Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga

OPINION

This matter involves a challenge to the acquisition of AutoNation, Incorporated by Republic Industries, Inc. A shareholder plaintiff contends that this acquisition (the “Merger”) was a self-interested transaction effected for the benefit of Republic directors who owned a substantial block of AutoNation shares, that the terms of the transaction were unfair to Republic and its public stockholders, and that stockholder approval of the transaction was procured through a materially misleading proxy statement (the “Proxy Statement”).

The defendant directors of Republic seek to dismiss the complaint because: the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the Republic Board and as such the derivative unfairness claim in the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 23.1; the complaint fails to state a claim that the Merger was unfair to Republic or its stockholders; and the com- • plaint fails to state a claim that the Proxy Statement was materially misleading.

In this opinion, I resolve these issues as follows:

The Rule 23.1 motion: Three of the seven Republic directors are concededly disabled from impartially considering a demand and the issue of demand excusal turns on the status of a fourth director, defendant Harris V. Hudson. Because Hudson was a stockholder in AutoNation, has significant business relationships with AutoNation’s largest stockholder, defendant H. Wayne Huizenga, and is Huizen-ga’s brother-in-law, plaintiff has pled facts demonstrating Hudson’s inability to objectively consider a demand that the Republic board sue the proponents of the Merger. See § II(A), infra. Demand is therefore excused and the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Chancery Court Rule 23.1 is denied.

The Rule 12(b)(6) motion: The complaint fails to state a claim that the disclosures in connection with the Merger were misleading or incomplete. See § 11(B)(5), infra. The affirmative stockholder vote on the Merger was informed and uncoerced, and disinterested shares constituted the overwhelming proportion of the Republic electorate. As a result, the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked and the Merger may only be attacked as wasteful. As a matter of logic and sound policy, one might think that a fair vote of disinterested stockholders in support of the transaction would dispose of the case altogether because a waste claim must be supported by facts demonstrating that “no person of ordinary sound business judgment” could consider the merger fair to Republic 1 and because many disinterested and presumably rational Republic stock *882 holders voted for the Merger. See § 11(B)(4), infra. But under an unbroken line of authority dating from early in this century^ a non-unanimous, although overwhelming, free and fair vote of disinterested stockholders does not extinguish a claim for waste. 2 See § 11(B)(4), infra. The waste vestige does not aid the plaintiff here, however, because the complaint at best alleges that the Merger was unfair, see § 11(B)(2), infra, and does not plead facts demonstrating that no reasonable person of ordinary business judgment could believe the transaction advisable for Republic. See § 11(B)(3), infra. Thus I grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6).

I. Factual Background

The following facts are for the most part drawn exclusively from the amended complaint. 3 Some are also drawn from the Proxy Statement, which was expressly referenced and quoted in the complaint.

A.. The Defendants

Nominal defendant Republic operates several business lines, including a solid waste disposal, collection, and recycling business. In 1996, Republic expanded into the automobile rental and retailing business.

The other defendants are all members of the board of directors of Republic (the “Board”). Four of the directors were Au-toNation stockholders before the Merger. Three were not.

1. The AutoNation Stockholder Directors

Defendant Wayne Huizenga has been the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Republic since August 1995, when he made a major equity investment in the company. He owns 15% of the outstanding common stock of Republic.

Huizenga has had a diverse and successful business career. Huizenga co-founded Waste Management, Inc. in 1971 and served that company in various capacities, including as President and director, until 1984. Huizenga served as Chairman of the Board and CEO of Blockbuster Entertainment Corporation from 1987 until 1994, when that company was sold to Viacom Inc. Huizenga now also owns or controls the Miami Dolphins, the Florida Marlins, the Florida Panthers, and the Pro Player Stadium in Southern Florida. He is Chairman of the Board of Florida Panthers Holding, Inc. (“PUCK”) and Extended Stay America, Inc. (“Extended Stay”). In 1996, Huizenga also became the second largest stockholder in Century Business Services, Inc. (“Century”).

Before the Merger, Huizenga was Auto-Nation’s largest stockholder. In the Merger he received 6,397,757 Republic shares in exchange for his 29,375,000 Auto-Nation shares. On the Merger date of January 16, 1997, the Republic shares Huizenga received were worth over $235 million.

Defendant Harris Hudson is a director of Republic and owned 10.1% of the company’s shares before the Merger. From August 1995 until October 1996, Hudson served as Republic’s President. His- involvement in Republic commenced simultaneously with that of Huizenga. Hudson owned 100,000 shares of AutoNation stock before the Merger and received 21,779 Republic shares in that transaction. On the Merger date, the Republic shares Hudson received were worth $825,000. Hudson is Huizenga’s brother-in-law. For eighteen years, Hudson served as a Vice President of Waste Management of Florida, Inc., which was Waste Management’s predecessor and later one of its subsidiaries. Hudson also serves as a director of PUCK.

Defendant George A. Johnson has served as a director of Republic since No *883 vember 1995. In the Merger, Johnson received 544,490 shares of Republic shares for his 2.5 million AutoNation shares. On the Merger date, the Republic shares Johnson received were worth over $20 million. Johnson is Chairman, CEO, and director of Extended Stay. From 1993 until 1995, when Huizenga sold Blockbuster to Viacom, Johnson was a director of Blockbuster and a president of one of Blockbuster’s divisions.

Defendant John J. Melk became a director of Republic at the time Huizenga joined the Board. In the Merger, Melk received 179,681 Republic shares for his 825,000 shares of AutoNation stock. On the Merger date, the Republic shares Melk received were worth over $6.6 million. Melk held various management positions at Waste Management while Huizenga controlled that company. Before Huizen-ga sold Blockbuster, Melk was a member of that company’s board. As of December

1996, he was a director of Extended Stay.

2. The Republic Directors Who Did Not Own AutoNation Shares

Defendant Michael G. DeGroote is a director and the largest single stockholder in Republic, owning 15.1% of Republic’s shares before the Merger. Before August 1995, DeGroote was Republic’s CEO. De-Groote is CEO of Century and its largest stockholder. DeGroote has served as a director of Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. (“Gulf Canada”) since May of 1995.

Defendant J.L. Bryan is a director of Republic and President and CEO of Gulf Canada.

Defendant Rick L. Burdick has been a director of Republic since May 1991. Bur-dick has an equity interest in the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (“Akin Gump”). Akin Gump, through Bur-dick, performed legal services for Republic in 1996 and 1997 and “received substantial remuneration therefrom.” 4 Burdick has also performed legal work on behalf of DeGroote, and Institutional Investor magazine has allegedly referred to him as one of the “key members of Huizenga’s entourage” of “a small and loyal group of investors.” 5

3. The Relationships Among Republic’s Directors

As the reader has probably gleaned from the numerous companies mentioned above, the Republic directors’ business relationships with one another are not confined to their common association with Republic. Rather, the Republic directors have worked together as fellow directors, managerial colleagues, and shareholders in a variety of business enterprises over the years.

The following chart illustrates the companies in which the directors have simultaneously served as managers, directors, contractors, or shareholders. As to Republic itself, I limit inclusion to those instances where the director was a manager or contractor contemporaneously with the Merger.

*884 [[Image here]]

B. The Merger

AutoNation was formed in the second half of 1995. AutoNation’s business plan contemplated the development of a chain of used car “megastores” that would operate under the brand name “AutoNation USA.” 6

Several Republic directors helped form AutoNation. Huizenga and members of his family initially held 55% of AutoNation’s stock; this was reduced to 37.4% through subsequent transfers. As noted, Directors Johnson, Melk, and Hudson also bought substantial blocks of AutoNation shares.

Before AutoNation opened a single store, it embarked on merger discussions with Republic. In mid-March of 1996, Huizenga told DeGroote that AutoNation had retained Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-ner & Smith, Incorporated (“Merrill Lynch”) and other investment advisors to assist AutoNation in considering an initial public offering. In these discussions, Huizenga said that these advisors had given oral advice that the preliminary valuation of AutoNation for purposes of an IPO was around $1 billion. Yet Merrill Lynch’s contemporaneous written valuation of AutoNation allegedly contained base case scenarios valuing AutoNation at no more than $300 million. 7

On March 29, 1996, Republic held a Board meeting. At that meeting, Huizen-ga proposed that Republic acquire Auto-Nation for $250 million worth of Republic shares. The Board agreed to the proposal and Republic issued a press release later that day announcing that it intended to purchase AutoNation on those terms. This amounted to 17,467,248 Republic shares or 0.217796 Republic shares for every AutoNation share (the “Exchange Ratio”), based on the trading price of .Republic .shares at the close of the market on March 26,1996. 8

The Board formed a special committee (the “Special Committee”) to consider the acquisition proposal. Bryan, Burdick, and DeGroote were appointed. DeGroote was selected to be the Chairman.

The Special Committee undertook to hire an independent investment advisor to assist it in reviewing the acquisition proposal. Rejecting proposals from other prestigious investment banking firms, the Special Committee retained Merrill Lynch. It did so despite Merrill Lynch’s forthright disclosure of its relationship with AutoNation and the fact that Merrill Lynch had already “ ‘built a substantial valuation model of AutoNation’s history, operations *885 and financial prospects’ on this very issue for ‘certain stockholders of AutoNation.’ ” 9

Negotiations between Republic and Au-toNation ensued to reach a final merger agreement. These negotiations proceeded without participation by any members of the Special Committee or Merrill Lynch. 10 Richard L. Handley and Gregory K. Fairbanks handled the negotiations for Republic. Handley was Republic’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel at the time. Fairbanks was Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Republic. As such, both Handley and Fairbanks were management subordinates of Republic’s CEO, Huizenga, at the time of the negotiations. The negotiations did not produce a change in the Exchange Ratio. 11

On May 7, 1996, Merrill Lynch delivered a written opinion to the Special Committee indicating that the Exchange Ratio was fair to Republic’s stockholders from a financial point of view. The next day the Special Committee approved the Merger and the full Board met thereafter and approved the Merger Agreement. The Merger was contingent on approval by the stockholders of Republic.

In connection with the Merger Agreement, Republic and AutoNation also entered into a loan agreement (the “Loan Agreement”). The Loan Agreement required Republic to provide AutoNation with a line of credit to fund AutoNation’s cash flow requirements before consummation of the Merger.

The Board’s approval of the Merger Agreement was publicly disclosed the same day. The press release disclosed the Exchange Ratio but did not mention the Loan Agreement.

On December 16, 1996, Republic sent its stockholders the Proxy Statement in connection with the Merger vote. By this time, the implied merger consideration to be provided to AutoNation stockholders had' risen to $558 million because of a sharp increase in the value of Republic’s stock price.

By December 31, 1996, AutoNation had also drawn down $247.5 million under the Loan Agreement. The Proxy Statement disclosed that Republic had advanced $112.9 million to AutoNation as of September 30,1996 but did not disclose the specific amounts of any subsequent advances.

On January 16, 1997, the Republic shareholders overwhelmingly voted to approve the Merger. Although the complaint does not mention this fact, the Proxy Statement indicates that the Republic directors who owned AutoNation shares controlled no more than 27% of the votes. 12

According to the plaintiff, the AutoNation concept resulted in a $150 million restructuring charge a year after the Merger. The charge reflected the cost of merging Republic’s AutoNation used car business with its new car franchise operations. At the same time, Republic announced that it would no longer report *886 business information regarding its used car business separately from its new cár business. For these reasons, the plaintiff contends that “Republic buried its used-car tracks under its new-car business ... to conceal the ill-conceived nature and poor results of its used-car AutoNation acquisition. 13

II. Legal Analysis

The defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed for two major reasons. First, the defendants contend that Count I of the complaint, which challenges the Merger’s fairness to Republic, should be dismissed pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 23.1 because the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the Republic Board. Second, the defendants contend that Counts I and II fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

For the sake of creating a completely reviewable record, I deal with each of these arguments in turn.

A. Defendants’ Rule 28.1 Motion: Was Demand On The Republic Board Required?

Chancery Court Rule 23.1 requires a plaintiff prosecuting a derivative action to “allege with particularity ... the reasons ... for not making” a demand on the board of directors. 14 In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1, the court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the amended complaint as true. 15 Conclu-sory allegations, however, will not be accepted as true. 16

To determine whether demand is excused, I must apply the familiar test set forth by the Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis. 17 That test requires an evaluation of whether, under the particularized facts alleged in the complaint, a reasonable doubt is created that either a majority of “the directors are disinterested and independent” or that the “challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” 18

In this case, the plaintiff alleges that demand is excused under the first prong of Aronson because a majority of the Board members are directly interested in the Merger and/or beholden to Huizenga. For their part, the defendants concede that defendants. Huizenga, Johnson, and Melk held so many AutoNation shares before the Merger as to render them incapable of objectively considering a demand. They argue that the remaining four members of the Republic Board have no disabling characteristics and can independently and impartially determine whether to bring suit to rescind the Merger or recover damages resulting from that transaction. As a result, if the amended complaint gives me reason to doubt the impartiality of any one of the remaining directors, demand is excused.

Plaintiff and defendants do battle mostly over the status of director Hudson. Plaintiff contends that director Hudson’s objectivity is in grave doubt because of his familial and business relationships with Huizenga, as well as the fact that Hudson owned. AutoNation shares before the Merger.

The defendants contend that Hudson is not so beholden to Huizenga as to make it doubtful that Hudson can impartially consider whether to cause Republic to sue to rescind a merger in which Huizenga received $235 million worth of Republic stock. They note that Delaware courts ■have often adjudicated business disputes involving fights among family members and that I cannot presume that Hudson *887 has a cordial familial relationship with his brother-in-law. They also argue that irrespective of Hudson’s direct interest in the Merger as an owner of AutoNation stock, he can be impartial because he owned a much more substantial block of Republic stock before the Merger that rendered his AutoNation holdings immaterial to him.

For several reasons, I harbor a reasonable doubt about Hudson’s ability to impartially consider a demand. First, I would be hesitant to conclude that a director whose interest in a transaction clearly implicates the literal terms of 8 Del. C. § 144 can disinterestedly evaluate whether the corporation should sue to rescind that transaction. 19 Even if there were some de minimis exception to § 144 for insubstantial holdings, such an exception would not seem to apply in Hudson’s case. 20 Hudson owned 100,000 shares of AutoNation stock for which he received $825,000 in Republic shares (as of January 16, 1996) in the Merger. This level of investment appears to satisfy § 144.

As a pleading matter, it also seems to meet the materiality standard articulated in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 21 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (“Cede II”) 22 — a standard that is inapplicable when a director’s interest implicates § 144. 23 On this motion, it would seem reasonable to infer that a reasonable Republic director would have regarded the fact that Hudson had nearly a million dollars riding on the Merger “ ‘as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed transaction.’ ” 24 And at this pleading stage, it would be difficult for me to infer other than that Hudson desired to receive the highest price possible for his AutoNation shares. 25 Likewise, it would be hard to conceive how he could neutrally determine whether Republic should sue him and the other Auto-Nation stockholder directors to obtain disgorgement of the Republic shares they received in the Merger.

It may well be that economic evidence might ultimately persuade me that it would have been irrational for Hudson to seek unfair economic advantage in the Merger for AutoNation stockholders at the expense of Republic, because any such ad *888 vantage would cause more than, offsetting harm to him, given his 10% ownership interest in AutoNation. I also recognize that the particularized pleading requirement of Rule 23.1-places special burdens on derivative plaintiffs.

But I would be disinclined to find that a derivative plaintiff has the obligation at the pleading stage to demonstrate that a director’s material holdings on the other side of the table from the corporation are not outweighed-by his stockholdings in the corporation itself. In Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc,, 26 Vice Chancellor Jacobs refused to analyze whether the holdings of certain Tri-Star Pictures directors ■ in Coca-Cola were insignificant in view of their allegedly more substantial holdings in Tri-Star. Because the directors’ Coca-Cola holdings resulted in their receipt of benefits from the challenged transaction ■not available to all Tri-Star stockholders, a reasonable doubt was created for demand excusal purposes. In so holding, Vice Chancellor Jacobs distinguished between the burden a plaintiff bears to plead reasonable doubt as to director disinterest under Rule 23.1 and its ultimate burden to demonstrate, director interest later in the litigation through admissible evidence. 27

Siegman’s refusal to engage in the weighing analysis advocated by the defendants strikes me as quite sensible. 28 But I *889 need not and do not hinge my decision solely on Hudson’s AutoNation holdings, because those holdings are only one of several factors justifying demand excusal as to him.

Hudson’s relationship with Huizenga is the most important reason I doubt Hudson’s ability to consider a demand impartially. Granting demand in this case would be materially adverse to Huizenga’s personal interests, because it could result in Republic pressing for him to return stock worth nearly $235 million and to pay damages on top of that amount. Such a decision would have “potentially significant financial consequences,” even for a man of Huizenga’s wealth. 29

Hudson’s ties to Huizenga are such that it is unreasonable to believe that Hudson could objectively consider the approval of such a suit against Huizenga. Hudson’s business relationship with Huizenga extends back over 30 years. He was a management subordinate of Huizenga’s at Waste Management during many of those years. He bought into Republic at the same time as Huizenga. He helped Huiz-enga develop the AutoNation concept and start the company. 30 He serves on the board of PUCK, Huizenga’s sports holding company. This long-standing pattern of mutually advantageous business relations makes me doubtful that Hudson could impartially consider a demand that Republic file a lawsuit adverse to Huizenga’s interests.

That Hudson also happens to be Huizen-ga’s brother-in-law makes me incredulous about Hudson’s impartiality. Close familial relationships between directors can create a reasonable doubt as to impartiality. 31 The plaintiff bears no burden to plead facts demonstrating that directors who are closely related have no history of discord or enmity that renders the natural inference of mutual loyalty and affection unreasonable. 32 Even were such a burden to exist, the plaintiff has met it here. Why would Huizenga put Hudson on the PUCK board if they were estranged? Why would they have invested in Republic together? Why would they have worked together to start AutoNation?

I acknowledge that a not insubstantial proportion of people have rather cool relationships with their in-laws. That would not seem to be the case with Hudson and Huizenga. Even if it were, many people swallow their actual views of their in-laws for the sake of their spouses (and for the self-interested reason of avoiding marital strife).

Because plaintiff has pled facts that cause me to harbor a reasonable doubt about Hudson’s ability to consider a demand impartially and the defendants admit three other directors cannot impartially evaluate the demand, demand is excused.

B. The Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

In deciding the defendant’s motion to dismiss, I will apply the familiar stan *890 dard. 33 Because the plaintiff relies upon the Proxy Statement in support of its disclosure claim and that document is necessarily integral to that claim, it is proper for me to consider that document in evaluating whether the complaint states a disclosure claim. 34

1. The Interrelationship Between The Counts Of The Complaint

The complaint states two counts. Count I alleges that the defendants breached their duty of loyalty by approving the Merger. The Count contends that the defendants approved the Merger to benefit the AutoNation stockholder directors and that the terms of the Merger were unfair to Republic and its public stockholders. Count II alleges that the Proxy Statement faded fairly to disclose all material facts regarding the Merger and, as a result, “Republic’s public shareholders were wrongfully induced to approve the ... Merger....” 35

In this case, Counts I and II are in an important sense dependent on each other. In § 11(B)(5), infra, I conclude that Count II fails to state a claim that the Republic stockholders’ vote in favor of the Merger was tainted by material misdisclo-sures. Therefore, Count I must be- dismissed as well, 36 because the effect of untainted stockholder approval of the Merger is to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule and to insulate- the Merger from all attacks other than on the ground of waste. 37

Because the parties themselves did not initially address the connection between Counts I and II, they were afforded the opportunity to brief that issue. In its supplemental submissions, the plaintiff conceded that dismissal of Count II would preclude Count I. But even though the complaint does not specifically plead waste, the plaintiff contends that the facts set forth in the complaint adequately support a waste claim. Under the Supreme Court’s teaching in Michelson v. Duncan, “[s]o long as [a] claimant alleges facts in his description of a series of events from which a gift or waste may reasonably be inferred and makes a specific claim for the relief he hopes to obtain, he need not announce with any greater particularity the precise legal theory he is using.” 38 Therefore, I must consider whether the plaintiff’s implicit waste claim is adequate *891 ly pled. If it is not, then the complaint can be dismissed in its entirety because Count II is deficient. 39

For the sake of thoroughness, I will first address whether the complaint states claims for breach of loyalty and/or waste, independently of any consideration of the stockholder vote on the Merger. I will then explain why Count II does not, in my view, state a disclosure claim.

2. Putting The Stockholder Vote Aside, Does The Complaint State An Unfairness Claim?

The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that, if accepted as true, support an inference that the Merger was unfair to Republic and its stockholders. In view of the pleading doubt I must afford the plaintiff on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I reach a contrary conclusion.

The complaint alleges that, as of the time of the Republic Board’s approval of the Merger Agreement, AutoNation was an unproven start-up company with no active operations and huge capital needs. As of that time, the total investment made by AutoNation’s stockholders in the company was around $52 million. Yet Republic agreed to give AutoNation’s stockholders Republic stock worth five times that amount and ended up pumping another $250 million into AutoNation before the Merger closed.

A majority of the AutoNation Board held material amounts of AutoNation stock and had an interest triggering 8 Del C. § 144. Although the Merger price and terms were blessed by a putatively independent special committee, the Special Committee included DeGroote and Bur-dick, whose business relationships with Huizenga allegedly extend beyond Republic itself. Most important, it is alleged that the Special Committee did not participate in negotiations over the Merger, but left that to management insiders subordinate to the company’s CEO Huizenga — the leading mover on the other side of the deal.

Not only that, the Special Committee hired an investment bank that had been helping Huizenga determine whether to raise capital for AutoNation through an IPO. The natural inference is that Merrill Lynch did its best in that role, within the wide confines of professional valuation techniques, to justify an impressive value for AutoNation on behalf of its client, Huizenga. Merrill Lynch then turned around and began working for a client, the Special Committee, whose role was to avoid over-paying for AutoNation. Thus Merrill Lynch’s professional incentives were the opposite of what they had been just months before. 40 Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that Merrill Lynch’s advice to the Special Committee was flawed.

The plaintiff has pled facts that suggest that a majority of the Republic Board could not disinterestedly or independently evaluate the Merger. The plaintiff has also pled facts that suggest that the Republic Special Committee did not function with the independence and competence necessary to command any deference. 41 As such, the burden of proof may ultimately fall on the defendants to establish that the transaction was entirely fair to Republic and its stockholders.

*892 The plaintiff has also pled facts suggesting that the defendants may be unable to prove the financial fairness of the Merger. 42 Their sum total convinces me that Count I states a claim, although some of these “facts” are pled at the very outer margins of adequacy. 43

3. Putting The Stockholder Vote Aside, Does The Complaint State A Claim Of Waste?

The pleading burden on a plaintiff attacking a corporate transaction as wasteful is necessarily higher than that of a plaintiff challenging a transaction as “unfair” as a result of the directors’ conflicted loyalties or lack of due care. 44 To plead a claim of waste, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that “ ‘no person of ordinary sound business judgment’ ” could view the benefits received in the transaction as “ ‘a fair exchange’ ” for the consideration paid by the corporation. 45 Put another way, if, under the facts pled in the complaint, “any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense, then the judicial inquiry ends..” 46

Here, the plaintiff has not pled facts that, if true, could support a conclusion that no rational person could regard the Merger as sensible. In determining why that is so, I believe it important to step back and look at the big picture presented by the Merger. By the complaint’s own admission, Republic entered the new car retail automobile industry in 1996. 47 Although the complaint does not burden me with what that means, I infer that it means that Republic was developing its own network of new automobile dealerships. At the same time, AutoNation was putting together a network of used car “megastores,” and over $50 million had already been invested by its owners in laying the groundwork to bring that concept to market. The proposition that it might make sense for Republic to purchase AutoNation and to develop a network of dealerships that could sell new and used cars seems to me to be one that could well commend itself to a reasonable person of ordinary business judgment.

The complaint does not plead facts to the contrary. In lieu of facts, the plaintiff quotes excerpts from newspaper articles questioning the value of AutoNation’s proposed network of used car superstores and indicating that the concept of such superstores is one that has yet to be proved profitable. The president of one of Auto- *893 Nation’s competitors, Drivers Mart Worldwide — an executive who himself was “preparing to open used car superstores in the Fall of 1996” and therefore must have thought the concept worthy of exploration — is quoted as having “laughed” when he was asked whether he could fetch $250 million for Drivers Mart. 48 The complaint alleges no facts indicating that Drivers Mart can be validly compared to AutoNation for valuation purposes. The complaint quotes another of AutoNation’s competitors who questioned AutoNation’s strategy of planning to open a number of superstores at one time. 49 Furthermore, the complaint confidently tells me that “losses in the used-car industry are the norm, rather than the exception.” 50

Although Delaware has a notice pleading standard, that standard does not totally relieve a plaintiff of the burden to plead facts, not conclusions. The complaint does not contain any analysis of AutoNation’s actual plans to open the me-gastores; it simply contains eye-catching snippets of quotes from industry competitors who have obvious motives for downplaying AutoNation’s prospects. And its rather amazing statement (in view of the sheer number of such apparently money-losing establishments in this small state alone) that the used-car industry is, on the whole, an unprofitable one is wholly con-clusory.

Other than these assertions, the complaint rests largely on: i) the previously discussed facts bearing on the fairness of the negotiations; ii) allegations that Merrill Lynch’s fairness opinion was flawed; and iii) the fact that over a year after the Merger Republic took a charge against earnings to consolidate its new and used car operations. But even the totality of these pleadings do not give rise to a proper waste claim.

The attack on the fairness of the negotiations certainly gives flavor to the plaintiffs claim of waste. But the mere assertion that the transaction implicates 8 Del. C. § 144 and that the directors did not conduct the negotiations through a well-functioning special committee cannot, in and of itself, be sufficient to support a waste claim. Rather, the fundamental basis for a waste claim must rest on the pleading of facts that show that the economics of the transaction were so flawed that no disinterested person of right mind and ordinary business judgment could think the transaction beneficial to the corporation. 51 Otherwise, the distinction between a “fairness” claim extinguishable by a stockholder vote and a “waste” claim would be illusory. 52

Of course, the complaint’s attack on the Merrill Lynch fairness opinion is relevant to whether there is a basis for determining that Republic received so little consideration in the Merger that the Merger might be deemed wasteful. The complaint is detailed in its discussions of the flaws in the Merrill Lynch fairness opinion. 53 But the complaint does not plead facts that show that, if properly conducted, a fairness opinion would have valued AutoNation at such a low level that no rational person would have thought AutoNation worth the Republic stock required to be paid under the Merger Exchange Ratio. Furthermore, the complaint is wholly devoid of any allegations discussing the actual business *894 plans of AutoNation, the number and locations of its proposed megastores, or other pertinent allegations specifically bearing on the value of AutoNation. That is, the complaint does not plead facts denigrating AutoNation’s value; it simply pleads conclusions. Indeed, the complaint in some respects may be read as saying that there was no way at all to value AutoNation because it was a start-up.

Nor do the complaint’s allegations about what happened after the Merger buttress a waste claim. In this regard, it is worth quoting the complaint’s allegations in that respect in full:

47. The folly of the Merger was unveiled when AutoNation demonstrated that it could not profit — -indeed it could not avoid enormous losses — in its used car business. On January 29, 1998, Republic reported that it had taken a $150 million restructuring charge against earnings to combine its franchised Auto-Nation dealership for new cars and Au-toNation’s used-car operations into one automotive retail division. Further, in January 1998, Republic told analysts that it would no longer report business segment information on AutoNation’s used ear business separately from new ear sales. Thus, to conceal the ill-conceived nature and poor results of its used-car AutoNation acquisition, Republic buried its used-car tracks under its new-car business.

At oral argument, the plaintiff cited this paragraph as stating the most compelling facts supporting its waste claim.

What is most striking about this paragraph is what it does not say. It does not say that Republic is no longer operating used car megastores; it says that “Republic told analysts that it would no longer report business segment information on AutoNation’s used car business separately from new car sales.” Somehow I am supposed to infer from the restructuring charge that the AutoNation concept “could not profit” and that the restructuring was designed to conceal the “ill-conceived nature” of the Merger.

But at bottom, is there any “there there” from which I can infer any such thing? The amended complaint was filed nearly two years after the Merger. The plaintiff has had the opportunity to develop, through many sources, facts to plead. Yet it cannot even straightforwardly plead that the AutoNation operations in fact lost money for Republic after the Merger. Even taking as true the implicit and wholly conclusory assertion that the used car concept was not profitable in its first year and a half and the allegation that Republic took a charge against earnings to consolidate its new and used car operations “into one retail automobile division,” the -complaint fails to state facts from which one can 'infer that the Merger was so irrational that no reasonable investor could support it as a fair exchange. It is hardly uncommon for new businesses to not profit in their first few years of operations; the marketplace may, as the current “Internet company” vogue proves, still place a high value on them. Moreover, the fact that Republic decided to consolidate its automobile operations in one division hardly supports the inference that it did so to bury the “poor results of its used-car AutoNation acquisition.” Lacking in the complaint is any basis in fact (e.g., an allegation that Republic has abandoned the used car industry altogether because it was unprofitable or that it is not using the mega-store locations identified and open pursuant to AutoNation’s business plan) that would support the inflammatory conclusions asserted. 54

Also of importance is the fact that there is no allegation of facts that would have led *895 a person of ordinary business judgment to conclude that it was certain or even likely that the AutoNation concept would fail as of the time the Merger was consummated. Risk and reward are both elements of capitalism, and the former goes with the opportunity for the latter. The fact that a purchase transaction did not yield hoped-for returns does not mean that the assets purchased were valueless at the time of the purchase.

At best, the complaint barely states a claim premised on the bottom-line proposition that the Merger was unfair because Republic paid a rather high price for a risky, start-up company owned by key Republic insiders. 55 The complaint does not plead facts that, if true, would support an inference that no person of sound business judgment would have believed it a good idea for Republic to consummate the Merger.

I am conscious that my decision is not the “safe” one, in the sense that it is almost always possible for a trial judge, given our liberal notice pleading standards, to craft a logical basis for determining that a claim is best resolved after discovery. Taking that option in this case would work an injustice. The plaintiff filed this action in April 1996. Only after threats of dismissal for failure to prosecute did the plaintiff file the amended complaint, some two years later. During the entire course of the litigation, the plaintiff has made little or no effort to prosecute its claims.

Not only that, the plaintiff scrupulously avoided the inclusion in its complaint of factual statements in the Proxy Statement that it has not claimed are false in its disclosure count, and which, if true, undercut both its fairness and waste claims. 56 The plaintiff has even blinded itself and therefore me to the fact that Republic is now called AutoNation because its automobile retailing operations are its leading business. Although I cannot rely upon those facts in ruling on this motion, the complaint’s exclusion of them is noteworthy because it demonstrates the necessity for the court to require a complaint to survive on well-pleaded factual allegations, not just conclusory adjectival assaults. The costs to stockholders of representative litigation are too substantial to do otherwise.

Indeed, these costs have caused me to consider whether there is a sufficient policy basis to continue to allow plaintiffs to claim that transactions that fully informed, disinterested stockholders have approved were wasteful. With the reader’s indulgence, I will now turn to that issue, which, though not case-dispositive, has important practical implications for corporations and stockholders.

4. Why Doesn’t A Fully Informed, Un-coerced Vote Of Disinterested Stockholders Foreclose A Waste Claim?

Although I recognize that our law has long afforded plaintiffs the vestigial right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed, uncoerced independent stockholders approved by- a non-unanimous vote was wasteful, I question the continued utility of this “equitable safety valve.” 57

The origin of this rule is rooted in the distinction between voidable and void acts, 58 a distinction that appears to have *896 grown out of the now largely abolished ultra- vires doctrine. Voidable- acts are traditionally held to be ratifiable because the corporation can lawfully accomplish them if it does so in the appropriate manner. Thus if directors who could not lawfully effect a transaction without stockholder approval did so anyway, and the requisite approval of the stockholders was later attained, the transaction is deemed fully ratified because the subsequent approval of the stockholders cured the defect.

In contrast, void acts are said to be non-ratifiable because the corporation cannot, in any case, lawfully accomplish them. 59 Such void acts are often described in con-clusory terms such as “ultra vires” or “fraudulent” or as “gifts or waste of corporate assets.” 60 Because at first blush it seems it would be a shocking, if not theoretically impossible, thing for stockholders to be able to sanction the directors in committing illegal a