Cullen v. Pinholster

with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan join as to Part II, dissenting.

Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court through no fault of their own. Congress recognized as much when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, and permitted therein the introduction of new evidence in federal habeas proceedings in certain limited circumstances. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). Under the Court’s novel interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), however, federal courts must turn a blind eye to new evidence in deciding whether a petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(l)’s threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief — even when it is clear that the petitioner would be entitled to relief in light of that evidence. In reading the statute to “compe[l]” this harsh result, ante, at 182, the Court ignores a key textual difference between §§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2) and discards the previous understanding in our precedents that new evidence can, in fact, inform the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry. I therefore dissent from the Court’s first holding.

*207I also disagree with the Court that, even if the § 2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state-court record, respondent Scott Pinholster failed to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decision denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). There is no reason for the majority to decide whether the § 2254(d)(1) analysis is limited to the state-court record because Pinholster satisfied § 2254(d)(1) on either the state- or federal-court record.

I

The Court first holds that, in determining whether a state-court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1), “review ... is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Ante, at 181. New evidence adduced at a federal evidentiary hearing is now irrelevant to determining whether a petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(1). This holding is unnecessary to promote AEDPA’s purposes, and it is inconsistent with the provision’s text, the structure of the statute, and our precedents.

A

To understand the significance of the majority’s holding, it is important to view the issue in context. AEDPA’s entire structure — which gives state courts the opportunity to decide factual and legal questions in the first instance — ensures that evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings are very rare. See N. Kang, F. Cheesman, & B. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U. S. District Courts 35-36 (2007) (evidentiary hearings under AEDPA occur in 0.4 percent of noncapital cases and 9.5 percent of capital cases). Even absent the new restriction created by today’s holding, AEDPA erects multiple hurdles to a state prisoner’s ability to introduce new evidence in a federal habeas proceeding.

*208First, “[u]nder the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner challenging a state conviction must first attempt to present his claim in state court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011); see also § 2254(b)(1)(A). With certain narrow exceptions, federal courts cannot consider a claim at all, let alone accept new evidence relevant to the claim, if it has not been exhausted in state court.1 The exhaustion requirement thus reserves to state courts the first opportunity to resolve factual disputes relevant to a state prisoner’s claim. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 845 (1999).

Second, the exhaustion requirement is “complement[ed]” by the standards set forth in § 2254(d). Harrington, 562 U. S., at 103. Under this provision, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any “claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the adjudication

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

These standards “control whether to grant habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465, 474 (2007). Accordingly, we have said, if the factual allegations a petitioner seeks to prove at an evidentiary hearing would not satisfy these standards, there is no reason for a hearing. See id., at 481. In such a case, the district court may exercise its “discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing.” Ibid.; see also infra, at 218-219. This approach makes eminent sense: If district courts held evidentiary hearings without first asking *209whether the evidence the petitioner seeks to present would satisfy AEDPA’s demanding standards, they would needlessly prolong federal habeas proceedings.

Third, even when a petitioner seeks to introduce new evidence that would entitle him to relief, AEDPA prohibits him from doing so, except in a narrow range of cases, unless he “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 435 (2000) (Michael Williams). Thus, § 2254(e)(2) provides:

“If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—

“(A) the claim relies on—

“(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to eases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

“(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

“(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”

In Michael Williams, we construed the opening clause of this provision — which triggers the bar on evidentiary hearings — to apply when “there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”2 Id., at 432. AEDPA thus bars an evidentiary hearing for a nondiligent petitioner unless the petitioner can *210satisfy both §§ 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B), which few petitioners can. Section 2254(e)(2) in this way incentivizes state petitioners to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court.

To the limited extent that federal evidentiary hearings are available under AEDPA, they ensure that petitioners who diligently developed the factual basis of their claims in state court, discovered new evidence after the state-court proceeding, and cannot return to state court retain the ability to access the Great Writ. See ante, at 203-204 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed area of law, it did so without losing sight of the fact that the ‘writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights.’” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000)). Allowing a petitioner to introduce new evidence at a hearing in the limited circumstance permitted by § 2254(e)(2) does not upset the balance that Congress struck in AEDPA between the state and federal courts. By construing § 2254(d)(1) to do the work of other provisions in AEDPA, the majority has subverted Congress’ careful balance of responsibilities. It has also created unnecessarily a brandnew set of procedural complexities that lower courts will have to confront.3

B

The majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) finds no support in the provision’s text or the statute’s structure as a whole.

1

Section 2254(d)(1) requires district courts to ask whether a state-court adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federál law, as determined by *211the Supreme Court of the United States. ” Beeause this provision uses “backward-looking language” — i. e., past-tense verbs — the majority believes that it limits review to the state-court record. Ante, at 182. But both §§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2) use “backward-looking language,” and § 2254(d)(2) — unlike § 2254(d)(1) — expressly directs district courts to base their review on “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” If use of the past tense were sufficient to indicate Congress’ intent to restrict analysis to the state-court record, the phrase “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” in §2254(d)(2) would be superfluous. The majority’s construction of § 2254(d)(1) fails to give meaning to Congress’ decision to include language referring to the evidence presented to the state court in § 2254(d)(2). Cf. Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

Ignoring our usual “reluctan[ee] to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting,” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), the majority characterizes the phrase appearing in § 2254(d)(2) as mere “clarifying language,” ante, at 185, n. 7. It speculates that “[t]he omission of clarifying language from § 2254(d)(1) just as likely reflects Congress’ belief that such language was unnecessary as it does anything else.” Ibid. The argument that this phrase is merely “clarifying” might have more force, however, had Congress included this phrase in § 2254(d)(1) but not in § 2254(d)(2). As between the two provisions, § 2254(d)(2) — which requires review of the state court’s “determination of the facts” — more logically depends on the facts presented to the state court. Because this provision needs less clarification on this point than *212§ 2254(d)(1), it is all the more telling that Congress included this phrase in § 2254(d)(2) but elected to exclude it from § 2254(d)(1).

Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I refuse to assume that Congress simply engaged in sloppy drafting. The inclusion of this phrase in § 2254(d)(2) — coupled with its omission from § 2254(d)(2)’s partner provision, § 2254(d)(1) — provides strong reason to think that Congress did not intend for the § 2254(d)(1) analysis to be limited categorically to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

2

The “ ‘broader context of the statute as a whole/ ” ante, at 182 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997)), reinforces this conclusion. In particular, Congress’ decision to include in AEDPA a provision, § 2254(e)(2), that permits federal evidentiary hearings in certain circumstances provides further evidence that Congress did not intend to limit the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry to the state-court record in every case.

We have long recognized that some diligent habeas petitioners are unable to develop all of the facts supporting their claims in state court.4 As discussed above, in enacting AEDPA, Congress generally barred evidentiary hearings for petitioners who did not “exercise diligence in pursuing their claims” in state court. Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 436; *213see also § 2254(e)(2). Importantly, it did not impose any express limit on evidentiary hearings for petitioners who had been diligent in state court. See id., at 436 (“[T]he statute does not equate prisoners who exercise diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not”). For those petitioners, Congress left the decision to hold a hearing “to the sound discretion of district courts.” Landrigan, 550 U. S., at 473.

Faced with situations in which a diligent petitioner offers additional evidence in federal court, the courts of appeals have taken two approaches to applying § 2254(d)(1). Some courts have held that when a federal court admits new evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, § 2254(d)(1) does not apply at all and the federal court may review the claim de novo. See ante, at 184; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649, 653 (2004) (per curiam); see, e. g., Winston v. Kelly, 592 F. 3d 535, 555-556 (CA4 2010). I agree with the majority’s rejection of this approach. See ante, at 185. It would undermine the comity principles motivating AEDPA to decline to defer to a state-court adjudication of a claim because the state court, through no fault of its own, lacked all the relevant evidence.5

Other Courts of Appeals, including the court below, have struck a more considered balance. These courts have held that § 2254(d)(1) continues to apply but that new evidence properly presented in a federal hearing is relevant to the *214reasonableness of the state-court decision. See Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F. 3d 651, 668 (CA9 2009) (en banc) (“If the evidence is admissible under Michael Williams or § 2254(e)(2), and if it does not render the petitioner’s claims unexhausted ..., then it is properly considered in evaluating whether the legal conclusion reached by the state habeas court was a reasonable application of Supreme Court law”); accord, Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F. 3d 490, 500 (CA2 2009); Pecoraro v. Walls, 286 F. 3d 439, 443 (CA7 2002); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F. 3d 941, 952 (CA5 2001). This approach accommodates the competing goals, reflected in §§ 2254(d) and 2254(e)(2), of according deference to reasonable state-court decisions and preserving the opportunity for diligent petitioners to present evidence to the federal court when they were unable to do so in state court.

The majority charts a third, novel course that, so far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted: Section 2254(d)(1) continues to apply when a petitioner has additional evidence that he was unable to present to the state court, but the district court cannot consider that evidence in deciding whether the petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(1). The problem with this approach is its potential to bar federal habeas relief for diligent habeas petitioners who cannot present new evidence to a state court.

Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently attempted in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The state court denied relief on the ground that the withheld evidence then known did not rise to the level of materiality required under Brady. Before the time for filing a federal habeas petition has expired, however, a state court orders the State to disclose additional documents the petitioner had timely requested under the State’s public records Act. The disclosed documents reveal that the State withheld other exculpatory witness statements, but state law would not per*215mit the petitioner to present the new evidence in a successive petition.6

Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his Brady claim to the state court at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted, and the petitioner could attempt to show cause and prejudice to overcome the default. See Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 444; see also n. 1, supra. If, however, the new evidence merely bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is unclear how the petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s holding. What may have been a reasonable decision on the state-court record may no longer be reasonable in light of the new evidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 436 (1995) (materiality of Brady evidence is viewed “collectively, not item by item”). Because the state court adjudicated the petitioner’s Brady claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) would still apply. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court is now prohibited from considering the new evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state-court decision.

The majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) thus suggests the anomalous result that petitioners with new claims based on newly obtained evidence can obtain federal habeas relief if they can show cause and prejudice for their default but petitioners with newly obtained evidence supporting a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court cannot obtain federal habeas relief if they cannot first satisfy § 2254(d)(1) without the new evidence. That the majority’s interpretation leads to this anomaly is good reason to conclude that its interpretation is wrong. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1992) (“ [I]t is . . . irrational to distinguish between failing to properly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state court to properly develop such a claim”).

*216The majority responds to this anomaly by suggesting that my hypothetical petitioner “may well [have] a new claim.”7 Ante, at 186, n. 10. This suggestion is puzzling. New evidence does not usually give rise to a new claim; it merely provides additional proof of a claim already adjudicated on the merits.8 The majority presumably means to suggest that the petitioner might be able to obtain federal-court review of his new evidence if he can show cause and prejudice for his failure to present the “new” claim to a state court. In that scenario, however, the federal court would review the purportedly “new” claim de novo. The majority’s approach thus threatens to replace deferential review of new evidence under § 2254(d)(1) with de novo review of new evidence in the form of “new” claims.9 Because it is unlikely that Congress intended de novo review — the result suggested by the majority’s opinion — it must have intended for district courts to consider newly discovered evidence in conducting the § 2254(d)(1) analysis.

The majority’s reading of § 2254(d)(1) appears ultimately to rest on its understanding that state courts must have the first opportunity to adjudicate habeas petitioners’ claims. See ante, at 182 (“It would be contrary to [AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement] to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in *217the first instance effectively de novo”).10 Justice Breyer takes the same position. See ante, at 206 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (AEDPA is designed “to give the State a first opportunity to consider most matters”). I fully agree that habeas petitioners must attempt to present evidence to state courts in the first instance, as does Justice Alito, see ante, at 203-204. Where I disagree with the majority is in my understanding that § 2254(e)(2) already accomplishes this result. By reading § 2254(d)(1) to do the work of § 2254(e)(2), the majority gives § 2254(e)(2) an unnaturally cramped reading. As a result, the majority either has foreclosed habeas relief for diligent petitioners who, through no fault of their own, were unable to present exculpatory evidence to the state court that adjudicated their claims or has created a new set of procedural complexities for the lower courts to navigate to ensure the availability of the Great Writ for diligent petitioners.

3

These considerations lead me to agree with the Courts of Appeals that have concluded that a federal court should assess the reasonableness of a state court’s application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) in light of evidence properly admitted in a federal evidentiary hearing. There is nothing “strange” about this approach. Ante, at 182. Under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts routinely engage in analysis that the state court itself might never have conducted or did not conduct. For example, when a state court summarily denies a claim without explanation, as the California Supreme Court did here, district courts must deny habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) so long as “there is any reasonable argument” supporting the denial of the petitioner’s *218claim. Harrington, 562 U. S., at 105. We likewise ask whether a state-court decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when the state court issued a reasoned decision but failed to cite federal law altogether. See Early v. Packer, 537 U. S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Determining whether a state court could reasonably have denied a petitioner relief in light of newly discovered evidence is not so different than determining whether there is any reasonable basis for a state court’s unreasoned decision.

Admittedly, the text of § 2254(d)(1), standing alone, does not compel either reading of that provision. But construing § 2254(d)(1) to permit consideration of evidence properly introduced in federal court best accords with the text of § 2254(d)(2) and AEDPA’s structure as a whole. By interpreting § 2254(d)(1) to prevent nondiligent petitioners from gaming the system — the very purpose of § 2254(e)(2) — the majority potentially has put habeas relief out of reach for diligent petitioners with meritorious claims based on new evidence.

C

The majority claims that its holding is “consistent” with our case law. Ante, at 182. Quite the opposite is true: Orneases reflect our previous understanding that evidence properly admitted pursuant to § 2254(e)(2) is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) analysis.

In Landrigan, Justice Thomas, the author of today’s opinion, confirmed this understanding of the interplay between §§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(e)(2). As noted above, we admonished district courts to consider whether a petitioner’s allegations, if proved true, would satisfy § 2254(d) in determining whether to grant a hearing. After highlighting the deference owed to state courts under §§ 2254(d) and 2254(e)(1), we stated:

“In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing *219could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Because the deferential standards prescribed by §2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” 550 U. S., at 474 (citation omitted).

By instructing district courts to consider the § 2254(d) standards in deciding whether to grant a hearing, we must have understood that the evidence admitted at a hearing could be considered in the § 2254(d)(1) analysis. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 9 (“The whole point of Landrigan’s admonition that the court must decide whether to hold a hearing with an eye on § 2254(d)(1) is that some proffers of evidence will not justify federal fact-finding in view of § 2254(d)(1), but that other proffers of proof will”).11

In Michael Williams, the warden argued that § 2254(e)(2) bars an evidentiary hearing whenever a petitioner was unable to develop the factual record in state court, “whether or not through his own fault or neglect.” 529 U. S., at 430. Under the warden’s argument, a petitioner who did not develop the record in state court, whatever the reason, would be barred from presenting evidence to the federal court. In rejecting that argument, we observed:

“A prisoner who developed his claim in state court and can prove the state court’s decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ is not barred from obtaining relief *220by § 2254(d)(1). If the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) covers a request for an evidentiary hearing on a claim which was pursued with diligence but remained undeveloped in state court because, for instance, the prosecution concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear and convincing evidence of innocence could be barred from a hearing on the claim even if he could satisfy § 2254(d).” Id., at 434 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

A petitioner in the latter situation would almost certainly be unable to “satisfy § 2254(d)” without introducing the concealed facts in federal court. This passage thus reflects our understanding that, in some circumstances, a petitioner might need an evidentiary hearing in federal court to prove the facts necessary to satisfy § 2254(d). To avoid foreclosing habeas relief for such petitioners, we concluded that § 2254(e)(2) could not bear the warden’s “harsh reading,” which essentially would have held petitioners strictly at fault for their inability to develop the facts in state court. Ibid. The majority today gives an equally “harsh reading” to § 2254(d)(1) to achieve the result we rejected in Michael Williams.12

None of the other cases cited by the majority supports its result. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000) (Terry Williams), we interpreted § 2254(d)(1) to ask whether the state-court decision “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., *221at 413. However, we had no reason to decide whether the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry was limited to the state-court record, as the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in that case. See id., at 372.

In Holland v. Jackson, we stated that “we have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.” 542 U, S., at 652. In the next sentence, however, we observed that the evidence at issue “could have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing by the District Court, but only if respondent was not at fault in failing to develop that evidence in state court.” Id., at 652-653. We proceeded to find that the evidence was not properly admitted under § 2254(e)(2) before concluding that the Court of Appeals had erred in its § 2254(d)(1) analysis. Id., at 653; see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U. S. 74, 79 (2005) (per curiam).

In sum, our cases reflect our recognition that it is sometimes appropriate to consider new evidence in deciding whether a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d)(1). In reading our precedent to require the opposite conclusion, the majority disregards the concerns that motivated our decision in Michael Williams: Some petitioners, even if diligent, may be unable to develop the factual record in state court through no fault of their own. We should not interpret § 2254(d)(1) to foreclose these diligent petitioners from accessing the Great Writ when the state court will not consider the new evidence and could not reasonably have reached the same conclusion with the new evidence before it.

II

I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Pinholster had satisfied § 2254(d)(1) on the basis of the state-court record.13

*222A

The majority omits critical details relating to the performance of Pinholster’s trial counsel, the mitigating evidence they failed to discover, and the history of these proceedings. I therefore highlight several aspects of the facts and history of this case.

1

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court instructed the jury to return six days later for the penalty phase. This prompted discussion at sidebar regarding whether the State had provided notice of its intent to offer aggravating evidence. Pinholster’s court-appointed attorney, Wilbur Dettmar, argued that the State should be precluded from offering aggravating evidence:

“I am not presently prepared to offer anything by way of mitigation. If I was going to proceed on mitigation, the people would have the right to rebuttal with or without notice.

“I took the position, since the people had not given notice, I had not prepared any evidence by way of mitigation. I would submit it on that basis.” 52 Reporter’s Tr. 7250 (hereinafter Tr.) (emphasis added).

*223Undoubtedly anticipating that counsel might need additional time to prepare an adequate mitigation defense, the court asked Dettmar whether a continuance would be helpful in the event it ruled against him. He declined the offer on the spot, stating: “I think we would probably still go forward on Monday. Clearly the one person that comes to mind is the defendant’s mother. How much beyond that I don’t know. I don’t think the pa[ss]age of time would make a great deal of difference.” Id., at 7257-7258. After hearing testimony, the court denied Pinholster’s motion to preclude aggravating evidence.

At the penalty phase, defense counsel called only one witness: Pinholster’s mother, Burnice Brashear. Brashear testified that Pinholster “never really wanted for anything at home too much” and “had everything normally materialwise that most people have.” Id., at 7395. She said that Pinholster was “different” from his siblings, whom she characterized as “basically very good children.” Id., at 7401-7402. Pinholster, she said, had a “friendly” relationship with his stepfather, although his stepfather “sometimes would lose his temper” with Pinholster, who “had a mind of his own.” Id., at 7392-7393; see also id., at 7393 (stating that his stepfather was “at times” “abusive or near abusive”).

Brashear provided brief testimony regarding Pinholster’s childhood. She described two car accidents — one when she ran over him in the driveway and one when he went through the windshield. Id., at 7389-7391. She stated that he started failing school in the first grade and that the school eventually “sent him to [an] educationally handicapped class.” Id., at 7393-7394. When Pinholster was 10, a psychologist recommended placing him in a mental institution, but she “didn’t think he was that far gone.” Id., at 7395. A few years later, she testified, he spent six months in a state hospital for emotionally handicapped children. Id., at 7402.

According to Brashear, Pinholster had suffered from epilepsy since age 18, when he was beaten in jail. Id., at 7397. *224She said that her family doctor, Dr. Dubin, had given him medication to treat the epilepsy. Ibid. Brashear also suggested that Pinholster did not have long to live, stating that he had “a chip in his head floating around” and that “they don’t think — he won’t be here very much longer anyway.”14 Ibid.

In closing argument, the prosecutor ridiculed Brashear’s testimony. See 53 id., at 7442 (“She said his stepfather disciplined him. So what? I am sure you have all disciplined your children. I was disciplined myself”); ibid. (“He was run over by a car when he was three years old. That’s very unfortunate. There is no evidence of any brain damage. A lot of children get dropped, fall from their cribs or whatever”); id., at 7444-7445 (“I submit to you that if this defendant truly had epilepsy,... a doctor would have been brought in to tell you that. Medical records, something”). The prosecutor also highlighted Brashear’s testimony about Pin-holster’s stable home environment, arguing: “He came from a good home. You heard that he was not a deprived child. Had many things going for him, probably more than many children.” Id., at 7442.

Notwithstanding the meager mitigation case presented by Pinholster’s counsel, it took the jury two days to reach a decision to sentence Pinholster to death. His counsel later moved to modify the sentence to life imprisonment. In denying the motion, the trial judge stated: “The evidence which the defense offered concerning the defendant’s extenuation was merely some testimony from his mother that was not persuasive. His mother did not, in the court’s opinion, present any evidence which the court would find to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. No witnesses supplied such evidence.” 54 id., at 7514.

*2252

After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Pinholster filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court alleging, among other things, that his counsel had “unreasonably failed to investigate, prepare and present available mitigating evidence during penalty phase.” Record ER-103.

Pinholster’s state-court petition included 121 exhibits. In a series of declarations, his trial attorney Harry Brainard (who had by then been disbarred) confirmed what Dettmar had forthrightly told the trial court: Brainard and Dettmar neither expected nor prepared to present mitigation evidence.15 See id., at ER-333 (“Mr. Dettmar and I did not prepare a case in mitigation. We felt there would be no penalty phase hearing inasmuch as we did not receive written notice of evidence in aggravation pursuant to Penal Code §190.3”). Brainard further confirmed what was apparent from the mitigation case they eventually put on: They conducted virtually no mitigation investigation. See id., at ER-182 (“I have no recollection of Mr. Dettmar having secured or reviewed any of Scott’s medical records, nor did I see any of Scott’s medical records. So far as I recollect, neither Mr. Dettmar nor myself interviewed any of Scott’s previous medical providers”); id., at ER-183 (“I do not recall interviewing or attempting to interview Scott’s family members or any other persons regarding penalty phase testimony, except Mrs. Brashears [sic]”); ibid. (“I have no recollection of seeing or attempting to secure Scott’s school records, juvenile records, medical records, or records of prior placements”); ibid. (“I have no recollection of interviewing or attempting to interview Scott’s former school teachers, counselors, or juvenile officers”).16

*226Statements by relatives (none of whom trial counsel had attempted to interview regarding Pinholster’s background) and documentary evidence revealed that the picture of Pin-holster’s family life painted by his mother at trial was false. Pinholster was “raised in chaos and poverty.” Id., at ER-312. A relative remembered seeing the children mix together flour and water in an attempt to get something to eat. Pinholster’s stepfather beat him several times a week, including at least once with a two-by-four board. “There was so much violence in [the] home” that Pinholster’s brother “dreaded coming home each day.” Id., at ER-313. Pinholster’s half sister was removed from the home as a result of a beating by his stepfather.

Documentary evidence showed, directly contrary to Bra-shear’s trial testimony, that Pinholster’s siblings had very troubled pasts. Pinholster’s elder brother was arrested for armed burglary, robbery, and forcible rape of a 14-year-old with a deadly weapon. While in custody, he was diagnosed as “catatonic-like” and “acutely psychotic, probably suffering some type of schizophrenia.” Id., at ER-219, ER-224. He later committed suicide.17 Pinholster’s half sister, a recovering alcoholic, had been made a ward of the juvenile court for prostitution and forcible sexual battery on a 14-year-old.

Pinholster’s petition and exhibits described a long history of emotional disturbance and neurological problems. A former schoolteacher stated that, as a child, Pinholster “seemed incapable of relating either to his peers or to adults,” that “[i]t was even hard to maintain eye contact with him,” and that “[h]is hyperactivity was so extreme that [she] formed the opinion it probably had an organic base.” Id., at ER-231. School records revealed that he “talk[ed] to self continuously,” had “many grimaces,” fought in his sleep, and could *227“control self for only 1 hour per day.” Id., at EE-230, EE-233. He “show[ed] progressive deterioration each semester since Kindergarten.” Id., at ER-230. School officials recommended placement in a school for emotionally handicapped students and referral to a neurologist. At age 9, he had an abnormal EEG, revealing “an organic basis for his behavior.” Id., at EE-157, ER-234. Just months before the homicides, a doctor recommended placement in the Hope Psychiatric Institute, but this did not occur.

This and other evidence attached to the petition was summarized in a declaration by Dr. George Woods. Dr. Woods opined that Pinholster “suffered] from severe and long standing seizure disorders,” id., at EE-156, that his childhood head traumas “may have been the precipitating factors for [his] seizure disorder,” id., at ER-157, and that he suffered from bipolar mood disorder. He pointed to trial testimony that immediately before the burglary on the night of the homicides, Pinholster announced that he “'ha[d] a message from God’” — which Dr. Woods believed to reflect “[a]uditory hallucinations” and “severe psychosis.” Id., at ER-169. He concluded that at the time of the homicides Pinholster “was suffering from bipolar mood disorder with psychotic ideation and was suffering a complex partial seizure.” Id., at ER-170. He also observed that Pinholster’s “grossly dysfunctional family, the abuse he received as a child, his history of suffering from substantial seizure and mood disorders, his frequently untreated psychiatric and psychological disabilities and his educational handicaps were relevant circumstances which would extenuate the gravity of the crime.” Id., at ER-171.

On the basis of Pinholster’s submission, the California Supreme Court denied Pinholster’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Pinholster then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court. He included an additional exhibit: a declaration by Dr. John Stalberg, a psychiatrist who had hastily examined *228Pinholster and produced a two-page report in the middle of the original trial.18 After reviewing the new material collected by Pinholster’s habeas counsel, Dr. Stalberg stated that the available evidence showed a familial history of “severe psychiatric disorders,” “a history of seizure disorders of unknown etiology,” “repeated head traumas,” “an abnormal EEG,” and “evidence of mental disturbance during Mr. Pin-holster’s childhood and some degree of brain damage.” Id., at ER-493. He also opined that “there [was] voluminous mitigating evidence which includes a childhood of physical abuse, emotional neglect, and a family history of mental illness and criminal behavior.” Id., at ER-494.

The District Court stayed the federal proceedings while Pinholster sought state-court review of claims the District Court deemed unexhausted. Pinholster’s second habeas submission to the California Supreme Court included Stalberg’s declaration. That court summarily denied Pinholster’s petition on the merits.

Pinholster returned to Federal District Court and filed an amended petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court concluded that Pinholster had demonstrated deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.19 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. 590 F. 3d 651.

*229B

As the majority notes, Pinholster’s claim arises under Strickland v. Washington. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [under Strickland] must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”