with the terms of the present Convention, the State addressed may refuse to comply therewith only if it deems that compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security. It may not refuse to comply solely on the ground that, under its internal law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not permit the action upon which the application is based. The Central Authority shall, in case of refusal, promptly inform the applicant and state the reasons for the refusal. Article 14 Difficulties which may arise in connection with the transmission of judicial documents for service shall be settled through diplomatic channels. Article 15 Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that— (a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or (b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention, and that m either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend. Each contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this article, may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the following conditions are fulfilled— (a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention, (b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document, (c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent authorities of the State addressed. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures. Article 16 When a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and a judgment has been entered against a defendant who has not appeared, the judge shall have the power to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiration of the time for appeal from the judgment if the following conditions are fulfilled— (a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend, or knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to appeal, and (b) the defendant has disclosed a prima facie defense to the action on the merits. An application for relief may be filed only within a reasonable time after the defendant has knowledge of the judgment Each contracting State may declare that the application will not be entertained if it is filed after the expiration of a time to be stated in the declaration, but which shall in no case be less than one year following the date of the judgment This article shall not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity of persons. CHAPTER II—EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS Article 17 Extrajudicial documents emanating from authorities and judicial officers of a contracting State may be transmitted for the purpose of service in another contracting State by the methods and under the provisions of the present Convention. CHAPTER III—GENERAL CLAUSES Article 18 Each contracting State may designate other authorities in addition to the Central Authority and shall determine the extent of their competence. The applicant shall, however, in all cases, have the right to address a request directly to the Central Authority. Federal States shall be free to designate more than one Central Authority.

*1489 107 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 Article 19 To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions. Article 20 The present Convention shall not prevent an agreement between any two or more contracting States to dispense with— (a) the necessity for duplicate copies of transmitted documents as required by the second paragraph of article 3, (b) the language requirements of the third paragraph of article 5 and article 7, (c) the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 5, (d) the provisions of the second paragraph of article 12. Article 21 Each contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a later date, inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of the following— (a) the designation of authorities, pursuant to articles 2 and 18, (b) the designation of the authority competent to complete the certificate pursuant to article 6, (c) the designation of the authority competent to receive documents transmitted by consular channels, pursuant to article 9. Each contracting State shall similarly inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of— (a) opposition to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10, (b) declarations pursuant to the second paragraph of article 15 and the third paragraph of article 16, (c) all modifications of the above designations, oppositions and declarations. Article 22 Where Parties to the present Convention are also Parties to one or both of the Conventions on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th July 1905 [99 BFSP 990], and on 1st March 1954 [286 UNTS 265], this Convention shall replace as between them articles 1 to 7 of the earlier Conventions. Article 23 The present Convention shall not affect the application of article 23 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th July 1905, or of article 24 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 1st March 1954. These articles shall, however, apply only if methods of communication, identical to those provided for in these Conventions, are used. Article 24 Supplementary agreements between parties to the Conventions of 1905 and 1954 shall be considered as equally applicable to the present Convention, unless the Parties have otherwise agreed. Article 25 Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 22 and 24, the present Convention shall not derogate from Conventions containing provisions on the matters governed by this Convention to which the contracting States are, or shall become, Parties. Article 26 The present Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Article 27 The present Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification referred to in the second paragraph of article 26. The Convention shall enter into force for each signatory State which ratifies subsequently on the sixtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification. Article 28 Any State not represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law may accede to the present Convention after it has entered into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27. The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

*1490 Rule 4 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 108 The Convention shall enter into force for such a State in the absence of any objection from a State, which has ratified the Convention before such deposit, notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands within a period of six months after the date on which the said Ministry has notified it of such accession. In the absence of any such objection, the Convention shall enter into force for the acceding State on the first day of the month following the expiration of the last of the periods referred to in the preceding paragraph. Article 29 Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention shall extend to all the territories for the