Grandis Family Partnership, Ltd. v. Hess Corp.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Hess Corporation’s Motion To Stay The Litigation And Compel Arbitration, Or, In The Alternative, To Transfer Venue (DE 12). An evidentiary hearing was held before this Court on July 8, 2008, at which the Parties presented evidence in support of and opposition to the instant Motion. The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

This is a difficult case. It involves several discrete areas of New York contract law coupled with imperfect facts; the combination of which is appropriately found on the pages of cruel contracts exams given by law professors clad in bow ties. Nevertheless, pursuant to this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the following facts were adduced and legal issues raised by the Parties for this Court .to resolve.

Defendant Hess Corporation (hereinafter “Hess”) and Plaintiff Advanced Power Technologies (hereinafter “APT”) began working together in 2003, when Hess contracted with APT for it to service - and maintain the lighting at many of Hess’s retail gas stations in Florida. Hess was pleased with their business relationship, and in June of 2007, Hess expanded its business with APT by purchasing several orders of lighting ballasts.

*1322 In the same year, Hess began accepting bids for a major renovation of its gas stations’ outdoor lighting. It planned to replace the existing lighting and ballasts with more energy-efficient models. APT’s bid was accepted, and in May of that year, the Parties began negotiating the terms of their agreement. When the Parties’ formal agreement was memorialized on July 2, 2007, it consisted of an eleven-page written agreement, complete with eighty pages of appendices, schedules, and forms. However, for certain business reasons, APT began its performance on the project in late June of that year.

The first eleven pages of the Parties’ contract was a form prepared by Hess’s legal department, which it has used for over a decade. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, DE 33, pp. 36, 47 (hereinafter “Transcript”). At the evidentiary hearing, John Garabino, the Hess representative who negotiated the contract with APT, testified that the eleven-page contract was used as a base for the contractual agreement with APT, while the appendices and schedules attached thereto made up the heart of the Parties’ agreement. Transcript pp. 46-48. Despite the contract with its appendices and Schedules being seemingly exhaustive in their breadth and detail, it did not contain an arbitration clause or venue provision. Pertinent to the instant Motion, the contract contained a clause listing the documents that were to be incorporated by reference, DE 12, Ex. 1, ¶ 2, an integration clause, id. ¶ 29, and a choice-of-law clause, id. ¶ 32, whereby the Parties agreed that New York law governs any disputes.

■ After the Parties’ agreement was formalized but before the project was completed, the Parties’ relationship broke down. APT responded by filing suit in Florida state court, wherein it alleged that Hess was in breach of the contract. Hess timely removed the suit to this Court. See DE 1. With its Answer, it filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and conversion against APT. The factual basis for the counterclaim is immaterial to this Order.

After the case was at issue but before discovery had commenced, Hess filed the instant Motion (DE 12). In it, Hess argues that any disputes arising from the contract must be referred to arbitration, despite the contract’s silence concerning the same. In support of this position, Hess cites the terms and conditions referenced in the thirty-two Purchase Orders it sent APT for work performed under the contract. The face of the Purchase Order references the contract’s Schedules and forms in several different areas, including each of the individual projects’ start and completion dates, as well as forms APT was to complete with the work it performed. See DE 12, Ex. 3. Directly under the Purchase Order’s style was the following sentence, in bold:

THE PURCHASE ORDER TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS WELL AS THE SHIPMENT ROUTING POLICY LOCATED AT http://www.hess.com/ PO/HessMR.htm ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE IN THIS PURCHASE ORDER.

DE 12, Ex. 2. By viewing the website listed above, APT would see the additional terms and conditions that it was deemed to assent to by filling the Purchase Order. Among the terms and conditions located on the Hess website, one is of particular importance to this Motion: the arbitration clause. It states, in pertinent part, that “all disputes, claims, questions, or differences shall be finally settled by arbitration.” DE 12, Ex. 4, ¶ 34.

Hess seeks to refer this case to arbitration and makes four arguments for why the arbitration clause is binding on APT. First, the Hess Purchase Order was formally incorporated by reference into the *1323 Parties’ contract. Second, the Hess Purchase Order and the contract should be read together as one document, because the Purchase Orders were • the vehicles through which the contract was imple: mented; without them, APT could not perform under the contract. DE 12, p. 11. Third, the Hess Purchase Order and the contract should be read together, because “[s]igned and unsigned writings relating to the same transaction and containing all the essential terms of a contract may be read together to evidence a binding contract.” DE 12, p. 12. And fourth, the Hess Purchase Orders stand alone as separate contracts binding APT to arbitrate the claims arising under them. Id. at 12. The Parties stipulate that if the arbitration clause referenced in the Purchase Orders is binding then all of the claims and counterclaims raised in this action would be referred to arbitration.

The thrust of the instant Motion (DE 12) focuses on the first two arguments, with passing reference to the third and fourth; Hess spends little more than a sentence briefing each of the latter two arguments. At. the evidentiary hearing, Hess proceeded solely on the argument that the Hess Purchase Orders were incorporated by reference into the contract. DE 33, p 64. In its closing argument, Hess relied on the logic of the second argument to the bolster its first: Hess reasoned that because APT could not perform without the Purchase Orders, they were necessarily incorporated by reference in Schedule C into the contract. Id. pp. 62-63.

Hess did not argue at the hearing that the Hess Purchase Orders were incorporated by reference through implication or that because the two documents were executed contemporaneously, or more accurately, near the same time, they should be read together. Nor did Hess argue that the Purchase Orders were a modification of the contract. In fact, when asked whether the Hess Purchase Orders amended the contract, Hess’s attorney responded: “I don’t believe so, your Hon- or.... It is our position that the purchase orders were one of th[e] documents incorporated by reference and, therefore, form a part of.the contract that the parties entered into.”. DE 33, p. 64.

In response to Hess’s four arguments, APT argues that under New York law an agreement‘to arbitrate must be clear and unambiguous. Aerotech World Trade Ltd. v. Excalibur Sys., Inc., 236 A.D.2d 609, 654 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (N.Y.App.Div.1997). Thus, the generic reference to “purchase orders” in Schedule C fails, as a matter of law, to incorporate the terms and conditions of the Hess Purchase Orders into the Parties’ contract. It also takes the position that Hess’s alternative arguments fail to establish that the arbitration clause on the Hess website should be read into the contract.

As expressed more fully below, the Court finds that the reference to “purchase orders” in Schedule C is insufficient to formally incorporate by reference the Hess Purchase Orders into the contract. Further, the facts adduced at the hearing did not establish that APT’s prior dealings with the Hess Purchase Orders containing the arbitration clause were sufficient to impute knowledge of their existence and terms to APT. APT’s employees testified that over the years Hess had issued thousands of purchase orders to APT, none of which resembled those at issue here. Only the purchase orders dealing with the ballast purchases contained the website link, and APT’s processing clerk and President took no notice of the modified form. Further, there was contradictory testimony concerning whether APT ever received a copy of the Hess Purchase Orders with the website terms and conditions -in a meeting *1324 held prior to entering into the contract. Thus, knowledge of the Hess Purchase Orders with their terms and conditions cannot be imputed to APT when it was entering into the contract with Hess.

Hess’s alternative arguments also fail. Its theory that the Purchase Orders and-the contract should be read together because APT could not perform under the contract without them is without a basis in New York law; even if general contract principles supported Hess’s argument, the evidence adduced at the hearing does not permit the Court to make a finding that APT could not perform under the contract without Hess issuing its Purchase Orders. The caselaw cited by Hess in support of its position that the Purchase Orders and contract should be read together as relating to the same transaction thereby evidencing a single binding contract is inapposite to this case. The pertinent issue in this litigation is not whether a single binding contract exists, but whether the single binding contract includes terms contained only in the Purchase Orders. Further, Hess’s argument that the Purchase Orders constituted separate contracts that bound APT beyond the terms previously agreed to in the contract is without a basis in law, absent the Purchase Orders being viewed as a modification of the Parties’ formal agreement. Therefore, the Court will deny Hess’s Motion To Compel Arbitration (DE 12) and allow this case to proceed on its merit s in this Court.

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (2006) (hereinafter the “FAA”), requires the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. Under § 2 of the FAA,

[a] written agreement in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). By enacting the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration.” Wheat First Securities Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984)). This policy, as directed by the Supreme Court, requires courts to give arbitration agreements “a liberal reading.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Thus, “[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927. This dictate extends to every facet of the agreement, “whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927 (citing Wick v. Atl. Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1979)).

While this strong national policy directs the Court’s reading of arbitration provisions in contracts, it cannot run roughshod over fundamental contract law and principles. Before the Court can enforce an arbitration clause, it must find that an agreement to arbitrate was made, because federal law “does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). Thus, while “[f]ederal law establishes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, ... state law governs the interpretation and formation of such agreements.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.2001). The Parties agree that New York law applies to this *1325 action and that if the arbitration clause is binding then all the claims and counterclaims arising in this action would be referred to arbitration. Therefore, the dis-positive issue before the Court is whether under New York law the Parties ever formulated an agreement to arbitrate their disputes.

III. Incorporation by Reference

Hess’s principal argument for referring this case to arbitration is that the Hess Purchase Order, complete with its terms and conditions on the Hess website, is incorporated by reference into the contract. New York adheres to the common-law principle that parties are free to incorporate into a contract terms that are contained in a separate, independent document. In order for the separate, referenced document to be incorporated, “it must be clear that the parties to the agreement had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated terms.” Lamb v. Emhart Corp., 47 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir.1995). New York courts have expressed the rule as “requiring] that the paper to be incorporated into a written instrument by reference must be so referred to and described in the instrument that the paper may be identified beyond all reasonable doubt.” PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201 (2d. Cir.1996) (quoting Chiacchia v. Nat. Westminster Bank, 124 A.D.2d 626, 628, 507 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y.App.Div.1986) (emphasis supplied in Bybyk)). For the incorporated terms to be binding “it must be clear that the parties know of and consented to the terms to be incorporated by reference.” Creative Waste Mgt. v. Capt. Envtl. Servs., 429 F.Supp.2d 582, 602 (S.D.N.Y.2006). An oblique reference to a separate, non-contemporaneous document is insufficient to incorporate the same into the contract. Ryan, Beck & Co., LLC v. Fakih, 268 F.Supp.2d 210, 223 (E.D.N.Y.2003).

• Courts outside New York recognize that incorporation by reference may also be accomplished by implication. See Richard Lord, Williston on Contracts § 30:26 (subtitled “Writing Implicitly Incorporated by Reference”). In those cases, the analysis focuses on what the parties would clearly understand, given their mutual understanding and knowledge of the terms in question. See, e.g., Newton v. Smith Motors, Inc., 122 Vt. 409, 175 A.2d 514, 516 (1961). This is no different than when courts give particular terms the meaning they are ascribed in the specialized trade or industry, rather than relying upon the plain meaning of the term outside that context. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales, Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.1960) (discussing the meaning of the term “chicken”) (Friendly, J.). 1

Hess cites both the language of the contract and APT’s prior notice of and dealings with the Purchase Orders to establish that the website’s terms are incorporated by reference into the contract. Thus, Hess makes two arguments: one on the four corners of the contract and the other on the Parties’ use and understanding of the term “purchase orders.”

*1326 A.

Hess’s primary argument is based on the contract’s language: the term “purchase order” is used in Schedule C, and therefore, the Hess Purchase Orders are incorporated by reference into the contract. Schedule C states that “[a]fter receipt of a purchase order for each subpro-ject the Contractor may submit a payment application for 30% of the purchase order value.” DE 12, Ex. 2, p. 88. The next paragraph states: “After receipt of an approved changed [sic] order Contractor may submit a payment application for the remaining value of the purchase order (total revised purchase order value less the 30% of original purchase order value previously paid).” Id. There is no other reference to purchase orders in the 91 pages that make up the Parties’ formal agreement.

To bolster its argument that the Purchase Orders áre incorporated by reference, Hess introduced the testimony of John Garabino. He testified that he reviewed the contract with APT before entering into it and felt it was clear that the references to purchase orders in Schedule C was to the Purchase Orders used by Hess. Transcript pp. 27-28. He also testified that a sample Hess Purchase Order, complete with the terms and conditions on the website, was provided to APT representatives at a meeting held in late May with APT, Hess, and the supplier of the materials used on the project. Id. pp. 12-19. In support, Hess introduced as Defendant’s Exhibit 1 an email with an agenda of the May 23, 2007, meeting attached. Garabino also testified that Purchase Orders with the bolded language quoted above, directing a reader to the Hess website, were sent to APT when Hess ordered ballasts in June of 2007. Id. pp. 28, 35; Hess Exhibit 4. Hess also introduced into evidence an email APT sent it commenting on the Purchase Orders Hess sent in June of 2007 regarding the purchase of ballasts. Hess Exhibit 3.

The precise issue for this Court to determine is whether the language of Schedule' C clearly referenced the Hess Purchase Orders to make it clear, beyond a reasonable doubt to APT that the Hess Purchase Order was being incorporated by reference into the'contract. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1201. Whether an extrinsic document is incorporated by reference is a question of law. See Advanced Display Sys, Inc. v. Kent St. Univ., 212 F.3d 1272 (Fed.Cir.2000). As such, the Court looks first to the language of the contract; if its language is ambiguous, then the Court will look to the “mutual knowledge and understanding on part of both parties [to determine] that reference by implication is clear.” Newton v. Smith Motors, Inc., 122 Vt. 409, 175 A.2d 514, 516 (1961).

Looking first to the plain language of the contract, it is clear that the only reference to purchase orders is found in Schedule C. Hess argues that these references refer APT to the Hess 'Purchase Orders that they were previously provided with, complete with the reference to the Hess website. As noted above, to. incorporate the Hess Purchase Orders by reference, Hess must establish that the contract’s language both identifies beyond all reasonable doubt the Hess Purchase Orders and makes clear that they are being incorporated by reference into the contract. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1201.

In contrast to the high bar set by New York caselaw, Schedule C’s references to “purchase orders” speak in a vague and general sense. It does not reference a specific Purchase Order or specific form of purchase order, nor does the contract state that such a Purchase Order is being incorporated by reference. Grammatically, this general rather than specific reference is evidenced by the drafter’s choice to refer to purchase orders as a common noun, rather than a proper noun. The latter *1327 would evidence a particular purchase order, one that any person reading the contract would either expect to be attached to the contract, or, if not attached, the use of a proper noun would lead APT to expect the purchase order referenced to have a definite form that they are either aware of or should take the time to apprise themselves of. This lack of specificity is con-, firmed by the drafter’s use of the indefinite article “a” when first referring to “purchase orders” in Schedule C, rather than the definite article “the.” 2 As it stands, Schedule C’s language refers to a generic form, purchase orders, that is common to most industries and does not immediately or clearly denote the specific Hess Purchase Orders, with their particular provisions. 3 See, e.g., Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 31, 11 S.Ct. 243, 34 L.Ed. 843 (1891) (noting that when a -document’s meaning is doubtful, grammar and punctuation add'light to a text’s meaning).

The language of Schedule C does not make a deliberate attempt to alert the reader that the Hess Purchase Orders are being incorporated by reference, or that any purchase orders are being incorporated by reference. This failure is highlighted by contrasting the clauses throughout the contract incorporating other forms by reference with the reference to purchase orders in Schedule C. In the second provision of the contract it states:

This Contract consists of this document, together with the following listed documents as attached and any document incorporated herein by reference: (collectively, “this Contract”)

(1) Schedule A: “Basis and Scope of Work” - •

(2) Schedule B: “Items to be Furnished By Owner”

(3) Schedule C: “Progress Payments”

(3) [sic] Schedule D: “Contractor’s Affidavit”

(4) Schedule E: “Change Order”

DE 12, Ex. 1, ¶ 2.A. The five areas listed above, correspond to many of the forms attached to the contract and are clearly incorporated therein. In Schedule D,- the Contractor’s Affidavit has a definite form that is referenced to as a proper noun, and it is attached. Id. p. 91, In Schedule E, the Change Order is referenced as a proper noun, see id. ¶¶ 13, 16, and it is also attached to the contract. Id. p. 92. The clarity of the second provision of the contract permits a party to the contract, or a court interpreting it, to know precisely the forms and terms that are being incorporated by reference into the contract.

Schedule C is unlike Schedules D and E. Both of those Schedules are stand-alone forms that have been formally incorporated by reference into the contract. In contrast, Schedule C contains numerous pages of information, the terms of which could be expected to be part of the Parties’ agreement.' A sensible reading as'to the effect of Schedule C being listed among the documents incorporated by reference is that the entire Schedule, as a separate docu *1328 ment, is incorporated by reference into the 11-page contract. This would be consistent with how Schedules B, D, and E operate: each Schedule is a separate document that has become part of the contract through its specific incorporation by reference in the second provision of the contract.

Hess is then, essentially, arguing that the Hess Purchase Orders are incorporated by reference into Schedule C and Schedule C is incorporated by reference into the contract. Nothing in Schedule C, however, indicates with any semblance of intention or clarity that it is incorporating a document by reference. It strains credulity to argue that every common noun referenced in each of the Schedules incorporates by reference a separate nonat-tached document into the contract.

Reading the contract as a whole and contrasting the purchase order language of Schedule C with the rest of the contract, it is clear that the drafter did not evidence an intent to formally incorporate by reference the Hess Purchase Orders into the contract. Even if the drafter personally intended to incorporate by reference the Hess Purchase Orders, the document’s reference to purchase orders was oblique and did not “identiffy] beyond all reasonable doubt” the non-contemporaneous document he sought to incorporate by reference: the Hess Purchase Order. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1201. The Hess Purchase Orders were not among the items explicitly incorporated by reference in the second provision, they are not referred to as proper nouns, they were not attached to the contract, and the sole reference to “purchase orders” in Schedule C was both oblique and without any indication that it was incorporating a specific document by reference into the contract or Schedule C.

That is not to say that a form being referred to as a proper noun is a necessary, condition to have a form incorporated by reference. It is possible that a form could be of such a unique nature that absent being set out with particularity it would be incorporated by reference into the contract because of the mutual knowledge and understanding of the parties. However, with the generic title “purchase order” used in Schedule C, there is nothing that would convey to a person reading the contract a direct and specific indication that a particular document is being incorporated by reference. Purchase orders are a common form in the service industry. Without a definite understanding being set forth for the Parties, knowledge that “purchase orders” in Schedule C refers to the Hess Purchase Orders cannot be imputed to APT.

B.

The language of the contract fails to clearly set forth that the term “purchase order” in Schedule C is meant to incorporate by reference the Hess Purchase Orders; nevertheless, for the benefit of the Parties and any reviewing court, the Court will look to what the Parties clearly understood “purchase orders” in Schedule C to mean, given their dealings in the formation of the contract. In considering parol evidence, Hess’s burden remains the same, namely some contract must identify beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hess Purchase Orders are being incorporated by reference. Hess can establish through testimony and documents outside the contract what APT understood the term “purchase orders” in Schedule C to mean. See Newton, 175 A.2d at 516. At the hearing, Garabino testified that APT was provided with the Hess Purchase Orders twice before the contract was signed: once at the May 27 meeting and again when Hess purchased ballasts through APT. Transcript pp. 12-22. Hess argues that this May 27 meeting establishes that APT knew precisely what the term “purchase *1329 order” in Schedule C referred to, because Hess presented APT with a sample Purchase Order complete with the link to the website that contained the arbitration clause.

At the evidentiary hearing, APT denied having any prior knowledge of the Hess Purchase Orders and the terms and conditions on the website. Several Hess Purchase Orders, complete with the website link, were sent to APT for the ballasts purchased in June of 2007. APT’s president Devin Grandis testified that the sale of ballasts was done as a courtesy for Hess, and because of that, he paid no attention to the Purchase Orders that were sent for the ballasts. APT’s vice president Fred die Manfretti testified that in the course of APT’s dealings with Hess he handled hundreds if not thousands of purchase orders from Hess, and not one of them contained a link to a website containing an arbitration clause. The administrative assistant, Cathy Cole, who dealt with the Purchase Orders for the ballasts also testified that she took no notice of the link to the website, she only paid attention to the fact that the wrong parts number was listed on the order. She mistakenly assumed that those Purchase Orders were like the others that she had processed from Hess.

All of the APT employees testified that in their previous dealings with Hess the purchase orders sent did not resemble those at issue here with the link to the website. 4 This fact is critical because without actual knowledge of these prior Purchase Orders being sent for the ballasts, the term “purchase order” in Schedule C would not carry any significance for APT to know that it incorporated by reference the Hess Purchase Orders with the additional terms. Thus, there was nothing in the prior Purchase Orders for ballasts that would have made APT representatives conscious of the website link and the additional terms contained therein when it signed the contract with Hess.

Additionally, APT’s president Devin Grandis' testified that neither the Purchase Orders nor the terms and conditions contained on Hess’s website were provided to him at the meeting held between APT and Hess on May 27, 2008. Both Manfretti and Cathy Cole testified to this fact. After observing the demeanor of the witnesses for APT, the Court finds their testimony to be credible. In addition, on cross-examination Hess’s representative Garabino was not positive that he provided a copy of the Purchase Orders to APT representatives at the meeting; he was only sure that the agenda reflected that they would be discussed. See DE 33, pp. 43-46. He testified that his assistant Sue Thompson was in charge of handing out the Hess Purchase Order and the terms and conditions on the website. He also believed that because the topics were on the agenda the APT representatives would have received a copy. However, Hess failed to call Sue Thompson, the person who did have actual knowledge of whether a sample Hess Purchase Order was actually distributed to APT. Id. pp. 45-46. Based on the testimony and evidence, it is not clear whether APT was provided the Purchase Orders with the terms and conditions at the May 23, 2007 meeting, which would have given APT knowledge of what the term “purchase order” in Schedule C was referring to.

The high standard set by New York law to incorporate an independent document by reference into a contract demands that knowledge of the document’s existence be *1330 mutual. The Court finds that the behavior and knowledge of the Parties prior to and through the course of formulating the contract fails to establish that the Hess Purchase Orders were identified beyond all reasonable doubt to APT. Thus, the Hess Purchase Orders are not incorporated by reference into the contract. Therefore, the arbitration clause contained on the Hess website is not a term of the contract, and for that reason it is not binding on APT.

C.

As an aside, the Court will address Hess’s reliance on certain New York case-law, including Liberty Management v. Fifth Avenue & Sixty-Sixth St. Corp., 208 A.D.2d 73, 620 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y.App.Div.1995), for its position that Schedule C’s reference to “purchase orders” was sufficient to incorporate the Purchase Orders by reference. In its briefs Hess cites several instances when New York courts have incorporated external documents into a contract by reference. However, each of those cases is distinguishable from the facts of this case. Specifically, in Liberty Management the parties did not have a written contract, and the court determined the existence and scope of the parties’ agreement on the basis of several communications sent between them. The documents that contained the arbitration clause were specifically referenced in those communications. The communications also referenced a specific trade document, an American Institute of Architects agreement (hereinafter “ALA agreement”), that the parties knew contained an arbitration clause, or were at least on notice of that fact. Id. at 76, 620 N.Y.S.2d 827 (noting that under either version of the agreement, the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate). Further, Liberty Management dealt with the construction industry, where there are specific practices, including arbitration, that govern relationships throughout the trade. Id. at 74-76, 620 N.Y.S.2d 827 (discussing the import and effect of the AIA contract in the trade).

The facts of Liberty Management are easily distinguishable from this case. Its holding does nothing to erode the clear standard that has been articulated by New York courts for when a document may be incorporated by reference: a document that is to be incorporated by reference must be “identified beyond all reasonable doubt.” Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1201.

LV. Hess’s Alternative Arguments

As noted above, Hess also argues in the alternative that the contract and the Hess Purchase Orders, complete with the arbitration clause, should be read as one document because they were the vehicle by which the Parties conducted business. Second, the contract and the Hess Purchase Order should be read together because they were executed at the same time and deal with the same subject and thus “may be read together to evidence a binding contract.” DE 12, p. 11. (quoting Weiner & Co. v. Teitelbaum, 107 A.D.2d 583, 583, 483 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y.App.Div.1985)). Third, Hess argues that the thirty-two Purchase Orders stand alone as thirty-two separately executed contracts between the Parties, and because all of the Parties’ claims and counterclaims are contemplated under the thirty-two Purchase Orders, then the arbitration clause would compel arbitration.

A.

Hess’s first argument is that the Purchase Orders were the vehicle through which the contract was executed, and therefore they must be read together. Hess does not refer the Court to any easelaw in New York or any other jurisdiction that supports this argument. And the cases Hess cites, Collins & Aikman Prod *1331 ucts Co. v. Building Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 23 (2d. Cir.1995) and Specht v. Netscape Commn’s, Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 36-38 (2d Cir.2002), do not stand for such a broad proposition. In Collins, the Second Circuit simply decided the scope of the arbitration clause in question. Collins, 58 F.3d at 18 (“The sole issue in the appeal is the scope of this clause.”). Further, Collins clearly set forth which claims fell under the arbitration agreement and which lay outside. The Specht opinion, in both its reasoning and holding, is likewise inapplicable; it dealt with whether certain claims touch matters covered by the arbitration agreement. Specht, 306 F.3d at 36. It did not address whether an ancillary document, in the instant action a purchase order, should be read together with the parties’ contract, when the ancillary document was not explicitly incorporated by reference. Nothing cited by Hess supports its position that the two documents should necessarily be read together because the Purchase Orders are the vehicle through which the contract was implemented.

There is one case from the Fourth Circuit adopting Hess’s argument, though it was applied to distinguishable facts. In JJ. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir.1988), the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the arbitration clause found in the parties’ distribution agreement was binding upon the parties’ claims involving separately executed documents: their purchase orders, security agreements, and compensation agreement. The court found that the ancillary contracts were the means by which the distribution agreements were implemented. Thus, the terms of one agreement flowed to the other.

The instant action would be the reverse, where the contract was silent on arbitration, and the Hess Purchase Order and its terms would be read back into the contract. However, nothing in Hess’s briefing on this matter or in the Court’s own review of New York law supports the New York Court of Appeals adopting the principles and reasoning found in JJ. Ryan & Sons. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,