Nationwide Contractor Audit Service, Inc. v. National Compliance Management Services, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this tortious interference and unfair competition case, Defendant National Compliance Management Services, Inc. (“NCMS”), has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce *279 dure 12(b)(2) (Docket No. 7), arguing that Plaintiff Nationwide Contractor Audit Service, Inc. (“Nationwide”), cannot establish the Constitutional prerequisites which would allow this Court to exercise either specific or general jurisdiction over Defendant. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion is granted. However, the Court will exercise its discretion and transfer this matter to the District of Kansas for further consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History 1

Both NCMS and Nationwide assist the oil and gas pipeline industry in complying with certain regulations established by the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA.”) Under these regulations, any company whose work involves connecting individual consumers to the main oil or gas delivery pipeline (“a Contractor”) must establish an anti-drug use and alcohol abuse prevention program for its employees who directly work on the pipelines. The Contractors must also periodically test those employees for evidence of drug or alcohol abuse and provide certifications that they have complied with these requirements. Because many Contractors are small businesses, they often join a consortium with others and engage a third-party administrator to implement the programs. NCMS and Nationwide serve Contractors by performing audits of the information provided by Contractors or third party administrators to ensure that the programs themselves meet government standards, that the drug and alcohol tests are performed in a proper, timely manner, and that each Contractor has met the standards established by the regulations, i.e., that it is a “qualified” Contractor.

Under the same federal regulations, the operators of oil and gas pipelines (“Operators”) are charged with assuring that the Contractors they hire have complied with the drug and alcohol regulations. NCMS and Nationwide serve these customers by maintaining lists of Contractors who have pre-qualified under the DOT/PHMSA regulations or with requirements established by a specific Operator.

Richard L. Rippert was employed by NCMS, a Kansas corporation with a principal place of business in Hutchinson, Kansas, sometime in the early 1990s. During the first few years, their relationship included a non-eompete agreement. In September 1997, however, for reasons which are not clear from the record, the agreement was terminated by mutual consent. Mr. Rippert is regarded as a well-known authority on the DOT/PHMSA drug and alcohol regulations and Plaintiff alleges that “his name and reputation are valuable to compete in the business engaged in by Plaintiff and Defendant.” (Complaint, ¶ 5.)

On April 13, 2007, Mr. Rippert resigned from NCMS and, together with Pennsylvania residents Eugene Miklaucic and Pamela Siegert, formed Nationwide as of May 16, 2007. Nationwide’s principal place of business is located in Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania. Soon thereafter, Nationwide sent postcards to over 400 Operators announcing the formation of the new company. For its part, NCMS had sent an email message to many of its clients an *280 nouncing Mr. Rippert’s departure within a few days of his resignation. However, apparently to Mr. Rippert’s profound annoyance, NCMS continued to include his name on its website, despite repeated requests that it be removed.

Robert Frankhouser manages the drug and alcohol compliance program for Equitable Resources, Inc. (“Equitable”), whose office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, oversees the company’s oil and gas pipelines in western Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Mr. Rippert and Mr. Frankhouser apparently knew each other from a contract between NCMS and Equitable dating back to at least 2002. In the summer of 2007, Mr. Rippert contacted Mr. Frankhouser, informing him about his new venture and offering to set up a specialized database for the Equitable monitoring program. The two worked together for several months and, Plaintiff alleges, Mr. Frankhouser was prepared to move Equitable’s business to Nationwide when the company’s contract with NCMS expired.

In November 2007, Mr., Frankhouser sent a letter to the president of NCMS, Vergi Geurian, in which he advised her that he intended to terminate the monitoring contract between NCMS and Equitable and asked for confirmation that the contract ended as of December 31, 2007. Ms. Geurian, understandably eager to avoid this result, contacted Mr. Frankhouser by e-mail and voice mail, informing him that the contract actually terminated at the end of November and asking him what NCMS could do to keep Equitable’s business. During a telephone call in late November, Ms. Geurian allegedly told Mr. Frankhouser that Mr. Rippert was still subject to a non-compete agreement which would be violated if Equitable became a customer of Nationwide. She also offered to reduce Equitable’s annual service fee from $20,000 to $2,000.

Mr. Frankhouser subsequently decided Equitable would continue as a customer of NCMS for the upcoming year. When advised of this decision, Mr. Rippert asked Mr. Frankhouser if he had heard allegations from Ms. Geurian that he was still subject to a non-compete agreement. Mr. Frankhouser admitted she had made such statements, but told Mr. Rippert he had just decided not to change monitoring services in part because it was the middle of winter.

According to Plaintiff, at the time she made the statements about the non-compete agreement, Ms. Geurian knew they were false because she is both president of NCMS and the person who terminated the agreement in September 2007. Moreover, Ms. Geurian allegedly made similar false and misleading statements to Jeannie Myers, an employee of Columbia Gas Co. (“Columbia”), in Washington, Pennsylvania, and to Deborah Simmons of Center-point Energy Service Company, LLC (“Centerpoint”) in Houston, Texas. According to Plaintiff, both Columbia and Centerpoint had previously expressed an interest in becoming Nationwide clients, but decided not to do so as a result of Ms. Geurian’s comments. Plaintiff contends Ms. Geurian deliberately made these statements in order to interfere with Nationwide’s prospective contracts, divert its business, disparage its reputation and that of Mr. Rippert, and unfairly compete with the new company.

B. Procedural History

Nationwide filed suit against NCMS in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on December 10, 2007. In its Complaint, Nationwide first alleges that NCMS, through Ms. Geurian, knew of Nationwide’s prospective contractual relationships with Equitable, Columbia, and Centerpoint, yet made false and *281 misleading statements to representatives of those Operators with the intention of interfering with Nationwide’s prospective contracts. In Count II, Plaintiff contends that NCMS, again through Ms. Geurian’s actions, willfully and deliberately engaged in unfair competition in its commercial practices and has been unjustly enriched by obtaining clients it would not have otherwise obtained but for its unlawful conduct. In the same Count, Plaintiff alleges NCMS made false and misleading representations on its website which imply that the DOT has approved its drug and alcohol testing plans when, in fact, its plans are not approved and do not comply with current DOT regulations. In the third and final Count, Plaintiff alleges that these actions also constitute a violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). That is, in addition to the false and misleading statements about DOT approval, Defendant violated the Lanham Act by intentionally leaving Mr. Rippert’s name on its website after he was no longer affiliated with NCMS, thereby trading on his name and reputation. The intent of these false and misleading statements, which were made in interstate commerce, was to deceive customers and potential customers of both Nationwide and NCMS. In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from engaging in any of these detrimental activities.

On January 2, 2008, Defendant filed a timely notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, based on the original jurisdiction provided to federal district courts for Lanham Act claims. 15 U.S.C. § 1121. Plaintiff did not object to removal.

On February 6, 2008, Defendant filed the now-pending motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. At the request of Plaintiff, the Court ordered the parties to conduct reciprocal discovery limited to the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction over Defendant and directed them to file briefs in support of their respective positions on the jurisdictional question. (Docket No. 13.) The motion is now ripe for decision.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims due to the presence of a federal question, the Lanham Act claim, and diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Jurisdiction over the common law claims for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations and unfair competition is established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 inasmuch as those causes of actions are part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim. The question of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is the crux of this Opinion. If we determine that this Court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over NCMS, venue is appropriate in this district inasmuch as a substantial part of the events which are alleged to have injured Plaintiff occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) “is inherently a matter which requires resolution of factual issues outside the pleadings.” Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66, n. 9 (3d Cir.1984). When a defendant raises the question of whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over that defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing personal jurisdiction exists. GE v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001); Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir.1992) (“Farino.”) A plaintiff may meet this burden by “establishing with *282 reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Farino, 960 F.2d at 1223 (internal quotation omitted.) However, the plaintiff may not rest solely on its pleadings to satisfy this burden. Red Square Corp. v. Novik, Inc., CA No. 07-498, 2007 WL 2234518, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56217, *6 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 2, 2007), citing Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1992). “General averments in an unverified complaint or response without the support of ‘sworn affidavits or other competent evidence’ are insufficient to establish jurisdictional facts.” Vector Security, Inc. v. Corum, CA No. 03-741, 2003 WL 21293767, *1, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6573, *2 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 21, 2003), quoting Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 66, n. 9; 2 see also Farino, id. Otherwise, for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept the plaintiffs allegations as true, and ... construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted.)

If the plaintiff is successful in demonstrating that jurisdiction “comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice,” the defendant must subsequently “present a compelling case that ... renderfs] jurisdiction unreasonable.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004), quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Determining the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction requires the court to consider several factors, e.g., “the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interest of the interstate judicial system in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174; Farino, 960 F.2d at 1222.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over a Non-Resident Defendant

The only issue now before the Court is whether we have personal jurisdiction over NCMS. A court faced with the question of whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-resident defendant must begin with Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 4(e), a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the forum “to the extent permissible under the law of the state where the district court sits.” Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir.1998) (citation omitted.) In turn, Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5322(b); see also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel, 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir.2007), noting that Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute “provides for jurisdiction based on the most minimum contact with the Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States” (internal citations omitted.) That is, as long as the requirements of the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution have been satisfied, jurisdiction will lie over non-resident defendants in Pennsylvania. *283 Pennzoil Prods., id. However, “[w]e cannot presume that jurisdiction is proper simply because the requirements of a long-arm statute have been met.... [A] court must engage in due process analysis after it concludes that a state’s long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to a defendant.” Id. at 202-203. Because Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute “is co-extensive with the dictates of the Constitution,” this Court’s jurisdictional inquiry therefore “turns exclusively on whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would conform with the Due Process Clause.” Poole v. Sasson, 122 F.Supp.2d 556, 558 (E.D.Pa. 2000).

“Under the due process clause, a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless there are certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 63, citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The minimum contacts with the forum state must be “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quotation marks and citations omitted.) Having minimum contacts, i.e., having purposefully directed his activities toward the residents of the state, provides “fair warning” to a defendant that he may be subject to suit in that forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (internal citations and quotation omitted.) In evaluating whether personal jurisdiction exists, the Court may only consider the actions taken by the defendant individually. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (“Unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum state to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.”)

The basic principles of due process are reflected in the two recognized types of personal jurisdiction. See Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir.2007). “A plaintiff may establish personal jurisdiction either by suing under a cause of action arising from minimum contacts of the defendant with the forum state (specific jurisdiction), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5322, or [by showing] that the defendant has ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state, in which case the cause of action need not arise from those contacts (general jurisdiction), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5301.” Star Creations Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Alan Amron Dev., Inc., CA No. 95-4328, 1995 WL 495126, *11, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11967, *30 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 18, 1995), citing Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.1987).

General and specific jurisdiction are “analytically distinct categories, not two points on a sliding scale.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 321. In determining whether it has either general or specific jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant, a court must take “specific analytical steps.” Pennzoil Prods., 149 F.3d at 200. The court first determines whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “systematic and continuous,” i.e., sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction. Id.; see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-415, 104 S.Ct. 1868. “The threshold for establishing general jurisdiction is very high, and requires a showing of ‘extensive and pervasive’ facts demonstrating connections with the forum state.” ComponentOne, LLC v. ComponentArt, Inc., CA No. 05-1122, 2007 WL 776930, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18333, *5 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 12, *284 2007), quoting Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir.1982); see also Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437 (“[T]he plaintiff must show significantly more than mere minimum contacts to establish general jurisdiction.”) In short, this higher threshold demands contacts with the forum which approximate physical presence. William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc., 123 F.Supp.2d 268, 274 (M.D.Pa.2000) (internal quotation omitted.)

In the absence of general jurisdiction, a court must determine whether the requirements of specific personal jurisdiction have been met. This traditionally involves a three-part inquiry: first, the defendant must have “purposefully directed” its activities at the forum; second, the plaintiffs claim must “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those specific activities; and third, assuming the first two have been met, the court should consider additional factors “to ensure that the assertion of jurisdiction otherwise comports with principles of fair play and substantial justice.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (internal quotations and citations omitted.) The conclusion that a court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant as to one of several claims does not necessarily mean it has specific jurisdiction over all the claims. Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir.2001).

B. General Jurisdiction

Pointing to the admission by NCMS that it has contracts with at least four Pennsylvania-based Operators, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has engaged in systematic and continuous activities in Pennsylvania to such an extent that this Court has power to exercise general jurisdiction. (Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 18, “Plf.’s Brief,” at 15.) Nationwide further argues that the Court should consider whether these business dealings are central to NCMS’s business and how frequently interactions between the forum-based entities and Defendant occur, not the amount of income generated from those relationships or the percentage of Defendant’s total business they might represent. Plaintiff also suggests that even in the absence of any physical presence in the forum, general jurisdiction is established over NCMS by the fact that it provides monitoring services on a regular basis for Pennsylvania Operators and audits “hundreds” of Pennsylvania-based Contractors. (Id. at 16— 17.)

In order for a court in Pennsylvania to exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation, the corporation must either (1) be incorporated in Pennsylvania or licensed as a foreign corporation in the Commonwealth; (2) consent to jurisdiction; or (3) carry on a “continuous and systematic part of its general business within this Commonwealth.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301(a)(2). NCMS has clearly not consented to jurisdiction and contends it is neither incorporated nor licensed as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania. (Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 8, “Def.’s Brief,” Exh. B, Affidavit of Vergi Geurian, “Geurian Aff.,” ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to refute these contentions.

Federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania also consider the following objective criteria in ascertaining the existence of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, e.g., whether the defendant:

pays taxes to or files any tax returns with the Commonwealth; regularly purchases products or supplies within Pennsylvania; advertises in Pennsylvania; *285 maintains telephone listings or a mailing address in Pennsylvania;

owns or leases land or property within the state; or

maintains an agent in Pennsylvania.

Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F.Supp. 264, 269 (E.D.Pa.1991); see also ClubCom, Inc. v. Captive Media, Inc., CA No. 07-1462, 2008 WL 2036907, *4-*5, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38410, *12 (W.D.Pa. May 9, 2008), and Davis v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, CA No. 07-2352, 2007 WL 4553695, *2-*3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94381, *6-*7 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 26, 2007).

Defendant asserts that none of these criteria applies to it except that on one occasion in 1994, an NCMS representative traveled to Pennsylvania to solicit the business of an Operator located in Allentown. Moreover, all its advertising is done via its website which is available to anyone in the world with internet access, including Pennsylvania residents. (Geurian Aff., ¶¶ 12-17.) Again, Plaintiff has not offered evidence or even argument in opposition to these averments.

Defendant asserts that it has contracts with only four Pennsylvania Operators out of its total customer base of 85 Operators nationwide (i.e., less than 5% of its customers) and that these contracts generate no more than 6% of its annual revenues. (Geurian Aff., ¶¶ 8 and 20.) Such limited contacts, it argues, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. As the case relied upon by Plaintiff states, “the percentage of [the defendant’s] total business represented by its Pennsylvania contacts is generally irrelevant” to the existence of general personal jurisdiction over a defendant. (Plf.’s Brief at 16, citing Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 438, for the conclusion that although less than 1% of non-resident bank’s loans and deposits originated in Pennsylvania, the defendant’s use “every business day” of a Pennsylvania bank was central to its business and constituted “substantial, continuous and systematic activity” in Pennsylvania.)

While Plaintiff regards Defendant’s argument as “a non-starter,” numerous courts in this Circuit have found that where the defendant had no other contacts with the state, deriving a small percentage of its revenue and/or having only a small percentage of its total market located in the forum was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. See, for example, Davis, 2007 WL 4553695 at *3-*4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94381 at *9-*10 (fact that approximately 14-17% of defendant’s slot machine customers in a membership program were Pennsylvania residents did not establish substantial and continuous contacts with the forum); New Generation Devices, Inc. v. Slocum Enters., Inc., CA No. 04-2583, 2005 WL 3078181, *1-*2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28118, *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005) (sales revenue of less than one percent of total sales and contacts with 11 veterinarians in New Jersey were not dispositive facts but supported the conclusion the defendant had insufficient contacts to establish general jurisdiction); Wims, 759 F.Supp. at 269-270 (fact that 25-27% of registered guests at New Jersey hotel during preceding year and 10% of its employees were Pennsylvania residents did not establish substantial and continuous contacts with Pennsylvania); Ware v. Ball Plastic Container Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d 434, 438 (D.Del.2006) (defendant who had no facilities, records or employees in Delaware but sold of 3% of its annual total bottle production there did not have continuous and substantial affiliations with the forum state); and Simplicity, Inc. v. MTS Prods., CA No. 05-3008, 2006 WL 924993, *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17626, *15 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 6, 2006) (sales and shipments into the forum consisting of less *286 than 5% of total sales “falls substantially below” standard of continuous and systematic contacts.) Compare ClubCom, Inc., 2008 WL 2036907 at *5, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38410 at *13-*14 (where only 10 of its 2500-member health club customer base were located in the Western District of Pennsylvania, but long-term contracts with those 10 clubs were controlled by Pennsylvania law and defendant routinely contacted clubs to offer products, had worked with an independent contractor and advertised extensively in the district, general jurisdiction existed.)

We conclude that the revenues and percentage of business from its four Pennsylvania-based Operators are insufficient, when considered in isolation, to confer general jurisdiction over Defendant. We must consider that issue in combination, however, with Plaintiffs argument that additional minimum contacts exist as a result of the contractual relationships between Defendant and the Operators and through the audits of “hundreds” of individual Contractors in Pennsylvania. (Plf.’s Brief at 16-17.)

1. Establishing Jurisdiction through Pennsylvania Operator Contracts: Standing alone, the fact that the defendant has entered, into a contract with a resident third party is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 557 (3d Cir.1993) (“DiVeronica Bros.”), concluding that “[cjontracting with a resident of the forum state does not alone justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.”

Nationwide has offered no evidence which would tend to prove that NCMS deliberately sought out the Pennsylvania Operators with whom it has contracts, the terms or duration of those contracts, or any other aspects thereof which would show that Defendant’s contacts to Pennsylvania through the Operator contracts are “continuous and substantial.” Moreover, Defendant asserts that it provides no in-state services through those contracts; rather all its operations are based in Kansas. (Geurian Aff., ¶ 11.) In a case involving a similar line of argument, the defendant in Gehling v. St. George’s School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542-543 (3d Cir.1985), provided educational services to students from all over the United States, including Pennsylvania. Although it advertised extensively in the state and received a portion of its income from Pennsylvania residents, the services which generated that income were performed in Grenada, not in Pennsylvania. The court found that this relationship was insufficient to show continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state. Similarly, although NCMS provides services to Pennsylvania Operators, e.g., posting Contractors’ compliance data to its website for their review, Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence to refute Defendant’s claim that its services are provided from Kansas and the information is available throughout the United States, not only to Operators located in Pennsylvania. As in Gehling, while it is true Defendant derives a portion of its income from Pennsylvania-based sources, there is no evidence the services provided are specialized for Pennsylvania residents or that those Operators are central to NCMS’s business.

Moreover, after NCMS and a Pennsylvania Operator enter into a contract, no further interactions seem to take place directly between the parties unless the Operator requests consulting services from NCMS. That is, all further information transfer and services are provided via the NCMS website discussed below. Mr. Frankhouser testified at his deposition that he is the only person at Equitable *287 who communicates with NCMS regarding the work Defendant does for Equitable and he communicates with the company “very, very rarely. I might get an e-mail from [NCMS] that says hey, look, you have plumber or a contractor that’s not responding or they ought to be dropped, should I drop them, and I’ll respond to that. But very, very infrequently.” (Plf.’s Brief, Attachment 1, Affidavit of Joseph Decker, “Decker Aff.,” Exh. B at 19.) To the extent NCMS and the Operators do communicate with each other during the course of performing the contract, it has long been held in this Circuit that “informational communications in furtherance of a contract between a resident and a nonresident [do] not establish the purposeful activity necessary for a valid assertion of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.” Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir.1996) (citations omitted.)

We find the facts of this case as alleged by Plaintiff to be parallel with those of a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff alleged he was injured during the course of an operation performed in Toronto, Canada. See Romah v. Scully, CA No. 06-698, 2007 WL 3493943, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83835 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 13, 2007.) One of the defendants, the hospital at which the surgery was performed, filed a motion to dismiss based in part on lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that eight contracts to which the hospital was a party, at least some of which were with the University of Pittsburgh, established continuous and systematic contacts with this Commonwealth. The court (Barry-Fisher, J.) refused to exercise general jurisdiction, concluding it was well-established that “the mere existence of a contract, standing alone, does not confer general jurisdiction over a defendant.” 2007 WL 3493943 at *6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83835 at *20, citing DiVeronica Bros., supra, and Mickleburgh Machinery Co., Inc. v. Pacific Economic Development Co., 738 F.Supp. 159, 162 (E.D.Pa.1990) (“It should be noted that the mere entrance of a non-resident defendant into a contract with a Pennsylvania corporation does not bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts.”) As the court pointed out, “the totality of the parties’ dealings, including the contract negotiations, contemplated future consequences of the contract, and actual course of dealing must be evaluated in order to determine whether the foreign defendant is subject to suit in the plaintiffs chosen forum.” Romah, id. (internal quotation omitted.) Because the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence regarding the events surrounding the formation or performance of the contracts, while at the same time the defendant offered an affidavit indicating the contracts had been negotiated and executed in Canada and that all the work performed thereunder was completed in Canada, the court concluded Romah could not establish general jurisdiction with the requisite reasonable particularity by relying on the existence of contracts between the defendant and a third party. Id. at *6-*7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83835 at *21-*22.

Similarly, here, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence regarding the formation, duration or other factors pertaining to the contracts which would persuade this Court that NCMS should be subject to general jurisdiction here because of the four contracts it has with Pennsylvania Operators.

2. Establishing Jurisdiction through Contacts ivith Contractors: Nor can we conclude that the work NCMS performs in auditing Contractors from Pennsylvania establishes the basis for general jurisdiction. Based on Mr. Frankhouser’s testimony, Plaintiff argues that there are *288 “hundreds” of such Contractors. Mr. Frankhouser actually testified that there were between “800 and 1500 plumbers” in Western Pennsylvania and northern West Virginia; there is no indication of how many of them are from Pennsylvania. (Decker Aff., Exh. B at 17-18.)

Plaintiff has' not come forward with any evidence as to the amount of income NCMS receives from individual Contractors or third-party administrators of drug and alcohol programs. It appears the larger Contractors pay a fee directly to NCMS to participate in the auditing program, determined by the size of the employee pool to be reviewed; smaller Contractors may join a consortium to economically receive program monitoring by a third-party administrator who presumably then pays NCMS for the auditing service. Nationwide has provided only a single example of a third-party administrator in Pennsylvania, Spectrum Medical Services, Inc. (“Spectrum”), whose director of data services happens to be Plaintiffs chief executive officer, Ms. Siegert. (Plf.’s Brief, Declaration of Pamela Siegert, “Siegert Dec.,” ¶ 1.) However, there is no evidence that Spectrum and NCMS have a contractual relationship, nor is there evidence regarding any fees Spectrum pays to Defendant for the auditing services.

As noted above, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to refute Ms. Geurian’s affidavit in which she states that all the services NCMS provides to its clients are performed in Kansas, e.g., no one from NCMS travels to a Contractor’s site in Pennsylvania'or elsewhere as part of the auditing process. Instead, NCMS employees perform a “desktop audit” of information sent to the company and post the audit results to the website maintained in Kansas. Operators obtain information about those Contractors by accessing the database or by contacting the company via e-mail, telephone or facsimile transmission. (Geurian Aff., ¶ 7.) The