Krinsky v. Doe 6

Opinion

As Internet technology has evolved over the past two decades, computer users have encountered a proliferation of chat rooms and Web sites that allow them to share their views on myriad topics from consumer products to international diplomacy. Internet bulletin boards, or “message boards,” have the advantage of allowing users, or “posters,” to express themselves anonymously, by using “screen names” traceable only through the hosts of the sites or their Internet service providers (ISP’s). One popular fornm is the financial message board, which offers posters the opportunity to communicate with others concerning stock trading, corporate behavior, and other finance-related issues.

The conversation on one financial message board devolved into scathing verbal attacks on the corporate officers of a Florida company, prompting a lawsuit by one of those officers, plaintiff Lisa Krinsky. Plaintiff attempted to discover the identity of 10 of the pseudonymous posters by serving a subpoena on the message board host, Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo!). Defendant “Doe *1159 6” moved to quash the subpoena, but the trial court denied the motion. Doe 6 appeals, contending that he had a First Amendment right to speak anonymously on the Internet. Under the circumstances presented, we agree with Doe 6 that his identity should be protected and therefore reverse the order.

Procedural History

Until December 31, 2005, plaintiff was the president, chair of the board, and chief operating officer of SFBC International, Inc., a publicly traded “global development drug service company” with offices in Florida. In January 2006 plaintiff sued 10 “Doe” defendants in a Florida court. In the action plaintiff alleged that defendants had made “defamatory remarks” about her on Yahoo! message boards and other Web sites, using screen names to conceal their identities. During the litigation defendant Doe 6 was often referred to as “Senor_Pinche_Wey,” the screen name he had used in posting on the Yahoo! Finance message board. 1

Seeking damages and an injunction, plaintiff asserted two causes of action in the Florida complaint. All 10 defendants were accused of intentional interference with a “contractual and/or business employment relationship” between plaintiff and SFBC. Nine of the defendants were accused together of libel based on false and misleading Internet statements imputing dishonesty, fraud, improper professional conduct, and criminal activity to plaintiff.

The record contains copies of the alleged defamatory messages posted on the Yahoo! message board devoted to SFBC. Most of the posts derided another SFBC executive, “Jerry ‘Lew’ Seifer.” 2 Doe 6 called Seifer a “mega scum bag” and a “cockroach” and suggested that there were more “cockroach” executives at the company after Seifer resigned. In one message, posted on December 18, 2005, Doe 6 purported to find it “funny and rather sad that the losers who post here are supporting a management consisting of boobs, losers and crooks. (Krinsky, Natan and Seifer) while criticizing a charitable and successful hedge fund manager, who, unlike his critics and the longs here, has done his homework.” In a December 30, 2005 post, Doe 6 offered his so-called “Jerry ‘Lew’ Seifer’s New Year’s resolutions.” The list included the following statement: “I will reciprocate felatoin [sic] with Lisa even though she has fat thighs, a fake medical degree, ‘queefs’ and has poor feminine hygiene.” 3

*1160 In order to serve the proper defendants, Krinsky served a subpoena on the custodian of records at Yahoo! in Sunnyvale, California. Yahoo! notified Doe 6 that it would comply with the subpoena in 15 days unless a motion to quash or other legal objection was filed. Doe 6 then moved in superior court to quash the subpoena on the grounds that (1) plaintiff had failed to state a claim sufficient to overcome his First Amendment rights for either defamation or interference with a contractual or business relationship, and (2) plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was an invalid prior restraint.

At the April 28, 2006 hearing on the motion, the superior court suggested that Doe 6 was “trying to drive down the price of [plaintiff’s] company to manipulate the stock price, sell it short and so forth.” The court queried whether it was “protected speech to do that? To deliberately engage in tactics designed to circumvent securities laws to drive the price down to a publicly traded company?” The court also expressed the view that “[accusing a woman of unchastity” and “calling somebody a crook . . . saying that they have a fake medical degree, accusing someone of a criminal act, accusing someone—impinging [ire] their integrity to practice in their chosen profession historically have been libel per se.” Counsel for Doe 6 maintained, however, that the reference to “crook” was to Seifer, not plaintiff, 4 and that the use of this term was, in context, mere opinion and therefore protected by the First Amendment.

On July 6, 2006, the court requested additional briefing on two questions: whether O’Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1423 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 72] applied to this case; and whether there was “any consideration of whether the actions of the defendants [had violated] any State or Federal securities laws.” After receiving supplemental briefs from each party on these questions, the court denied the motion to quash. The court recognized the applicability of the First Amendment to speech on the Internet and summarized the holdings of several appellate courts addressing claims of free speech in the context of libel suits. The court did not decide, however, whether Doe 6’s messages were protected speech. Instead, it looked to the issues it had posed to the parties and specifically found that Doe 6’s conduct appeared to be similar to federal cases involving “ ‘pump and dump’ stock manipulation” efforts. The court expressly adopted plaintiff’s supplemental *1161 brief, concluding that “[t]he issues raised by this Court” and “the totality of the circumstances of this case justif[y] the relief Plaintiff is seeking [szc].”

Discussion

1. Standard of Review

The parties do not concur on the applicable standard of review. Doe 6 submits that we must evaluate his motion de novo, as the matter “involves the important constitutional right to speak anonymously.” Plaintiff maintains that the order should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

This appeal arises from a discovery order, which normally is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1186 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 137 P.3d 153]; Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 380 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266].) Accordingly, a reviewing court generally will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and will not set aside the trial court’s decision unless “there was ‘no legal justification’ for the order granting or denying the discovery in question.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 341].) On the other hand, “while the trial court has wide discretion in managing discovery issues, ‘there can be no room for the exercise of such discretion if no ground exists upon which it might operate.’ [Citation.] Where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed, we review a trial court’s exercise of discretion as a question of law. [Citation.] An appellate court may reverse a trial court decision for abuse of discretion where the exercise of that discretion is not based upon the applicable law. ‘Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Toshiba America Electronic Components v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 762, 768 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 532].)

Moreover, Doe 6 invokes the protection of the First Amendment in seeking reversal. We cannot ignore our highest court’s admonition that when the appellate issue is whether a particular communication falls outside the protection of the First Amendment, independent review is called for, “both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.” (Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 505 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 104 S.Ct. 1949].) Thus, when called upon to draw “ ‘the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and *1162 speech [that] may legitimately be regulated,’ ” “we ‘examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.’ ” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 285 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S.Ct. 710], quoting Pennekamp v. Florida (1946) 328 U.S. 331, 335 [90 L.Ed. 1295, 66 S.Ct. 1029]; see also In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 632 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007] [independent review of plausible First Amendment defense in determining whether communication constitutes a criminal threat].) 5 In all other respects, the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate. And to the limited extent that the court below resolved evidentiary disputes, made credibility determinations, or made findings of fact that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue, we uphold those rulings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 634.)

2. The First Amendment and Speech on the Internet

As noted earlier, ordinary people with access to the Internet can express their views to a wide audience through the forum of the online message board. The poster’s message not only is transmitted instantly to other subscribers to the message board, but potentially is passed on to an expanding network of recipients, as readers may copy, forward, or print those messages to distribute to others. The use of a pseudonymous screen name offers a safe outlet for the user to experiment with novel ideas, express unorthodox political views, or criticize corporate or individual behavior without fear of intimidation or reprisal. In addition, by concealing speakers’ identities, the online forum allows individuals of any economic, political, or social status to be heard without suppression or other intervention by the media or more powerful figures in the field.

Yet no one is truly anonymous on the Internet, even with the use of a pseudonym. Yahoo! warns users of its message boards that their identities can be traced, and that it will reveal their identifying information when legally compelled to do so. 6 Nevertheless, the relative anonymity afforded by the Internet forum promotes a looser, more relaxed communication style. Users *1163 are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even combative tone. As one commentator has observed, online discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional catharsis than a forum for the rapid exchange of information and ideas: “Hyperbole and exaggeration are common, and ‘venting’ is at least as common as careful and considered argumentation. The fact that many Internet speakers employ online pseudonyms tends to heighten this sense that ‘anything goes,’ and some commentators have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.” (Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace (2000) 49 Duke L.J. 855, 863, fns. omitted.)

It is this informal ability to “sound off,” often in harsh and unbridled invective, that opens the door to libel and other tortious conduct. In the corporate and financial arena, the targets of such “cybersmear” may suffer damage to their business reputations and a concomitant decline in company value as disinformation and rumors propagate rapidly over the Internet. In addition, as the level of rational and civil discourse deteriorates, it becomes increasingly difficult to find meaningful contribution in these online conversations. (Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, supra, 49 Duke L.J. at p. 903.)

Judicial recognition of the constitutional right to publish anonymously is a long-standing tradition. Most of the early decisions affirming this right concern political speech or artistic endeavors. “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.” (Talley v. California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64 [4 L.Ed.2d 559, 80 S.Ct. 536] [ruling unconstitutional ordinance barring without limitation distribution of handbills that lacked identification of persons preparing or sponsoring them].) “The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. Accordingly, an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” *1164 (McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n (1995) 514 U.S. 334, 341-342 [131 L.Ed.2d 426, 115 S.Ct. 1511], fn. omitted; accord, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton (2002) 536 U.S. 150, 166 [153 L.Ed.2d 205, 122 S.Ct. 2080].)

When vigorous criticism descends into defamation, however, constitutional protection is no longer available. “[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 S.Ct. 766], fns. omitted; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 245-246 [152 L.Ed.2d 403, 122 S.Ct. 1389] [freedom of speech “has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children . . .”]; Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) 343 U.S. 250, 266 [96 L.Ed. 919, 72 S.Ct. 725] [“[l]ibelous utterances” are not constitutionally protected speech].)

Speech on the Internet is also accorded First Amendment protection. “Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. . . . [Q]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.” (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 870 [138 L.Ed.2d 874, 117 S.Ct. 2329].) As noted earlier, however, criticism on the Internet is often so recklessly communicated that the harm to its targets, particularly in the financial arena, may extend far beyond what is covered by rules applicable to oral rhetoric and pamphleteering.

Corporate and individual targets of these online aspersions may seek redress by filing suit against their unknown detractors. Once notified of a lawsuit by the Web site host or ISP, a defendant may then assert his or her First *1165 Amendment right to speak anonymously through an application for a protective order or, as here, a motion to quash the subpoena. The present action for defamation and interference with business relationships is but one example of such confrontations.

3. The Applicable Balancing Test

The parties agree that the viability of the subpoena should be determined by weighing Doe 6’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously against plaintiff’s interest in discovering his identity in order to pursue her claim. They disagree, however, as to how that weighing process should be approached. Plaintiff urges application of three California decisions: Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 268 [208 Cal.Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d 625], where the Supreme Court articulated five factors to consider in deciding whether a journalist may be compelled to disclose the identity of and information from confidential sources; 7 O’Grady v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 1423, which protected e-mail correspondence and its senders from disclosure in response to a civil subpoena; and Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1538 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 274], where the court applied a qualified constitutional privilege protecting anonymous authors of advertisements criticizing the plaintiff hospital.

None of these cases is helpful to our analysis. Mitchell, for example, concerned a libel action in which the defendants, a newsmagazine and its reporters, resisted disclosing their confidential sources based on the “freedom of the press.” (Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 274.) The Supreme Court held that the defendants had a qualified privilege to protect the identity of confidential sources. {Id. at p. 276.) Here we are not confronted with issues involving freedom of the press, the confidentiality of news sources, or the public confidence in media publications. The interrelated factors that define the scope of that privilege are of limited relevance here.

Rancho Publications is likewise not helpful. There the appellate court balanced the relevance of the material sought and the plaintiff’s need for disclosure against the magnitude of the invasion of the critics’ privacy. The *1166 court stressed the “particularized nature” of the qualified privilege it was applying. (Rancho Publications v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550.) In an analysis that took into consideration the Mitchell factors, the court found that the newspaper that had published the critical advertisements had not itself been sued for defamation. Indeed, the hospital had supplied only “rank conjecture” that the “advertorials” were authored by the same source as the object of the preexisting defamation lawsuit. (Id. at p. 1551.) Furthermore, the hospital had not shown that the statements were false or beyond description as opinion.

In O’Grady v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 1423, Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple), sued a number of “Doe” defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets after they communicated information about a new Apple product that had not yet been released. O’Grady and another individual were the publishers of “online news magazine” Web sites on which they posted articles about the new product. (Id. at p. 1432.) The trial court permitted Apple to serve subpoenas on the host of one publisher’s e-mail account and the other’s Web site to produce documents relating to the identities of the defendants who had provided the information from which the articles were derived. The subpoenas further required the e-mail service hosts to produce all communications relating to Apple’s new product. The trial court denied the publishers’ motion for a protective order, but this court overturned the order by granting their petition for a writ of mandate. We held that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) prohibited disclosure of the information, with no exception for civil discovery. We further explained that the SCA “does not authorize the disclosure of the identity of the author of a stored message; it authorizes the disclosure of ‘a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) . . . .’ (18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), italics added.)” (O’Grady, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) O’Grady was not a case in which the subscriber himself had posted anonymous messages that were known; Apple sought the contents of private messages stored on the hosts’ facilities. Such disclosure would have violated the SCA. Finally, we found that the petitioners were protected by article I, section 2, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution, the reporter’s shield law (precluding judgments of contempt), and by the privilege enjoyed by a free press to safeguard the identity of confidential sources. Applying the Mitchell factors, we held that the circumstances favoring disclosure were outweighed by countervailing factors, particularly Apple’s failure to exhaust alternative sources of the information.

This case is of the kind we distinguished in O’Grady. Plaintiff seeks only the identity of her detractor, not the content of a communication; and the protected interests asserted in the motion are not those of a third party host or news medium but those of the anonymous speaker himself. To reach a *1167 workable standard by which to balance the parties’ competing interests we must look beyond the reporters’ shield law and the constitutional protections enjoyed by the news media. The proper focus instead should be on providing an injured party a means of redress without compromising the legitimate right of the Internet user to communicate freely with others.

4. Dendrite, Cahill, and Other Tests

Federal and state courts have made valiant efforts to devise a fair standard by which to balance the interests of the parties involved in disputes over Internet speech. The most deferential to plaintiffs are those applying a “good faith” standard. (See, e.g., In re Subpoena to America Online, Inc. (2000) 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 [ISP required to disclose Doe identities upon corporate plaintiff’s “legitimate, good faith basis” for alleging actionable conduct and the necessity of the information to advance the claim].) Plaintiff does not urge us to adopt such a low threshold for disclosure, nor would we do so; it offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith and leaves the speaker with little protection.

Other courts have exercised greater scrutiny of the plaintiff’s cause of action before allowing the speaker to be identified. In Dendrite Intern. v. Doe No. 3 (2001) 342 N.J. Super. 134 [775 A.2d 756], for example, a corporation alleged defamation by multiple Doe defendants on a Yahoo! message board and then sought expedited discovery in order to learn their identities. The New Jersey appellate court set forth a four-part test to ensure that plaintiffs do not use discovery to “harass, intimidate or silence critics in the public forum opportunities presented by the Internet.” (Id., 775 A.2d at p. 771.) First, the plaintiff must make an effort to notify the anonymous poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. The plaintiff must also set forth the specific statements that are alleged to be actionable. Third, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to state a prima facie cause of action. If this showing is made, then the final step should be undertaken: to balance the strength of that prima facie case against the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously. (Id., 775 A.2d at pp. 760-761.) In Dendrite, the appellate court affinned the trial court’s denial of the discovery application, as the corporate plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that any decline in its stock price had been caused by the offensive messages. 8

*1168 The same court on the same day followed Dendrite to a different result in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe (2001) 342 N.J. Super. 160 [775 A.2d 773, 777]. There the plaintiff company established a prima facie cause of action for breach of a confidentiality agreement by an employee suspected of revealing proprietary information on a Yahoo! finance message board. On this occasion the court did not analyze the harm asserted by Immunomedics. It also emphasized that the defendant would not be permitted to present evidence to disprove the plaintiff’s claims, as that would afford the anonymous poster an unfair defense advantage. (Id., 775 A.2d at p. 778.)

The third and fourth ingredients of the Dendrite analysis were later applied in Highfields Capital Management, L.P. v. Doe (N.D.Cal. 2005) 385 F.Supp.2d 969 (Highfields Capital). There the hedge fund management firm, which was the controlling shareholder of Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI), alleged that the Doe defendant had engaged in defamation, commercial disparagement, and violation of trademark and unfair competition laws through its three postings on a Yahoo! message board devoted to SGI. The district court ruled that the magistrate had properly required the plaintiff to present a “ ‘real evidentiary basis’ ” for believing the defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct causing harm to the plaintiff’s interests. (Id. at p. 970.) The court adopted the test employed by the magistrate: (1) the plaintiff must adduce competent evidence to support a finding of each fact essential to the cause of action; and (2) if the first requirement is satisfied, the court must compare the magnitude of the harm to each party’s interests that would result from a ruling in favor of either. (Id. at p. 976.) The magistrate found, and the district court agreed, that the plaintiff had not met the first component of the test, and it was therefore unnecessary to reach the second.

While Doe 6 urges us to follow Highfields Capital, plaintiff objects to that court’s requirement of a prima facie showing of each element at the pleading stage. She nevertheless maintains that she met that test. Neither party advocates a third line of analysis set forth in Doe v. Cahill (Del. 2005) 884 A.2d 451, a case involving political speech about a public figure. In Cahill the Doe defendant was sued for defamation after criticizing a town councilman on an Internet blog. The trial court applied a “good faith” standard for disclosure and denied the defendant’s request for a protective *1169 order, but the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The good faith standard, the high court held, was “too easily satisfied” to protect the First Amendment right to speak anonymously. (884 A.2d at p. 458.) Even a motion-to-dismiss standard was, in the court’s view, too weak, because Delaware, as a notice-pleading state, required only “well-pleaded allegations” for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. (Ibid.) Consequently, any allegation that put the opposing party on notice of the claim was sufficient in that jurisdiction, even if it was “ ‘vague or lacking in detail.’ ” (Ibid.)

The Dendrite test, on the other hand, required too much. The Cahill court instead adopted a standard applicable to a plaintiff opposing summary judgment. Thus, the plaintiff “must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” 9 (Doe v. Cahill, supra, 884 A.2d at p. 460.) The second Dendrite requirement, that the plaintiff set forth the exact statements alleged to be defamatory, was unnecessary because those statements must be quoted in the plaintiff’s complaint to avoid summary judgment. The fourth Dendrite step, the balancing of the defendant’s First Amendment rights against the strength of the plaintiff’s case, was also unnecessary because “[t]he summary judgment test is itself the balance. The fourth requirement adds no protection above and beyond that of the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis.” (884 A.2d at p. 461.) The court did, however, endorse the first element of the Dendrite test, that the plaintiff make reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous poster about the subpoena or request for a disclosure order and give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Cahill court even required the plaintiff to publish that notice on the same message board where the allegedly defamatory statement appeared.

Cahill was followed by trial courts in various jurisdictions. (See, e.g., Best Western Intern., Inc. v. Doe (D. Ariz., July 25, 2006, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC) 2006 WL 2091695 [agreeing with Cahill that a summary judgment standard should be satisfied]; Reunion Industries, Inc. v. Doe 1 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2007) 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 449 [finding summary judgment standard “appropriate”]; but see Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Development, Inc., supra, 2006 WL 37020 [agreeing with Vogel that existing procedural rules are sufficient without any new standards].) In Lassa v. Rongstad (2006) 2006 WI 105 [294 Wis.2d 187, 718 N.W.2d 673], however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Delaware court’s summary judgment standard in favor of a motion-to-dismiss standard. The “ ‘silly *1170 or trivial libel claims’ ” that would survive a motion to dismiss in a notice-pleading state such as Delaware would be adequately tested on a motion to dismiss in Wisconsin, where the statement constituting libel must be set forth in the complaint. (Id., 718 N.W.2d at p. 687.) The majority opinion did not, however, explain how (or if) a motion to dismiss would incorporate a balancing of the parties’ competing interests.

Other courts have utilized a motion-to-dismiss standard in weighing the need of injured parties to discover the identity of libelous Doe defendants against the rights of those defendants to speak anonymously. In Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does I Through 20 (N.D.Cal., May 29, 2003, No. MISC 03-003 3 CRB, 2003 U.S.Dist. Lexis 16277 [2003 WL 22149380]), on facts similar to those before us, the federal district court granted a motion to quash a subpoena on Yahoo!. The plaintiff could not satisfy the court that its complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss, as it could not show that any of the anonymous poster’s statements constituted libel. In its ruling the district court relied on Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com (N.D.Cal. 1999)