Boyd v. Lantz

RULING ON PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

Terrence Boyd, the petitioner, is serving a twenty-five year sentence of incarceration at the State of Connecticut’s Osborn Correctional Institution after pleading guilty to felony murder, in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-54e. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 1 on the ground that the respondent, Theresa Lantz, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”), wrongly denied him credit toward that sentence, in violation of his federal due process rights. 2 For the reasons that follow, Boyd’s petition is granted.

I. Background! 3

Boyd alleges that DOC violated his due process rights by applying Conn. GemStat. § 18-98d to deny him over six years of credit toward his felony murder sentence. The time line of this case is as follows: Boyd was first arrested and placed in custody on December 15, 1986. Following a jury trial in the Connecticut Superior Court, he was convicted of burglary, larceny, and felony murder. On January 21, 1988, he was sentenced to forty-five years of incarceration for felony murder, fifteen years for burglary, and five years for larceny, with the sentences to run concurrently. On March 6, 1990, the Connecticut Supreme Court vacated Boyd’s felony murder conviction. 4 He remained incarcerated on the burglary and larceny convictions. The state brought a new felony murder charge against Boyd, which he challenged pre-trial on double jeopardy grounds in state court. After losing his final appeal in state court, 5 he filed a fed *6 eral habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut that reiterated his double jeopardy claim. The district court denied Boyd’s petition and the Second Circuit affirmed that decision. Boyd v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.1996). On October 7, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to his habe-as petition. Boyd v. Armstrong, 519 U.S. 838, 117 S.Ct. 114, 136 L.Ed.2d 66 (1996). On January 3, 1997, Boyd completed his state burglary sentence, but remained incarcerated because of his re-prosecution for felony murder. On September 15, 1998 he pled guilty to felony murder, and he was sentenced that day to twenty-five years’ incarceration, the sentence provided for in his plea agreement. Boyd has been incarcerated continuously through the present date since his initial arrest and detention on December 15,1986.

In calculating the pre-sentence credits Boyd was to receive for time served to reduce his second felony murder sentence, DOC (1) awarded Boyd credit from December 15, 1986, the date of his initial arrest, to March 6, 1990, the date his first felony murder conviction was vacated by the Connecticut Supreme Court; (2) awarded Boyd credit from January 3,1997, the date he finished serving his burglary sentence, through September 15, 1998, the date he pled guilty and was sentenced for his second felony murder conviction; and (3) denied Boyd credit from March 7,1990, the day after his first felony murder conviction was vacated, to January 3,1997, the date Boyd finished serving his sentence for burglary. DOC excluded the period between March 7, 1990 and January 3, 1997 because of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d(a)(l). That statute provides:

Any person who is confined to a ... correctional institution ... because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail ... shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of such person’s sentence equal to the number of days which such person spent in such facility from the time such person was placed in presentence confinement to the time such person began serving the term of imprisonment imposed; provided (A) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement; and (B) ... this section shall only apply to a person for whom the existence of a mittimus, an inability to obtain bail or the denial of bail is the sole reason for such person’s presentence confinement....

Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d(a)(l).

In Steve v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Appellate Court held that Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d prohibits a prisoner who is incarcerated on a separate conviction and awaiting re-prosecution on a previously vacated conviction from receiving credit toward any future sentence arising out of the re-prosecution. 6 39 Conn.App. 455, 469, 665 A.2d 168 (1995). In calculating Boyd’s sentence for his second felony murder conviction, DOC viewed the period after the Supreme Court of Connecticut vacated his first felony murder conviction but before he finished his burglary sentence as falling directly under Steve, and hence refused to credit Boyd for this time.

Boyd challenged DOC’s denial of this credit through a state habeas petition. The Superior Court denied the petition *7 and the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the denial; the Supreme Court of Connecticut then denied certiorari. Boyd v. Comm’r of Corr., 84 Conn.App. 22, 851 A.2d 1209 (2004); cert. denied, 271 Conn. 929, 859 A.2d 583 (2004); Boyd v. Warden, No. CY000003130, 2002 WL 31758386, 2002 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3676 (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov.15, 2002). In its decision, the Appellate Court held that while Steve (applying North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)) requires DOC to credit a prisoner for time served while the prisoner challenges the underlying conviction up to the time of the reversal of the conviction, Boyd’s double jeopardy challenge was a “collateral ... attack after the underlying conviction was clearly vacated and [Boyd] was no longer incarcerated on that conviction.” Boyd, 84 Conn.App. at 30, 851 A.2d 1209. Since Boyd was challenging his re-prosecution, not his former conviction, Steve and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d prohibited him from receiving “double credit” counted against both his burglary sentence and his future felony murder sentence. Id. The Appellate Court found no distinction between Boyd’s case and the facts of Steve, where the petitioner sought credit for time spent incarcerated for assault while awaiting re-prosecution for robbery and a separate assault charge. 7 See id.

In the instant case, Boyd does not disagree that the plain language of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d, as explained by Steve, requires the result reached by DOC and the Connecticut courts. However, Boyd argues that the statute, as applied to his situation by DOC and the Connecticut courts, violates his constitutional rights. 8 Specifically, Boyd claims that this application of the statute unconstitutionally burdened his right to bring a pre-conviction double jeopardy challenge to his re-prosecution. In light of this, Boyd seeks credit for the duration of his double jeopardy challenge. 9

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a habeas petition filed after April 24, 1996 may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly defined the term “clearly established Federal law” to mean “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Further, these governing principles must stem from the Court’s holdings, not mere dicta. Yarborough v. Alvarado, *8 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established federal law in two ways. First, a state court decision is contrary to clearly established state law “if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Second, the state court decision fails this test “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by [the Supreme Court].” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005).

Habeas relief is also proper if the state court’s decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law. This occurs “if the state court applie[d] [the Supreme Court’s] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. This means that, while the state court correctly identified the governing federal law, the state court’s application of it was objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court). “Relief may also be available under this prong if the state court ... unreasonably fails to extend a legal rule to a context in which the rule reasonably should apply.” Serrano v. Fischer, 412 F.3d 292, 296-97 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Kennaugh v. Miller, 289 F.3d 36, 45 & n. 2 (2d Cir.2002)).

AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” requirement provides significant protection to state court decisions, because it prevents a federal court from granting a ha-beas petition merely because the state court’s application of federal law was incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“Under § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”). Although a lower federal court “often [has] an obligation to inform state courts [of] what [it] believe[s] the correct answer [to a constitutional question] to be,” Kruelski v. Conn. Superior Court for the Judicial Dist. of Danbury, 316 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir.2003), “[a] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state court applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Hoi Man Yung v. Walker, 468 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495). To grant the petition, “[t]he increment of incorrectness beyond error [by the state court] need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.” Id. At the same time, however, the federal habeas court “must be able to adequately identify why [it] found the [state-court] decision ... to be objectively unreasonable.” Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 147 (2d Cir.2006) (citations omitted).

The reasonableness of a state court’s decision must be examined in light of the nature of the federal rule the state court applied. See Serrano, 412 F.3d at 297. The applicable “clearly established federal law” “may be either a generalized standard enunciated in the [Supreme] Court’s case law or a bright-line rule designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context.” Kennaugh, 289 F.3d at 42. While specific, bright-line rules “may not permit much leeway in their interpretation, the same is not true of more general rules, the meaning of which ‘must emerge *9 in application over the course of time.’ ” Serrano, 412 F.3d at 297 (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140). Because of this, the “range of judgments [by the state court] that can be deemed ‘reasonable’ ” varies with the contours of the federal rule in question. Id.

In light of AEDPA’s mandate that federal habeas courts must uphold state courts’ incorrect but reasonable interpretations of federal law, a federal habeas court may analyze a state court’s decision with a two step test. Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 106. If a federal district court adopts this approach, 10 the court should first “determine[ ] ... the correct interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.” Id. Then, “if the state court’s understanding or application of that precedent is determined to be erroneous,” the district court must resolve whether that error was reasonable. Id. The district court may grant the writ only if it concludes that the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable. Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 147.

B. Substantive Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees more than fair process.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). The Clause’s substantive component “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights.” Id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). It is well-settled that the Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the government to infringe ... ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Flores, 507 U.S. at 302[, 113 S.Ct. 1439] (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court, in many contexts, has confirmed that state burdens on the exercise of fundamental rights will be strictly scrutinized. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988) (“classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (right of access to courts); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (right to interstate travel); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (right to plead not guilty); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (right to marry); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (criminal defendant’s right not to testify at trial); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (freedom of association); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942) (right to have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (right to educate children).

Fundamental rights include those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 34, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “although the Court resisted for some time the idea that ‘fundamental *10 fairness’ necessarily included the protections of the Bill of Rights, it ultimately incorporated virtually all of them [against the states]” (citations omitted)). The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual’s fundamental right not to be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy.” 11 U.S. Const. amend. V. In addition to prohibiting successive punishments for the same offense, “the Double Jeopardy Clause ... is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (emphasis in original); see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984) (“The right guaranteed ... is more than the right not to be convicted in a second prosecution ... it is the right not to be ‘placed in jeopardy’ — that is, the right not to be tried.”). It is well settled that an individual’s double jeopardy rights may be fully vindicated only through a pre-trial challenge to the prosecution. Ab-ney, 431 U.S. at 662, 97 S.Ct. 2034 (“[I]f a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs.”); see United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir.2006) (discussing Abney); United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1999) (“[The Clause’s] protection would be forever lost if a criminal defendant were forced to endure a second trial before an appeal could be taken.”). The Supreme Court’s inclusion of double jeopardy challenges as one of only three narrow grounds for interlocutory appellate review in criminal cases highlights the necessity of pre-trial review to protect double jeopardy rights. 12 United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982) (citing United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978)). Since pre-trial review is necessary to protect double jeopardy rights, the right to assert a pre-trial challenge to a prosecution is implicit in the Clause’s guarantee. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266, 104 S.Ct. 1051 (“[T]he asserted rights [in double jeopardy challenges] would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until trial is completed.”).

C. Substantive Due Process and Conn. Gen. St at. § 18-98d

Boyd claims that Conn. Gen.Stat. § 18-98d, as applied to his case by DOC and the Connecticut courts, unconstitutionally burdened his due process right to seek pre-trial vindication of his double jeopardy rights. In Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir.1983), the Second Circuit established a three part test to assess substantive due process challenges to legislative action. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 180 (2d Cir.2003) (reaffirming Joyner test). First, the court should assess whether a fundamental right is at stake. Joyner, 712 F.2d at 777. Second, *11 the court should determine whether the statute burdens the fundamental right. Id. Finally, the court must “analyze whether an important state interest justifies the infringement.” Id. Boyd’s claim satisfies the first prong of this test because, as discussed above, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant’s right to challenge a prosecution in advance of trial.

Boyd’s claim also satisfies the test’s second prong. Boyd argues that the statute places a price — in the form of an effectively much longer prison sentence — on the exercise of double jeopardy rights by criminal defendants who, while incarcerated for other crimes on sentences to run concurrent to the sentence for the vacated conviction, are re-prosecuted after successfully appealing that conviction. The State’s decision to re-prosecute Boyd left him with three choices. He could have (1) pled guilty, (2) gone to trial, or (3) challenged the re-prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. Only the third option, which Boyd chose, would fully protect Boyd’s due process and double jeopardy rights. Abney, 431 U.S. at 662, 97 S.Ct. 2034; see Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266, 104 S.Ct. 1051. However, bringing this challenge also kept Boyd within Conn Gen.Stat. § 18-98d’s classification of pre-trial prisoners ineligible for credit toward a subsequent re-conviction, because he was still serving the sentence for his burglary conviction when he brought the challenge, and his first felony murder conviction had been vacated. Boyd, 84 Conn.App. at 30, 851 A.2d 1209 (citing Steve, 39 Conn.App. at 469, 665 A.2d 168). The Connecticut courts used this basis to uphold DOC’s denial of credit for the six and a half years Boyd spent litigating his double jeopardy challenge from prison prior to the completion of his burglary sentence. Id. However, this application of the statute penalized Boyd for bringing his double jeopardy challenge because the challenge effectively postponed the second felony murder prosecution and prevented Boyd from receiving concurrent sentence credit on the felony murder charge. If Boyd had instead pled guilty immediately, or submitted to re-prosecution and been convicted, under the statute he would have received credit for all of his time in prison after the conviction, regardless of the fact that he may have still been serving his burglary sentence. See Steve, 39 Conn.App. at 469, 665 A.2d 168. Since the application of Conn. GemStat. § 18-98d to a defendant in Boyd’s position will result in a substantially longer period of incarceration should the defendant choose to exercise his double jeopardy rights, 13 the Court concludes that the statute, as applied in this narrow factual context, burdens such a defendant’s fundamental due process right to challenge his re-prosecution. 14 See United States v. *12 Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (“the imposition of ... a punishment penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights would be patently unconstitutional”) (citations omitted); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (“Congress cannot impose [ ] a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.... A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.”); Griffin v. California,