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Full Opinion
William J. VINCENT and Judy S. Vincent, individually and as parents of Tonya M. Vincent, Carol Bartlein, individually and as parent of Kurt Bartlein, Sara Bartlein and Kimberly Bartlein, Pam Britten, individually and as parent of Travis Britten, Cortney Britten and Taylor Britten, Karen Drazkowski, individually and as parent of Steve Drazkowski and Ann Drazkowski, Michael Endress and Susan Endress, individually and as parents of Jill Endress and Megan Endress, Michael J. Fairchild and Juliana Schmidt, individually and as parents of Kara B. Fairchild and Alexander R. Fairchild, Charles Hetfield, individually and as parent of Angela Hetfield, Rebecca Hetfield and Brock Hetfield, John Keller and Kathleen Keller, individually and as parents of Courtney K. Keller, Lynn Klatt, individually and as parent of Leslie Klatt and Ross Klatt and as foster parent of Blade Corrente, William Loasching, individually and as parent of Kelly Loasching, Kari Loasching, Kirt Loasching and Katie Loasching, Margaret McGinnity and Thomas McGinnity, individually and as parents of Ann McGinnity, Kate McGinnity, Megan McGinnity, and Betsy McGinnity, Joyce A. Olson, individually and as parent of Casey Brouhard and Robert Brouhard, Denise Callaway Reistad and Gary Reistad, individually and as parents of George Reistad, Kelsey Reistad and Sonja Reistad, Mary Rochon-Jewert, individually and as parent of Keith Jewert and Candyl Jewert, Pao Vang, individually and as parent of Phong Vang, Lee Vang, Mary Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang, Sheng Vang, Lue Vang, Xay Vang and Jenny Vang, Gloria Wahl, individually and *589 as parent of Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ronald J. Walsh, individually and as parent of Ryan J. Walsh and Laura M. Walsh; and, Jacqueline Ward, individually and as parent of Jessica Justiniano and Tatiana Justiniano, Tonya M. Vincent, Kurt Bartlein, Sara Bartlein, Kimberly Bartlein, Travis Britten, Cortney Britten, Taylor Britten, Steve Drazkowski, Ann Drazkowski, Jill Endress, Megan Endress, Kara B. Fairchild, Alexander R. Fairchild, Angela Hetfield, Rebecca Hetfield, Brock Hetfield, Courtney K. Keller, Leslie Klatt, Ross Klatt, Blade Corrente, Kelly Loasching, Kari Loasching, Kirt Loasching, Katie Loasching, Ann McGinnity, Kate McGinnity, Megan McGinnity, Betsy McGinnity, Casey Brouhard, Robert Brouhard, George Reistad, Kelsey Reistad, Sonja Reistad, Keith Jewert, Candyl Jewert, Phong Vang, Lee Vang, Mary Vang, See Vang, Toua Vang, Sheng Vang, Lue Vang, Xay Vang, Jenny Vang, Jordan Woods-Wahl, Ryan J. Walsh, Laura M. Walsh, Jessica Justiniano and Tatiana Justiniano, minors, on behalf of themselves and all other public school students and prospective students in the State of Wisconsin similarly situated; and, Mary Bills, Douglas Haselow, Ray Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier, David Smette and Jerome A. Sommer, on behalf of themselves and all other property taxpayers in the State of Wisconsin similarly situated; and Ray Heinzen, Mary Lohmeier and Roland Rockwell, on behalf of themselves and all other citizens of the State of Wisconsin similarly situated; and, School District of Abbotsford and its School Board, School District of Algoma and its School Board, School District of Alma and its School Board, School District of Alma Center-Humbird Merrillan and its School Board, School District of Ashland and its School Board, School District of Augusta and its *590 School Board, Baldwin-Woodville Area School District and its School Board, Barron Area School District and its School Board, School District of Bayfield and its School Board, School District of Beecher-Dunbar-Pembine and its School Board, School District of Beloit and its School Board, School District of Benton and its School Board, Berlin Area School District and its School Board, School District of Black Hawk and its School Board, School District of Black River Falls and its School Board, School District of Bloomer and its School Board, Boyceville Community School District and its School Board, School District of Cadott Community and its School Board, School District of Cameron and its School Board, School District of Cashton and its School Board, School District of Chetek and its School Board, Clayton School District and its School Board, School District of Clear Lake and its School Board, Clintonville Public School District and its School Board, Cochrane-Fountain City Community School District and its School Board, School District of Colfax and its School Board, School District of Cornell and its School Board, School District of Cuba City and its School Board, School District of Denmark and its School Board, Desoto Area School District and its School Board, Dodgeland School District and its School Board, Dodgeville School District and its School Board, School District of Durand and its School Board, Elk Mound Area School District and its School Board, School District of Elmwood and its School Board, School District of Fall Creek and its School Board, Frederic School District and its School Board, School District of the City of Galesville, Villages of Ettrick and Trempealeau, Towns of Caledonia, Dodge, Ettrick, Gale and Trempealeau in Trempealeau County and the Town of North Bend in *591 Jackson County and its School Board, School District of Gilmanton and its School Board, School District of Grantsburg and its School Board, School District of Greenwood and its School Board, School District of Holmen and its School Board, School District of Horicon and its School Board, School District of Howard-Suamico and its School Board, Kewaunee School District and its School Board, Kickapoo Area School District and its School Board, School District of La Crosse and its School Board, School District of Lake Holcombe and its School Board, School District of Laona and its School Board, Lena Public School District and its School Board, School District of Luck and its School Board, Manitowoc Public School District and its School Board, School District of Marion and its School Board, School District of Mayville and its School Board, Medford Area Public School District and its School Board, School District of the Menomonie Area and its School Board, Milwaukee Public Schools and the Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, Mineral Point Unified School District and its School Board, School District of Mondovi and its School Board, School District of Mosinee and its School Board, Necedah Area School District and its School Board, School District of New Richmond and its School Board, North Crawford School District and its School Board, Oconto Falls School District and its School Board, Oconto Unified School District and its School Board, Osseo-Fairchild School District and its School Board, School District of Owen-Withee and its School Board, Pepin Area School District and its School Board, School District of Phillips and its School Board, School District of Poynette and its School Board, Prairie Farm Public School District and its School Board, Pulaski Community School *592 District and its School Board, Racine Unified School District and its School Board, Reedsville School District and its School Board, School District of Rib Lake and its School Board, Rice Lake Area School District and its School Board, Riverdale School District and its School Board, River Ridge School District and its School Board, Saint Croix Central School District and its School Board, School District of Seneca and its School Board, Seymour Community School District and its School Board, School District of Shell Lake and its School Board, School District of Siren and its School Board, School District of Somerset and its School Board, Southwestern Wisconsin Community School District and its School Board, School District of Spring Valley and its School Board, School District of Stratford and its School Board, School District of Superior and its School Board, School District of Thorp and its School Board, School District of Tigerton and its School Board, Tomah Area School District and its School Board, Valders Area School District and its School Board, Viroqua Area School District and its School Board, School District of Wabeno Area and its School Board, School District of Washburn and its School Board, School District of Waupun and its School Board, Joint School District, Villages of Wauzeka and Steuben, Towns of Wauzeka, Bridgeport, Eastman, Haney, Marietta and Prairie du Chien and its School Board, School District of West Salem and its School Board, School District of Weston and its School Board, Weyerhauser Area School District and its School Board, School District of Winter and its School Board, School District of Wonewoc and Union Center and its School Board, and Mary Bills, Pam Britten, and Lynn Klatt, on behalf of themselves and all other school board members in the State of *593 Wisconsin similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners,
Terrance CRANEY, Guy Costello, Regina Washinawatok, Jeffrey Erhardt, Kathleen Hildebrandt, Randy Kuivinen, William Nelson, Douglass Thomas, and Wisconsin Education Association Council, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
v.
Jack C. VOIGHT, in his official capacity as State of Wisconsin Treasurer, John T. Benson, in his official capacity as State of Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Cate Zeuske, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, and Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Defendants-Respondents.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
*597 For the intervening plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Bruce Meredith, Chris Galinat and Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison, and Robert H. Friebert and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, SC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Bruce Meredith.
For the plaintiffs-co-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by David J. Hase, Heidi L. Vogt and Cook & Franke, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by David J. Hase.
For the defendants-respondents the cause was argued by Peter C. Anderson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Bruce A. Olsen, assistant attorney general.
Amicus Curiae brief by Patricia A. Brannan, Alethia Nancoo and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., on behalf of The Council of the Great City Schools.
Amicus Curiae brief by Gary E. Sherman on behalf of State Representatives Gary E. Sherman, Dan Schooff, John H. Ainsworth, Tom Sykora, Shirley I. Krug, Marlin D. Schneider, Peter E. Bock, Robert L. Turner, Julie M. Lassa, Mary Hubler, G. Spencer Coggs, Pedro A. Colon, Barbara Gronemus, Donald W. Hasenohrl, John W. Lehman, Mark Miller, Joe Plouff, Jon Richards, Marty Reynolds, Christine Sinicki and *598 State Senators Brian D. Rude, Brian B. Burke, Gwendolynne S. Moore, Kimberly M. Plache.
Amicus Curiae brief by Raymond P. Taffora, Jordan J. Hemaidan, Karla M. Davis and Michael, Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, on behalf of Fair Aid Coalition.
Amicus Curiae brief by Lawrence A. Wiley on behalf of Governor Tommy G. Thompson.
Amicus Curiae brief by James D. Peterson, Brady C. Williamson and LaFollette Sinykin, LLP, Madison, on behalf of Institute for Wisconsin's Future, Inc., Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, Inc., and Wisconsin Parent Teachers Association.
Amicus Curiae brief by Peter M. Koneazny on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin, Inc.
Amicus Curiae brief by James D. Peterson, Brady C. Williamson and LaFollette Sinykin, LLP, Madison, on behalf of City of Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist.
ś 1. N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
The Petitioners in this case are various Wisconsin students, parents, teachers, school districts, school board members, citizens, and the president of the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC).[1] The Petitioners collectively *599 challenge the constitutionality of the state school finance system under Wis. Stat. ch. 121 and Wis. Stat. §§ 79.10 and 79.14. Two main issues are presented for our review: 1) whether the state school finance system is unconstitutional under Wis. Const. art. X, § 3â the uniformity clause of the education article; and 2) whether the state school finance system is unconstitutional under Wis. Const. art. I, § 1â the Equal Protection Clause. The Petitioners contend that the school finance system violates both art. X, § 3 and art. I, § 1 because it fails to equalize access to financial resources among school districts.
ś 2. In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the school finance system. Vincent v. Voight, No. 97-3174, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1998). The court determined that the current school finance system is not materially different from the system that this court upheld as constitutional in Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).[2] Slip op. at 6. We agree *600 that the Petitioners have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the current state school finance system violates either art. X, § 3 or art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The present school finance system more effectively equalizes the tax base among districts than the system in place at the time Kukor was decided.
ś 3. We further hold that Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a *601 sound basic education. An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally. The legislature has articulated a standard for equal opportunity for a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§ 118.30(1g)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997-98) as the opportunity for students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education and foreign language, in accordance with their age and aptitude.[3] An equal opportunity for a sound basic education acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students, economically disadvantaged students, and students with limited English language skills. So long as the legislature is providing sufficient resources so that school districts offer students the equal opportunity for a sound basic education as required by the constitution, the state school finance system will pass constitutional muster.
I
A. The Wisconsin School Finance System
ś 4. We begin by outlining the constitutional provisions applicable to school finance. Article X of the Wisconsin Constitution establishes the state public school system[4] and provides that the school districts *602 "shall be as nearly uniform as practicable. . . ." Wis. Const. art. X, § 3. The constitution also creates a school fund for the "support and maintenance" of schools and libraries. Wis. Const. art. X, § 2. Article X, § 4 allows for the imposition of a local tax on the school districts. It states that the sum to be raised locally must be "not less than one-half the amount received by such town or city respectively for school purposes from the income of the school fund." Wis. Const. art. X, § 4. Section 5 provides for the distribution of the income from the school fund "in some just proportion to the number of children and youth resident therein between the ages of four and twenty years." Wis. Const. art. X, § 5.
ś 5. From these constitutional provisions, the legislature has developed an elaborate state school finance formula.[5] One source of school funding is the property tax, which applies directly to each local district. The other significant source of funding is state aid.[6] State aid includes equalization aid, categorical aid, and the school levy tax credit.[7] We describe each type of aid in turn.
*603 EQUALIZATION AID
ś 6. According to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, equalization aid "is intended to ensure that differences in tax rate primarily reflect differences in school district spending levels."[8] Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 10 (Jan. 1999). Equalization aid is distributed on the basis of a school district's relative fiscal capacity. Id. at 1. The majority of school funds are derived from property taxes. However, since the property tax base differs between districts, the state distributes equalization aid according to the formula set forth in Wis. Stat. § 121.07 (1997-98).[9] Equalization aid provides each qualifying school district with a guaranteed tax base, thereby *604 minimizing differences in the ability of school districts to raise revenue through property tax. Equalization aid compensates any deficiencies in a school district's tax base up to the guaranteed amount provided by the state. In other words, the equalization aid "make[s] up the difference between the district's actual tax base and the state['s] guaranteed tax base." Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 7.
ś 7. Computation of state equalization aid depends on five factors: a) membership, b) shared cost, c) equalized property valuation, d) guaranteed valuation, and e) the amount of available funding. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 7. The number of students enrolled in a district determines the district's membership. Wis. Stat. § 121.07(1)(a). Shared cost is the "sum of the net cost of the general fund and the net cost of the debt service fund." § 121.07(6)(a). Shared cost represents those school district expenditures for which the equalization formula provides aid. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 7. Equalized property valuation is "the full market value of taxable property in the school district as determined by the Department of Revenue (DOR). . .each year." Id. District equalized value (DEV) is the equalized valuation on a per pupil basis. See Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 33. Guaranteed valuation represents a guaranteed tax base. Id. at 10. The state guaranteed valuation (SGV) is "the amount of property tax base support which the state guarantees behind each pupil." Id. at 8. See also § 121.07(7)-(8).
ś 8. Equalization aid applies at three different district spending levels. District spending levels are defined in terms of shared cost. The first level consists of a primary guaranteed tax base of $2,000,000 per *605 pupil for the first $1,000 of shared costs.[10] Wis. Stat. § 121.07(6)(b), (c), and (7)(a). The $1,000 is also referred to as the primary cost ceiling. The Legislative Fiscal Bureau further explains:
The first level is for shared costs up to the "primary cost ceiling" of $1,000 per member. The state's sharing of costs at the primary cost ceiling, referred to as "primary shared costs," is calculated using a statutory guaranteed valuation of $2,000,000 per member. State aid at the primary level is based on a comparison between a school district's equalized valuation per member and the primary guaranteed valuation; state aid will equal the amount of costs that would be funded by the missing portion of the guaranteed tax base. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 8.
Currently, all school districts in the state receive some primary equalization aid. The primary guarantee is protected by a hold harmless provision, which means that negative aids cannot reduce any district's primary aid amount. See id.
ś 9. The state gives secondary equalization aid to a school district when the district spends at a level between the primary shared cost ceiling and the secondary cost ceiling. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 8. See also Wis. Stat. § 121.07(6)(d)1-2 and (dg). The 1998-99 secondary cost ceiling was $6,285. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 8. The amount of aid is *606 determined by the ratio of a district's actual per-pupil equalized valuation to the secondary guaranteed valuation. The secondary guaranteed valuation is a variable amount. Id. In 1998-99 it was $676,977. Id.
ś 10. The third level, or "tertiary shared cost" level, "is that portion of a school district's shared cost which is greater than the secondary ceiling cost per member multiplied by its membership." Wis. Stat. § 121.07(6)(dr). Before the legislature acted in 1995, the state employed a two-tiered system, which was replaced by the current three-tiered system under 1995 Wis. Act. 27. The amount of tertiary aid is deducted from the secondary aid amount if the amount of tertiary aid is a negative number. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 9. This is referred to as "negative aid." However, when the secondary and tertiary aid equal a negative number, the resulting amount is not deducted from the primary aid. Id. The tertiary guarantee is designed to discourage districts from spending at a level above the ceiling, and to narrow per pupil spending disparities. Id.
ś 11. Applying these concepts, the amount of aid a district receives at any level may be determined by the following formula:
State aid = 1-DEV/SGV x shared cost[11]
The general equalization formula to determine the amount of aid a school district receives is:
*607 Equalization aid = (1-(DEV/primary SGV) x primary shared cost) +
(1-(DEV/secondary SGV) x secondary shared cost) +
(1-(DEV/tertiary SGV) x tertiary shared cost)
CATEGORICAL AID
ś 12. There are approximately 25 categorical aid programs.[12] The programs are either formula-driven, or they are grant programs. Formula-driven programs give funds to school districts on the basis of the number of students who meet the criteria for the program. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 14. Grant programs require districts to submit a proposal to receive funds. Id. Categorical aids differ from equalization aid in that they do not depend on the relative *608 wealth of a school district. Id. Categorical aids are not calculated into statutory revenue limits.
THE SCHOOL LEVY TAX CREDIT
ś 13. The school levy tax credit is paid to municipalities, in contrast to equalization aid and categorical aid, which are paid to school districts. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 1. See also Wis. Stat. §§ 20.835(3)(b), 79.10, 79.14. The tax credit is designed to reduce property taxes. Id. In 1998-99, on a statewide level, the school levy credit reduced the school portion of tax bills by 16.8% on average. Elementary and Secondary Sch. Aids at 29.
ś 14. In addition to the school levy tax credit, district increases funded by local taxes are limited by a fixed amount, termed a "revenue limit." Wis. Stat. § 121.91. Revenue limits may only be exceeded if residents in a district pass a voter referendum. § 121.91(3). A school district may be penalized if the school district exceeds the maximum allowed revenue under § 121.91. § 121.92.
B. Procedural History
ś 15. We now turn to an examination of the procedural history of this case. The Plaintiffs initiated this action in October 1995. Thereafter, the president of the Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) and other teachers ("the Intervening Plaintiffs") intervened. The Plaintiffs, Intervening Plaintiffs, and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment on February 24, 1997.
*609 ś 16. The Petitioners[13] contend that the needs of Wisconsin students are changing and that the school finance system has not kept up with those needs. They contend that the perceived inequities in the system violate the uniformity clause and the Equal Protection Clause, contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution. The inequality stems from a failure "to adequately adjust for the disparity in tax base." (Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 4.) As a result, property wealth dictates educational opportunity in this state, the Petitioners argue.
ś 17. According to the Petitioners, categorical aids have been reduced, which "effectively restricts district spending by preventing the school board from compensating for the reduced state aid with additional property tax revenue." (Intervening Pl.-Pet'r's Br. at 12.) This results in school districts shifting funds away from regular programs and into categorical programs. As a result, some districts are unable to retain teaching positions or maintain school facilities. Other districts have cut their offerings in advanced placement or multiple foreign languages.
ś 18. The Petitioners further contend that revenue limits prevent school districts from raising necessary funding. For instance, revenue limits prohibit school districts from purchasing and implementing new technology.
ś 19. Moreover, the Petitioners argue that there has been a significant increase in "high need" students in Wisconsin. High need students include impoverished *610 children, disabled children, and children with limited English skills. Additional programs have been mandated by either the state or the federal government for these high need students, but without necessarily increasing funding for the programs.
ś 20. Finally, the Intervening Plaintiffs-Petitioners contend that charter schools and the Milwaukee Parental School Choice Program pull students out of the public schools. This in turn decreases the number of pupils, or members, in a school district, reducing the amount of funding the district receives.
ś 21. The circuit court, the Honorable Richard J. Callaway presiding, found that under Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d 469, the school finance system is constitutional and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court first noted that all children in this state have an equal right to education. However, the Plaintiffs "mistakenly framed the issue as whether the State distributes its school money in a manner which equalizes local budgets rather than whether the children of Wisconsin. . .are receiving the education to which they are entitled." The court then concluded that the Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs had not overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality that statutes enjoy. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963).
ś 22. The school finance system does not violate the uniformity clause of the constitution, the circuit court found, because according to this court's interpretation of the uniformity clause in Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 492 (Ceci, J. plurality); 148 Wis. 2d at 514 (Steinmetz, J., concurring), the constitution does not require that the educational opportunities provided by school districts be absolutely equal.
*611 ś 23. The circuit court also determined that the school finance system does not violate equal protection. The court repeatedly noted that the Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs failed to give virtually any evidence relating to the quality of education students receive in Wisconsin, and therefore, the court could not ascertain whether students are being deprived of their right to an education. The state has significantly increased its total state aid to the public schools, and the increase in state aid outweighs any disproportionate distribution of tax credit to wealthy property owners. The court further recognized that the current system provides schools across the board with more state aid than the system at issue in Kukor. The schools face the same problems that they did when the Kukor court reviewed the system, and the Kukor court was unpersuaded by those facts.
ś 24. In sum, the circuit court concluded that the Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the school finance system's negative impact on education. Without such evidence, the court had no way to ascertain "the magnitude of any deficiencies in the State's effort to fulfill its duty to provide students with a basic education."
ś 25. The court of appeals agreed that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any material difference between the current system and the system at issue in Kukor. Vincent, slip op. at 6. In other words, no significant disparities exist between the aid given under either system. Slip op. at 28-29. Moreover, the court found no evidence of children who do not receive at least a basic education. Slip op. at 32-33. In fact, the court concluded, "the evidence suggests that the state is providing greater aid to school districts than it did at the time Kukor was decided." Slip op. at 33.
*612 ś 26. Judge Dykman concurred in the court of appeals' decision, but noted the record demonstrated "that lower spending school districts are laboring under very difficult conditions." Vincent, slip op. at 35 (Dykman, J., concurring). The concurrence also lamented that Kukor contained no test for the court of appeals to use in assessing the current finance system and that "substantially improved programs are needed in our less affluent school districts." Slip op. at 36.
ś 27. In part II of this opinion we analyze art. X, § 3 in light of its constitutional history and this court's past precedent. We affirm Kukor, but explain further the Kukor definition of equal opportunity for an education. In parts III and IV we address whether the current school finance system violates art. X, § 3 and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
II
[1]
ś 28. We begin by interpreting the uniformity clause in art. X, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states that the district schools "shall be as nearly uniform as practicable."[14] We interpret constitutional provisions de novo. Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996). We benefit, however, *613 from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.
[2]
ś 29. We recognize that "the clear purpose of art. X, § 3, was to compel the exercise of the power to the extent designated." Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 658, 251 N.W.2d 822 (1977). It is a "fundamental principle" that the Wisconsin Constitution limits legislative power. Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids, 231 Wis. 94, 97, 285 N.W. 403 (1939). See also State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 326, 339, 193 N.W. 499 (1923); Pauly v. Keebler, 175 Wis. 428, 439, 185 N.W. 554 (1921); Outagamie County v. Zuehlke, 165 Wis. 32, 35, 161 N.W. 6 (1917). In Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 564, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), we specifically stated that "the search is not for a grant of power to the legislature but for a restriction thereon." Moreover, it is "a limitation upon the broad power of the state to educate its citizens through the establishment and operation of schools. The limitations are precisely stated: District schools, uniformity, and free tuition for certain ages." Zweifel, 76 Wis. 2d at 658. See also Manitowoc, 231 Wis. at 97-98; Zuehlke, 165 Wis. at 35.
ś 30. Three sources guide our interpretation of a constitutional provision: "the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following adoption." Id.
ś 31. The word "uniform" in the context of art. X, § 3 plainly refers to the "character of instruction" provided in the public schools. In T.B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida County and another, 72 Wis. 158, 161, 39 N.W. 343 (1888), this court found that the organization of a *614 township school system[15] did not violate the uniformity clause under art. X, § 3. By finding the township school system "uniform," this court implied that it did not equate equal acreage with "uniformity." Suzanne M. Steinke, The Exception to the Rule: Wisconsin's Fundamental Right to Education and Public School Financing, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1387, 1399 [hereinafter, The Exception to the Rule]. Later, in State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 221 N.W. 860 (1928), we determined that the uniformity clause in art. X, § 3 related to the "character of instruction" at the public schools after they were established, not the "method of forming school districts," or fixing district boundaries. "Character of instruction" was described as "the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin." Id. These representative cases demonstrate that from our earliest jurisprudence on, we have construed the uniformity clause to relate to the "character of instruction" offered in the public schools, and not the size, boundaries, or composition of the school districts. See also The Exception to the Rule, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. at 1400.
ś 32. The practices in existence around the time of the constitutional conventions further guide our interpretation of Wis. Const. art. X, § 3. Before the mid-1800's, elementary and secondary schools were generally privately funded. Erik LeRoy, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Busé v. Smith Criticized, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1325, 1344 [hereinafter, Egalitarian Roots]. See also The Exception to the *615 Rule, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. at 1391. The territorial government in 1836 created a "district school" system that was financed partially by taxes, but still in large part by private subscription. Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1344-45.
ś 33. Several factors produced an "impetus" for free public school education in Wisconsin. Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1347. First, some viewed public schools as an opportunity to eliminate distinctions between the wealthy and the poor.[16]Id. at 1346. Others viewed public schools as a way to integrate the swell of new immigrants with East Coast "transplants." Id. at 1347. Finally, others simply wanted to use state funds to "to pay for education." Id. at 1348.
ś 34. It appears that by the time of the 1846 constitutional convention, there was general support for a constitutional provision on education. Egalitarian Roots, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. at 1348 and n.101. The 1846 constitutional convention manifested its support for education by devoting 500,000 acres of land, which the federal government was to give to Wisconsin upon attaining statehood. Id. at 1349. Unfortunately, however, no debates ensued relating to the draft of art. X, § 3 at either the 1846 or 1848 constitutional conventions because the provision was wholly uncontroversial. Id. at 1350.
ś 35. Finally, we examine the early state statutes on school finance. The state laws of 1848 contained a number of statutory provisions relating to the public schools. The most comprehensive statute on public schools included a detailed section on local *616 taxes[17] and a section on the distribution of income of *617 the school fund. "An Act in Relation to Public Schools," Laws of 1848, p. 240-41, 243. Significantly, Section 91 of the statute required each town receiving state funds to match at least half of the amount donated by the state. Section 92 set the property tax at "two and a half mills on each dollar." Section 93 provided for an additional tax that could be raised after a vote was taken to fund teachers' wages and expenses. The school fund provision stated that towns would receive interest from the school fund "in proportion to the number of children in such town. . . ." Section 104, Distribution of Income of the School Fund, Laws of 1848, p. 243.
[3]
ś 36. The plain meaning, the practices around the time of the constitutional convention, and the early statutes all indicate that art. X, § 3 was intended to refer to the character of the instruction given at the public schools.
ś 37. We now turn to this court's more recent precedent regarding school finance. This court has directly examined the constitutionality of the state school finance system twice in the last 25 years. At issue in Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 556, were two statutes that created negative aid for certain school districts, or reduced the positive aid those districts could have received. The plaintiffs, the negative aid school districts and property taxpayers residing in the negative aid school districts, argued that the negative aid statutes were unconstitutional. Their main argument was *618 that the statutory negative aid provisions violated the rule of uniform taxation, articulated in art. VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 554. Additionally, the court addressed whether negative aid was unconstitutional under art. X, §§ 3 and 4 and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Id. at 562.
ś 38. The court first examined whether the statutes violated the uniformity clause of Wis. Const. art. X, § 3. The court specifically considered whether art. X, § 3 requires the legislature "to provide an equal opportunity for education for all school children in the state." Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 562. The court recognized that while the United States Constitution does not require the establishment of schools, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Wisconsin Constitution does contain that requirement. Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 564 (quoting Wis. Const. art. X, § 3). Besides establishing the public schools, art. X, § 3 also states that the public schools must be "as nearly uniform as practicable" and that children in the state may attend the public schools without charge. Id. at 565.
ś 39. Having set forth the pertinent constitutional provisions, the court held the framers of the constitution intended the phrase "as nearly uniform as practicable" to refer to the "character of instruction" at the district schools. Id. at 566 (quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 N.W. 860, 223 N.W. 123 (1928)). The court further stated that "[e]quality of opportunity for education is equated with the right of all school children to attend a public school free of charge. . .," id. at 565, and equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right. Id. at 567. However, the court concluded that according to the plain meaning of art. X, § 3 and constitutional history, art. X, § 3 *619 does not require educational opportunity to be absolutely uniform. Id. at 568.
ś 40. With regard to art. X, § 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the court examined whether local district control of funding was, in some measure, required by the constitution. Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 570. The court again carefully examined the language of the constitution, the constitutional debates, and the early legislative enactments to determine that "[l]ocal districts retain the control to provide educational opportunities over and above those required by the state a