928 S.W.2d 482 (1996)

George Edward McFARLAND, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 71557.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.

February 21, 1996. Rehearing Denied June 19, 1996.

*493 Marcelyn Curry, Houston, for appellant.

Alan Curry, Assist. Dist. Atty., Robert A. Huttash, Houston, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of capital murder, specifically murder in the course of a robbery. V.T.C.A.Penal Code, § 19.03(a)(2). The jury answered the special issues prescribed by Article 37.071 § 2(b)(1) *494 and (2), V.A.C.C.P.^[1] affirmatively and answered negatively the special issue prescribed by Article 37.071 § 2(e). Punishment was assessed accordingly at death. Appeal to this Court is automatic. Article 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises thirty-four points of error in his original brief and thirty-five points of error in a supplemental brief. We will affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt. Appellant asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the death of Kenneth Kwan because other parties were involved in the crime.

The evidence at trial established the following: At approximately 12:30 p.m. on Friday, November 15, 1991, Kwan and a security guard, James Powell, were returning to Kwan's grocery store after going to the bank to obtain $27,000 to cash his customers' payroll checks. Upon arrival, Kwan and Powell, armed with a shotgun, exited Kwan's vehicle and proceeded toward the store. Carolyn Bartie, a regular customer, then pulled into the parking lot and Kwan waved.

Bartie testified that when she parked her car she noticed a black man, appellant,^[2] kneeling on the ground between the grocery store and the adjacent laundromat. Appellant had a bag. When Kwan waved, Bartie noticed appellant get up and walk in front of her car toward Kwan. She looked down at her purse, then heard a "popping sound." When she looked up, appellant had Powell by the neck and was firing into the doors of the store. Another black man then came from behind appellant and ran in a ducking position into the store and soon came back out.

Powell testified that he also noticed a black man sitting along some rails beside the store with what looked like a bag of leaves. The man had his hand on top of the bag and a couple of towels on top of his hand. He surmised that the man had come from the laundromat next door. However, when the man jumped up and began coming towards him, Powell sensed something was wrong. Kwan began to run for the door of the store and Powell testified he lost eye contact with the man holding the bag. Suddenly, Powell felt a "gun up side [his] head." The man told Powell, "Drop the gun. Drop the gun. If you don't, I'll blow your God-damned brains out." Powell complied.

Powell next heard two shots fired from behind him, so he dropped to the ground. Powell testified that the shots were fired at Kwan as Kwan was trying to enter the store. He further testified that the man with the gun said nothing to Kwan before shooting him. Kwan was only fifteen to twenty feet away. Powell stated he heard approximately two shots inside the store and someone yell, "Get the bag, get the bag." Bartie testified that appellant was the one that yelled "get the bag."

Lupe Jiminez, a customer in the store, testified that he too heard a "popping sound" and then Kwan burst into the store. Immediately behind Kwan, Jiminez saw a tall black man in a ski mask follow Kwan into the store and shoot Kwan in the back. Larry Davis, another customer, testified that the man in the ski mask shot Kwan twice with a revolver. Both Jiminez and Davis ran to the back storage room to get out of the way. Mrs. Kwan, who was working at the cash register, witnessed her husband fall to the floor and saw the man who had entered the store take the money bag from him and exit the store. Powell testified that he observed the men drive off quickly in a grey Suburban. The Suburban was later determined to have been stolen.

Dr. Eduardo Bellas, Harris County Assistant Medical Examiner, performed the autopsy. Bellas testified that Kwan had five gunshot wounds, three of which he considered fatal. The fatal wounds consisted of two wounds in the right side of Kwan's back and one wound in the front chest. The other two wounds were merely grazing wounds to his *495 right arm. Bellas testified that the wounds could have been caused by .38-caliber bullets. Donald Davis, a firearms examiner, testified that the bullets recovered from the victim and the scene were fired from either a.38 or .357-caliber gun. There was no evidence that the bullets were fired from the same gun.

Four days after the instant offense, Craig Burks, appellant's nephew, phoned Crime Stoppers with information pertaining to the crime.^[3] Burks stated that appellant, Albert Harris, and Michael Clark were each involved in the robbery.

At trial, Burks testified that while riding around with Clark two weeks before the robbery, Clark pointed out Kwan's grocery store as they drove past. Clark told Burks that "he was going to retire from armed robbery and then the Chinese guy [sic] supposed to bring him a bunch of money[.]" Burks did not hear of the store again until he saw a news report the day of the offense. Later, on the day of the robbery, appellant came by Burks' house. Appellant had a new car and took Burks, Burks' brother Cedric, and Burks' uncle Walter for a ride and bought them all beer. Burks testified that, while driving, appellant talked about how he "robbed the Chinese guy. He pulled a pistol on a security guard and shot the dude, the Chinese guy." Burks further testified that appellant said that he had dressed like a bum for the crime and that Michael Clark, Albert Harris, and somebody named Marty were also involved. Appellant claimed they got $50,000 in the robbery and Burks noted appellant had a "bundle of money" with him in the car. Burks also testified that appellant changed his story and said that Albert Harris was the only one to fire a gun.

In order to support a guilty verdict, the State must prove the elements of the offense as set forth in the jury charge. Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex.Cr. App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3047, 125 L.Ed.2d 731 (1993); Rivera v. State, 808 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 279, 116 L.Ed.2d 231 (1991). The charge in this case authorized conviction of capital murder as follows:

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 15th day of November, 1991, in Harris County, Texas, the [defendant] did then and there unlawfully while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the aggravated robbery of [Kwan], intentionally cause the death of [Kwan], by shooting [Kwan] with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 15th day of November, 1991, in Harris County, Texas, Albert Harris and/or Michael Clark and/or Marty did then and there unlawfully while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the aggravated robbery of [Kwan], intentionally cause the death of [Kwan] by shooting [Kwan] with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and that the [defendant], with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Albert Harris and/or Michael Clark and/or Marty to commit the offense, if he did, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.

In reviewing a sufficiency question, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 73 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232, 111 S.Ct. 2856, 115 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1991).

Without citing any authority and ignoring the standard of review, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient because: (1) Bartie and Powell did not always have constant views of what was happening; (2) Bartie stated at the scene that she was not sure if she would be able to identify the perpetrators; (3) when Bartie identified appellant in a photo-spread, she stated she would also like to see him in a live line-up to be 100-percent sure; (4) neither Jiminez nor *496 Davis saw appellant shoot Kwan; (5) if the man holding Powell fired at Kwan as he ran in the door, the man in the ski mask surely would have been shot, and therefore appellant could not have shot at Kwan; and (6) Burks was not a credible witness.^[4]

We first note that the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.^[5]Lafoon v. State, 543 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Second, we also note that proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant fired the fatal shot is not necessary for a capital murder conviction where the jury is charged on the law of parties. Rabbani, 847 S.W.2d at 558. In the instant case, an eye-witness testified that appellant participated in the crime and, in fact, fired shots at Kwan as he tried to enter the store. Further, appellant's admissions to his nephew that same evening following the crime establish that he was, at a minimum, a party to the offense. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of capital murder. Point of error one is overruled.

Appellant's twenty-ninth supplemental point of error contends that the evidence was insufficient to make an affirmative finding that he would be a future danger. Article 37.071 § 2(b)(1). We disagree.^[6]

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the punishment phase, we again view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could make the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. See Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). The burden was on the State to prove the first two punishment issues beyond a reasonable doubt. Article 37.071 § 2(c). A jury is permitted to consider a variety of factors when determining whether a defendant will pose a continuing threat to society. See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).^[7]

At the punishment phase of trial, the State introduced evidence of various extraneous offenses. Appellant was convicted of the following: (1) on May 5, 1981, appellant and an accomplice robbed a Gordon's Jewelers at gunpoint (aggravated robbery); (2) on September 7, 1984, appellant and an accomplice hit a sixty-year old man on the head, stole a bank bag from him containing $2,400, and then tried to flee from the police (theft); and (3) on June 17, 1987, appellant attempted to evade arrest after being discovered with a stolen vehicle (evading arrest). The State *497 also put on evidence regarding the following three unadjudicated offenses.

On September 6, 1991, two Wal-Mart employees were robbed when they returned to the store after going to the bank to make a deposit and obtain $5,000 in change. One of the victims, Frank Eppner, identified appellant as the man who held an uzi-machine gun to his head and demanded the money. Appellant made Eppner lay face down on the ground with his hands spread out while appellant held the gun on him and looked for the money. When appellant's accomplice had trouble with Richard Phillips, the other victim, appellant said, "Just shoot him, take the keys yourself. Just kill the man. Don't jack with him. Kill him." Appellant and his accomplice eventually took Eppner's truck and the money. They fled the scene without harming either victim. Phillips followed them in his car. At an intersection, the men stopped the truck, appellant got out, pointed his gun at Phillips, and fired a shot. Phillips got away unharmed. It was later determined that the vehicle appellant and his accomplice had used to get to the Wal-Mart was also stolen.

On September 8, 1991, appellant was arrested for an altercation in a night club parking lot. Appellant had been arguing with another customer and they were both asked to leave the club. A security guard noticed the men still in the club parking lot after closing. The men were in a shouting match. Appellant then went to a car, retrieved a gun, and put the gun to the other man's back. The security guard intervened and took the weapon. The gun was later determined to be loaded with hollow-point bullets. The security guard had to obtain help in order to place appellant under arrest.

Finally, on December 19, 1991, prior to appellant's arrest for the instant offense, he was seen exiting a stolen vehicle. Thus the record shows that appellant repeatedly exhibited and used deadly weapons during this and other offenses. Further, he exhibited a general disregard for human life by threatening to kill others during these offenses and by harming his victims on more than one occasion. Considering the record as a whole, we conclude there was ample evidence to support the jury's affirmative finding that there was a probability that appellant would be a continuing threat to society. Appellant's twenty-ninth supplemental point of error is overruled.

In supplemental point of error fifteen, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's negative answer to the mitigation question.^[8] He urges this Court to limit its sufficiency review to the mitigating factors and exclude consideration of the aggravating factors. Further, supplemental point eighteen avers that this Court should engage in a proportionality review of the sufficiency of mitigating evidence: weigh the aggravating evidence against the mitigating evidence.

This Court has previously held:

In Texas, this mitigating evidence is admissible at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. Once admitted, the jury may then give it weight, if in their individual minds it is appropriate, when answering the questions which determine sentence. However, "[t]he amount of weight that the factfinder might give any particular piece of mitigating evidence is left to `the range of judgment and discretion' exercised by each juror.'"

Banda v. State, 890 S.W.2d 42, 54 (Tex.Cr. App.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2253, 132 L.Ed.2d 260 (1995); Johnson v. State, 773 S.W.2d 322, 331 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989), affirmed in part, Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). Currently, the Texas legislature has not clearly assigned a burden to either the State or the defendant to disprove or prove the mitigating evidence.^[9]Barnes v. State, *498 876 S.W.2d 316, 330 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 174, 130 L.Ed.2d 110 (1994). Unlike a particular offense or defense defined in the Texas Penal Code which contains specific elements that must be met, "mitigating evidence" is not specifically defined. Instead it is left to each individual juror's own determination. In fact, Article 37.071§ 2(f)(4) defines "mitigating evidence" to be "evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness." (Emphasis provided).^[10] There is no per se evidence that must be viewed by a juror as having definitive mitigating effect. Because the weighing of "mitigating evidence" is a subjective determination undertaken by each individual juror, we decline to review that evidence for "sufficiency." We defer to the jury's conclusion that the evidence did not warrant a sentence of life imprisonment. Supplemental points of error fifteen and eighteen are overruled.

Conversely, in supplemental points sixteen and seventeen, appellant agrees that a meaningful appellate review of the sufficiency of mitigating evidence is impossible, but he contends such review is required. He argues that Article 44.251(a) requires review of Article 37.071 § 2(e). He concludes that because the mitigation special issue precludes a meaningful review, the Texas death penalty scheme is unconstitutional.

We first note that meaningful review of the jury's verdict by which the penalty of death is assessed is not wholly precluded. This Court does review the sufficiency of the future dangerousness issue. See Keeton, supra. As stated previously, the mitigation issue is a vehicle provided to take into account jurors' individual views and allows them to choose a life sentence if they feel it is warranted. The jury does not reach the mitigation issue unless it has already found that the defendant will be a future danger. Article 37.071 § 2(e). While this Court can review objective evidence of future dangerousness, we cannot meaningfully review the jury's normative decision on mitigation, whether it answers in the affirmative or the negative.

Next, appellant contends Article 44.251(a) requires a sufficiency review. Article 44.251(a) states:

(a) The court of criminal appeals shall reform a sentence of death to a sentence of confinement in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life if the court finds that there is insufficient evidence to support an affirmative answer to an issue submitted to the jury under Article 37.071(b) of this code or a negative answer to an issue submitted to a jury under Article 37.071(e) of this code.^[11]

On its face this provision does indeed mandate a reformation of sentence from death to life "if" the evidence is not "sufficient" to support a negative answer to the mitigation issue.

In construing a statute, we look first to the literal language, for that is the best indicator of the legislative intent. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). In this case, however, we cannot take the statute to mean what it plainly says. A genuine *499 "sufficiency" review of the jury's negative answer to Article 37.071 § 2(e) is a logical absurdity. Because the burden of production (if not persuasion) under Article 37.071, § 2(e) is on the defendant, he can only argue that the jury's negative answer was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence—not that the evidence was "insufficient" to support it. See n. 9, ante. Thus, if we hold Article 44.251(a) to its literal terms, this Court by definition will never reform a sentence of death to life on account of "insufficiency" of the evidence to support a negative finding on mitigation.

In order to give Article 44.251(a) effect, we could interpret it to mandate reformation to life upon a finding that the jury's negative answer was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. But as we have already shown, Article 37.071 § 2(f)(4) assigns to the jury the task of evaluating what evidence proffered in mitigation is "sufficient" to warrant a life sentence. We cannot say that evidence is mitigating as a matter of law any more than we can say, in a non-capital case, that the evidence is insufficient to support a twenty year sentence, or that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence establishes that the proper sentence would have been ten years, probated. There is simply no way for an appellate court to review the jury's normative judgment that the evidence did or did not warrant a life sentence.

There is one other alternative. We could construe Article 44.251(a) to mandate that this Court conduct an independent, de novo review of the mitigating evidence, and decide according to our own lights whether Article 37.071 § 2(e) ought to be answered in the affirmative. We think it highly unlikely, however, that this construction would jibe with the Legislature's intent. Such a scheme would effectively render the jury's answer to the § 2(e) special issue merely advisory. While that would undoubtedly withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny, it would constitute a radical departure from our ordinary jury-deferring routine in reviewing the "sufficiency" of special issues at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. See Burns v. State, 761 S.W.2d at 355-356 & n. 4. Presuming the Legislature to be cognizant of this Court's prior caselaw, we would hardly expect it to mandate a "sufficiency" review if by that it meant this Court should re-evaluate and reweigh the same evidence the jury has already heard.

In any event, we do not believe constitutionality of Article 37.071 is contingent upon appellate review of the mitigation issue, whatever form that review takes. So long as the jury is not precluded from hearing and effectuating mitigating evidence, we have never regarded appellate review of mitigating evidence to be an essential component of a constitutionally acceptable capital punishment scheme. Indeed, in Burns we "abandoned any pretense" of balancing mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence as a matter of appellate review of the punishment issues then extant. We cited Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) for the proposition that "it is doubtful [that] Eighth Amendment or Due Process considerations absolutely require this Court to reweigh punishment evidence...." Id., at 356, n. 4. We now hold that appellate review of the jury's answer to the Article 37.071 § 2(e) special issue is not constitutionally required. Indeed, as we have shown, it is a practical impossibility. Supplemental points sixteen and seventeen are overruled.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In points of error two through fourteen, appellant argues that he was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. He points to various individual examples of deficiencies in his counsel's performance to prove that the representation by trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial. He then argues that the totality of the incidents prejudiced him to such a degree that he was denied a fair trial. After a careful review of the record, and considering the strict standards for determining that counsel was ineffective, we cannot say appellant was rendered ineffective assistance.

The standard for testing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 *500 (1984).^[12] In Strickland, the Supreme Court admonished that a claimant must prove that counsel's representation so undermined the "proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on having produced a just result." Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Appellant must prove: (1) that his counsel's representation was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance was so serious that it prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This means appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficiency the result of the trial would have been different. McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct. 2937, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993).

The review of counsel's representation is highly deferential; we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The burden is on appellant to overcome that presumption. Id. Appellant "must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged" to constitute ineffective assistance and affirmatively prove that they fall below the professional norm for reasonableness. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. After proving error, appellant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68. Appellant must prove that counsel's errors, judged by the totality of the representation, not by isolated instances of error or by only a portion of trial, denied him a fair trial. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69; McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 843. It is not enough for appellant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68. He must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt and/or the sentence of death. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. In reviewing this determination, we consider the totality of the evidence before the jury. Id. Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987). Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071.

1. Trial Preparation

In his second point of error, appellant contends that his attorneys did not adequately prepare before trial. In point of error three, he argues that counsel did not confer with him in a manner consistent with the gravity of a capital case. And, in his fourth point of error, he complains that none of his requested witnesses were questioned or subpoenaed.

Appellant first focuses his attention on the fact that attorney Benn did not file any motions or subpoena any witnesses. We note that appellant fails to take into account that he was represented by two attorneys, Benn and Melamed. Melamed filed numerous motions with the trial court. In addition, Melamed testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he felt it was his position "to be prepared to do everything" and that he was prepared to do the entire trial, although he did obtain both appellant's and Benn's consent on various matters. Appellant fails to show whether Melamed did or did not subpoena any witnesses.^[13] However, we note that three defense witnesses were called at punishment. Benn also testified that he believed Melamed was a capable co-counsel and that he relied on Melamed to subpoena any witnesses.

Appellant specifically complains that his counsel failed to subpoena Walter Burks, Ricky Payton, James Pritchett, and Wilbert Bonaparte. At the motion for new trial hearing, Melamed testified that he and appellant discussed which witnesses should be called. *501 Appellant gave him no names to assist in the guilt/innocence phase of trial. Some of the witnesses appellant discussed for punishment could not be located. Melamed also stated that he and appellant agreed not to call the other potential witnesses. Further, as to Walter Burks, Melamed testified that when he and appellant discussed family members testifying as to the mental state of Craig Burks, they decided not to call certain relatives because of a family conflict. Walter Burks is Craig Burks' uncle and appellant's brother-in-law. At the hearing, Melamed could not remember whether or not Walter was one of the family members that appellant did not want to call. Melamed did testify that appellant specifically stated that he did not want his former attorney, Richard Frankoff, subpoenaed to discuss the unadjudicated aggravated robbery offense. Benn testified that appellant participated in the decisions regarding whether or not a witness should be subpoenaed. See McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 848 (When defendant preempts attorney's strategy by insisting certain evidence be put on or kept out, no claim of ineffectiveness can be sustained). Benn also testified that they did not call any witnesses that they believed would testify in a manner adverse to appellant's case.^[14]

Appellant next claims that Benn and Melamed failed to question any witnesses prior to trial and did not go to the scene of either the capital murder or the extraneous aggravated robbery, relying solely on the contents of the State's file for their investigation. As we observed in Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) (Plurality opinion), "counsel is charged with making an independent investigation of the facts of the case[.]" Ordinarily counsel should not blindly rely on the veracity either of his client's version of the facts or witness statements in the State's file. Id. But this duty to investigate, at least since Strickland was decided, is not categorical. Rather, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Such a decision not to investigate "must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id. In any event, we will not reverse a conviction unless the consequence of the failure to investigate "is that the only viable defense available to the accused is not advanced[,]" Ex parte Duffy, supra, at 517, and "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [failure to advance the defense], the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.

The record shows that the attorneys, at a minimum, discussed the case with appellant and went over the State's witnesses' statements. Counsel decided that further interviews were unnecessary. There is no indication that any new or helpful information would have been acquired or that this decision in any way limited or impeded appellant's defense. See Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 550 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1590, 94 L.Ed.2d 779 (1987). As for counsels' failure to visit the scene of the capital murder and the extraneous robbery, these deficiencies are not alone sufficient to amount to ineffective counsel under Strickland. Both attorneys testified that they reviewed the State's files regarding both offenses. The record reveals, at least for the capital crime, that counsel had access to a crime scene video, numerous photos, and witness statements. Counsel further discussed the case with appellant. There is nothing in the record to show that potential defenses were precluded or that a visit to either scene would have made any difference in appellant's defense.^[15]

*502 Appellant fails to satisfy, if not the deficiency prong of Strickland, see Wilkerson, supra, then the prejudice prong; he cannot show a reasonable probability that had counsel independently investigated, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Appellant further makes various conclusory accusations about his counsel. He claims that Melamed did not view the video line-up until the identification-suppression hearing. The record does not support this statement. Melamed merely testified that "there was indeed a video lineup and, I believe, a hearing prior to trial to suppress the identification" as based upon the line-up. We cannot and do not glean from these statements that Melamed had never before viewed the video. Next, he insists that neither counsel knew that Richard Phillips had not identified appellant in the Wal-mart robbery or that Frank Eppner had some doubt that appellant was the robber. Again, appellant misinterprets the record. In both cases, the information was elicited from the witness and appellant's counsel confirmed it for the jury during cross-examination. No evidence appears that appellant's counsel was unaware of the information prior to the witnesses testifying. Finally, he asserts that his counsel never viewed the arrest warrant, probable cause affidavit, or photo spread from the Wal-mart robbery. Appellant fails to support this claim with any record evidence. Merely because counsel cannot recall whether he viewed this evidence does not conclusively prove that he did not. These complaints have no merit.

Appellant next focuses on the number of times that Melamed spoke with appellant. However, appellant himself testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he and Melamed discussed the capital crime and the extraneous offenses. He also testified that he talked to Melamed every day during jury selection. Melamed testified that he met with appellant for several hours at the jail, spoke to him several times at the courthouse, and spoke with him several times on the phone. We fail to see the inadequacy of Melamed's meeting times. Appellant cites no authority to give us guidance.^[16]

Appellant also points to the fact that when Melamed went to the jail to speak with him, Melamed only took notes on appellant's personal life. However, as Melamed explains, he was taking notes on any possible mitigating evidence that could be helpful at punishment. We will not fault counsel for attempting to develop strategy to be used at trial. And, again, appellant does not cite us to any authority to support his position that Melamed's particular note-taking habits rendered his performance inadequate.

Lastly, appellant argues that counsel did not confer with each other enough and did not discuss which attorney would question each witness. Appellant fails to explain why or how the number of meetings between his counsel was detrimental to him. Further, regarding the witnesses, appellant points to nothing in the record to show that counsel was unprepared during questioning.^[17]

Viewing the circumstances as a whole, we hold that appellant fails to meet the first prong of the Strickland test in any of the above arguments. Accordingly, trial counsel's preparation for trial did not fall below *503 the objective standard. Points of error two, three and four are overruled.

2. Voir Dire

In his fifth point of error, appellant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Benn only asked a limited number of questions of the jurors selected during voir dire. Appellant cites the Court to Benn's questioning of each of the jurors. However, with the exception of Scott, Petter and Taylor, he fails to explain in any manner why these jurors were objectionable or why further questioning might have been in order. Therefore, we will only address appellant's complaints concerning Benn's questioning of these three jurors.

In reference to juror Scott, appellant points to a portion of her testimony that he finds troublesome:

[State]: Do you feel like you would have any problems working with 11 other citizens to make the decision in such a way that you would know that the Defendant would get the death penalty?

A. No, because no matter how I felt, I would want to make sure that he did get all the right benefits. Just because I feel one way, that's what the jury is for. We can talk about it and decide what punishment that he should get, and a lot of times, you can see things a little bit clearer when you have 11 other people that are discussing it with you and pointing out different factors. But I don't think I would have a problem even voicing my opinion with 11 more people.

Appellant asserts that Scott considers the death penalty to be a "benefit," and, presumably, would therefore always vote for the death penalty. This is not the only, or even the likely, import of Scott's testimony. From her surrounding statements, it is apparent that Scott meant that she would give appellant all of his "constitutional benefits." We cannot rule out that Benn also interpreted Scott's testimony in this way. Because Scott would not be challengeable for cause on this statement, appellant does not show that Benn's representation was deficient.

For juror Petter, appellant again misconstrues the likely gist of the testimony in order to argue that the juror "has extreme belief in the extensive use of the death penalty." Appellant believes the following testimony should have caused Benn concern:

[State]: You say the Silence of the Lambs was the last movie you saw. Certainly, there was an individual in there—I haven't seen the movie—but I understand that there is an individual in there that might be strongly considered for the death penalty?

A. There was more than one.

Appellant contends that any "competent" attorney would question Petter regarding his belief in the death penalty. However, he ignores all Petter's other responses regarding the death penalty, including: "Sometimes I think life imprisonment can be more effective than the death penalty, depending on the individual circumstances." Petter further stated that he believed some people can be rehabilitated and that he would consider all mitigating circumstances. We do not believe that appellant has shown that Benn's performance was deficient in failing to question Petter further on this issue; nor do we find that appellant proves that Petter would have been challengeable for cause in any way.

Next, appellant claims juror Taylor was biased against him and that Benn was ineffective because he failed to question her about her brother's murder six years earlier. Appellant particularly points to the fact that Taylor agreed on the prospective jurors' questionnaire that, "I am strongly in favor of capital punishment as an appropriate penalty." He also notes that she stated, "I don't think that I can be fair to the Defendant with my judgment ... I just don't think I would be able to sit through a murder trial, knowing my brother had, at one time, been killed and I had gone through this once before ... I think I might be too harsh in my opinion." However, appellant again fails to view the juror's testimony as a whole. Taylor stated that she would be able to put aside what she had been through and listen to the evidence in the instant case. She also stated that she would be able to be fair to appellant and hold t