Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP

Opinion

The principal issue in this consolidated appeal, 1 which arises out of a series of disputes 2 con- *498 ceming the management and oversight of a family partnership and various family trusts, 3 is whether the plaintiffs’ attorney had apparent authority to make settlement proposals, engage in settlement discussions and bind the plaintiffs to a global settlement agreement with the defendants. 4 The plaintiffs claim that the trial court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement between the parties, based on a finding of apparent authority on the part of the plaintiffs’ attorney to bind the plaintiffs to the agreement, was clearly erroneous in the absence of conduct by the plaintiffs (1) manifesting that their attorney had authority to settle the pending litigation, and (2) leading the opposing defense attorneys reasonably to believe that the plaintiffs’ attorney had full and final authority to settle the litigation, as distinguished from authority only to negotiate. The plaintiffs also claim that they were denied their right to a jury trial on issues of fact under article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article four of the amendments, when the trial court, in the midst of voir dire, made findings of fact and determined that the litigants had reached a settlement of the pending litigation. The defendants respond that the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ counsel had apparent authority to settle the litigation was not clearly erroneous and that the plaintiffs had no right to a jury trial on their equitable motions seeking to enforce the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

*499 In the underlying cases, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et. seq. The cases were scheduled for a combined jury and court trial to commence on July 8, 2008, after the completion of jury selection. On July 3, 2008, however, the Sobol defendants and the defendant Bank of America each filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement purportedly reached with the plaintiffs on July 1, 2008. On July 8, 2008, the trial court, Eveleigh, J., conducted a hearing pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811-12, 626 A.2d 729 (1993), 5 to determine whether the settlement agreement was enforceable, at which the plaintiffs argued that there was no agreement and the defendants argued that there was. On July 9, 2008, the court issued an oral decision from the bench containing the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

“[T]he parties met for a mediation, which was held on May 29,2008, before the Honorable Michael Sheldon. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Glenn Coe, represented the plaintiffs at this mediation.

“At the time the mediation was concluded, a settlement had not been reached . . . although Judge Sheldon did remain active in further negotiations between the parties. These negotiations continued to the point where [Coe] made a detailed offer of settlement . . . *500 by way of letter dated June 16, 2008, which was addressed to Attorneys [Robert] Wyld, [Dina] Fisher, and [Steven] Ecker representing the defendants in this action other than Bank of America.

“That particular letter was responded to by [Wyld] ... in which he rejected the proposal. . . . After that rejection, negotiations continued in the matter to the point where [Coe] made an offer to settle the litigation in a series of conversations with [Wyld] and [Attorney David] Schneider [who represented the Bank of America] on Thursday, June 26, and Friday, June 27, 2008.

“[Coe] had been speaking on behalf of all [the] plaintiffs regarding settlement with the knowledge and authority of his own client[s], as well as [Attorney William Horan], who [had] represented the other two plaintiffs . . . [Rakoszynski] . . . and Mann, and that situation had continued since the time of the mediation on May 29, 2008. During that two day period of June 26 and June 27, 2008, [Coe] expressly assured [the] defendants’ attorneys on separate occasions in response to direct questioning on the issue that the settlement offer proposed by him at that time was fully authorized by his client[s] as well as [Horan]; [and] that if accepted by the defendants, [it] would resolve the litigation in all respects.

“[Wyld], who was negotiating the settlement on behalf of . . . the Sobol defendants . . . notified [Coe] on Monday, June 30, 2008, that the offer of settlement made by [Coe] on behalf of all [of the] plaintiffs was accepted by the Sobol defendants. The Sobol defendants understood that the settlement between the plaintiffs and the Sobol defendants was part of a global settlement proposal made by [the] plaintiffs’ counsel, and, therefore, both [Wyld] and [Coe] awaited word from [Schneider], who represented the Bank of America *501 in the separate actions in which Tamar Ackerman . . . and [Rakoszynski] were named plaintiffs.

“The settlement demand by [the] plaintiffs’ counsel to [the] Bank of America was in the sum of $1.1 million. [Schneider], in response to that proposal, had numerous conversations with numerous bank executives on Friday, June 27, 2008, Monday, June [3]0, 2008, and Tuesday, July 1, 2008, in an effort to secure authority to accept the . . . $1.1 million demand communicated by [the] plaintiffs’ counsel.

“Due to the fact that the amount of the proposal was in excess of $1 million, [Schneider] required approval at higher levels and it was difficult to gain that approval by the time period which had been expressed. Therefore, [Schneider] requested to extend . . . the deadline for . . . acceptance to 5 p.m. on July 1, which request was granted. The Bank of America, through [Schneider], accepted the $1.1 million settlement proposal in the early afternoon of July 1, 2008, prior to the 5 p.m. deadline. The global settlement offer thus [had] been accepted by all [of the] defendants.

“The plaintiffs Rena Ackerman, [Rakoszynski], and [Mann], were all present on the day that the Bank of America accepted the offer, July 1, 2008. Beginning at 9:30 that morning, the parties had convened at the Hartford offices of Shipman and Goodwin for the deposition of [Rakoszynski] and [Mann], [the] plaintiffs in [one of] the . . . cases. In particular, Rena Ackerman was present from the outset of the deposition.

“At no time prior to the acceptance of the settlement proposal on July 1, 2008, were [the] defendants or their attorneys notified that the offer had been withdrawn, unauthorized, or otherwise ineffective. During that same period [Rena] Ackerman never manifested to [the] defendants or their attorneys that the settlement authority of her attorney was limited or had been terminated.

*502 “[Coe] is a very experienced, highly regarded lawyer. He’s been representing plaintiffs and parties for over thirty years. [Coe], again, [has been] the lead negotiator in settlement discussions since May 29, 2008, in an ongoing sustained and intense series of negotiations. It was certainly clear that by May 29, 2008, he was authorized to negotiate settlement terms on the plaintiffs’ behalf.

“Defense counsel had observed [Rena] Ackerman in [Coe’s] presence during the mediation process and knew that [Coe] was consulting with her concerning negotiations based upon [Coe’s] feedback. [Rena] Ack-erman was very involved in every aspect ... of the case, including settlement. She [is] found by the court to be a very bright person who is vigilant in pursuing and protecting her interests in these lawsuits.

“[Coe] expressly and unambiguously assured both [Wyld] and [Schneider] in separate conversations that he had authorization from [Rena] Ackerman to offer the specific settlement terms at issue. After [Wyld] informed [Coe] on June 30, 2008, that the Sobol defendants agreed to the settlement terms, [Coe] continued to inquire regarding [Schneider’s] progress with the Bank of America and demonstrated no changes in the commitment to the settlement.

“On July 1, 2008, while . . . [Rena] Ackerman was physically present at the offices of Shipman and Goodwin, [Coe] continued to await word from [Schneider] regarding [the] Bank of America’s willingness to settle the case for $1.1 million and extended the deadline for response from 12 noon to 5 p.m.

“The express terms of the settlement between the Sobol defendants and the plaintiffs the court finds were as testified to by [Wyld]. Part of those terms had been agreed to as expressed in [Coe’s] letter dated June 16. Additional terms involved the payment of $1.4 million *503 from the Sobol defendants and a payment from Ruth Sobol resolving the probate appeal and the fees contained therein.

“The precise details at issue at the time of the negotiations which were resolved on July 1, was the additional sum of payment of $1.4 million. . . . [T]hat particular settlement [Wyld] had indicated that — and notified [Coe] on Monday, June 30, that the offer for settlement of $1.4 million in addition to the other terms previously agreed to was accepted by the Sobol defendants. . . .

“In connection with the threshold question posed by Audubon [Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225 Conn. 811-12], the court finds that the contractual terms with respect to both Bank of America and with respect to the settlement of the Sobol defendants were clear, certain, and unambiguous.

“It further appears to the court that there was no challenge at the time of the hearing from the testimony of [Coe] himself. It was clearly expressed to Bank of America that $1.1 million would resolve the case. They came up with $1.1 million. The offer was accepted. It’s further clear to the court that although there are numerous issues as testified to by [Wyld] regarding the settlement of the Sobol defendants, the one remaining issue to be resolved was the amount of money to be paid and the demand in that regard was that the Sobol defendants pay $1.4 million. They came up with the money. The proposal was accepted.

“At the time of the hearing there was no challenge from anyone [claiming] that either settlement was unclear or ambiguous .... Further ... an otherwise valid settlement agreement is enforceable even if not in writing or signed by the parties.

“Having found the agreements to be clear and unambiguous, the court next moves to what is really the crux *504 of the issue in this particular matter and that is the apparent authority of [Coe] to make the settlement proposals and to accept the settlement on behalf of all the plaintiffs. Connecticut law is clear to the extent that under the ordinary rules of a contract, an agent who has apparent authority, but not express authority, can bind his principal especially as to parties who act in good faith ....

“Since the case of Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 734, 629 A.2d 333 (1993), the court’s inquiry as to the doctrine of apparent authority is now refined to a two part analysis. Apparent authority exists, one, where the principal held the agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question and knowingly permitted him to act as having such authority; and, two, in consequence thereof, the person dealing with the agent acting in good faith reasonably believed under all the circumstances that the agent had the necessary authority. . . .

“Based upon the court’s prior findings in this matter, the court finds that [Coe] certainly did have apparent authority from his client[s]. Further . . . the court so finds, [it was] acknowledged in testimony, that the defendants’ counsel reasonably believed that [Coe] was, in fact, authorized by the plaintiffs to make the settlement offer at issue, and further, that [the] defendants’ counsel at all . . . relevant times were acting in good faith in their respective efforts to settle the case on the terms proposed by [Coe].

“As noted earlier, [Coe] had been, in fact, engaged in settlement discussions with his client’s obvious assent. [Rena Ackerman] had accompanied him to the mediation for over [one] month prior to the time the settlement was reached. [Coe] was certainly held out as being authorized to negotiate settlement on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants acted reasonably in *505 believing that he had authority to do so. [Coe] acknowledged in testimony that both [Wyld] and [Schneider] acted reasonably in relying on his stated authority. Further, there was no evidence at all that [Coe’s] apparent authority had been terminated at any time by [Rena] Ackerman.

“We have a situation in this case that is presented to the court where [the] plaintiffs’ attorney had been practicing at a major law firm for a number of years, had represented the plaintiff[s] in these actions for a number of years, had been actively engaged in settlement discussions, [and] participated in mediation supervised by Judge Sheldon. It’s clear that under the circumstances of this case the two prong requirement of the Tomlinson case has been established and the court so finds. . . .

“The court understands the plaintiffs’ attorney to indicate that there was a misunderstanding and that he did not appreciate the clients’ wishes with regard to the proposal. That testimony, while unfortunate, does not change the fact that he had apparent authority to enter into these discussions and bind his client[s]. Whether that misunderstanding came before or after the proposal was made and was the result of a change of heart on the part of the client[s], the court makes no comment.

“With regard to . . . the testimony of Rena . . . Ackerman regarding the settlement discussions and her authority to [Coe] indicating that he had no authority to enter into this settlement, the court finds that her testimony is not credible. 6

“Wherefore, in conclusion, the comí grants the Bank of America’s motion to enforce the settlement *506 agreement dated July 2, 2008, the payment of $1.1 million. The court also grants the motion of [the Sobol defendants] to enforce [the] settlement agreement dated July 3,2008, and instructs [Wyld] to draft a written agreement consistent with the terms and conditions that he testified to and [that] the court. . . finds [was] the agreement that had been reached between the parties.

“The signed settlement agreement between the parties shall be submitted for approval by the court within thirty days of this order.” (Citations omitted.)

On July 28, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion to rear-gue. The trial court denied the motion on September 16, 2008. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed from the July 9 decision enforcing the settlement agreement to the Appellate Court.

In the meantime, Wyld filed a motion on August 7, 2008, on behalf of the Sobol defendants, for approval of a draft settlement agreement memorializing the terms of the settlement pursuant to the trial court’s July 9 decision ordering the preparation of a signed agreement within thirty days. The motion noted that the plaintiffs had neither commented upon the draft agreement nor consented to sign it. On August 8, 2008, Schneider filed a similar motion on behalf of the Bank of America seeking approval of the draft agreement attached to the Sobol defendants’ motion. On October 2, 2008, the trial court denied both motions, noting that “the parties cannot agree on the wording of an agreement. Further, the proposed agreement is not in accord with the settlements approved by the court. The court cannot expand the language beyond the settlement and considers some of the language beyond mere[ly] incidental to settlement language. The language proposed by both sides goes beyond what the exiiibits state or what the court *507 heard in testimony. The court based its judgment on the exhibits and transcript.”

The court entered judgment in two separate documents, which it subsequently incorporated into a single “amended judgment” dated October 7, 2008. The plaintiffs appealed from the amended judgment to the Appellate Court on October 24, 2008. Thereafter, the Appellate Court consolidated the appeal with the plaintiffs’ appeal from the July 9 decision enforcing the settlement agreement, and we later transferred the consolidated appeal to this court.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motions to enforce the purported settlement agreement. They specifically claim that the trial court’s finding that their lead attorney, Coe, had apparent authority to settle the pending litigation was clearly erroneous because it was lacking in evidentiary support. The defendants respond that the trial court’s finding of apparent authority was not clearly erroneous because it was properly supported by the evidence. We agree with the defendants.

We begin with the standard of review. It is well settled that “[t]he nature and extent of an agent’s authority is a question of fact for the trier where the evidence is conflicting or where there are several reasonable inferences which can be drawn [therefrom].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 636, 850 A.2d 145 (2004). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s findings with regard to agency and an agent’s apparent authority under the clearly erroneous standard.

“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing *508 court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. ... In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption ... in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 433, 487, 970 A.2d 592 (2009).

With respect to the governing legal principles, “it is a general rule of agency law that the principal in an agency relationship is bound by, and liable for, the acts in which his agent engages with authority from the principal, and within the scope of the agent’s employment. ... An agent’s authority may be actual or apparent. . . . Actual authority exists when [an agent’s] action [is] expressly authorized . . . or . . . although not authorized, [is] subsequently ratified by the [principal].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maharishi School of Vedic Sciences, Inc. (Connecticut) v. Connecticut Constitution Associates Ltd. Partnership, 260 Conn. 598, 606-607, 799 A.2d 1027 (2002). In contrast, “[a]pparent authority is that semblance of authority which a principal, through his own acts or inadvertences, causes or allows third persons to believe his agent possesses. . . . Consequently, apparent authority is to be determined, not by the agent’s own acts, but by the acts of the agent’s principal. . . . The issue of apparent authority is one of fact to be determined based on two criteria. . . . First, it must appear from the principal’s conduct that the principal held the agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question, or knowingly permitted [the agent] to act as having such authority. . . . Sec *509 ond, the party dealing with the agent must have, acting in good faith, reasonably believed, under all the circumstances, that the agent had the necessary authority to bind the principal to the agent’s action. . . .

“Apparent authority terminates when the third person has notice that: (1) the agent’s authority has terminated; (2) the principal no longer consents that the agent shall deal with the third person; or (3) the agent is acting under a basic error as to the facts. 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 125, comment (a) (1958). Unless otherwise agreed, there is a notification by the principal to the third person of revocation of an agent’s [apparent] authority or other fact indicating its termination: (a) when the principal states such fact to the third person; or (b) when a reasonable time has elapsed after a writing stating such fact has been delivered by the principal (i) to the other personally .... 1 Restatement (Second), [supra, § 136 (1)]. In addition, the principal can properly give notification of the termination of the agent’s authority by ... (b) giving publicity by some . . . method reasonably adapted to give the information to such third person. [Id., § 136 (3)].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 734-35; see also Quint v. O’Connell, 89 Conn. 353, 357, 94 A. 288 (1915).

The same principles apply to the relationship between attorneys and their clients. See Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 181, 413 A.2d 819 (“[i]t is hornbook law that clients generally are bound by the acts of their attorneys”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1979); Butler v. Butler, 1 Root (Conn.) 275 (1791) (attorney may bind client in legal proceeding). In the context of settlement agreements, the authority to determine whether and on what terms to settle a claim is reserved to the client except when the client has validly authorized the attorney to make such decisions. See 1 Restatement (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers *510 § 22 (1), p. 180 (2000). Thus, an attorney with apparent authority may enter into a settlement agreement that is binding on the client. 1 Restatement (Third), Agency § 3.03, comment (b), p. 176 (2006) (“[a]ppaxent authority [of a lawyer in an attorney-client relationship] to effect a settlement that binds the client is present when, as in transactions of various sorts involving agents who are not lawyers, the opposing party or lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer has actual authority to effect a settlement and that belief is traceable to manifestations of the client”). Although reviewing courts in Connecticut have acknowledged that “[a]n attorney who is authorized to represent a client in litigation does not automatically have either implied 7 or apparent authority to settle or otherwise to compromise the Ghent’s cause of action”; (emphasis added) Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 213 n.4, 487 A.2d 197 (1985); they also have repeatedly held that an agent with implied or apparent authority may bind the principal to an enforceable settlement agreement. See Maharishi School of Vedic Sciences, Inc. (Connecticut) v. Connecticut Constitution Associates Ltd. Partnership, supra, 260 Conn. 605 (holding that attorney had implied actual authority to bind plaintiff to agreement); Yale University v. Out of the Box, LLC, 118 Conn. App. 800, 807, 811-12, 985 A.2d 1080 (2010) (holding that trial court “properly determined that the actions and inactions of the plaintiff, the principal, caused or allowed the *511 defendant reasonably to believe that . . . the agent [attorney], had the [apparent] authority to enter into and to bind the plaintiff to the settlement with the defendant”); see also In re Artha Management, Inc., 91 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1996) (although decision to settle case rests with client and client does not automatically bestow authority on retained counsel, unique nature of attorney-client relationship and public policy favoring settlements support presumption that “an attomey-of-record who enters into a settlement agreement, purportedly on behalf of a client, had authority to do so”).

We consider manifestations by the client that the attorney has apparent authority in light of the applicable Restatements of the Law, which have served as authoritative support for many of our holdings. Both the Restatement of Agency and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provide that the mere act of retaining an attorney, without more, is insufficient to create apparent authority to bind the client to a settlement. See 1 Restatement (Third), Agency, supra, § 3.03, comment (b), p. 176 (“[b]y retaining a lawyer in a litigated matter, a client does not by that conduct alone create . . . apparent authority for the lawyer to enter into a settlement without the client’s assent”); 1 Restatement (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers, supra, § 27, comment (d), p. 204 (“[m]erely retaining a lawyer does not create apparent authority in the lawyer to perform acts [such as whether and on what terms to settle a claim]”). Rather, manifestations of apparent authority must take the form of “conduct by a person, observable by others, that expresses meaning.” 1 Restatement (Third), Agency, supra, § 1.03, comment (b), p. 56. Such conduct, however, “is not limited to spoken or written words .... Silence may constitute a manifestation when, in light of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would express dissent to the infer *512 ence that other persons will draw from silence. Failure then to express dissent will be taken as a manifestation of affirmance.” Id., p. 57. Apparent authority also may be conveyed to the third person “from authorized statements of the agent, from documents or other indicia of authority given by the principal to the agent, or from third persons who have heard of the agent’s authority through authorized or permitted channels of communication. Likewise . . . apparent authority can be created by appointing a person to a position . . . which carries with it generally recognized duties ... to do the things ordinarily entrusted to one occupying such a position . ...” 1 Restatement (Second), Agency, supra, § 27, comment (a), p. 104. The Restatement (Third) of Agency similarly explains that “[a] principal may . . . make a manifestation by placing an agent in a defined position in an organization or by placing an agent in charge of a transaction or situation. Third parties who interact with the principal through the agent will naturally and reasonably assume that the agent has authority to do acts consistent with the agent’s position or role unless they have notice of facts suggesting that this may not be so. A principal may make an additional manifestation by permitting or requiring the agent to serve as the third party’s exclusive channel of communication to the principal. . . .

“If a principal has given an agent general authority to engage in a class of transactions, subject to limits known only to the agent and the principal, third parties may reasonably believe the agent to be authorized to conduct such transactions and need not inquire into the existence of undisclosed limits on the agent’s authority.” (Citations omitted.) 1 Restatement (Third), Agency, supra, § 3.03, comment (b), pp. 174-75.

We are also guided by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide the framework for the ethical prac *513 tice of law in this state. 8 See generally Rules of Professional Conduct, preamble. Among these rules are that an attorney shall be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf; Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1 (l); 9 an attorney shall abide by the client’s decision whether to settle a matter; Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 (a); 10 and an attorney shall promptly consult with the client and secure the client’s consent prior to taking action on any matter with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4 (a) (l). 11 Mindful of these *514 principles, we thus examine the record to determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings under Tomlinson.

A

We begin by considering whether the plaintiffs held Coe out as possessing sufficient authority to settle the litigation as required under the first prong of Tomlinson v. Board of Education, supra, 226 Conn. 734. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court’s findings that Rena Acker-man was present at the deposition on July 1, 2008, and that she “ ‘never manifested’ ” that the “ ‘settlement authority of her attorney was limited or had been terminated,’ ” were insufficient to support the conclusion that Coe had full and final settlement authority. The plaintiffs further contend that other findings by the trial court that Rena Ackerman was involved in every aspect of the litigation, including settlement, and that she is “a very bright person who is vigilant in pursuing and protecting her interests in these lawsuits,” are inconsistent with the conclusion that Coe had apparent authority to settle the litigation because they show that Rena Ackerman fully participated in her legal action and would not have given settlement authority to Coe. They also contend that there is no evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that Rena Ackerman spoke for all of the other plaintiffs, including Rakoszynski and Mann. The defendants respond that the trial court’s finding that Coe had apparent authority was based on a course of dealing that began, at the latest, during the court-ordered mediation on May 29, 2008, continued under court supervision through the month of June and concluded on July 1, during which time the plaintiffs consistently held Coe out as their sole spokesman on settlement matters with the power to receive, reject and make settlement offers. We agree with the defendants that the plaintiffs clothed Coe with apparent authority to settle the litigation.

*515 It is well established that “[a] manifestation [of a principal’s assent or intention] does not occur in a vacuum, and the meaning that may reasonably be inferred from it will reflect the context in which the manifestation is made. . . .

“Between particular persons, prior dealings or an ongoing relationship frame the context in which manifestations are made and understood.” 1 Restatement (Third), Agency, supra, § 1.03, comment (e), p. 62. Moreover, manifestations of apparent authority may take many forms. Id., § 2.03, comment (c), p. 115. For example, “[t]he principal may make a manifestation [of apparent authority] by . . . directing or designating an agent to . . . conduct negotiations ... or [by] placing the agent in charge of a transaction or situation.” Id.; see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d 493, Agency § 79 (2002). Connecticut courts likewise have recognized that the basis of apparent authority may be a course of dealing between the agent and the principal. See Graham v. Southington Bank & Trust Co., 99 Conn. 494, 505, 121 A. 812 (1923) (course of dealing between plaintiff receiver of corporation and defendant bank was not such that it would legally and logically support conclusion that third party was plaintiffs agent clothed with apparent authority to secure money from bank without check legally payable to him); Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53, 59, 22 A. 681 (1885) (one member of copartnership had no apparent authority to bind other member by executing negotiable promissory note in name of firm for money borrowed when there had been little time for course of conduct to develop); Yale University v. Out of the Box, LLC, supra, 118 Conn. App. 808 (basis of apparent authority may be course of dealing); Host America Corp. v. Ramsey, 107 Conn. App. 849, 858-59, 947 A.2d 957 (course of dealing involving execution of certain employment agreements without board approval by chief executive officer of plaintiff corpora *516 tion supported claim that officer had apparent authority to execute such agreements), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 904, 957 A.2d 870 (2008); Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc. v. Norwalk, 58 Conn. App. 340, 346, 752 A.2d 523 (2000) (basis of apparent authority may be course of dealing); Edart Truck Rental Corp. v. B. Swirsky & Co., 23 Conn. App. 137, 140, 579 A.2d 133 (1990) (same).

We conclude that the trial court’s finding 12 that the plaintiffs clothed Coe with apparent authority to settle the litigation is supported by evidence of a course of dealing involving the plaintiffs, Coe, the defendants and the parties’ attorneys that was well established before the Sobol defendants and the Bank of America accepted the global settlement offer. The plaintiffs do not dispute the trial court’s finding that Coe represented all of the plaintiffs at the court-ordered mediation on May 29, 2008, during which settlement terms were discussed and Rena Ackerman and the other plaintiffs were present. Moreover, it was Coe, acting on behalf of all of the plaintiffs, who subsequently rejected the defendants’ written offer in a conference telephone call scheduled by Judge Sheldon and who stated that a counteroffer might be forthcoming. Thereafter, Coe made the anticipated counteroffer on behalf of all of the plaintiffs in his June 16 letter to the Sobol defendants. It is clear that Coe was authorized to make this offer, which would have settled the litigation if accepted, because the letter contained language indicating that it pertained to all of the pending litigation and was “for settlement purposes only.” Indeed, all those who later gave testimony con- *517 ceming the letter, including Coe, Horan, 13 and the defense attorneys, understood that Coe had authority to make the offer, and the plaintiffs repeatedly concede in their appellate briefs that Coe had express, or actual, authority to do so.

Furthermore, after the Sobol defendants rejected the counteroffer, Wyld observed Rena Ackerman conferring with Coe at a hearing on June 25,2008, to determine which issues would be tried to a jury. Thereafter, Coe made the global settlement offer to the defendants in a series of conversations with Schneider and Wyld, repeatedly assuring them that he had authority to settle the litigation for the terms under discussion. On July 1, one day after the Sobol defendants accepted the offer, the plaintiffs Rena Ackerman, Rakoszynski and Mann were present with Coe at the Hartford offices of Ship-man and Goodwin for the depositions of Rakoszynski and Mann. On that day, Coe and Wyld, who also was present, were waiting to hear from Schneider whether the Bank of America would accept the terms that Coe had offered and that the Sobol defendants had accepted one day earlier. Wyld and Schneider both observed Rena Ackerman and her husband at the offices, where they met with Coe from time to time and were seen conferring with Coe before Schneider called to inform them that the Bank of America had accepted the offer, thus settling the litigation. There was no apparent discord or distance in the relationship between Coe and Rena Ackerman and no one objected to Coe’s extension of the deadline for the Bank of America to respond from noon until 5 p.m. In other words, Ackerman manifested by her conduct during the times she was observed with Coe prior to the offer’s acceptance that she was aware of, and fully supported, the global settlement offer.

*518 In addition, none of the plaintiffs, including Rena Ackerman, who was described by the trial court as “a very bright person who is vigilant in pursuing and protecting her interests,” indicated by their conduct prior to the Bank of America’s acceptance of the offer that Coe did not have continued authority to settle the litigation. Specifically, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs notified any third person that they had revoked Coe’s authority following the defendants’ rejection of their counteroffer, or that Coe no longer was representing Rakoszynski and Mann during the negotiations in June. This conclusion is supported by Rena Ackerman’s testimony that she had authorized Coe to engage in settlement discussions with other counsel, and that she never notified any other person involved in the negotiations that she had limited or revoked Coe’s authority after June 16 to reach a settlement on her behalf. Consistent with this testimony, Horan, who represented Rakoszynski and Mann, testified that he did not participate in the settlement negotiations that took place between June 26 and July 1, that he had many discussions with Coe during that period and that he had authorized Coe to engage in the ongoing negotiations after the defendants had rejected the offer of June 16. Further, no one testified that Horan notified any third party that Coe was not authorized to represent Rakoszynski and Mann or to make a settlement offer to the defendants between June 16 and the Bank of America’s acceptance of the offer on July 1. Accordingly, the evidence unequivocally supports the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs held Coe out as possessing the necessary authority to settle the litigation by (1) authorizing him to represent them at the court-ordered mediation, reject the defendant’s written proposal that followed the mediation and convey the June 16 counteroffer, (2) communicating with Coe in the presence of the defendants at various times during the *519 ongoing negotiations after June 16, and (3) failing to revoke Coe’s authority or to inform any third person that Coe no longer had authority to settle the litigation after June 16.

The plaintiffs argue that the present case is virtually identical to Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1996), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the attorney who represented the plaintiff had no apparent authority to settle the case. We disagree. In Auvil, counsel for the parties met before a pre