TMTV, CORP. v. Mass Productions, Inc.

          United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit

Nos. 09-1439, 09-1956

                            TMTV, CORP.,

              Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

                                 v.

MASS PRODUCTIONS, INC.; EMMANUEL LOGROÑO, a/k/a Sunshine Logroño;
      GILDA SANTINI; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP LOGROÑO-SANTINI,

             Defendants, Appellants/Cross-Appellees.


          APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

          [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]


                              Before
                      Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                   Souter,* Associate Justice,
                    and Selya, Circuit Judge.


     María D. Trelles-Hernández and Néstor M. Méndez-Gómez with
whom Pietrantoni Mendez & Alvarez LLP, John F. Nevares and John F.
Nevares and Associates PSC were on brief for defendants,
appellants/cross-appellees.
     Roberto Sueiro-Del Valle with whom Roberto Sueiro Del Valle
Law Offices, Freddie Oscar Torres-Gomez and Law Office of Roberto
Sueiro were on brief for plaintiff, appellee/cross-appellant.


                            June 13, 2011




     *
      The Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
             BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.     Before us are cross-appeals in a

decade-long copyright dispute concerning two sitcoms on Puerto

Rican television.       On one side is TMTV, Corp., a successor in

interest to the first sitcom's production company; on the other,

the second sitcom's production company, Mass Productions, Inc., and

its    principals--including   the    star       of   both   shows,    Emmanuel

"Sunshine" Logroño. The district court granted summary judgment to

TMTV on its claim charging infringement; and a jury granted it

substantial damages, which the district court reduced by an amount

recovered by TMTV in settlement of related litigation.

             A summary of events and prior proceedings will suffice.

In 1997, Antonio Mojena--an established television producer in

Puerto Rico--approached two veteran entertainers--Sunshine Logroño

and Iris Chacón--about co-hosting a variety show on Puerto Rican

television.     The show would be called De Noche con Iris y Sunshine

and would begin with four two-hour episodes, continuing thereafter

if    it   proved   popular.   Chacón      and    Logroño    both     agreed   to

participate.

             During Mojena's initial pitch, he and Logroño discussed

filling some of the two-hour episodes of De Noche con Iris y

Sunshine with comedy segments.        To that end, Logroño arranged a

meeting in late September or early October 1997 with a team of

comedians     and   scriptwriters,    including       scriptwriters     Roberto

Jiménez and Miguel Morales; Jiménez had worked with Logroño before,


                                     -2-
while Morales had not.   At the meeting Jiménez suggested a sitcom

centered on a condominium building and its residents.       Logroño

approved of the idea of setting a comedy segment in a condominium

building, and the title 20 Pisos de Historia ("20 Pisos") was

chosen.

          The session produced a number of suggestions for dramatis

personae, many modeled on preexisting characters taken from other

projects involving the team.    For example, a focus of the sitcom

was to be a gossipy security guard in the lobby named "Vázquez,"

who was based on a character Logroño played in a comedy segment in

a previous television special, Sunshine a la BBQ. "Soto," an older

woman living alone, was drawn from a character in another prior

Logroño show, La Tripletta.    These and like adaptations were used

when the sitcom was aired.

          After this discussion of ideas, Logroño asked Morales to

write scripts for two of the first three episodes of 20 Pisos and

Jiménez to write the third.     Logroño's recollection was that he

framed the plots of all three, and Morales and Jiménez merely

prepared dialogue to conform to Logroño's storylines. By contrast,

Morales claims that he wrote the two scripts at home, by himself,

based on the general concepts aired at the meeting; similarly,

Jiménez claims to have taken the general ideas from the session and

fixed them in writing for the first time.




                                 -3-
            The writers delivered their scripts to Logroño, who

retyped all three using special screen-writing software.     On the

cover pages, Logroño listed Morales as the author of episodes one

and three and Jiménez as the author of episode two.   Logroño claims

to have made substantial changes in the scripts given to him, but

the trail of drafts shows only minimal editing.   And while Logroño

appears to have co-written a number of later scripts for 20 Pisos,

these reflected themes and characters set up in the first three

episodes.

            The first episode of 20 Pisos aired on the inaugural

broadcast of the variety show, De Noche con Iris y Sunshine, on

November 7, 1997. The show was produced by Creative Relief Corp.--

a business wholly owned by Mojena--and broadcast in Puerto Rico by

the WKAQ television station, an affiliate of the Telemundo network.

The early episodes were successful and the variety show--and the 20

Pisos sitcom within it--became a recurring weekly program for

almost two years (although renamed after Chacón left).

            In December 1999, Logroño decamped from WKAQ for a rival

television station--WAPA, an affiliate of Televicentro--where he

starred in a new sitcom produced by Mass Productions (a company

controlled by Logroño and his wife), titled El Condominio. The new

show, which began airing on WAPA in March 2000, featured many of

the same actors as 20 Pisos.   The show retained the old characters

and the sitcom unfolded in a virtually identical condominium


                                 -4-
setting,       although      new   stories    were    developed     and   some   new

characters added.

               On March 15, 2000, TMTV brought a copyright infringement

action in federal district court against Logroño, his wife, and

their production company, Mass Productions.1                  The suit sought a

declaratory         judgment    and    various    other    legal    and   equitable

remedies. Logroño filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting that

he was the sole owner of the copyright to the outlines, scripts,

and characters used for 20 Pisos and that he was owed royalty

payments for the use of these properties by TMTV.

               In   due     course,   the    district     court    granted    summary

judgment in the plaintiff's favor.                TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods.,

Inc. (TMTV I), 345 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D.P.R. 2004).                   The court held

that Morales and Jiménez had authored the first three scripts of 20

Pisos       pursuant   to    valid    work-for-hire     agreements     with   TMTV's

predecessor in interest and that all later episodes of 20 Pisos

were derivative of the first three.                     Id. at 204-08.         As to

infringement, the district court found 20 Pisos and El Condominio

virtually identical.           Id. at 213.

               In December 2004, a month or so after this decision,

Televicentro--the network on which El Condominio was broadcast--



        1
      TMTV is wholly owned by Mojena, who formed it from a
predecessor entity in January 1999. In February 1999, Creative
Relief--the initial production company for De Noche con Iris y
Sunshine--assigned its putative copyrights to TMTV.

                                            -5-
sought unsuccessfully to intervene and to have the partial summary

judgment set aside. In August 2005, TMTV sought to consolidate its

own suit with two others now pending before another district judge:

an infringement suit by TMTV against Televicentro for broadcasting

El Condominio and a suit against TMTV by a group of actors claiming

copyright in the characters they had portrayed in 20 Pisos.     This

motion too was denied.

          Thereafter, Logroño made his own failed attempt to undo

the liability ruling against the defendants by claiming that the

scriptwriters' work-for-hire agreements with TMTV were invalid.

TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods., Inc. (TMTV II), 453 F. Supp. 2d 378,

382-83 (D.P.R. 2006). He also sought, unsuccessfully, to forestall

a trial on damages by arguing that a private intervening settlement

of the suit by TMTV against Televicentro meant that any further

award to TMTV would be an impermissible double recovery.

          Prior to the trial, TMTV elected to claim only its actual

damages (and not the defendants' profits or statutory damages).

See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).     TMTV's expert witness, economist

Michael Einhorn, estimated damages as at least $4.9 million, based

on licensing fees TMTV allegedly would have earned but for the

infringement by the defendants; this was measured in part by

licensing fees actually earned by another comparable sitcom on

Puerto Rican television.   The jury awarded TMTV $772,079.29.




                                -6-
              Following the verdict, the district court, over TMTV's

objection, reduced the award by $700,000, representing the amount

that TMTV had received in settlement from Televicentro.            The court

awarded TMTV prejudgment interest at the local-court rate of 5

percent per annum on the original jury verdict up through the date

of the Televicentro settlement and, from then on, on the much

smaller balance.       Finally, the court denied TMTV's request for

attorneys' fees as barred by the registration requirement of the

Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 412.

              Both parties filed timely appeals, and we begin with

Logroño's challenges to the summary judgment--most importantly, his

attack   on    the   infringement   ruling   against   him   and    his   co-

defendants.      That ruling in turn required that TMTV show both

ownership of a validly copyrighted work and improper copying of the

protected elements of that work.      Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater

Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).           Our review of the

summary judgment ruling is de novo.

              Since TMTV's claim to copyright runs through Jiménez and

Morales, the first question is whether they or Logroño should be

viewed as the creator of the original scripts. Jiménez and Morales

say that once the condominium setting was agreed upon, they wrote

the initial three scripts, framing the plots and dialogue and

drawing in part on stock characters used in previous projects in




                                    -7-
which the team had participated. Logroño says that he outlined the

plots and rewrote the scripts.

            Ordinarily, a credibility contest means that the case

must be tried but, in this instance, Logroño's claim to have

substantially rewritten the scripts is refuted by comparing the

originals   and   the   final   product.    As   for   Logroño's   supposed

outlining of the plots, he has pointed to no writing--neither any

written outline by him nor any notes taken by anyone at the

original meeting--that reflects anything like an outline of the

scripts.    At best, Logroño's version would mean that he suggested

some general ideas for plots and possible stock characters for the

initial scripts.

            One of the axiomatic requirements for copyright is that

the author's work be "fixed."      17 U.S.C. § 102(a).     Copyright is a

protection afforded to the definite expression of ideas but not the

ideas themselves.       See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.

Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.,

13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994).        On this record, the district

court properly found that there was no case on liability for a

jury.    Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).2



     2
      Nimmer raises the possibility of joint authorship in a case
where one party supplies the plot ideas and another writes them
down, 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07[A][3][a],
at 6-21 (rev. ed. 2009); but it is not certain that this suggestion
is consistent with authorities like Reid and anyway Logroño is not
arguing that the parties aimed at joint authorship.

                                    -8-
           Logroño claims to have suggested the security guard and

other characters; but nothing in the record indicates that they had

the delineation needed to make them subject to copyright.            Stock

characters, like stock scènes à faire, are not subject to copyright

protection.     Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121

(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); 1 P. Goldstein,

Goldstein on Copyright § 2.7.2, at 2:91-93 (3d ed. 2005); cf.

Coquico, Inc. v. Rodríguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.

2009).   So even if Logroño suggested      general plot ideas and stock

characters, his claim to authorship of the scripts still fails.

           Positing Jiménez and Morales as the authors, ownership

must still be traced to TMTV.        Although the copyright ordinarily

vests in the initial author or authors, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), TMTV

claims that the three scripts fall within the work "made for hire"

rubric, id. § 201(b), meaning that the original production company

would be considered the author. The district court agreed and, the

original production company having assigned its rights to TMTV, the

court treated TMTV as the copyright owner.        TMTV II, 453 F. Supp.

2d at 381-82; TMTV I, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 206-07.

           Jiménez and Morales confirmed in depositions that this

was their own oral understanding with the production company; but

the   statute   requires   express    agreement   in   a   signed   written

instrument, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition); and the circuits are

divided as to whether the language and policy require the writing


                                     -9-
before the creation or at least the completion of the work.3                            But

even assuming that the rights remained with the scriptwriters,

before      this       case    began    they     conveyed    (in    writing,    17   U.S.C.

§ 204(a)) whatever rights they had to TMTV.                         We may rely on this

assignment even though the district court did not.                        Torres v. E.I.

Dupont de Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2000).

                 Logroño next argues that he participated heavily in

writing later scripts and that the district court's conclusion that

these scripts were derivative works of the first three was cursory

and unsupported.              See TMTV I, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 207-08.             But this

was not his theory in the district court and so is forfeit,

Santiago-Sepúlveda v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.), No. 09-2312,

2011 WL 1548933, *3 (1st Cir. Apr. 26, 2011); nor, given the full

scale development of the show in the first three scripts, would

this new take be persuasive.

                 The     second        element     in   the        liability    claim    is

infringement, which requires proof that actual copying occurred and

that       the   copying       was     so   extensive       that    the   two   works   are

"substantially similar."                 Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co.,



       3
      Compare Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d
410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992) (written work-for-hire agreement must
precede creation of work), and Gladwell Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Cnty.
of Marin, 265 F. App'x 624, 626 (9th Cir. 2007) (same), with
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir.) (written
agreement might postdate creation if "memorializing" earlier oral
agreement), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995). See also 1 Nimmer
& Nimmer, supra, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-56.

                                               -10-
207 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000).

However, Logroño obviously had access to the original scripts and

based El Condominio upon them, bringing with him a number of the

actors.    The   initial        episode    of   El   Condominio      mentioned     the

characters'    move    to   a    new    building;     and     the    El    Condominio

advertising    campaign     invited       viewers    to   reconnect        with   their

favorite characters at a new location.

           So copying is not in doubt and the issue is substantial

similarity, which requires comparing the expressive elements of the

copyrighted work contributed by the author--the components alone

subject   to   copyright    protection--with          those    of    the    allegedly

infringing work.      Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 33.                No infringement

claim lies if the similarity between two works rests necessarily on

non-copyrightable      aspects     of     the   original--for        example,     "the

underlying ideas, or expressions that are not original with the

plaintiff." Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1998);

accord Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).

           Infringement can occur where--without copying a single

line--the later author borrows wholesale the entire backdrop,

characters, inter-relationships, genre, and plot design of an

earlier work.4        Imagine, for example, that the first Sherlock


     4
      Such an ensemble may be protected by copyright, when reduced
to expression in a book or script, even though it may itself
contain non-copyrightable elements, such as stock characters
borrowed from prior works. See, e.g., Barris/Fraser Enters. v.
Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 5037 (EW), 1988 WL 3013,

                                        -11-
Holmes stories had been penned and copyrighted last year by Sir

Arthur Conan Doyle, and Logroño had then written his own sequels

carrying everything forward into a new plot.    See, e.g., Anderson

v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *8 (C.D. Cal.

Apr. 25, 1989).   Here, we agree with the district court that

          the similarities between the two programs are
          so striking that there is no doubt that "El
          Condominio"   is   .  .   .  an   unauthorized
          derivative work.     In effect . . . both
          programs are the same with only a difference
          in name and transmitted via a different
          channel. Specifically, the setting, character
          names,   costumes,   character  interactions,
          comedy line, mood, [and] camera angles are
          almost identical in both sitcoms.

TMTV I, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 213.

          Logroño's claimed differences between the two shows are

not significant. For example, although the action in El Condominio

unfolds largely in a condominium building lobby virtually identical

to the lobby setting in 20 Pisos, the second sitcom also added some

scenes in a laundry room and the handyman's space; so, too, some

characters are given more dialogue or minor variations in character

traits (e.g., a new hearing problem).    Such trivial modifications

are not a defense.   Cf. Coquico, 562 F.3d at 68; Matthews, 157 F.3d

at 28.



at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1988) ("[E]ven though a television game
show is made up entirely of stock devices, an original selection,
organization, and presentation of such devices can nevertheless be
protected, just as it is the original combination of words or notes
that leads to a protectible book or song.").

                                -12-
           Liability for copyright violation being established, we

turn to damages. The jury awarded $772,079, but the district judge

reduced this figure by $700,000 for the settlement payment TMTV

received from Televicentro. Logroño argues that all of the damages

awarded by the jury should have been erased by the settlement;

TMTV, as cross-appellant, claims that none of the damages awarded

by the jury should have been reduced by the settlement payment.

           The     acts   of   infringement       by   the   defendants   and   by

Televicentro are not identical but they are entangled: Logroño and

his   production    company    produced     the    infringing    El   Condominio

programs and Televicentro broadcast them.                In this case, TMTV's

theory of damages at trial was that the infringement diverted from

TMTV potential licensing royalties; this was patently a claim for

plaintiff's damages rather than defendants' profits.5

           We start with the defendants' claims.                 The defendants

make two different arguments for their view that the prior TMTV-

Televicentro settlement barred any recovery at trial. The first is

that the settlement constituted a release of claims against any

available party who could be charged with infringement based on the

same episode; the second, that the judgment entered upon the


      5
      The Copyright Act of 1976 allows a party who recovers its
actual damages to recover any profits made by the infringers, at
least to the extent that the infringers' profits are not already
"taken into account in computing the actual damages." 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(b); see also 4 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, § 14.01[A], at 14-7.
TMTV agreed before trial to drop any claim it may have had to
recover the defendants' profits.

                                     -13-
settlement is res judicata, precluding any further claims against

the defendants.

            Older common law doctrine tended toward the view that a

settlement with one tortfeasor extinguished claims against other

joint tortfeasors responsible for the same harm--although who was

a joint tortfeasor and what constituted the same harm could be

fraught questions; but the modern view is strongly in favor of

treating a settlement with one joint tortfeasor as releasing the

others    only   if   the   parties   to     the   settlement   so   intended;

otherwise, the settlement becomes an offset against later judgments

if needed to avoid double recovery.6

            The TMTV-Televicentro settlement, as an agreement, is

arguably interpreted under Puerto Rico law, Great Clips, Inc. v.

Hair Cuttery of Greater Bos., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir.

2010), although federal law might be thought to bear on whether a

federal judgment incorporating a settlement should reduce a later

federal judgment on a federal claim, Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co.,

878 F.2d 596, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024

(1990).    But the question of which law applies is academic here,




     6
      See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 343-47 (1971) (release); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S.
202, 207-11 (1994) (credit for settlement).          See generally
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 (1982); Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 885-886 (1979); W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts §§ 48-49, at 330-35 (5th ed. 1984).

                                      -14-
because both Puerto Rico and federal law follow the modern approach

in looking to the intent of those who made the settlement.7

          The   defendants   claim   that   TMTV's   acceptance   of   the

settlement payment bespeaks an intent to relinquish claims against

non-settling tortfeasors, absent an express reservation of rights.

In some situations, a settlement with a joint tortfeasor might

suggest such an intent, see Keeton, supra, § 49, at 335--for

example, a release discharging "any and all persons" potentially

liable on the stated claims.         But the opposite is often more

plausible: frequently, the plaintiff gives a break to the first

settling defendant, puts some money in the bank, and aims for a

higher judgment against non-settling defendants.         If the release

were for all, a larger settlement would be demanded.

          Here, the settlement itself was apparently oral and TMTV

denies any such intent to release others besides Televicentro. The

defendants--on whom the burden of proof falls to prove release,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)--point to nothing to suggest that Televicentro

had such an intent.   Indeed, the defendants do not even suggest a




     7
      Compare BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d
1271, 1276-79 (11th Cir. 2008), and Screen Gems-Columbia Music,
Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 552, 554 & n.2 (2d Cir.
1972), with Vernet v. Serrano-Torres, 566 F.3d 254, 260-61 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citing Merle v. West Bend Co., 97 P.R. Dec. 403
(1969)), Río Mar Assocs., LP v. UHS of P.R., Inc., 522 F.3d 159,
164-67 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Szendrey v. Hospicare, 158 P.R. Dec.
648 (2003)), and Ortiz v. Banco Popular de P.R., 934 F. Supp. 29,
32 (D.P.R. 1996) (citing Merle, 97 P.R. Dec. 403).

                                 -15-
plausible reason why Televicentro should have wished to pay a

larger settlement in order to protect the defendants in this case.

           Turning then to the judgment entered pursuant to the

Televicentro settlement, it says that the $700,000 payment is made

"in   satisfaction   of   all   causes       of   action   identified   in   the

Complaint [against Televicentro] and its amendments."              The claims

in that complaint identified acts by Televicentro, including the

broadcast of episodes of El Condominio, as alleged violations of

TMTV's copyright based on the original scripts; but the complaint

asserted no claims against the present defendants based on their

production of the shows.

           A   judgment   has   the    meaning     (objectively   determined)

intended by the court that framed and entered it, cf. Concilio de

Salud Integral de Loíza, Inc. v. Perez-Perdomo, 625 F.3d 15, 19-20

(1st Cir. 2010); but where the judgment is based on a settlement,

courts may look to the intent of the settling parties, 18A C.

Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 4443, at 262 (2d ed. 2002); cf. Hermes Automation Tech., Inc. v.

Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co., 915 F.2d 739, 751 n.10 (1st Cir. 1990).

Here, nothing shows that either the judge who entered the prior

judgment or the parties to that case intended to release anyone

else.

           The result is the same if the settlement aspect is

ignored and formal res judicata rules are applied to the judgment.


                                      -16-
Because no issues were adjudicated in the settled case, issue

preclusion    is   irrelevant   and    the   concern    is   only   with   claim

preclusion. Classically, claim preclusion applies only where there

is (1) a prior final judgment on the merits (2) on the same or

sufficiently identical claims (3) between the same parties or their

privies.   Airframe Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st

Cir. 2010).

           Whether or not the defendants are treated as joint

tortfeasors, they were not parties to the settled case and are not

in privity with Televicentro.          See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.

880, 894 (2008). Claim preclusion extends beyond parties and their

privies only in unusual circumstances;8 consider, for example,                a

plaintiff, unsuccessful against an initial defendant, seeking to

litigate     identical   claims   against      new     but   closely   related

defendants. Negrón-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d

1, 10 (1st Cir. 2008).

           Eliminating entirely the party or privy condition would

require that whenever a plaintiff sued a defendant, the plaintiff

also sue in the same action all other defendants against whom the

plaintiff might have related claims.           No such compulsory joinder

requirement appears in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or



     8
      See FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Alt, 638 F.3d 70, 80-81 (1st
Cir. 2011); Airframe Sys., 601 F.3d at 17-18; In re El San Juan
Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Gambocz v.
Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 842 (3d Cir. 1972).

                                      -17-
elsewhere. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments, supra, § 49. If

such a rule were ever adopted--and this itself would be a debatable

choice--fairness      would       require    advance     warning      to   potential

plaintiffs and probably major qualifications on the requirement

itself.

            As for TMTV's objection to the offset, the modern view,

as already stated, is that an offset is conventional where needed

to prevent recovering twice for the same harm.                    There are other

solutions apart from a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the judgment

by   the   amount   of    the     settlement,     including      a    more   complex

proportional    regime      that    the     Supreme     Court   has    employed   in

admiralty cases.      See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 211-17; cf. Río Mar

Assocs., 522 F.3d at 166-67 (Puerto Rico law).                   But neither side

argues here that some other method should be used.

            Rather,      TMTV's    claim    is   that    the    reduction    is   not

warranted because (it asserts) the settlement was for a different

harm, in that Logroño prepared a derivative work, 17 U.S.C. §

106(2), while Televicentro publicly transmitted it, id. § 106(4).

True, some of the infringing acts differed: Logroño acted and wrote

scripts; the television company broadcast the programs.                      But the

damages were (on TMTV's own theory) the same harm: the lost

royalties that could have been earned by TMTV for the production

and broadcast of the El Condominio programs if TMTV's right had




                                       -18-
been respected instead of infringed. Production and broadcast were

two necessary, sequential steps needed to cause the same damage.

          TMTV also says that the Televicentro settlement was for

Televicentro's profits rather than TMTV's damages. Although damage

liability is joint and several, Screen Gems, 453 F.2d at 554,

liability for profits is several only, MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677

F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1981).9        But nothing supports TMTV's claim

that the Televicentro settlement was, sub silentio, restitution of

profits but not compensation of actual damages. Indeed, the damage

expert in both cases was the same.           In sum, the district court's

treatment of the settlement was correct.

          The defendants argue lastly that the district court erred

in its award of prejudgment interest (5 percent on the full jury

damage award up to settlement and thereafter only on the balance).

The defendants say that the Copyright Act does not authorize the

award of prejudgment interest and that, if the statute does permit

such an award, the equities do not favor an award here or at least

the award should have been made at a lower rate of interest.

          The   Copyright      Act    does     not     expressly     authorize

prejudgment   interest   but   authority     for     such   an   award   can   be

inferred, where appropriate, from congressional purpose and general



     9
      While separate profits of two infringers might well be
recovered without duplication, a copyright plaintiff may recover
actual damages and the infringers' profits only to the extent that
profits are not subsumed in actual damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).

                                     -19-
principles.   Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947).

Here, as actual damages were calculated, TMTV was deprived of

royalties that would have been due had the defendants produced the

infringing programs under license.        Prejudgment interest dating

from the infringements compensated the plaintiff for the time value

of monies it should have had--just as if a contract debt had not

been paid on time.

           Conversely, the defendants had the use of additional

funds--whatever   portion   of   their   assets   corresponded    to   such

royalties--during the period before the judgment, so an award of

prejudgment interest also avoids unjust enrichment.              Cf. Frank

Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1552 (9th

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).            Because the

Televicentro settlement provided TMTV with most of the deficiency

from that time forward, the defendants' interest obligations on the

reduced balance give them a slight windfall--although not at TMTV's

expense.

           Our own case law treats an award of prejudgment interest

in such cases as a matter for the informed discretion of the

district court.   See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant

Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 51 (1st Cir. 2003).10        Given the range


     10
      The case law in other circuits is too various to summarize,
but broadly speaking a number of circuits support prejudgment
interest awards for copyright infringement; and circuit cases where
such awards have been disallowed do not in general apply a
categorical ban. Compare, e.g., McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media

                                  -20-
of circumstances and the mix of motives for such awards, this

flexibility may make sense.           Certainly on the present facts there

was no abuse of discretion in making the award or in limiting it in

the fashion adopted by the district judge.

            For    post-judgment       interest       on    federal      judgments,   a

uniform federal rate applies by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006)

(weekly    average     yield   of    one-year    constant        maturity    treasury

bills),    but    no   default      federal    rate    exists      for    prejudgment

interest; here, the district judge applied the prevailing rate of

5 percent used in Puerto Rico courts for both pre- and post-

judgment interest.        P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, App. III, R. 44.3

(2000). The federal post-judgment section 1961 interest rate would

have been approximately 0.5 percent when judgment was entered in

January 2009.

            The defendants claim that it was obligatory or at least

more equitable to use the lower federal rate even though it is

designed    for   post-judgment       interest.            The   considerations   are

somewhat different where, absent a stay or bond, the successful

plaintiff can effectively require prompt payment, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 64(b), and the present federal rate is depressed by current

monetary policy designed to combat recession.                     The choice of the



100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding award),
with Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274,
277, 282 (6th Cir. 1988) (vacating award). See generally 4 Nimmer
& Nimmer, supra, § 14.02[C][1], at 14-31 to -34.

                                        -21-
local rate, like the award itself, was within the sound discretion

of the district judge.   E.g., Colon Velez v. P.R. Marine Mgmt.,

Inc., 957 F.2d 933, 941 (1st Cir. 1992).        Five percent is by

historical standards hardly exorbitant.

          The last issue is attorneys' fees.       Ordinarily, the

prevailing party in a copyright case can be awarded fees "[e]xcept

as otherwise provided by" the statute.    17 U.S.C. § 505.   Here,

such an award was barred by statute because the copyright for the

scripts was not registered in a timely fashion.    Id. § 412; see,

e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1012 (2d Cir.

1995) (vacating fee award). TMTV does not dispute that the statute

barred such a recovery on TMTV's own claims against the defendants.

          Instead, TMTV argues that it was also the prevailing

party as to Logroño's counterclaim, and so entitled to recover its

attorneys' fees attributable to defending against this claim.   The

argument--unpromising in any event--is forfeit, Dillon v. Select

Portfolio Servicing, 630 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2011), having first

been made in a motion for reconsideration of the district court's

denial of TMTV's request for attorneys' fees.

          The district court's judgment is affirmed.   Each side is

to bear its own costs on these cross-appeals.

          It is so ordered.




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