In Re Fredman

OPINION

In a matter of first impression in this District, the Court is asked to decide whether above-median chapter 7 debtors, in performing the means test, may deduct mortgage payments on real estate that they intend to surrender. In this case, the United States Trustee (UST) is challenging the debtors’ decision to proceed in a chapter 7 case as an abuse of the Bankruptcy system as defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. The Court must decide first whether the debtors may include mortgage payments on scheduled-for-surrender real estate when calculating their average monthly payments on account of secured debts set forth in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). If the Court finds in the debtors’ favor on the issue of the to-be-surrendered real estate, an evidentiary hearing will be scheduled to determine if there has been abuse as defined in § 707(b)(3).

The relevant facts, taken from the record of this case, are not in dispute. The debtors resided in a home in Englewood, Colorado from October 2001 until August 2009. The home was encumbered by a first mortgage of $232,479.15 held by Chase Home Finance LLC, with monthly payments of $1,782.08, and a second mortgage of $68,886.29 held by BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, with monthly payments of $191.15. After Mr. Fredman suffered the loss of a lucrative employment situation and eventually settled in a lower-paying position, the debtors ceased making mortgage payments for this home in December 2010. No payments were made on the home after that date.

Approximately six months later, on June 7, 2011, when they filed a chapter 7 petition for relief, the debtors were living in a home that they owned in Marion, Illinois. With a current monthly income 1 of $8,242.06, the debtors were considered to be above the median income for a family of their size in Illinois. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7). The Marion home was encumbered by a mortgage held by Chase Home Finance LLC for $48,789.19, with monthly payments of $546.32. The debtors listed both the Colorado and the Marion homes on Schedules A and D. The debtors’ Statement of Intention, filed on the petition date, declared “under penalty of perjury” that they intended to surrender the Colorado home. Their intent to surrender the Colorado home was expressed further by a solitary mortgage payment for the Marion home appearing as an expense on Schedule J, signaling that the debtors were not making payments on the Colorado home. In addition, their intent to surrender the Colorado home was reflected by the absence of mortgage payments for the Colorado home on line 20B(b) of the B22A form, 2 calling *542 for “Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by your home, if any, as stated in Line 42” and by their claim of a homestead exemption for the Marion home.

Nonetheless, on line 42 of the B22A form, entitled “Future payments on secured claims,” the debtors included payments for the first and second mortgages on the to-be-surrendered Colorado home along with the mortgage payment for the Marion home. The inclusion of the Colorado mortgage payments on lines 42(a) and (c) allowed the debtors to include $1,973.23 in phantom monthly debt payments in the figure of $8,469.39 that they placed on line 47 of the B22A form, constituting the “[t]otal of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2).” After further computation, the inclusion of the phantom Colorado mortgage payments resulted in the debtors having a negative “60-month disposable income under § 707(b)(2)” of -$13,639.80. 3 Since this figure was less than the $7,025 figure provided for comparison at line 52 of the B22A form, the debtors found that the presumption of abuse did not arise and that they were entitled to proceed in a chapter 7 case.

Among other concerns, the treatment of the Colorado mortgages described above prompted the UST to file a statement of presumed abuse on July 27, 2011, followed on August 26, 2011, by the instant motion to dismiss the debtors’ case. Then, Chase Home Finance LLC filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay, due to the debtors’ default under its mortgage(s) 4 on the Colorado home. An order lifting the automatic stay was entered, without objection, on November 29, 2011.

With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) was amended to add a screening mechanism, known as the “means test.” The purpose of the means test is to weed out chapter 7 debtors who are capable of funding a chapter 13 case. 5 The issue before the Court today centers on a provision of the means test that allows a debtor to take deductions for certain secured debts. This provision states:

(iii) The debtor’s average monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be calculated as the sum of—

(I) the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the filing of the petition; and

(II) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor, in filing a plan under chapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession *543 of the debtor’s primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts;

divided by 60.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).

In particular, the parties in the instant case call upon the Court to find the meaning of the phrase “scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the filing of the petition,” which phrase appears in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). The UST contends that the phrase in question prevents the Fredmans from deducting the mortgage payments on the Colorado home that they will be surrendering because they have not shown the payments as contractually due on their schedules. Rather, according to the UST, the debtors’ schedules show that they will not make the payments during the 60-month period following the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Fredmans counter that the phrase permits such a deduction because the Colorado mortgages remained contractually due on the petition date despite the debtors’ expressed intention to surrender the home to the lenders. Their dispute centers upon two points: (1) the meaning of the term “scheduled as” and (2) whether the phrase at issue demands a mechanical, snap-shot approach taken on the petition date or a realistic, forward-looking approach that takes into account the inevitable surrender of the home.

The tenets of statutory construction require the Court to begin with the plain language of a statute in an effort to parse its meaning. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). However, where that meaning is ambiguous or leads to a senseless result, the Court should examine the text with the goal of uncovering the legislative purpose behind the words. Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). In United States v. Balint, 201 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir.2000), the Court of Appeals for this Circuit outlined the rules of construction that allow departure from the plain meaning rule when literal interpretation leads to an outcome that is patently contrary to congressional intent or that produces an absurd result. The Balint court stated:

When we interpret a statute, we look first to its language. Pittway Corp. v. United States, 102 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir.1996). If that language is plain, our only function is “ ‘to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). The plain meaning of a statute is conclusive unless “ ‘literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). Therefore, our interpretation is guided not just by a single sentence or sentence fragment, but by the language of the whole law, and its object and policy. See Grammatico v. United States, 109 F.3d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849)). Further, we may adopt a restricted rather than a literal meaning of a word where acceptance of the literal meaning would lead to absurd results. See Chicago Transit Auth. v. Adams, 607 F.2d 1284, 1289-90 (7th Cir.1979); see also Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 85 S.Ct. 1162, 14 L.Ed.2d 75 (1965).

*544 United States v. Balint, 201 F.3d at 932-33 (parallel citations omitted). With these rules in mind, this Court turns to an analysis of the statutory language at issue here.

The Meaning of “Scheduled As”

The debtors’ interpretation of the phrase “scheduled as” follows the meaning adopted by the majority of courts. These courts interpret the words “scheduled as” in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) by their “ ‘common, dictionary-defined meaning’ ... as ‘planned for a certain date.’ ” In re Rudler, 576 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 55, 61 (Bankr.D.Mass.2007)). Courts taking this position have held that the statutory phrase asks only for a list of debts secured by property without regard to whether the debtors intend to retain the property or to surrender it. E.g., id. at 47. They conclude that the plain meaning of the text allows a debtor to deduct all secured payments owed at the time of the bankruptcy filing. E.g., id. at 47-48. The explanation is that § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) “does not refer directly to any bankruptcy schedules, and there is no schedule that asks a debtor to identify obligations that are ‘contractually due’ at the time of the petition, but that may be resolved through surrender of the collateral.” Id. at 47. In further support of this analysis, proponents point to the Bankruptcy Code’s use of the word “scheduled” in the dictionary-definition sense. The Rudler court uses the example of 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)(B), which refers to a debtor making pre-confirmation payments “ ‘scheduled in a lease of personal property directly to the lessor.’ ” Id. at 48 (quoting In re Hayes, 376 B.R. at 61-62).

The countervailing view, advanced by the UST, is that “scheduled as” is a term of art within the context of the Bankruptcy Code that refers to “whether a debt is identified on a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules.” In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594, 599 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.2006) (referencing the example of 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) which provides that a claim or interest is not deemed filed if it is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated on the bankruptcy schedules). This position is supported by the principle that a court must give effect to every clause and word of a statute. Id.; In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304, 307 (Bankr.E.D.Okla.2006). According to this viewpoint, the majority position renders the words “scheduled as” superfluous since all that is required by the majority construction is that the debts be contractually due. In re Harris, 353 B.R. at 307.

Mechanical vs. Realistic Approach

The Court turns now to the second point of contention: whether § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) demands a mechanical, snap-shot approach or a realistic, forward-looking approach. The debtors urge the Court to adopt the majority view, which, historically, has applied a mechanical approach rather than a forward-looking approach in interpreting the embattled phrase “scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). Courts taking the majority view have reasoned that at the time a chapter 7 debtor files a bankruptcy petition and completes the means test calculation in form B22A, the debtor will not yet have relinquished the secured property slated for surrender on the Statement of Intention. E.g., In re Rudler, 576 F.3d at 45. According to this approach, both the B22A form and the statute ask “in the present tense” for a list of debts secured by property. Id. at 46. “The statutory provision is stated comprehensively, asking for the total of all payments scheduled during the five-year period, without reference to whether other documents filed in connection with the bankruptcy show that *545 the payments are likely to stop during that period.” Id.

Proponents of the mechanical approach argue that the means test is intended to determine a debtor’s eligibility for chapter 7 relief at a specific point in time without regard to the accuracy of that determination. Id. at 48-49. “[T]he statute sets allowable expenses by means of several different methods, and, ‘[l]ike section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), many other provisions of the means test appear to operate contrary to the goal of accurately determining the amount of income that would actually be available for payments to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 case.’ ” Id. at 48 (quoting In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *6 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. May 1, 2006)). This point is illustrated by the calculation of current monthly income as a six-month pre-petition window that ignores a changed state of affairs on the date of bankruptcy filing, id. at 48, 6 and by the use of standardized deduction amounts for certain types of expenses that may not accurately reflect the amount of actual expenses. Id. at 49 (citing In re Hayes, 376 B.R. at 65; In re Randle, 358 B.R. 360, 364 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006), aff'd, No. 07 C 631, 2007 WL 2668727 (N.D.Ill. Jul. 20, 2007); In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125, at *7).

The majority viewpoint maintains that the plain language of the statute demands a rigid formula and that it does not impose an absurd methodology for assessing abuse. Rudler, 576 F.3d at 50. Rather, according to this approach, the mechanical treatment is consistent with Congress’s intent to limit the bankruptcy court’s discretion to determine abuse on a case-by-case basis. Id. Indeed, “choosing the certainty of a mechanical approach over an ‘actual circumstances’ evaluation under section 707(b)(2) complements the totality-of-the circumstances inquiry prescribed by section 707(b)(3)(B), which remains a backup option when the Trustee is dissatisfied by the results of the means test.” Id. at 51. “ ‘[I]nclud[ing] the outcome of future events as part of the means test would eliminate the distinction between the presumption of abuse test and the totality of the circumstances test.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 465 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006)).

In contrast, the minority position, historically, allows the Court to take into account a debtor’s expressed intent to surrender secured property even if the act of surrender has not been completed on the bankruptcy petition date. Courts taking the minority position have reached their conclusions in a number of ways. The case of In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594, involved debtors who had moved from their mobile home, had ceased payments to the secured lender on the mobile home prior to filing their chapter 7 case, had filed an original and an amended Statement of Intention reiterating their intention to surrender the mobile home, and did not contest the secured lender’s motion to lift the automatic stay to proceed against the mobile home. The Skaggs court held that statutory construction must be approached holistically so that “ ‘[i]n interpreting one part of a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ ” Id. at 599 (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Batterton v. *546 Francis, 482 U.S. 416, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977)).

In emphasizing that a debtor’s schedules and statements form the basis from which a court should determine whether a debt is “scheduled as contractually due,” the Skaggs court looked askance at the majority’s “focus on the single term ‘contractually due’ without due consideration of the import of the term ‘scheduled’ and the phrase ‘in each of the 60 months following the date of the petition....’” Id. at 599-600 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I)). To allow deductions for payments that “would have been due, but never paid,” id. at 598, ignores that “[a] primary intent of Congress in the passage of BAPCPA was to ensure that those debtors who can pay their debts do so.” Id. at 600 (citing In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 725 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006); 151 Cong. Rec. 2459 at 2469-70 (March 10, 2005)).

A similar analysis is found in In re Naut, No. 07-20280REF, 2008 WL 191297 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Jan. 22, 2008), in which the court examined the dictionary definition of the word “following” as it appears in § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) and determined it to mean “to go, proceed or come after,” “subsequent to” or “being next in order of time.” Id. at *9. Using this definition, the court concluded that “[ijncluding a loan payment as a deduction from income must be based on the loan payment actually being due in each of the 60 months after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Only this interpretation properly gives effect to every clause and word in the statute.” Id.

Another avenue leading to a similar conclusion is found in In re Singletary, 354 B.R. at 458, 465, in which the Court rejected the notion that the means test is a “threshold eligibility test” frozen on the petition date. The Singletary court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent found in In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448 (5th Cir.2006), and on the procedures and timing for filing a presumption of abuse motion outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 704(b) and in Fed. R. Bankr.P. 1017(e). Using this analysis, the court concluded that a motion to dismiss for abuse “may be based on a means test calculation that includes any changed circumstances in the Debtors’ position between the filing of the petition and the filing of the motion to dismiss.” Id. at 465-66. 7

Recent Developments

The majority viewpoint referenced above is challenged by more recent decisions that call into question its continued validity. In the case of In re Turner, 574 F.3d 349 (7th Cir.2009), the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court which had found it proper for a chapter 13 debtor to include his mortgage payment in the calculation of his disposable income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) and § 1325(b)(2) and (3) even though he intended to surrender the residence. In re Turner, 384 B.R. 537 (Bankr.S.D.Ind. 2008). In framing the issue before it, the Court of Appeals recognized the Code’s lack of clarity since “[bjoth parties labor mightily to extract from the language of the Bankruptcy Code guidance to whether an expense that affects the debtor’s obligation to his unsecured creditors and that by the debtor’s own declaration is certain to evaporate before the bankruptcy plan is approved by the bankruptcy judge must *547 nevertheless be treated as if it would persist throughout the entire period during which the plan will be in effect.” Turner, 574 F.3d at 354. Although Mr. Turner’s plan stated that he “intended to abandon the house to the mortgagee, which would have the same effect as foreclosure in canceling the mortgage,” id. at 351, he subtracted the monthly mortgage payments of $1,521 from his disposable income for the entire duration of the plan. He argued that this was permissible despite the fact that his mortgage would be canceled before he was required to make any plan payments. Id.

The Court of Appeals took a forward looking approach when it reversed the lower court and held that the chapter 13 debtor, who intended to surrender his residence, could not include the mortgage payment for that residence in the calculation of his disposable income and his projected disposable income. In the context of plan confirmation, the Court of Appeals found no merit “in throwing out undisputed information, bearing on how much the debt- or can afford to pay, that comes to light between the submission and approval of a plan of reorganization.” Id. at 355. The Court held that “the calculation of disposable income ... ‘is a starting point for determining the debtor’s projected disposable income, ... [and that] the final calculation can take into consideration changes that have occurred in the debtor’s financial circumstances.’ ” Id. at 356 (quoting In re Frederickson, 545 F.3d 652, 659-60 (8th Cir.2008)) (internal quotations removed). Although the Court of Appeals cautioned that “bankruptcy judges must not engage in speculation about the future income or expenses of the Chapter 13 debtor,” id. at 356, in the case before it, there was no speculation. Rather, “all that is at issue is a fixed debt that we know will disappear before the Chapter 13 plan is approved.” Id.

In addition, the Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Turner’s contention that the phrase “scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following the date of the filing of the petition” demanded a “mechanical” or snapshot approach. Id. at 355. In construing the language of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I), the Court stated:

Turner infers from this that the amount of the debtor’s payments on account of secured debts, such as a debt secured by a mortgage, must be calculated as of the date of the petition. But that is not what the provision says. It merely specifies that the date of the petition is the date on which the payment period begins.

Id. The Circuit Court’s interpretation of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) refutes the notion that the provision demands that an examination of secured debts must be frozen on the petition date. Moreover, while the Seventh Circuit continued to explain that jurisdictional questions, such as eligibility for chapter 13 relief under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), 8 should be measured as of the petition date, the Court did not include means testing in that category. Id.

After the Turner case was decided, the Supreme Court rejected a mechanical approach while evaluating the debtor’s income in the case of Hamilton v. Lanning, -U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010). In Lanning, the Supreme Court determined that, in calculating a chapter 13 debtor’s projected disposable income, bankruptcy courts may use a forward looking approach to “account for *548 changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation.” Id. at 2478. Ms. Lanning’s predicament began with a onetime buyout from her former employer that greatly inflated her income in the six-month period preceding her bankruptcy filing and that resulted in her having monthly disposable income of $1,114.98 on form B22C. 9 Id. at 2470. However, as reflected on Schedule I, Ms. Lanning had started a new job with monthly income of $1,922.00 and her actual monthly expenses, reported on Schedule J, were $1,772.97. Id. Subtracting her actual expenses from her actual income resulted in monthly disposable income of $149.03. When Ms. Lanning proposed a plan requiring her to pay $144.00 per month for 36 months, the chapter 13 trustee objected, using the mechanical approach. 10 The trustee demanded that she pay $756.00 per month for 60 months to properly commit all of her “projected disposable income” to the repayment of her creditors. Id. (citing § 1325(b)(1)(B)).

The Supreme Court rejected the trustee’s mechanical approach to determining “projected disposable income” as “unpersuasive,” id. at 2474, because it failed to take into account the undisputed fact that Ms. Lanning’s “actual income was insufficient to make payments in that amount.” Id. at 2470. Instead, after analyzing the text of § 1325 and recognizing that pre-BAPCPA practice allowing discretion 11 had not been discarded with the BAPCPA amendments, 12 the Court adopted the “forward looking approach” as the “correct” approach in calculating a debtor’s “projected disposable income.” Id. at 2469. The Court determined that “the Code does not insist upon rigid adherence to the mechanical approach in all cases....” Id. at 2477.

Following Lanning, in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 716, 178 L.Ed.2d 603 (2011), the Supreme Court examined the expense side of the means test in arriving at a chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income. Id. at 721-23. The Court held that a chapter 13 debtor who owned his or her vehicle outright, without a loan or lease payment, was not entitled to claim an ownership expense under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) since the expense was not “applicable” to that debtor. 13 *549 The lack of a vehicle payment disqualified Mr. Ransom from taking the I.R.S. standard deduction on form B22C because the deduction was not “appropriate, relevant, suitable, or fit” for him. Id. at 724. The Court reasoned that “a deduction is so appropriate only if the debtor has costs corresponding to the category covered by the table — that is, only if the debtor will incur that kind of expense during the life of the plan.” Id. Turning to the statutory purpose, the Court instructed:

Congress designed the means test to measure debtors’ disposable income and, in that way, “to ensure that [they] repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” H.R. Rep., at 2. This purpose is best achieved by interpreting the means test, consistent with the statutory text, to reflect a debtor’s ability to afford repayment. Cf. Hamilton, 560 U.S., at-, 130 S.Ct., at 2475-2476 (rejecting an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that “would produce [the] senseless re-sul[t]” of “denying] creditors payments that the debtor could easily make”).

Ransom, 131 S.Ct. at 725. The Supreme Court further held that Mr. Ransom was mistaken about what the means test deductions were meant to accomplish. Id. at 730. Their purpose, according to the Court, was to “serve merely to ensure that debtors in bankruptcy can afford essential items.” Id. If a debtor owned a car outright, “he ha[d] no need for this protection.” Id.

The Supreme Court had granted a writ of certiorari in Ransom to resolve a split of authority between the Circuits over whether a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments on his car may claim the deduction set forth in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) for vehicle ownership costs. Id. at 723. In affirming the decision of the Ninth Circuit in In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir.2009), which had refused the allowance of the car ownership expense, the Supreme Court abrogated the decisions of three Circuit Courts that had allowed the expense. These were: In re Washburn, 579 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.2009); In re Tate, 571 F.3d 423 (5th Cir.2009); and In re Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.2008) (all permitting the allowance of the car ownership expense). Ransom, 131 S.Ct. at 723 & n. 4. Notably, while Ransom and Washburn involved chapter 13 debtors, Tate and Ross-Tousey had brought their cases under chapter 7. Having pointed out that chapter 13 means testing is derived from that of chapter 7, 14 the Supreme Court did not draw a distinction between the chapters in denying the deduction set forth in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) for vehicle-ownership costs. If a debtor did not have a loan or lease payment on a car, that debtor could not claim a phantom car ownership expense under either chapter 13 or chapter 7 means testing. Id. at 723 & n. 4. A fictitious expense should not be allowed either during the life of a chapter 13 debtor’s plan or in determining the suitability of a debtor’s chapter 7 case.

*550 In chapter 7 cases decided after Turner, Lanning and Ransom, there continues to be a split of authority on the issue at hand, with the majority of cases adopting the mechanical approach. The majority view is followed in In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 566-67 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2012) (Lanning and Ransom do not affect the deductions that a chapter 7 debtor may claim under the means test of § 707(b)(2), which functions as a screening mechanism in chapter 7 and, like eligibility under 11 U.S.C. § 109, should be det