951 S.W.2d 420 (1997)

The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, INC., Petitioner
v.
Jeannie GRINNELL, individually and as independent executrix of the Estate of Wiley Grinnell, Jr., deceased, Wiley and Frances Grinnell, Sr., and Kevin Grinnell, Respondents.

No. 94-1227.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 13, 1996. Decided June 20, 1997. Rehearing Overruled October 2, 1997.

*424 Jana F. Lohse, Sam W. Cruse, Houston, Thomas E. Riley, Steven L. Vollins, Thomas E. Bezanson, New York, NY, Hubert Oxford, III, Beaumont, for Petitioner.

David B. Gaultney, Dewey J. Gonsoulin, Beaumont, Jonathan Massey, Washington, DC, Jorge Vega, Harry G. Potter, III, Austin, Lawrence H. Tribe, Cambridge, MA, for Respondents.

CORNYN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and GONZALEZ, SPECTOR, BAKER and ABBOTT, Justices, join.

In this wrongful death case, we confront an issue with profound health and public policy consequences: whether "common knowledge" of the health risks of cigarette smoking relieves tobacco companies of any duty to warn smokers of those risks. Applying our usual summary judgment standard, we conclude that the defendant has conclusively established the defense of common knowledge with regard to the general health risks of smoking. We also conclude, however, that the defendant has not conclusively established the common knowledge defense with regard to the addictive nature of cigarettes. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on most, but not all of the plaintiffs' claims, and remand the surviving claims to the trial court for further proceedings.

*425 In 1952, nineteen-year-old Wiley Grinnell began smoking Lucky Strikes, cigarettes manufactured by the American Tobacco Company. Almost a year later, Grinnell changed to Pall Malls, also manufactured by American. After smoking for approximately thirty-three years, Grinnell was diagnosed with lung cancer in July 1985. Shortly thereafter, he filed this lawsuit. He died less than a year later. Grinnell's family continued this suit after his death, adding wrongful death and survival claims. The family alleges that American failed to warn of, and actively concealed, facts that it knew or should have known, including the facts that Grinnell could quickly become addicted to cigarettes and that his smoking could result in injury or death from the cancer-causing ingredients if he used the cigarettes as American intended. They also allege that, even though American knew or should have known that its cigarettes were dangerous and could not be used safely, American represented to consumers that cigarettes were not harmful, dangerous, or capable of causing injury.

The Grinnells assert essentially six interrelated claims: (1) strict liability design, marketing, and manufacturing defect; (2) negligent testing, failure to warn, misrepresentation, and design; (3) affirmative fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment; (4) Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations for failure to disclose and deceptive advertising; (5) breach of express and implied warranties; and (6) civil conspiracy. They also assert claims based on violations of sections 321, 389, 519, and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965, 1977). The gravamen of their complaint is that Grinnell began smoking because American did not warn him of the potential dangers of smoking, and once he began smoking he could not stop because he became addicted to cigarettes.

In several motions for summary judgment, American asserted that it conclusively defeated at least one element of each of the Grinnells' claims and that many of the claims were preempted by federal law. In the first motion, American asserted that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 preempted the Grinnells' claims for American's post-1965 activities based on inadequate warnings in advertising and promotional materials. American's second motion asserted that federal law preempted all of the Grinnells' claims based upon post-1965 activity. In its "renewed" motion, American asserted that all of the Grinnells' claims were preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 or otherwise barred by Texas law. The trial court granted all three motions and dismissed the Grinnells' suit. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the entire case. 883 S.W.2d 791.

When reviewing a summary judgment, we follow these well-established rules: (1) The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Summary judgment is proper if the defendant disproves at least one element of each of the plaintiff's claims, Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex.1995), or establishes all elements of an affirmative defense to each claim. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). We first address those claims to which defenses other than federal preemption apply.

I. Common-Law Duties

A. Strict Liability

The Grinnells allege that cigarettes are both defective and unreasonably dangerous under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Specifically, they assert that American's cigarettes are (1) defectively designed because ingredients found in cigarettes cause cancer, addiction, and disease, (2) defectively marketed, because the cigarette packages contain inadequate warnings, and (3) defectively manufactured because cigarettes contain pesticide residue. In his deposition taken one month before his death, *426 Grinnell testified that had he known of the dangers inherent in cigarettes he would never have started smoking in the first place.

In Texas, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts governs claims for strict liability in tort. Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex.1967). Section 402A provides:

(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). A product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in marketing, design, or manufacturing. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.1995); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tex.1972). The Grinnells allege that the cigarettes sold by American were unreasonably dangerous due to each of the three types of defect. We address each of the Grinnells' claims in turn.

1. Marketing Defect

A defendant's failure to warn of a product's potential dangers when warnings are required is a type of marketing defect. Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 382; Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex.1984). The existence of a duty to warn of dangers or instruct as to the proper use of a product is a question of law. Firestone Steel, 927 S.W.2d at 613; General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. 1993). Generally, a manufacturer has a duty to warn if it knows or should know of the potential harm to a user because of the nature of its product. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.1978). Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that there is no duty to warn when the risks associated with a particular product are matters "within the ordinary knowledge common to the community." Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex.1991) (holding that no legal duty exists to warn of the health risks of alcohol consumption because such risks are common knowledge). American argues that it had no duty to warn Grinnell of the risks associated with smoking its cigarettes because the dangers of smoking were common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking in 1952.

Comments i and j to Restatement section 402A incorporate common knowledge into the analysis of whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" under that section.^[1] Comment i, which defines "unreasonably dangerous," forecloses liability against manufacturers unless a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer with knowledge common to the community:

Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption.... That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an *427 extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.... Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)(emphasis added). Comment j excuses a seller from the duty to warn about dangers that are generally known and recognized:

In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.... But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excess quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized. ... [T]he dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example....

Id. § 402A cmt. j (1965)(emphasis added).^[2]

Common knowledge, in the context of comments i and j, connotes a general societal understanding of the risks inherent in a specific product or class of products. Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 388. In Seagram we also emphasized that the standard for finding common knowledge as a matter of law is a strict one. First holding that the term "common knowledge" encompasses "those facts that are so well known to the community as to be beyond dispute," id., we then noted:

Because Seagram is asking this court to determine common knowledge as a matter of law, we find the judicial notice rule helpful in providing a standard. Compare 33 S. Goode, O. Wellborn, III & M. Sharlot, Guide to Texas Rules of Evidence § 201.2 (Tex.Prac.1988)(requiring "high degree of indisputability" as prerequisite to judicial notice) with Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 830-31 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied)("common knowledge is information known by the public generally based upon indisputable facts").

Id. at 388 n. 6.

Thus, common knowledge is an extraordinary defense^[3] that applies only in limited circumstances. As the court in Brune noted, common knowledge encompasses only those things "so patently obvious and so well known to the community generally, that there can be no question or dispute concerning their existence." Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830-31. We will find common knowledge as a matter of law only when the standard set out in Seagram is met. It is not met in all respects here.

For example, we do not find the dangers of alcohol and cigarettes, or the public's awareness of those respective dangers, to be commensurate. Unlike Seagram & Sons, which did not dispute the health dangers of prolonged alcohol use, Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 387, the tobacco industry, including American, actively disputed that cigarettes posed any health risk at the time Grinnell began smoking in 1952. Indeed, the industry continues to dispute the health risks of smoking and the addictive nature of cigarettes, before *428 Congress, in the national press,^[4] and even at oral argument before the Court in this case.^[5] Despite this ongoing "dispute," we are bound to apply the rule that whether knowledge has become common to the community is an objective determination. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex.1995).

The party asserting the common-knowledge defense must establish that the dangers attributable to alcohol, tobacco, or other products were a matter of common knowledge when the consumer began using the product. Based on the summary judgment record, we hold American established that the general ill-effects of smoking were commonly known when Grinnell started smoking in 1952. However, we also hold that American did not establish that the addictive quality of cigarettes was commonly known when Grinnell began smoking in 1952.

Regarding the general health risks associated with smoking, the Tennessee Supreme Court held as early as 1898 that these risks were "generally known." Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (1898), aff'd as modified sub nom. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 L.Ed. 224 (1900). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court observed:

[W]e should be shutting our eyes to what is constantly passing before them were we to affect an ignorance of the fact that a belief in [cigarettes'] deleterious effects, particularly upon young people, has become very general, and that communications are constantly finding their way into the public press denouncing their use as fraught with great danger....

179 U.S. at 348, 21 S.Ct. at 134 (emphasis added). Other early courts also recognized the harmful effects of smoking cigarettes. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N.E. 44, 45 (1898) (cigarettes are "deleterious" and "injurious"), aff'd, 177 U.S. 183, 20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725 (1900); State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 P. 347, 348 (1920) (dangers of smoking and deleterious effects of cigarettes are common knowledge); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009, 1010 (1915) (cigarettes are "possessed of no virtue, being bad inherently"). More recently, courts have similarly acknowledged that the inherent dangers of smoking cigarettes are within the community's common knowledge. Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 300, 136 L.Ed.2d 218 (1996) ("[T]he dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community."); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir.1988) ("`[T]obacco has been used for over 400 years and ... its characteristics have also been fully explored. Knowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community.'"); Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F.Supp. 228, 231 (N.D.Ohio 1993) ("Much as in the case of alcohol, users of tobacco products... made a consumer choice in the face of health risks that [have been] common to ordinary knowledge [since well before 1966].").

Moreover, by 1962, when the Surgeon General's advisory committee began examining the health risks associated with smoking, there were already more than seven thousand publications of professional and general circulation examining the relationship between *429 smoking and health. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 89-8411, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2 (1989). Of these publications, articles published in nationally circulated magazines dating back to the early 1900s informed readers about the deleterious effects of smoking. Brown, Is a Tobacco Crusade Coming?, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1920, at 447 (adverse medical science findings on smoking have been brought before the public for the past thirty years); Does Tobacco Make One Tired?, The Literary Digest, Apr. 15, 1922, at 27 (noting the effect of heavy smoking, light smoking, and nonsmoking on workers' efficiency); Hirshberg, Truth About Tobacco, Harper's Weekly, Jan. 4, 1913 (consumer awareness of claims linking smoking to cancer, health disease, and bronchitis is pervasive); Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 7 (examining data and projecting the number of future lung cancer deaths from smoking).

During this same period, many books examined the health risks associated with smoking and argued against the use of cigarettes. See generally COLES, THE BEAUTIES AND DEFORMITIES OF TOBACCO-USING (1851); GOFF, PETITION TO CONGRESS: PROHIBIT GROWING AND IMPORTATION OF TOBACCO (1913); GRISCOM, THE USE OF TOBACCO, AND THE EVILS (1868); PACK, TOBACCO AND HUMAN EFFICIENCY (1918); SCHRUMPF-PIERRON, TOBACCO AND PHYSICAL EFFICIENCY (1927); SLOCUM, ABOUT TOBACCO AND ITS DELETERIOUS EFFECTS (1909); TAYLOR, DON'T SMOKE (1944); WALSH, THE BURNING SHAME OF AMERICA: OUTLINE AGAINST NICOTINE (1924). These books and articles published before 1952 indicate that the general dangers of smoking were common knowledge even before Grinnell began smoking. See, e.g., Crist & Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation—Is Anything Really So New?, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 551, 553 (1987) ("Even prior to the beginning of this century, ... the public [was] constantly exposed to innumerable reports associating smoking with health risks."); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1325 (1991) ("The amount of information available to American consumers about the dangers of smoking is, and for some while has been, staggering.").

Not only does historical evidence illustrate the public's pre-1952 awareness of smoking's dangerous effects, but the Grinnells' experts also confirmed that the health hazards of smoking were common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking. Dr. Ravenholt, an expert on cancer and its causes, testified that the dangers of smoking were well known by the 1950s: "I think the majority [of people] would have been aware, you know, an adult, reasonably intelligent." He also testified that, in 1950, "evidence emerged of the lung cancer producing capability of smoking" and that the dangers attributable to smoking were extensively published and frequently front-page news stories in the 1950s. Dr. Greenberg likewise testified that the decision to smoke or refrain from smoking cigarettes is a matter of "individual personal responsibility" in light of the health risks.

We conclude that the general health dangers attributable to cigarettes were commonly known as a matter of law by the community when Grinnell began smoking. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d at 383 (common knowledge is usually determined as a matter of law). We cannot conclude, however, that the specific danger of nicotine addiction was common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking. Addiction is a danger apart from the direct physical dangers of smoking because the addictive nature of cigarettes multiplies the likelihood of and contributes to the smoker's ultimate injury, in Grinnell's case, lung cancer. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1423, 1430 (1980) ("[D]ependency adds a new dimension to smoking, for it greatly increases the likelihood of high volume, long term use which leads to disease, disability, and early death."). This Court has also recognized the seriousness of addiction and the need for manufacturers to warn of this danger in the context of prescription drugs. Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex.1974) (holding drug manufacturer liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B *430 for misrepresenting that drug "was free and safe from all dangers of addiction"); see also Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 516 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, writ denied) ("Indeed, the failure to warn of cigarettes' addictive nature could be the essence of a plaintiff's complaint."). We acknowledge that some authorities support the proposition that some members of the community associated addiction with smoking cigarettes earlier in this century. Ploch v. City of St. Louis, 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S.W.2d 1020, 1023 (1940) (cigarettes have "harmful properties" and it is common knowledge that nicotine produces "tobacco addicts"); Wiley, The Little White Slaver, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1916, at 91 (people can become "slaves" to the cigarette habit and cigarette smoking can "shorten their lives").

The Surgeon General spoke to the addictive nature of tobacco in the most recent and comprehensive report on the subject in 1988. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 8406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988) (hereafter Nicotine Addiction). In that report, the Surgeon General concluded that: (1) cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting, (2) nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, and (3) the pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Id. at iii.^[6] More recently, the Food and Drug Administration has concluded that tobacco products are addictive. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44555-56 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897) ("[T]he evidence shows that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are highly addictive, cause other psychoactive effects ... and that these effects are widely accepted in the scientific community."); see Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 958 F.Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C.1997) (upholding FDA's jurisdiction to impose access restrictions and labeling requirements on tobacco products).

But we cannot simply assume that common knowledge of the general health risks of tobacco use naturally includes common knowledge of tobacco's addictive quality. Indeed, as David Kessler, former head of the FDA, has pointed out:

Before 1980, when FDA last considered its jurisdiction over tobacco products, no major public health organization had determined that nicotine was an addictive drug. Today, however, all major public health organizations in the United States and abroad with expertise in tobacco or drug addiction recognize that the nicotine delivered by cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is addictive.

Kessler et al., The Legal and Scientific Basis for FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction over Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 277 Jama 405, 406 (1997) (emphasis added). The FDA based its 1996 assertion of jurisdiction on "a wealth of epidemiologic and laboratory data establishing that tobacco users display the clinical symptoms of addiction and that nicotine has the characteristics of other addictive drugs." Id. Thus, unlike the general dangers associated with smoking, as late as 1988 and certainly in 1952, the danger of addiction from smoking cigarettes was not widely known and recognized in the community in general, or, particularly, by children or adolescents. Nicotine Addiction at vi. The FDA has explained that because of tobacco's *431 addictive effects, the only way to prevent the ensuing disease and death is to prevent children and adolescents from starting to use tobacco: "Most people who suffer the adverse health consequences of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their use before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not prepared for, or equipped to, make a decision that, for many, will have lifelong consequences." Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44398.

Because the community's knowledge concerning the danger of nicotine addiction associated with cigarettes was not beyond dispute in 1952, the Seagram standard for finding common knowledge as a matter of law has not been met. We agree with the court in Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.:

There is no basis for our judicially noticing what the ordinary consumer's knowledge concerning the addictive qualities of cigarettes may have been when [the plaintiff] began smoking in 1940. The state of knowledge attributable to the community of individuals consuming cigarettes has changed over time and will continue to do so. It was not until 1988 that the Surgeon General published a report informing of the addictive nature of cigarettes.

557 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).^[7] Accordingly, we hold that American did not establish as a matter of law that the danger of addiction associated with cigarettes was commonly known in 1952.

Because we conclude that American did not conclusively establish that the danger of addiction to nicotine was common knowledge, the Grinnells may maintain their strict liability marketing defect claims to the extent they are based on the addictive qualities of cigarettes, if no other defenses defeat those claims.

The Grinnells assert that American breached its duty to warn users about it product's addictive nature because before January 1, 1966, the product's packages contained no warnings. A manufacturer is required to give an adequate warning if it knows or should know that potential harm may result from use of the product. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.1978). In the absence of a warning, a rebuttable presumption arises that the "user would have read and heeded such warnings and instructions." Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.1986) (citing Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.1972)). A manufacturer may rebut the presumption with evidence that the plaintiff did not heed whatever warnings were given, or would not have heeded any proposed warnings. See Magro, 721 S.W.2d at 834; see also General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Tex.1993).

The Grinnells assert that when Grinnell started smoking in 1952 he did not know and had heard nothing about any risk of addiction associated with smoking. The Grinnells further assert that American's failure to warn of the addictive nature of cigarettes caused Grinnell's eventual death because Grinnell testified that had he known what he later learned, he would never have started smoking. In rebuttal, American cites testimony that in the late 1950s and the 1960s, Grinnell continued smoking despite warnings from his father, coaches, and friends.

At most, the evidence relied on by American establishes that some people warned Grinnell about the general dangers of smoking. It does not conclusively establish that had Grinnell been warned that cigarettes were addictive before he began smoking he would have refused to follow the warnings. Grinnell testified at his deposition that if he had known of the dangers associated *432 with smoking, including addiction, he never would have started smoking. At the very least, this testimony creates a fact issue regarding whether Grinnell would have heeded warnings had they been given to him before he began smoking. Dr. Grabowski, an expert on addiction, testified that Grinnell was addicted to cigarettes by the late 1950s and early 1960s and could not have stopped smoking without "intensive intervention." In short, American's summary judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that adequate warnings would not have been followed and thus would not have "made a difference in the outcome." Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 357. Summary judgment on the Grinnells' marketing defect theory related to the addictive nature of cigarettes was therefore improper.

Thus, to the extent we hold that the general health risks of smoking were within the knowledge common to the community even before Grinnell began smoking in 1952, American has established that its cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous. Summary judgment was, therefore, proper to the extent the Grinnells' strict liability claims relate to the general health risks associated with smoking. However, we also hold that American did not establish as a matter of law that the specific danger of addiction from smoking was knowledge common to the community. Therefore, we hold that the Grinnells' marketing defect claim survives to the extent it is based on the allegation that the addictive nature of cigarettes rendered American's products unreasonably dangerous, and to the extent it is not preempted by federal law.^[8]

2. Design Defect

The duty to design a safe product is "an obligation imposed by law." McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex.1967). Whether a seller has breached this duty, that is, whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, is a question of fact for the jury. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. 1979). In determining whether a product is defectively designed, the jury must conclude that the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. Id. at 847 n. 1.

In Turner we held that evidence of the following factors of risk and utility were admissible in design defect cases: (1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (5) the expectations of the ordinary consumer. Id. at 846, 847. See also Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 384; Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 n. 2 (Tex.1980).

American argues that the commonknowledge defense bars the Grinnells' design defect claims as a matter of law. But, as we stated in Turner, "the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product," and "the expectations of the ordinary consumer," are but two factors for the jury to consider when determining whether a product was defectively designed. American's attempt to invoke the common-knowledge defense is actually an attempt to invoke the "open and obvious defense" or "patent danger rule," which this Court has rejected in design defect cases:

A number of courts are of the view that obvious risks are not design defects which must be remedied. See, e.g., Gray, 771 F.2d at 870 (applying Mississippi law); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir.1985) (applying Wisconsin law); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978). However, *433 our Court has held that liability for a design defect may attach even if the defect is apparent. Turner, 584 S.W.2d at 850. Determining if a design is unreasonably dangerous requires balancing the utility of the product against the risks involved in its use. Id. at 847 & n. 1

Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 383-84. Accordingly, American's attempt to invoke the common-knowledge defense in the context of an alleged design defect is without merit.

Alternatively, American argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because no safer alternative cigarette design exists. In Turner, we held that "the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive," was one factor for juries to consider when determining whether a product was defectively designed. We reaffirmed this holding in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears by stating that "if there are no safer alternatives, a product is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law." 911 S.W.2d at 384.^[9] Accordingly, if there is no safer alternative to the cigarette manufactured by American, then its cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.

The Grinnells assert that American's cigarettes could have been made reasonably safer by filtration, and by reducing the amount of tobacco, tar, nicotine, and toxins in them. In making its argument that no reasonably safer alternative design exists, American relies on the testimony of the Grinnells' experts, Drs. Greenberg, Stevens, and Ginzel. These experts testified that Grinnell would have developed cancer and died regardless of whether filters, lower tar, or less tobacco had been used. Specifically, Dr. Greenberg testified:

Q: It didn't matter to you and your opinion would not have changed as to the cause of the lung cancer, regardless of the brand, whether it was filtered or nonfiltered, short or long cigarette. Is that right?

A: That's correct.

Dr. Ginzel testified similarly:

Q: Doctor, is there any safe cigarette with respect to lung cancer?

A: Not that I know of.

Q: Is there any design for a cigarette that Mr. Grinnell could have smoked that would have avoided his claimed lung cancer?

A: Not during his lifetime, no.

Ultimately, the Grinnells essentially concede that no reasonably safer alternatives exist, but argue that all cigarettes are defective and unreasonably dangerous nonetheless.^[10] Because American conclusively proved that no reasonably safer alternative design exists for its cigarettes, we hold that summary judgment was proper on all of the Grinnells' design defect claims, including those based on the addictive quality of cigarettes.

3. Manufacturing Defect

We turn next to the Grinnells' strict liability claim based on a manufacturing defect. The Grinnells assert that American's products were defectively manufactured because they contained carcinogens and other toxic chemicals, including pesticide residue. During discovery, the Grinnells obtained internal documents showing that American fumigated its Turkish tobacco with Acritet 34, a chemical composed of acrylonitrile and carbon tetrachloride. American uses Turkish tobacco in all of its cigarettes. In 1978, American circulated a memorandum noting new government *434 regulations requiring all materials containing acrylonitrile to be a