In Re Marriage of JB and HB

OPINION

Opinion By

Does a Texas district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over a divorce case arising from a same-sex marriage that oc *659 curred in Massachusetts? The trial court held that it had jurisdiction and that article I, section 82(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the Texas Family-Code, which limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that Texas district courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a same-sex divorce case. Texas’s laws compelling this result do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We also conditionally grant the State’s petition for writ of mandamus to correct the trial court’s erroneous striking of the State’s petition in intervention.

I. Background

Appellee filed a petition for divorce in Dallas County in which he sought a divorce from H.B., whom appellee alleged to be his husband. Appellee alleged that he and H.B. were lawfully married in Massachusetts in September 2006 and moved to Texas in 2008. Appellee further alleged that he and H.B. “ceased to live together as husband and husband” in November 2008.

Appellee alleged in his divorce petition that there are no children of the marriage, born or adopted, and he requested a division of community property if a property-division agreement could not be reached. He prayed for a divorce, that his last name be changed back to his original last name, and “for general relief.” The record contains no answer by H.B.

A few days after appellee filed suit, the State intervened in the action “as a party respondent to oppose the Petition for Divorce and defend the constitutionality of Texas and federal law.” The Texas laws in question are article I, section 82(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code. The federal law in question is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 1 The State alleged that appellee is not a party to a “marriage” under Texas law, that he is therefore not eligible for the remedy of divorce, and that the trial court cannot grant a divorce without violating Texas law. At the end of its petition in intervention, the State prayed for dismissal of the petition for divorce.

Several weeks later, the State filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it asserted, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appel-lee’s petition demonstrated on its face that he and H.B. were not “married” as a matter of Texas law. The State asserted that section 6.204(c) of the family code “strips courts of jurisdiction” to confer the legal status of marriage upon any relationship besides the union of one man and one woman — even if only for the purpose of granting a divorce.

The trial court denied the State’s plea to the jurisdiction without a hearing. In its order, the court concluded that article I, section 32(a) of the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the family code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It further concluded that it *660 had jurisdiction “to hear a suit for divorce filed by persons legally married in another jurisdiction and who meet the residency and other prerequisites required to file for divorce in Dallas County, Texas.” It ordered “that Intervenor’s Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied and that the Intervention filed by the Office of the Attorney General is hereby stricken.” The State filed its notice of interlocutory appeal the day after the trial court signed the order. A few days later, the State filed its Conditional Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this Court seeking relief from the part of the trial court’s order striking its petition in intervention.

Within twenty days after the court signed the order, appellee filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State opposed the request. A few weeks later, the trial court signed both a set of findings of fact and conclusions of law and an amended order denying the State’s plea to the jurisdiction. In the amended order, the court made no reference to article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution, concluded that section 6.204 of the family code violated several provisions of the federal Constitution in addition to the Equal Protection Clause, and concluded that the State lacked both constitutional and statutory authority to intervene. The amended order concluded, “Therefore, the State’s Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied and the Intervention filed by the Office of the Attorney General is hereby stricken.”

We have consolidated the State’s mandamus proceeding with its interlocutory appeal.

II. Mandamus Relief From Order Striking Intervention

To obtain mandamus relief from the order striking its intervention, the State must meet two requirements. It must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the State has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004) (orig.proceeding); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding). In its mandamus petition, the State contends that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State’s intervention sua sponte and without sufficient cause. The State further contends that its remedy by appeal is inadequate.

We agree with the State that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State’s intervention sua sponte. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides, “Any party may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 60 (emphasis added). The court abuses its discretion by striking an intervention in the absence of a motion to strike. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990); Prototype Mach. Co. v. Boulware, 292 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.); Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (en banc); Flores v. Melo-Palacios, 921 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). Because appellee did not file a motion to strike the State’s intervention, the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

The foregoing analysis also disposes of appellee’s argument that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the State’s intervention because the office of the attorney general has no justi-ciable interest in the case. Lack of a justiciable interest to intervene must be raised by a motion to strike or the defense is waived. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 *661 (Tex.1998); see also Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. Thus, appellee cannot defend the trial court’s action by arguing that the State (which is the actual interve-nor, not the office of the attorney general) lacks a justiciable interest in the case.

We also agree with the State that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. This second prong of the test for mandamus relief has no comprehensive definition but calls for “the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations.” In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 136. “When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate.” Id. The detriments of mandamus review can include undue interference with trial-court proceedings, diversion of appellate-court attention to issues that are not important to the litigation or the development of the law, and increase in expense to the parties. Id. But mandamus review may yield benefits as well:

Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.

Id. The balancing of detriments and benefits is practical and prudential. Id.

In this case, the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the detriments. This is an exceptional case that involves not only basic principles of subject-matter jurisdiction but also the constitutionality of Texas’s laws concerning marriage. The trial court’s order striking the State’s petition in intervention potentially interferes with the State’s important right to be heard on the constitutionality of its statutes and its statutory right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.006(b) (Vernon 2008) (requiring attorney general to be given notice of any proceeding in which a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional); id. § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from denial of plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit); see also Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex.1999) (attorney general intervened to defend statute, moved for summary judgment, and pursued appeal to Texas Supreme Court); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 559 (Ct.Com.Pl.2010) (Pennsylvania attorney general intervened and participated in hearing regarding court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear same-sex divorce case). When the right to participate in litigation is wrongfully denied, mandamus relief is likely to be appropriate. See In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus and ordering court of appeals to allow insurer to participate in appeal so that insurer, which had superseded judgment, could defend its own interests). Mandamus relief will also yield the benefit of sparing the parties and the public the time and expense of divorce proceedings in a court that might lack subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed. Cf. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex.2007) (orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus relief from denial of Southwestern Bell’s plea to the jurisdiction); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to correct erroneous assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant). Because this is an issue that is likely to arise in other cases, prompt *662 appellate resolution of the subject-matter-jurisdiction question will have broad public benefits.

As compared to these benefits, the detriments of mandamus review in this case are not substantial. Mandamus review of the order in question does not require this Court to dedicate its resources to a routine or unimportant matter. Rather, in the absence of mandamus review, our consideration of issues that are important both to this litigation and to the law of this state would be impeded. Moreover, any additional expense that mandamus review imposes on the parties is offset by the savings of time and expense that will be gained by prompt appellate consideration of the State’s jurisdictional challenge.

We hold that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State’s intervention and that the State lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief with respect to the order striking the State’s intervention.

III. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

A plea to the jurisdiction contests a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Dallas Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Cox, 261 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). We review an order on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, as in this case, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 226. If the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but also do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. But if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227; see also Rebecca Simmons & Suzette K. Patton, Plea to the Jurisdiction: Defining the Undefined, 40 St. Mary’s L.J. 627, 648-54 (2009) (discussing Miranda).

Determinations of questions of law are reviewed de novo. Hoff v. Nueces Cnty., 153 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex.2004) (per curiam). This includes “questions raising constitutional concerns.” State v. Hodges, 92 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex.2002).

The State asserts that we should disregard the trial court’s amended order denying the State’s plea to the jurisdiction because it was signed during the automatic stay under section 51.014(b) of the civil practice and remedies code. We agree. When the State commenced this interlocutory appeal by filing its notice of appeal, “all other proceedings in the trial court” were stayed pending resolution of the appeal. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(b). An order signed during a stay is a “legal nullity.” Amrhein v. La Madeleine, Inc., 206 S.W.3d 173, 174-75 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). Accordingly, the trial court erred by signing the amended order. We vacate the amended order and analyze the State’s appeal in light of the grounds stated in the trial court’s original order. We also disregard the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law signed after the stay went into effect.

IV. Texas Courts Lack Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Same-Sex Divorce Cases

A. The Texas Constitution and Texas Family Code

The Texas Constitution was amended in 2005 to provide as follows:

*663 (a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.

(b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.

Tex. Const, art. I, § 32.

Under the Texas Family Code, the term “suit for dissolution of marriage” encompasses three distinct kinds of suits: suits for divorce, suits for annulment, and suits to declare a marriage void. Tex. Fam.Code Ann § 1.003 (Vernon 2006); see also id. §§ 6.001-.206 (Vernon 2006 & Supp.2009). In 2003, the legislature declared that same-sex marriages are void by adopting section 6.204, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this state.

(c) The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not give effect to a:

(1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction; or

(2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction.

Id. § 6.204(b)-(c) (Vernon 2006). Even before the adoption of section 6.204, the family code provided, “A [marriage] license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex.” Id. § 2.001(b). The statute governing informal marriage also characterizes the relationship as a “marriage of a man and woman.” Id. § 2.401(a).

Appellee did not plead for a declaration of voidness. Rather, he sought a divorce on the ground of insupportability. His petition tracks the language of section 6.001, which provides:

On the petition of either party to a marriage, the court may grant a divorce without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.

Id. § 6.001. A divorce based on this provision is commonly known as a “no-fault divorce.” See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 220 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (plurality op.); Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).

B. The Law of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

“Jurisdiction refers to the power of a court, under the constitution and laws, to determine the merits of an action between the parties and render judgment.” Ysasaga v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004) (“The failure of a jurisdictional requirement deprives the court of the power to act (other than to determine that it has no jurisdiction), and ever to have acted, as a matter of law.”). “Personal jurisdiction” refers to a court’s power to render a binding judgment against a particular person or entity, typically a nonresident. See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1996). “Subject-matter jurisdiction,” by contrast, refers to the court’s power to hear a particular type of suit. Id. “Subject matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have authority to *664 decide a case; it is never presumed and cannot be waived.” Combs v. Kaufman Cnty., 274 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

The trial court in this case is a district court, so the starting presumption is that it possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. This is because “Texas district courts are courts of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and to grant any relief that could be granted by either courts of law or equity.” Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Courts of general jurisdiction presumably have subject matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.2002); accord Liebbe v. Rios, No. 05-07-00381-CV, 2008 WL 1735448, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Apr. 16, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.); see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”).

A Texas trial court may lack subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular case or claim for a variety of reasons, such as immunity from suit, Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004), exclusive federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2006) (giving federal distinct courts jurisdiction “exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases”), and the effect of an automatic bankruptcy stay, Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542, 550-52 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.). Difficulties occasionally arise when the legislature adopts a rule that imposes a mandatory requirement on a claimant but does not specify whether failure to satisfy that requirement defeats the court’s jurisdiction or merely means the claim fails on the merits. In such cases, we presume that the legislature did not intend to make the requirement jurisdictional unless application of statutory-interpretation principles reveals a clear legislative intent to the contrary. City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex.2009).

C. The Parties’ Contentions

The State argues that section 6.204(c) of the family code and section 32(b) of article I of the Texas Constitution strip Texas trial courts of jurisdiction in same-sex-divorce cases because adjudicating the merits of such a case would recognize or “give effect to a ... right or claim” based on a same-sex marriage. Under the Texas Constitution, the state cannot “create or recognize” marriages other than between one man and one woman. Tex. Const, art. I, § 32(b). Under section 6.204(c) of the Texas Family Code, the state cannot “give effect to a ... right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 6.204(c)(2). Appellee’s principal response is that the trial court does not adjudicate or establish the validity of a marriage in a divorce case, and thus a divorce case does not recognize or give effect to a same-sex marriage formed in another jurisdiction. Appellee also urges us to apply the “place-of-celebration test” and conclude that he and H.B. are validly married for the limited purpose of adjudicating his divorce petition.

D. Application of Texas Law

In construing a statute, our objective is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s *665 intent. Our starting point is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute. If a statute’s meaning is unambiguous, we generally enforce it according to its plain meaning. We read the statute as a whole and interpret it so as to give effect to every part. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003).

Section 6.204(b) declares same-sex marriages void and against Texas public policy. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 6.204(b). “Void” means having no legal effect. In re Calderon, 96 S.W.3d 711, 719-20 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see also Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 850 (Tex.2009) (“A law that is declared void has no legal effect.”). Thus, section 6.204(b) means that same-sex marriages have no legal effect in Texas. See also Tex. Const. art. I, § 32.

Next, section 6.204(c)(1) provides that Texas and its agencies and subdivisions may not give any effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or validates a same-sex marriage “in this state or in any other jurisdiction.” Thus, section 6.204(c)(1) amplifies section 6.204(b) by providing explicitly that the rule of voidness applies even to same-sex marriages that have been recognized by another jurisdiction. Further, section 6.204(c)(1) mandates that Texas courts may not give any legal effect whatsoever to a public act, record, or judicial proceeding that validates a same-sex marriage. See also Tex. Const. art. I, § 32. In the case before us, appellee attached his Massachusetts marriage certificate to his divorce petition. Section 6.204(c)(1), which addresses “any public act, record, or judicial proceeding” that “creates, recognizes, or validates a same-sex marriage” in another jurisdiction, in this case, Massachusetts, provides the trial court may not give any legal effect to this document. Thus, section 6.204(c)(1) precludes any use of the marriage certificate in this case.

Section 6.204(c)(2) forbids the state and its subdivisions from giving any effect to a “right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility asserted as a result of a” same-sex marriage. Thus, the State may not give any legal effect even to a claim to a protection or benefit predicated on a same-sex marriage. A petition for divorce is a claim — that is, “a demand of a right or supposed right,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 414 (1981) — to legal protections, benefits, or responsibilities “asserted as a result of a marriage,” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 6.204(c)(2), one example of such a benefit being community-property rights. Under section 6.204(c)(2), the State cannot give any effect to such a petition when it is predicated on a same-sex marriage. If a trial court were to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a same-sex divorce petition, even if only to deny the petition, it would give that petition some legal effect in violation of section 6.204(c)(2). In order to comply with this statutory provision and accord appellee’s same-sex divorce petition no legal effect at all, the trial court must not address the merits. In other words, the court must dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ysasaga, 279 S.W.3d at 864 (“Jurisdiction refers to the power of a court, under the constitution and laws, to determine the merits of an action between the parties and render judgment.”).

Thus, in the instant case, section 6.204(c) precludes a trial court from giving any legal effect to appellee’s petition for divorce and all supporting documentation, and it deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Our holding that section 6.204(c) is a jurisdictional bar is consistent with Mireles v. Mireles, wherein Jennifer Jack *666 married and divorced Andrew Míreles. No. 01-08-00499-CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.). She then filed a “petition for bill of review” seeking to vacate the divorce decree on the ground that Míreles was actually born female, making their marriage a void same-sex marriage. Id. The trial court granted Jack’s petition and set aside the divorce decree. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. It concluded that Jack’s action was actually a collateral attack rather than a bill of review, but held that the collateral attack was proper because a void judgment “may be attacked collaterally with extrinsic evidence when the court ‘has not, under the very law of its creation, any possible power’ to decide the case.” Id. at *2 (quoting Templeton v. Ferguson, 89 Tex. 47, 54, 33 S.W. 329, 332 (Tex.1895)). “A Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it does to administer the estate of a living person.” Id. By holding that the original trial court had no “power” to issue the divorce decree, the court of appeals held, in effect, that the trial court lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce. See Tellez v. City of Socorro, 226 S.W.3d 413, 413 (Tex.2007) (per curiam) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction ‘involves a court’s power to hear a case.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)). Appellee argues that Míreles is factually distinguishable because the parties in that case were married in Texas, but we see nothing in the opinion indicating where the marriage ceremony took place. Moreover, such a factual distinction would be immaterial because the Texas Constitution and section 6.204 apply equally whether a same-sex marriage is contracted in Texas or in some other jurisdiction. Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 6.204(c).

Appellee contends that adjudicating a same-sex divorce does not “give effect” to a same-sex marriage because a divorce decree does not establish the validity of the marriage as against third parties. The Texas Constitution and section 6.204 of the Texas Family Code, however, forbid the State and its agencies from giving any effect whatsoever to a same-sex marriage. Thus, in order to prevail, appellee must show that a same-sex divorce gives no effect at all to the purported same-sex marriage. He cannot do so. A same-sex divorce proceeding would give effect to the purported same-sex marriage in several ways. For one, it would establish the validity of that marriage as to the parties involved under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Gray v. Gray, 354 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, writ dism’d) (“A suit for divorce presumes a valid marriage. At the trial on the merits the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was married to the defendant.”) (citations omitted); cf. Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 753-54 (Tex.1991) (per curiam) (dismissal of divorce action with prejudice was res judicata as to plaintiffs claim of the existence of a common-law marriage). Moreover, in this very case appellee seeks to “give effect” to his marriage under Texas law by seeking a division of the parties’ community property in the event they are unable to agree on a propei’ty division. Community property is a paradigmatic legal benefit that is associated intimately and solely with marriage. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.002 (“Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.”).

Furthermore, a divorce proceeding would “give effect” to a same-sex marriage. The inherent nature of a divorce proceeding requires both a respondent *667 whom the petitioner seeks to divorce and a legally recognized relationship between the parties that the petitioner seeks to alter. An obvious purpose and function of the divorce proceeding is to determine and resolve legal obligations of the parties arising from or affected by their marriage. A person does not and cannot seek a divorce without simultaneously asserting the existence and validity of a lawful marriage. Texas law, as embodied in our constitution and statutes, requires that a valid marriage must be a union of one man and one woman, and only when a union comprises one man and one woman can there be a divorce under Texas law.

Appellee argues in the alternative that if the adjudication of his divorce action “gives effect” to a same-sex marriage, then the adjudication of a suit to declare his marriage void under section 6.307 of the family code would as well. Appellee points out that the family code authorizes the trial court to grant various forms of relief, such as temporary restraining orders and name changes, in any kind of suit for dissolution of marriage, whether the ultimate relief sought is a divorce, an annulment, or a declaration of voidness. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 6.501, 45.105(a) (Vernon 2006 & 2008). There is also some authority that courts may order property divisions in voidness suits. See Hovious v. Hovious, No. 2-04-169-CV, 2005 WL 555219, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 10, 2005, pet. denied) (mem.op.). According to appellee, the State is trying to have it both ways by arguing that these remedies impermissibly “give effect” to a same-sex marriage if they are pursued in a suit for divorce but do not “give effect” to a same-sex marriage if they are sought in a suit to declare a marriage void. We disagree. A decree of voidness does not “give effect” to the void marriage but, just the opposite, establishes that the parties to the ostensible but void marriage were never married for purposes of Texas law. Also, orders granting ancillary relief, such as restraining orders and name changes, do not amount to “giving effect” to the void marriage. In the context of a voidness proceeding, such orders do not recognize or effectuate a marriage between the parties, or even a claim to marital benefits. They merely facilitate the disentanglement of the parties’ affairs when (1) they were never validly married in the eyes of Texas law and (2) at least one of the parties desires a judicial declaration to that effect.

We conclude that Texas courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a divorce petition in the context of a same-sex marriage. 2 Thus, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate appellee’s petition for divorce.

E. Comity

Appellee argues that the trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction based on principles of comity because he was legally married in Massachusetts. Appellee further contends that Texas courts have long *668 employed the comity-based “place-of-celebration rale” to determine whether a foreign marriage is valid for purposes of hearing a divorce, and that we should continue to apply that rule. He also cites cases from New York in which courts have entertained same-sex-divorce cases even though New York does not recognize same-sex marriages.

“Comity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state or extend immunity to a sister sovereign not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.” Hawsey v. La. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 934 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); accord BlacK’s Law Dictionary 284 (8th ed. 2004) (defining comity as “[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts”). “Because comity is grounded in cooperation and mutuality, Texas should extend comity by recognizing the laws and judicial decisions of other states unless: (1) the foreign state declines to extend comity to Texas or sister states under the same or similar circumstances; or (2) the foreign statute produces a result in violation of this state’s own legitimate public policy.” Hawsey, 934 S.W.2d at 726.

Appellee misconstrues the solidity of the place-of-celebration rule in Texas jurisprudence. In one of the more recent cases on point, the court rejected the place-of-celebration rule in favor of the most-substantial-relationship test and, based largely on Texas public policy, applied Texas law to ascertain the validity of marriages and divorces that took place in other countries. Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462-64 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ). In neither of the two cases cited by appellee did a Texas court actually use the place-of-celebration rule to give effect to a marriage that was valid in the place of celebration but void in Texas. In one, the court enforced California’s law refusing recognition of common-law marriages, thus rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of common-law marriage to the extent it was based on conduct that took place in California. See Braddock v. Taylor, 592 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 3 In the other, the question presented was whether a decedent had entered a valid common-law marriage with appellee Shelley Newman. Durr v. Newman, 537 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The appellant argued that the marriage was not valid under the place-of-celebration test because the only place Newman and decedent held themselves out as married was Nevada, which does not recognize common-law marriages. Id. at 326. The appellate court rejected the argument because the appellant had failed to prove the content of Nevada law properly in the trial court under the rules of procedure. Id. Thus, the court presumed that Nevada law was the same as Texas law, and the place-of-celebration rule was not essential to the case’s disposition.