Singh v. Singh

Opinion

The Sikh Temple-San Francisco Bay Area, Inc. (the Sikh Temple) 1 and its current board of directors (also referred to as the Supreme *1269 Council or Panj Pyaras), 2 Gurdial Singh, Harjot Singh, Amarjit Singh, Gurdev Singh, and Mota Singh, challenge a judgment following a bench trial. The Sikh Temple members Ala Singh, Kamail Singh, Ram Singh, Sukhdev Singh, Harjinder Singh, Joginder Singh, and Gurmeet Singh (collectively respondents or plaintiffs) sued the Sikh Temple and its current board of directors (collectively appellants or defendants) because they alleged that the board of directors or Supreme Council remained in office in violation of Corporations Code section 9220, subdivision (b). 3 The trial court found, among other things, that the Temple’s bylaws do not specify a life term for the Supreme Council and section 9220 therefore applies, creating a term of one year. Appellants challenge this ruling, contending that a prior judgment involving them as the defendants should have been given collateral estoppel effect; the ruling violates their First Amendment rights; the ruling represents an unconstitutional entanglement with religion; and the bylaws were not silent regarding the term of office for the Supreme Council. We are unpersuaded by their arguments and uphold the lower court.

BACKGROUND

The Sikh Temple was incorporated as a nonprofit religious corporation in 1977. Its articles of incorporation provide that the bylaws shall specify the qualifications for members, voting rights, and other privileges of membership. The current bylaws were adopted in 1987.

Article II of the bylaws provides that the general membership shall select and appoint the Supreme Council, or Panj Pyaras. Article II reads: “The principles and practices of the Gurdwara Management will be those espoused by Sikh faith and Gurmat tradition. The institution of Panj Pyaras (five beloved ones) will be revived in order to provide the guidelines for day-today functions of the Gurdwara. The Panj Pyaras (five beloved ones) will be selected and appointed by Sadh Sangat or membership of the Gurdwara Sahib [Sikh Temple]. If any of the Panj Pyaras is found unfit for his position, another Panj Pyara shall be selected by the General Body to fill up the vacancy. In the meantime, the Head Priest of the Gurdawara [.sic] Sahib shall perform the duties of a Panj Pyara.”

Article IV concerns the dismissal of a member of the Supreme Council. It specifies that a member of the Supreme Council can be dismissed for breaking the Sikh code of conduct, as prescribed in Rehatnamas; for breaking the Sikh rule of objectivity by indulging in petty politics of factionalism and *1270 name calling; and for being unable to get along with the Supreme Council. Article V sets forth the procedures for selecting the Executive Committee or Parbandhak Committee, which oversees daily management of the Sikh Temple. It provides in relevant part: “The Parbandhak Committee shall consist of eleven members. The Supreme Council will ask for the names of Sewadars from the Sadh Sangat [general membership] every now and then depending upon the availability of vacancy on the Parbandhak Committee. The Supreme Council will ask the Sadh Sangat for nominations. The term of the Parbandhak Committee shall be for a period of two years. A Parbandhak can stay on the Executive Committee for a maximum period of four years. . . ."

Article XVI provides in relevant part that any amendment to the bylaws must “be first presented to the Supreme Council of Panj Pyaras in the form of a petition, identifying major gaps or shortcomings according to Sikh tradition (Rahatmaryada). The Panj Pyaras should examine the petition carefully and submit their recommendations to the General Body of Gurdwara membership. The 3/4 majority of the Sikh membership in General Body can endorse the amendment and the Constitution can be changed accordingly.”

In 1988, pursuant to the newly adopted bylaws, the congregation nominated and elected five individuals to serve on the Supreme Council. 4 In 1991, four of the five members of the Supreme Council resigned. The congregation nominated and elected four new individuals. In 1993, all five members of the Supreme Council resigned and, subsequently, the congregation nominated and elected five new members.

In August 1996, a lawsuit was filed, Dhami v. Tut (Super. Ct. Alameda County, 1996, No. H-1921025). The plaintiffs sought, among other things, to remove three members of the Supreme Council, declare an earlier election valid or in the alternative order a new election, appoint a receiver, and determine the rights of the parties pursuant to section 9220. This case settled when the parties agreed to a court-supervised election of the Supreme Council. That election occurred on December 22, 1996, and resulted in the election of five Supreme Council members, including Gurdial Singh, Jarjot Singh, Amarjit Singh, and Gurdev Singh, who are appellants in the action before us.

In 1999, one member of the Supreme Council was involuntarily removed pursuant to Article IV of the bylaws. Mota Singh, an appellant in this action, was nominated and selected as a replacement by the congregation. Other than *1271 the filling of this vacancy, no elections for Supreme Council were held between December 22, 1996 and March 31, 2002.

In December 1998, a second lawsuit, Dhami v. Singh (Super. Ct. Alameda County, 1998, No. H-204698-5), was filed. 5 The complaint was for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and a receivership. The plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to section 7710 their action was derivative. They complained that there was an unlawful cancellation of a general election scheduled for December 20, 1998, by the defendants named in that case and the assumption of office by a new board of directors on December 6, 1998, without the benefit of an election. In their first cause of action for declaratory relief, they asserted that the defendants had violated the bylaws by refusing to permit the calling of the congregation to elect members of the Supreme Council and members of the Executive Committee or Management Committee. In the second cause of action, they requested the removal of these directors and officers. In their third cause of action, they alleged that the defendants had been in office for more than 12 consecutive months in violation of section 9220. They also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and requested injunctive relief and a receivership.

Dhami v. Singh proceeded to a court trial in February 1999; the Honorable John Burke, presiding. The court ruled in favor of the defendants on the first cause of action. Defendants’ counsel requested an order reflecting that the first cause of action had been bifurcated for final adjudication “without dealing with the other issues.” The court responded that it had ruled for the defense on the first cause of action. As to the second, the removal of directors and officer for breach of the bylaws, the court stated that it was also ruling for the defense on that action. The court continued: “The third cause of action was declaratory relief and injunctive relief in violation of Corporations Code [section] 9220, and I rule for the defense in that, [f] The fourth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court makes no ruling and took no evidence on [this]. [<[[] The fifth cause of action is for the injunctive relief for harassing and annoying and threatening, and the Court rules for the defense in that.” The court also ruled for the defense on the sixth cause of action. The fourth cause of action was bifurcated for trial and eventually dismissed.

Following this trial, a general body meeting for March 31, 2002, was called by appellants upon verbal notice given to those in attendance at the Sikh Temple meetings on the two Sundays prior to March 31. 6 The verbal notice of the general body meeting did not state an election would be held or that removal of the Supreme Council would be sought.

*1272 Respondents submitted a written request to address the congregation at the March 31 meeting. Appellants wrote a letter back to them explaining that they deemed the request to address the congregation as a request to advocate for bylaw amendments and that no vote would take place because they had not followed the procedure set forth in Article XVI.

At the meeting of March 31, 2002, respondent Ram Singh addressed the congregation with the concern that the Supreme Council had been in office since 1996 and no elections had been held. He stated that an election should take place. Respondent Gurmeet Singh also addressed the congregation and he told the congregation that it had complete authority to form or to dissolve the Supreme Council. He then proceeded with the following three proclamations: The congregation has decided that every four years there should be elections for the Supreme Council; the present Supreme Council and Executive Committee are dissolved; and respondents Sukdev Singh, Kamail Singh, Ram Singh, Harjinger Singh, Bhal Ala Singh, and Joginder Singh are the new Supreme Council and they will hold new elections in six months. Following each proclamation, the people attending the meeting orally, and simultaneously, voiced their approval or disapproval.

Following this March meeting, appellants remained as the Supreme Council and refused to vacate. Consequently, on April 3, 2002, respondents filed this action. On April 22, they filed their first amended complaint for judicial determination of the validity of the March 2002 election and for declaratory relief. Respondents asserted that appellants remained in office in violation of section 9220, subdivision (b), which requires annual elections of the board of directors unless the bylaws or articles of incorporation specify otherwise. They requested the court to determine the validity of the election of the Supreme Council on March 31, 2002, or to order a new election and determine the right of the Sikh Temple members to vote pursuant to section 9418, subdivision (c).

The Honorable Julia A. Spain presided over a court trial on this action in June 2002. The parties stipulated that the Supreme Council is the board of directors for purposes of a Corporations Code analysis. The court heard evidence regarding the term of office for the Supreme Council. Respondents argued that members of the Supreme Council were not elected for life and appellants argued that the institution of Panj Pyaras is permanent without any term limit for the Supreme Council. During the trial, the court advised the parties, on its own motion, of its intent to take judicial notice of the court files in the two earlier cases, Dhami v. Tut and Dhami v. Singh. Appellants objected to the court’s taking judicial notice of the entire court files in those *1273 actions, but later both parties stipulated that the court could take judicialnotice of selected documents. 7

On July 23, 2002, the court issued its tentative statement of decision that the Supreme Council’s term had expired and it ordered a new election. Appellants filed written objections asserting, for the first time, that the court was bound by Dhami v. Singh on the issue of the Supreme Council’s term.

The court’s judgment was filed September 4, 2002. The court concluded that Dhami v. Singh did not have any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the case before it. It found that no final judgment had been entered in Dhami and appellants had waived the argument because, despite the court’s invitation, they failed to plead, prove, or argue collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense. In addition, the court found the issues litigated in the two actions were not identical. The court explained: “According to the First Amended Complaint in Dhami v. Singh, each and every cause of action arose to some degree from the alleged unlawful cancellation of a general election scheduled for December 20, 1998, by the defendants named in that case and the assumption of office by a new Board of Directors on December 6, 1998, without the benefit of an election. The First Amended Complaint in Dhami v. Singh refers to the members of the Supreme Council and the members of the Executive Committee (or Management Committee) as the ‘Board of Directors,’ and in the third cause of action seeks to limit the term of office for this collective group to one year and to compel a new election for this combined ‘Board of Directors.’ In the present case, the plaintiffs request judicial determination of the validity of an election held on March 31, 2002. For purposes of this litigation, the parties stipulated that only the Supreme Council is the corporate board of directors. The First Amended Complaint in this case seeks to compel a new election of the Supreme Council, exclusive of the Executive Committee. Thus, the Court finds the issues which were presented for judicial determination in Dhami v Singh are not identical to those presented in the instant action. Defendants failed to carry their burden of proof on this requirement.”

The court also found that appellants failed to establish that the Supreme Council’s term had been actually litigated or necessarily decided in Dhami v. Singh. In addition, the court found there was no privity. None of the plaintiffs in the case before it was a party to the Dhami v. Singh action. In a footnote, the court explained that four of the named individual defendants in the action before it were also named defendants in Dhami v. Singh, as was the Sikh Temple. The court explained: “[T]hey are the parties ‘asserting’ collateral estoppel, not the parties against whom preclusion is sought. Therefore, that these four defendants are ‘identical’ is not determinative.”

*1274 As to the validity and outcome of the election on March 31, 2002, the trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction to decide which persons were entitled to manage the Sikh Temple, including control of significant corporate assets, by applying neutral principles of law, focusing on the bylaws themselves. The court found that the bylaws do not specify the term of office for the Supreme Council and therefore pursuant to section 9220, subdivision (b), the terms of office shall be one year. The court stated that it could not determine the outcome of the March 31, 2002 election from the evidence presented at trial and, since the term of office for each of the current Supreme Council members had expired, it was ordering new elections. The court ordered a new election by written ballot to occur on January 12, 2003.

Since the Sikh Temple had failed to maintain membership records in violation of section 9510, subdivision (a), the court ordered that the Temple undertake to admit members upon application and consent as specified in section 9350, subdivision (b), by applying the standards in Article X and the first sentence of Article XI of the bylaws. For this purpose, it ordered the creation of a membership committee consisting of four representatives appointed by plaintiffs and four representatives appointed by defendants. Any membership disputes that the membership committee was unable to resolve by majority vote were to be submitted to a special master for decision.

On September 10, 2002, judgment in Dhami v. Singh was entered.

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment order in this case.

DISCUSSION

I. Collateral Estoppel *

II. Jurisdiction

Appellants contend that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider respondents’ request for declaratory relief in which they sought a determination of the validity and outcome of the election of March 31, 2002, or their request for a court-ordered election for the Supreme Council. They maintain that the court’s decision violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 13 and that the trial court was *1275 “simply not correct to say that the doctrinal issues raised by the references to the Gurmat tradition and the Panj Pyaras were merely incidental to the resolution of this dispute.” Respondents counter that the Supreme Council, as the board of directors, maintains control of the property and assets of the Sikh Temple and the court has jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the control of property of a religious organization.

The question presented is whether the restraints of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the restraints imposed by our state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), 14 permitted the trial court to order an election for the members of the Supreme Council. Clearly, courts cannot intrude into a religious organization’s determination of religious or ecclesiastical matters such as theological doctrine, church discipline, or the conformity of members to standards of faith and morality. (Metropolitan Philip v. Steiger (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 923 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 605]; Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 275] [competing factions within congregation claimed to be “true” church and any judicial determination would have required courts to interpret and apply religious doctrine].) “Ecclesiastical matters include in the main, creeds and proper modes of exercising one’s belief.” (Rosicrucian Fellow, v. Rosicrucian etc. Ch. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 121, 131 [245 P.2d 481] (Rosicrucian).) Thus, we must determine whether the court in the case before us impermissibly intruded into the Sikh’s Temple’s ecclesiastical matters.

The United States Supreme Court and our state courts have grappled with the question of resolving disputes within religious organizations and excessive entanglement. Accordingly, prior to considering the facts of the case before us, we briefly review the extensive case law in this area.

A. The United States Supreme Court and State Case Law on the Establishment Clause and Adjudicating Disputes Among Religious Organizations

The approach of the United States Supreme Court to resolving property disputes involving religious organizations originally developed in Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 [20 L.Ed. 666] (Watson), which was decided prior to the application of the First Amendment to the States. In *1276 resolving intra-church schisms or property disputes, the court identified two categories of church polities: congregational and hierarchical. (Id. at p. 722.) Although it was concerned with a hierarchical organization, the Watson court discussed the court’s role in resolving property disputes in congregational organizations: “In such cases where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the governing body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization; for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the property when purchased or given, the court will not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use those who by regular succession and order constitute the church, because they may have changed in some respect their views of religious truth.” (Id. at p. 725.)

As already mentioned, Watson did not involve a congregational church, but a hierarchical organization. In a hierarchical organization, “the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments.” (Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at pp. 726-727.) “In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.” (Id. at p. 727.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Watson refused to resolve a property dispute between a national Presbyterian organization and local churches of that organization, because such a determination would have required the court to determine whether there had been departures from doctrine by the general church. (Id. at pp. 733-735.)

*1277 California courts interpreted Watson as supporting “the rule that civil and property rights [can] be adjudicated.” (Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131, citing Watson, supra, 80 U.S. 679 and other California cases.) 15 Shortly after issuing its opinion in Rosicrucian, our Supreme Court reiterated in Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Ct. that courts “will entertain jurisdiction of controversies in religious bodies although some ecclesiastical matters are incidentally involved” as long as civil or property rights are involved. (Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Ct. (1952) 40 Cal.2d 55, 60-61 [251 P.2d 10] (Providence Baptist Church).) Our Supreme Court in Providence Baptist Church focused on the fact that the dispute involved a congregational type of church where its affairs were controlled by the members. “That type exists ‘where each local group is in charge of all its affairs through majority vote of its members and there is no control from above.’ [Citation.]” (Providence Baptist Church, supra, at p. 61.) While acknowledging that there was some authority to the contrary of its holding, our Supreme Court stated: “[I]t has been held that where a religious society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court may determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was removed was properly conducted according to the usage, contracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent principles of law where civil and property rights, such as the emoluments of the property rights, are involved, and that in so doing the court is not interfering with any ecclesiastical function.” (Id. at pp. 61-62.)

In Providence Baptist Church, our Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider whether a congregational church had followed its own bylaws and internal procedures in discharging a pastor: “While we may not be dealing with the officer of a corporation in the strict sense (the pastor of a church is involved) the situation is similar and we see no reason why an election cannot be conducted where, as appears, a fair and proper election cannot be conducted by the church and the election previously held was irregular and of no effect. In other words the appropriate body of the church is assisted in acting within its proper sphere, according to its rules and regulations, to protect civil and property rights. If the problem was whether the pastor was preaching a theology contrary to the denominational doctrine or conducting religious services in a manner out of harmony with the ritual of the church, it would clearly not be within the province of a court to interfere, *1278 and the controversy would have to be settled by the church tribunals. But where, as here, the question presented is whether the property and funds of the church are being handled in accordance with the by-laws and rules of the church corporation or such by-laws and rules are being properly observed by the governing body of the church, those aggrieved may seek redress through court action.” (Providence Baptist Church, supra, 40 Cal.2d at pp. 63-64.)

The same year our Supreme Court decided Providence Baptist Church, a Court of Appeal addressed the issue, which is almost identical to the one raised in the case before us, whether the court could order and monitor an election of the directors of a religious corporation. (Burnett v. Banks (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 631 [279 P.2d 579] (Burnett).) In Burnett, the court adjudicated a dispute between rival church factions regarding a pastor’s right to appoint the directors rather than to hold elections by the congregation. (Id. at p. 635.) The court explained: “Certainly no directors of a corporation, whatever their number, may perpetuate themselves in office by refusing to call an election.” (Id. at p. 634.) “It is clear that the court has the right when it appears that a corporation election will not be held because of the failure of its directors to call it, or that such directors will not conduct a free, fair and full election to order one held under court auspices. This is not an ecclesiastical matter but a corporation one. But even if it were ecclesiastical, as the corporation owns real and personal property, the matter would come within the qualified rule set forth in Rosicrucian. . . .” (Id. at p. 635.)

These California cases specifically concerned congregational organizations, while subsequent cases in front of the United States Supreme Court, such as Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. 440 (Hull), involved hierarchical religious organizations. In Hull, the disputes involved a decision by an association of local Presbyterian churches (general church) to take over the property of two local churches that had withdrawn from the association. (Id. at pp. 441-143.) In holding that the First Amendment barred courts from adjudicating this property dispute because it would require the court to interpret church doctrine, the Hull court set forth the doctrine of “neutral principles” for resolving property disputes: “[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the *1279 hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. Because of these hazards, the First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes, [citation]; the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, states, religious organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.” (Id. at p. 449.)

About seven years later, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the question of adjudicating property rights within hierarchical religious organizations in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 708-720 [49 L.Ed.2d 151, 96 S.Ct. 2372] (Serbian). The Supreme Court held that civil courts could not properly countermand the decision by the highest authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church to defrock the bishop who presided over its American diocese, notwithstanding that this decision incidentally affected the control of diocesan property. (Id. at pp. 708-709.) The court stated that “this case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals.” (Id. at p. 709.) The court concluded: “In short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.” (Id. at pp. 724-725.)

The United States Supreme Court further explained and applied the neutral principles of law doctrine in Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 595 [61 L.Ed.2d 775, 99 S.Ct. 3020] (Wolf). Wolf involved a dispute over ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. The court stated: “The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.” (Id. at p. 602.) The court explained: “Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. [Citations.] As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization. [Citations.] Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed, ‘a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church *1280 property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.’ ” (Ibid.) In holding that there was no impermissible entanglement with religion in the case before it, the Wolf court set forth the “neutral principles of law” approach as requiring a civil court to examine in purely secular terms certain religious documents, such as a church constitution. (Id. at p. 604.)

Following these later Supreme Court case holdings, particularly that of Hull and Serbian, some California Courts of Appeal have asserted that the language, if not the holdings, in the earlier California cases of Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d 121, Providence Baptist Church, supra, 40 Cal.2d 55, and Burnett, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 631, is questionable. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Hinkle (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 506, 512 [136 Cal.Rptr. 731]; Vukovich v. Radulovich (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 281, 293 [286 Cal.Rptr. 547].) Of course, California courts concerned with restraints under the First Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment are bound by the authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. We note that all of the United States Supreme Court cases, unlike the California cases, concerned hierarchical religious organizations; it remains unclear whether the constitutional analysis for congregational and hierarchical religious institutions is identical. 16 However, no matter whether the religious organization is hierarchical or congregational, it is clear that the decisions of the highest religious tribunal on questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law must be accepted. (See, e.g., Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 910, 919 [152 Cal.Rptr. 854].) “However, when the dispute to be resolved is essentially ownership or right to possession of property, the civil courts appropriately adjudicate the controversy even though it may arise out of a dispute over doctrine or other ecclesiastical question, provided the court can resolve the property dispute without attempting to resolve the underlying ecclesiastical controversy.” (Id. at p. 920.)

*1281 We do not necessarily agree that these California cases decided in the 1950’s cannot be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court holdings. None of the California cases stated that courts could adjudicate matters that were predominantly ecclesiastical. To the extent that these cases held that all property disputes could be resolved by civil courts, their holdings should be refined to restrict review to the application of neutral principles of law taking care “ ‘to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.’ ” (In re Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 850, 858-859 [121 Cal.Rptr. 899] (Metropolitan Baptist Church) [jurisdiction to adjudicate distribution of dissolving church’s assets and any ecclesiastical concern was incidental and remote]; see also Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 597; Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at pp. 925-929 [property dispute can be resolved without attempting to resolve underlying ecclesiastical controversy]; Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 599, 615 [171 Cal.Rptr. 541].) “ ‘[A]s long as the court does not have to resolve the doctrinal propriety [of a church’s action] in order to determine who has legal control of the property, there is no unconstitutional intervention by the state in church affairs.’ ” (Metropolitan Baptist Church, supra, at p. 859.)

B. Applying Federal and State Precedent to Determine the Constitutionality of Ordering an Election for the Supreme Council

Respondents requested the trial court to determine that the election in March 2002 was valid or, alternatively, to order a new election because the current Supreme Council’s term had expired and the current Supreme Council refused to order an election. Respondents argued that the express terms of the Sikh Temple’s bylaws do not specify a term of office for the Supreme Council and therefore the law of the Corporations Code should be applied, which imposes a one-year term limit when the bylaws are silent. (§ 9220, subd. (b).) Appellants responded that their term on the Supreme Council was for life 17 in accordance to the doctrine of the Gurmat tradition and the institution of Panj Pyaras. Any determination of their term of office, appellants asserted, requires the court to violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment because the court would be resolving a dispute regarding religious doctrine.

Before trial, the parties stipulated to the fact that the Supreme Council, also known as the Panj Pyaras, is the corporate board of directors for the Sikh Temple. The board of directors is entitled to manage the affairs of the Sikh *1282 Temple, and therefore controls significant corporate assets.