Stroud v. Grace

This appeal arises out of a series of disputes between Milliken Enterprises, Inc. (“Milliken”), a privately-held Delaware corporation, and certain shareholders, mostly members of the Stroud branch of the Mil-liken family (the “Strouds”). Plaintiffs brought individual and derivative claims against Milliken and its board of directors (“defendants”), alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duties by recommending certain charter amendments to its shareholders (the “Amendments”). The Strouds also contested the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosures the board made to the shareholders in the notice of meeting at which the proposed amendments were to be considered, and also challenged the validity of the amendments and a by-law (“By-law 3”) which established the procedure for nominating candidates to Milliken’s board of directors.

The Court of Chancery sua sponte granted summary judgment for the defendants on all of Stroud’s claims but upheld Stroud’s attack on By-law 3. Stroud v. Grace, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 10719, Hartnett, V.C., slip op., 1990 WL 176803 (Nov. 1, 1990) (“Stroud II”). The Vice Chancellor ruled that the board’s actions would not be reviewed under the standards set forth in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 946 (1985) and found that the notice of the annual meeting was not inadequate or misleading. The trial court held that the board was under a duty to disclose more information in its notice than the requirements of 8 Del.C. §§ 222(a) & 242(b)(1). The Court of Chancery ruled that Milliken did not have to disclose any confidential information to shareholders who had not first executed a reasonable confidentiality agreement. Finally, the trial court assessed Stroud’s challenge to the validity of the Amendments and By-law 3 under the “compelling justification” standard of Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., Del.Ch., 564 A.2d 651 (1988). The Vice Chancellor found that the Amendments were fair, but that By-law 3 was *79 unreasonable on its face because it potentially prevented the shareholders from nominating their candidates for the board of directors.

We agree that Unocal was inapplicable. The board was not under a threat to its control and its decision to recommend the Amendments to the shareholders was not defensive. We also agree that the notice of Milliken’s 1989 meeting was not legally insufficient, but reach this conclusion by a different analysis. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the board had no duty to disclose more than that required by the General Corporation Law. We also find that in certain circumstances a board can condition the release of confidential data to a shareholder upon the execution of a confidentiality agreement.

We agree that the challenged Amendments were fair to Milliken’s shareholders, but reject an analysis under the heightened Blasius standard. While we generally agree with the broad principles articulated in Blasius, we find that the Amendments and By-law 3 did not merit such close judicial scrutiny. The board did not act when its control was threatened, and an overwhelming majority of Milliken’s fully-informed shareholders approved the Amendments. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s invalidation of By-law 3. We reiterate that Delaware courts should exercise caution when invalidating corporate acts based upon hypothetical injuries and without giving due deference to established principles of Delaware law regarding corporate governance.

I.

The basic facts are not in serious dispute. We only summarize them in view of our comprehensive examination of this controversy in Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 476, 477-79 (1989) (“Stroud I”). Milliken is a privately-held Delaware corporation. It is one of the largest and most successful textile businesses in the world. Most of Milliken’s 200 shareholders are direct descendants of its founder, Seth Milliken. The Milliken board has ten members. Four directors, Roger Milliken, Chief Executive Officer, Gerrish Milliken, a retired Vice President, Minot Milliken, Vice President, and Dr. Thomas Malone, President, are all members of the Milliken family or employees of the corporation. The remaining six directors are otherwise unaffiliated with the company. Roger, Gerrish, and Minot Milliken own or control, through various trusts, over 50% of Milliken's preferred and common shares.

The current controversy arose after the death in 1985 of Mrs. W.B. Dixon Stroud, Roger and Gerrish’s sister. As a result of her death, certain Milliken shares were released from a trust under the control of Roger, Gerrish and Minot to the Strouds, who now own or control close to 17% of Milliken’s shares.

Soon after Mrs. Stroud’s death, Roger proposed that the Milliken shareholders enter into a General Option Agreement (“GOA”). The GOA gave the Milliken family and then Milliken itself, a right of first refusal to purchase any shares offered to unrelated persons. The GOA recited that it was intended to keep the company in private hands and to prevent the dissemination of confidential data. Almost 75% of Milliken’s shareholders executed the GOA. Only the Strouds and a few others did not do so.

The Milliken board then proposed charter and by-law amendments which were recommended to the shareholders for their approval at the April 15, 1987 annual meeting. Milliken solicited proxies in connection with the proposed meeting. The Strouds sued in the Court of Chancery to enjoin the meeting. The Strouds complained, among other things, that the notice of the meeting and the proxy materials contained inadequate and misleading information. Stroud also challenged the proposed amendments claiming that they were intended to entrench the board.

The trial court entered a temporary restraining order that was not contested. Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 8969-NC, Hartnett, V.C. (Apr. 28, 1987). A few weeks later, the Milliken board reconvened, withdrew the challenged charter amendments and by *80 laws, and replaced them with a series of new provisions. Significantly, the board proposed to circulate a new notice of meeting. This notice did not explain the reasons for the changes, and stated that the board would not solicit proxies.

Stroud filed an amended complaint again challenging the notice, by-laws and charter amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part. Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., Del.Ch., 585 A.2d 1306 (1988). An appeal to this Court was dismissed. See Stroud I, 552 A.2d at 481-82.

The board subsequently withdrew the 1987 amendments and replaced them with the present “Amendments.” The most controversial aspects of the Amendments are charter Article Eleventh (c) and By-law 3. Article Eleventh (c) established a new method of qualifying directors for membership on Milliken’s board. By-law 3 established the procedure for nominating board candidates. By-law 3 required the shareholders to submit a notice of their candidates to the board, specifying their qualifications under Article Eleventh (c), well in advance of the annual meeting. By-law 3 also empowered the board to disqualify a shareholder’s nominee at any time even at the annual meeting.

The board considered the Amendments during meetings held on February 2, 1989, March 10, 1989 and March 11, 1989. The directors adopted the Amendments at their March 11, 1989 meeting which was attended by Milliken’s counsel, nine of its ten directors, including five out of the six unaffiliated or outside directors. The board unanimously approved the Amendments and adopted a resolution recommending them to the shareholders for their adoption at Milliken’s annual meeting scheduled for April 24, 1989.

On March 14, 1989, Milliken mailed notice of the 1989 annual meeting to its shareholders. Included with the notice was a copy of Milliken’s current by-laws, the board resolution proposing the Amendments and Milliken’s current Certificate of Incorporation. The notice was four pages long and included a number of recitals. It mentioned that the board had unanimously adopted the Amendments. Significantly, it also stated:

These amendments are proposed in lieu of all amendments previously proposed upon which the stockholders have not acted.

The notice did not explain the differences or similarities between the new Amendments and the previously withdrawn amendments. The notice stated that the board would not solicit proxies in connection with the scheduled 1989 meeting and cautioned:

[SJtockholders are encouraged to attend the meeting in person.... Pursuant to the corporation’s by-laws, the chairman of the Board of the corporation, Roger Milliken, will preside at the meeting, and he and others will, among other things, endeavor to answer questions from stockholders concerning the matters to be voted upon, including the proposed amendments to the certificate of incorporation.

The Strouds then sued in the Court of Chancery to enjoin the 1989 annual meeting, claiming that the notice both omitted and misstated certain material facts. Plaintiffs also attacked the Amendments. This time, the trial court denied Stroud’s request. See Stroud v. Grace, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 10719, Hartnett, V.C., slip op., 1989 WL 40829 (Apr. 21, 1989).

Milliken held its annual meeting on April 24, 1989 in Wilmington, Delaware. Of its eligible voters, 93% personally attended the meeting, and 97.8% of the shares entitled to vote were present. Most of the Strouds and their Wilmington counsel also participated in the meeting.

Roger Milliken chaired the meeting and presented a formal report of Milliken’s business condition. Various charts were shown on a screen from a slide projector. When asked, Roger Milliken willingly answered questions concerning these materials. Nonetheless, citing a confidentiality policy Milliken adopted in 1987, Roger Mil-liken refused to answer any questions or release a copy of slides containing any con *81 fidential or proprietary data. However, Milliken informed the shareholders that they could receive a copy of any such inf or-mation if they first executed a confidentiality agreement. The Amendments were approved at the meeting by 78% of the shares entitled to vote.

After the meeting and vote, the Strouds again filed individual and derivative suits in the Court of Chancery against the defendants contesting the validity of the notice, the Amendments, and By-law 3. Plaintiffs argued that the board breached its duty of care and loyalty in approving and recommending the Amendments. They also argued that the Amendments were unfair to Milliken’s shareholders by effectively entrenching Roger, Gerrish and Minot Milliken’s control of the board.

The Strouds then moved for summary judgment. With one exception, the trial court sua sponte granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor. See Stroud II, slip op. at 53. The Vice Chancellor granted summary judgment in favor of the Strouds by ruling that By-law 3 was unfair to Milliken’s shareholders. Id. at 29-31.

II.

We first consider the Strouds' procedural claim before addressing the substantive merits of this appeal. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Strouds also contend that the trial court failed to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to them because the record supposedly contained disputed issues of material fact.

Our review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants is de novo. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1131, 1141 (1990). The Court must analyze the entire record, including the trial court’s opinion, the pleadings, depositions and other relevant evidence contained in the record. Id. at 1142; Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Del.Supr., 535 A.2d 840, 844 (1987). We treat all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. We will draw our own factual conclusions if the trial court’s rulings are clearly wrong and we will decide the summary judgment issue only if there is no dispute of material facts. Id. We examine all legal issues to determine whether the trial court “erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.” Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1142.

A review of the record indicates that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. In Bank of Delaware v. Claymont Fire Co. No. 1, Del.Supr., 528 A.2d 1196, 1199 (1987), we found that in the interests of judicial economy, Chancery Court Rule 56 gives that court the inherent authority to grant summary judgment sua sponte against a party seeking summary judgment. Id. We explained that “[t]he form of pleadings should not place a limitation upon the court’s ability to do justice.” Id. Claymont Fire also recognized that the Court of Chancery should only sua sponte grant summary judgment against a party seeking summary judgment when the “state of the record is such that the non-moving party is clearly entitled to such relief....” Id.

In essence, plaintiffs’ claim that the record was insufficient for a sua sponte grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor merely reargues the merits of plaintiffs’ substantive claims — a boot-strap argument at best. In our opinion, the record adequately supports the trial court’s decision. This appeal must turn on the merits of plaintiffs’ substantive claims, not empty procedural objections.

III.

The Strouds launch a broad-brush attack on Milliken’s board, claiming their decision to approve and recommend the Amendments to the shareholders expressly violated their fiduciary duty of care, and implicitly, the duty of loyalty. Plaintiffs further argue that the Court of Chancery erred in failing to apply the heightened standard of Unocal. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.

The Strouds ascribe little importance to the fact that 78% of Milliken’s shareholders — virtually all but the Strouds — ap *82 proved the Amendments. Plaintiffs claim that the alleged inadequacies of the notice of the 1989 annual meeting rendered the shareholder vote a nullity.

Under Delaware law a fully informed shareholder vote in favor of a disputed transaction ratifies board action in the absence of fraud. See Bershad, 535 A.2d at 846; Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del.Supr., 488 A.2d 858, 890 (1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (1983); Michelson v. Duncan, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 211, 224 (1979); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., Del.Supr., 91 A.2d 57, 58-59 (1952); Gerlach v. Gillam, Del.Ch., 139 A.2d 591, 593 (1958).

The Vice Chancellor applied the presumption of the “traditional business judgment rule.” Stroud II, slip op. at 19. The trial court ultimately concluded that the board did not violate any fiduciary duties. Id. at 21. In rejecting the Unocal analysis, the Vice Chancellor stated:

The amendments here could not have been adopted in response to some threat to corporate policy and effectiveness because management controls, and will control for the foreseeable [sic] future, well over 50% of the stock of Milliken.

The plaintiffs have also failed to show that the Charter and By-law amendments were adopted as defensive measures. The plaintiffs merely speculate that these Charter and By-law amendments tend to ensure the future control of Roger, Gerrish and Minot Milliken over Mil-liken & Company. They, however, have failed to adduce any facts supporting their assertions.

Id. at 19. The Strouds contend that this ruling “is contrary to Delaware law,” and construes Unocal too narrowly. Plaintiffs correctly state that Unocal applies whenever a board “perceives a threat” to control and takes defensive measures in response to the threat. Citing to various sections of the record, including: (1) the board’s supposed decision to pursue the GOA to respond to a generalized “threat” to the Mil-liken family’s control; and (2) a provision in a subsequently revoked charter amendment identifying a threat to control, plaintiffs argue that the board was reacting to a threat when it approved the Amendments.

In our opinion this record does not justify application of Unocal and its progeny. The Strouds’ analysis of Unocal is contrary to Delaware law.

Unocal reaffirmed the application of the business judgment rule in the context of a hostile battle for control of a Delaware corporation where board action is taken to the exclusion of, or in limitation upon, a valid stockholder vote. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Pogostin v. Rice, Del.Supr., 480 A.2d 619, 627 (1984). Unocal recognized that directors are often faced with an “inherent conflict of interest” during contests for corporate control “[bjecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders_” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. Unocal thus requires a reviewing court to apply an enhanced standard of review to determine whether the directors “had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed ...” and that the board’s response “was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Id. at 955. If the board action meets the Unocal standard, it is accorded the protection of the business judgment rule. Id.

The scrutiny of Unocal is not limited to the adoption of a defensive measure during a hostile contest for control. In Moran v. Household International, Inc., Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 1346 (1985), we held that Unocal also applied to a preemptive defensive measure where the corporation was not under immediate “attack.” Id. at 1350-53. Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the application of Unocal whenever a board takes defensive measures in reaction to a perceived “threat to corporate policy and effectiveness which touches upon issues of control.” Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1144; see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Del.Supr., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (1989).

*83 Inherent in all of the foregoing principles is a presumption that a board acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote ratifying the challenged action. This significant distinction, in addition to the fact that Milliken faced no threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the board’s control, is fatal to plaintiffs’ Unocal arguments.

Here, there is no evidence that the board adopted the Amendments as defensive measures. See Stroud II, slip op. at 19. The Strouds’ contention that the GOA was primarily designed as a takeover defense is untenable. That was a matter of private contract between the shareholders themselves and their company. All shareholders were free to accept the GOA or reject it. The plaintiffs chose the latter course. The shareholders of many privately-held corporations, like Milliken, enter into contracts, like the GOA, to preserve family ownership and give themselves a right of first refusal to purchase a company’s shares. See 12 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5461.1 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1985); 1 F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert B. Thompson, O’Neal’s Close Corporations § 7.24 (3d ed. 1987); 8 Del.C. § 202. The Strouds offer no material proof to support their claim that the board adopted Article Eleventh (c) to thwart a takeover. Any defensive effects of the GOA and the Amendments themselves were collateral at best.

Significantly, the record shows beyond peradventure that there was no threat to the board’s control. Milliken was neither a takeover target, nor vulnerable to one. No Delaware court has applied Unocal in the absence of a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, or as here, in the face of a valid shareholder vote ratifying the challenged board action. See, e.g., Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1143-44; Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152 (upholding trial court’s decision to apply traditional business judgment rule to Time-Warner merger transaction before bidder appeared and trial court’s decision to assess amended agreement under Unocal after parties received hostile bid); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349, 1356 (upholding poison pill adopted as a pre-planned defensive measure because the company was “vulnerable” to a takeover).

The record clearly indicates, and Stroud concedes, that over 50% of the outstanding shares of Milliken are under the direct control of Roger, Minot and Gerrish Milliken. These directors controlled the corporation in fact and law. Aronson v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 815 (1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., Del.Ch., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (1971)). This obviates any threat contemplated by Unocal, and is buttressed by the further fact that at least 70% of Milliken’s shareholders supported the GOA.

Thus, the Court of Chancery properly analyzed the board’s decision to adopt and recommend the Amendments to the shareholders under the presumption of the business judgment rule. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Under such circumstances the burden is on the plaintiff to overcome the presumption of the rule. See Mills, 559 A.2d at 1279; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Unfortunately, however, that does not end the matter. Since an overwhelming majority of Milliken’s shareholders, even excluding those shares owned or controlled by Roger, Gerrish and Minot Milliken, approved the disputed Amendments at the 1989 annual meeting, standards governing the board’s action leading to a fully informed stockholder vote have little relevance to the ultimate issue. Thus, our standard of review is linked to the validity of the shareholder vote.

IV.

In the absence of fraud, a fully informed shareholder vote in favor of even a “voidable” transaction ratifies board action and places the burden of proof on the challenger. See Bershad, 535 A.2d at 846; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224; Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 58-59; Saxe v. Brady, Del.Ch., 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962); Gerlach, 139 A.2d at 593. The fact that controlling shareholders voted in favor of the transaction is irrelevant as long as *84 they did not breach their fiduciary duties to the minority holders. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958; Bershad, 535 A.2d at 845; see Ringling Bros.—B arnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, Del.Supr., 53 A.2d 441, 447 (1947). There is no proof whatever of any such breach in this case. The burden, however, remains on those relying on the vote to show that all material facts relevant to the transaction were fully disclosed. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Cahall v. Lofland, Del.Ch., 114 A. 224, 234 (1921).

Here, 78% of Milliken’s shareholders adopted the disputed Amendments at the 1989 annual meeting. In the absence of proof by plaintiffs that the disclosures were misleading or inadequate, or that the actions of the board involved fraud, waste or other misconduct which were not ratified by unanimous vote of the stockholders, this ends the matter. See, e.g., Keenan v. Eshleman, Del.Supr., 2 A.2d 904, 909 (1938). 1

Plaintiffs allege a breach of the “duty of candor.” Preliminarily we note that the term “duty of candor” does not import a unique or special rule of disclosure. It represents nothing more than the well-recognized proposition that directors of Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action. That is the standard and duty of disclosure in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), as fully adopted by this Court in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (1985). Such a materiality standard has been a mainstay of Delaware law for decades. See Cahall, 114 A. at 234. Thus, the term “duty of candor” has no well accepted meaning in the disclosure context. Its use is both confusing and imprecise given the well-established principles and duties of disclosure that otherwise exist. Thus, it is more appropriate for our courts to speak of a duty of disclosure based on a materiality standard rather than the unhelpful terminology that has crept into Delaware court decisions as a “duty of candor.” This is entirely consistent with our prior statements of Delaware law regarding the duty and standard of disclosure. See id.; see also Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890.

The Strouds argue that: (1) the directors failed to explain the differences between the 1989 amendments and the previously proposed and withdrawn amendments; (2) the board misstated this Court’s resolution of the first Stroud decision; (3) the board misleadingly stated that it consisted of a majority of outside directors; (4) the board’s disclosure of financial data and its responses to shareholder inquiries at the annual meeting was hasty and inadequate; and finally (5) the board falsely informed the shareholders that an independent valuation of the corporation’s shares was accurate. The trial court considered these claims and found them meritless. See Stroud II, slip op. at 37-44. The Vice Chancellor, however, analyzed the Strouds’ pre-meeting disclosure claims within a novel legal framework. Id. at 32-34. Due to the unique manner in which the trial court examined Strouds’ disclosure claim, we must first address important legal questions implicating the relationship between the General Corporation Law and a director’s common law fiduciary duties.

A.

The trial court noted that the board did not solicit proxies for the 1989 annual meeting. Stroud II, slip op. at 31. The Vice Chancellor also recognized that the *85 board “complied” with the notice provisions of 8 Del. C. §§ 222 & 242(b)(1) when it mailed the notice of the 1989 annual meeting. Id. at 33-34. Nonetheless, observing the well-established fiduciary duty of disclosure, couched as a duty of “candor,” and citing this Court’s previous decision in Stroud I, the Vice Chancellor found:

This duty of complete candor cannot be avoided by the directors by a decision not to solicit proxies and to merely comply with the statutory notice provisions of 8 Del.C. § 222 and 242.

Id. at 32. On appeal, the defendants attack the Vice Chancellor’s decision to extend this duty of disclosure into a substantive requirement which supervenes 8 Del.C. §§ 222(a) & 242(b)(1). Defendants claim that extending the duty of disclosure violates the clear meaning, purpose and intent of the corporation law. Defendants also argue that the Vice Chancellor’s ruling is contrary to well-established legal practice for privately-held corporations.

B.

We first address the trial court’s decision to extend the duty of disclosure in this factual context beyond that required by statute. The Vice Chancellor applied a novel legal analysis to test the Strouds’ disclosure claims. We analyze all legal issues de novo to determine whether the trial court “erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.” Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1142; see Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927, 930 (1982).

Delaware law imposes upon a board of directors the fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material facts within its control that would have a significant effect upon a stockholder vote. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944-45; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889-90; Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr., 383 A.2d 278, 279, 281 (1977). The board is not required to disclose all available information. As we explained in Rosenblatt, the materiality standard of TSC Industries, supra, requires disclosure of all facts which “ ‘would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.’ ” Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449, 96 S.Ct. at 2132); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.

The directors’ duty to disclose all material facts in connection with contemplated shareholder action does not exist in a vacuum. The provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law also establish mandatory disclosures in certain circumstances. In a case like this, where a board issues a notice of annual meeting with the intention of amending its certificate of incorporation, the General Corporation Law requires two separate disclosures. Section 222(a) provides in pertinent part:

Whenever stockholders are required or permitted to take any action at a meeting, a written notice of the meeting shall be given which shall state the place, date and hour of the meeting....

8 Del.C. § 222(a). Section 242(b)(1) provides in part that:

Every amendment authorized by subsection (a) of this section shall be made and effected in the following manner:

(1) If the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either calling a special meeting of the stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof for the consideration of such amendment or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next annual meeting of the stockholders. Such special or annual meeting shall be called and held upon notice in accordance with § 222 of this title. The notice shall set forth such amendment in full or a brief summary of the changes to be effected thereby, as the directors shall deem advisable.

8 Del.C. § 242(b)(1). Significantly, the General Corporation Law does not require any further disclosures in the absence of a proxy solicitation.

The Vice Chancellor attempted to fill this void by imposing the so-called duty of candor. While recognizing that Delaware *86 precedent suggests that a board has no duty to disclose anything beyond the requirements of 8 Del.C. §§ 222(a) & 242(b)(1) when proxies are not solicited, the Vice Chancellor held:

Under the rule in [Stroud /], however, it is clear that the directors of Milliken owed the Milliken shareholders a fiduciary duty of disclosure with complete candor which was not fulfilled by the mere compliance with the statutory mandate, notwithstanding that no proxies were solicited.

Stroud II, slip op. at 34 (emphasis added). The Vice Chancellor cited no other authority or rationale to justify this conclusion.

Stroud I did not change the law. Indeed, Stroud I recognized that the issue of “whether the defendant directors of a private company may, under the operative facts, avoid a common law duty of candor by not soliciting proxies and by simply complying with the statutory notice requirements of 8 Del.C. §§ 222 and 242” was “novel and important” to the corporation law. Stroud I, 552 A.2d at 481. Stroud I, however, turned on the fact that the case was not ripe for adjudication. Nothing more was, or could have been, decided since to do so would have amounted to the issuance of an impermissible advisory opinion. Stroud I, 552 A.2d at 479-82. Under the circumstances, reliance on Stroud I to establish a new substantive principle of law is misplaced.

All of our previous decisions involving disclosure requirements, and subsequent shareholder ratification, involved proxy solicitations. In the absence of that circumstance, questions of disclosure beyond those mandated by statute become less compelling. Milliken is a privately-held, non-public, corporation which is not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or subject to the proxy requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a & 78a. Accordingly, it is exempted from the federal statutes, rules and regulations governing disclosures in proxy materials. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 1 Thomas L. Hazen, <