Base Metal Trading SA v. Russian Aluminum

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a case about two Russian companies, Novokuznetsk Aluminum Zavod (“NKAZ”) and Kochkanarsky GOK (“GOK”), Russia’s largest producers of aluminum and vanadium, respectively. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from the defendants’ alleged illegal takeovers of these companies by means including bribery of local Russian political officials, judicial corruption in Russia, and armed force. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants drove NKAZ and GOK into bankruptcy and then gained control of the companies through sham bankruptcy proceedings overseen by allegedly corrupt local Russian judges. The plaintiffs seek over $3 billion for alleged damages. The defendants have now moved to dismiss the current Complaint on many bases, including forum non conve-niens.

The plaintiffs, Base Metal Trading, SA (“BMT SA”), Base Metal Trading, Ltd. (“BMT Ltd.”), Alucoal Holdings, Ltd. (“Alucoal”) (collectively the “BMT Plaintiffs”), MIKOM (collectively, with the BMT Plaintiffs the “NKAZ Plaintiffs” or the “Aluminum Plaintiffs”); Davis International, LLC (“Davis”), Holdex, LLC (“Hol-dex”), Foston Management, Ltd. (“Fo-ston”), Omni Trusthouse, Ltd. (“Omni”) (collectively the “Davis Plaintiffs”); Nexis Products, LLC (“Nexis”) and Polyprom (collectively the “GOK Plaintiffs”) bring this action for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., intentional interference with contract, and conversion. The defendants are Sibirsky Aluminum Group (“Sibirsky Russia”), Sibirsky Aluminum Products USA Corp. (“Sibirsky USA”), Bauxal Management, S.A. (“Bauxal”), Metcare Management, S.A. (“Met-care”), Unimetal Limited, S.A. (“Unime-tal”), Mr. Oleg Deripaska (“Deripaska”) (“collectively the “Sibirsky Defendants”), Russian Aluminum, RUAL Trade, Ltd. (“RUAL”), Mikhail Chernoi (“Chernoi”), Blonde Management, Inc. (“Blonde Management”), Blonde Investments, Corpora *684 tion (“Blonde Investments”), Pan-American Corporation (“Pan-American”), Arnold Kislin (“Kislin”), Iskander Makhmudov (“Makhmudov”), Moskovskiy Delovoi Mir Bank (“MDM Bank”), NKAZ, New Start Group Corporation (“New Start”), Venitom Corporation (“Venitom”), Unidale LLC (“Unidale”) and Investland, LLC (“Invest-land”) (New Start, Venitom, Unidale and Investland hereinafter the “GOK Defendants”).

The Sibirsky Defendants now move to dismiss on the basis of forum non conve-niens and all defendants join this motion. MDM Bank has also filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The Sibirsky Defendants move pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, as well as failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). All defendants join in this motion. Two motions to dismiss on the ground of comity have also been filed, one by NKAZ and the other by the GOK Defendants. All defendants join in these motions.

I.

On December 19, 2000, the BMT Plaintiffs — BMT SA, BMT Ltd. and Alucoal— filed suit in this Court alleging that defendant Deripaska, the head of Sibirsky Aluminum, and his partner, defendant Cher-noi, conspired with others to monopolize the Russian aluminum industry beginning in the 1990’s. (Original Compl. ¶ 1.) The Complaint alleged that Sibirsky, comprising Sibirsky Aluminum and its affiliates, including Russian Aluminum, took over NKAZ through rigged bankruptcy proceedings in the Kemerovo Region of Russia. (Original Compl. ¶ 5.) The Kemerovo Region is located in Western Siberia north of the border between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Once in control of NKAZ, Si-birsky terminated contracts between NKAZ and the BMT Plaintiffs and forced the BMT Plaintiffs to enter into less favorable contracts with Sibirsky affiliates. (Original Compl. ¶ 6.) None of the BMT Plaintiffs are United States citizens or residents. (Am.Compl.lffl 23, 25, 27.)

In May, 2001, all of the defendants filed motions to dismiss on a series of grounds, including forum non conveniens and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response, the BMT Plaintiffs amended the Complaint on August 3, 2001 to add seven new plaintiffs, including three United States corporations. 1 The Amended Complaint added twelve new defendants and a new scheme to take over GOK, in addition to NKAZ. The Amended Complaint alleges a:

massive racketeering scheme beginning in the 1990’s among, inter alia, the members of an international Russian-American organized crime group, headed by Mikhail Chernoi, and including business moguls Oleg Deripaska, the head of Sibirsky Aluminum, and Iskan-der Makhmudov, the then de facto head of MDM Bank, and the Izmailovo Russian-Ameriean mafia group to take over and monopolize the Russian aluminum and other metals industries (the “Illegal scheme”).

(Am.Compl^ 1.) The plaintiffs claim Cher-noi, Deripaska, and Makhmudov (“the Conspirators”), as well as their allies and *685 the companies they control, directly or indirectly committed numerous criminal acts including physical violence, mail and wire fraud, and money laundering in the United States in furtherance of the illegal scheme. (Am.Compl.¶ 2-4.)

The’Amended Complaint comprises two primary parts. First, the BMT Plaintiffs and one new party, MIKOM, reallege that the Conspirators took over NKAZ in 2000 by using rigged bankruptcy proceedings. 2 (Am.Compl.¶¶ 5-6.) Second, the remainder of the new plaintiffs bring new claims for the alleged illegal takeover of GOK through physical force, bribery, and extortion. 3 (Am.Compl^ 5.)

Changes to one section of the Original Complaint exemplify the way in which the plaintiffs try to meld the new claims into the old to form one coherent scheme. The Original Complaint included a section entitled “The Aluminum Wars” that traced the history of an alleged series of “wars” to control the Russian aluminum industry precipitated by its privatization in the 1990s. (Original Complaint ¶¶ 68-71.) The BMT Plaintiffs alleged that during this period and continuing to the present, Deripaska and Chernoi conspired together to take over the Russian aluminum industry, including NKAZ. (Original Compl. ¶ 71.) These allegations have been newly styled in the Amended Complaint as the history of “The Metal Wars.” The sole changes to the Original Complaint are added references to the vanadium industry and other metal industries that are tacked on to the text of the Original Complaint. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 122-24.) Additionally, Chernoi and Deripaska are now alleged to have been joined by defendant Makhmu-dov in conspiring to control the Russian metals industry, including NKAZ and GOK. (Am.CompU 124.)

(A)

The Amended Complaint first tells the story of the defendants’ alleged illegal takeover of the Russian aluminum industry, particularly with respect to NKAZ. The first steps in this scheme allegedly included takeovers of three other Russian aluminum companies: Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Zavod (“KRAZ”), Sayansk Aluminum Zavod (“SAZ”), and Bratsk Aluminum Zavod (“BRAZ”). (Am.Compl.¶¶ 123, 125-47.) The Conspirators allegedly effected the takeovers through various illegal means, including redirecting the shipment of finished aluminum from the factories, the murder of numerous rivals in association with the Izmailovo Mafia, the filing of false criminal charges against an official of KRAZ, rigged Russian court proceedings and economic extortion. (Am. Compl.¶¶ 130, 136, 138, 140, 142, 145.)

Beginning in late 1994 or early 1995, plaintiff MIKOM, under its president Mikhail Zhivilo (“Zhivilo”), entered into a con *686 tract to manage NKAZ. (Am.Compl.ff 12, 30, 148.) MIKOM then solicited Western trading partners such as BMT Ltd. to extend loans to NKAZ and to trade with the company. (Am.Compl.f 149.) At that time, NKAZ purchased approximately 70% of its alumina, a raw material necessary to produce aluminum, from the Pavlodarsky Aluminum Zavod (“PAZ”). (Am. Compl.f 150.) At about the same time, the plaintiffs allege, Chernoi and his allies gained control of PAZ and threatened to stop shipments of alumina to NKAZ unless NKAZ gave them 50% of its aluminum sales profits and 50% of the shares in NKAZ. (Am.Compl.f 151.) Chernoi later manipulated NKAZ into buying all of its alumina from PAZ at a premium. (Am. Compl.f 152.)

In August 1995, Zhivilo informed Cher-noi that NKAZ and BMT Ltd. would no longer trade with PAZ. (Am.Compl.f 161.) The plaintiffs allege that shortly thereafter, Deripaska and Chernoi made direct and indirect threats on Zhivilo’s life that were followed by an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him. One of the threats was allegedly made to Yuri Zhivilo, Mikhail Zhivilo’s brother, in Chicago, Illinois in 1995. (Am.Comp.ff 165-66.) Other threats were allegedly made directly to Mikhail Zhivilo in Tel Aviv, Israel and in Paris, France. (Am.Comp.ff 165-70, 189.) In response to the threats, BMT Ltd., NKAZ, and Alucoal allegedly paid millions of dollars in protection money to the Conspirators between April, 1996 and October, 1999. (Am.Compl.ff 172-74.) The payments were allegedly made through several New York banks and the funds were eventually laundered through various entities including defendants Pan-American and Blonde Management. (Am. Compl.ff 173-176.)

In or about 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed Aman Tuleyev (“Tu-leyev”) as Kemerovo Regional Governor. (Am.Compl.f 186.) The next year Tuleyev allegedly began demanding that Zhivilo pay bribes from NKAZ, MIKOM, BMT Ltd. and BMT SA. (Am.Compl.f 187.) Tu-leyev threatened that failure to pay would result in the transfer of NKAZ to the Conspirators. (Am.Compl.f 188.)

In 1999, the Conspirators and Tuleyev allegedly joined together to take over NKAZ illegally with the assistance of the local energy provider, Kuzbass. (Am. Complff 177,193-94.) The essence of the takeover scheme was for Kuzbass to “assert false tariff claims [against NKAZ], file suit upon them, and obtain a sham judgment against NKAZ, with the active assistance of Tuleyev, using the corrupt Russian regional court system.” 4 (Am. CompLf 199.) This would allow the Conspirators to force NKAZ into an involuntary bankruptcy after which the Conspirators could place their own agents in control of the company. (Am.Compl.f 202.) The Conspirators would then cancel NKAZ’s trading contracts with the BMT Plaintiffs as well as the management contract with *687 MIKOM and replace those companies with affiliates of the Conspirators. (Am. ComplA 201.) The Conspirators would profit from the scheme by supplying raw materials to NKAZ and then trading in the finished aluminum, while Kuzbass would receive higher energy payments for its participation in the takeover. (Am. Comply 200.) For his role in the takeover, Tuleyev allegedly received $3 million between 1999 and 2000 paid at least in part with funds wired by Pan-American, Blonde Management, and Blonde Investments through American banks at Kislin’s instruction. (Am.Compl.1ffl 196-98, 455, 459.)

The plaintiffs allege that the illegal scheme unfolded as follows. Beginning in late 1994, NKAZ contracted with Kuzbass to supply energy at agreed upon rates. (Am.CompLIIt 204-06.) In an action filed on November 12, 1997 in the Kemerovo Arbitrazh Court, Kuzbass repudiated its agreements with NKAZ in response to which NKAZ filed a counter suit. (Am. Compilé 208-15.) As a result of the dispute, the Kemerovo Arbitrazh court ultimately awarded Kuzbass a judgment of approximately $26.3 million on October 21, 1999. (Am.Compl^ 216.) The plaintiffs contend that Tuleyev influenced the arbi-trazh court to obtain this result. (Am. ComplJ 216.) NKAZ unsuccessfully appealed the award to the appellate branch of the Kemerovo Arbitrazh Court which was “also apparently under the influence of Tuleyev” and which entered a final judgment upholding the award on December 24, 1999. (Am.Compl.1ffl 217-18.) NKAZ then appealed the award to the West Siberian Circuit Federal Arbitrazh Court in Tyumen. (Am.Compl^ 219.) The court stayed the execution of the award on or about January 19, 2000 pending consideration of the appeal. (Am. ComplA 220.)

Despite the stay, Kuzbass prevailed on an ex parte petition to the Kemerovo Arbi-trazh Court for an order declaring NKAZ bankrupt, appointing Sergey A. Chernysh-ev (“Chernyshev”) as Provisional Manager, and imposing allegedly unnecessary conservatory measures on the company. (Am.Compl^ 222-24, 227-230.) The plaintiffs claim that the bankruptcy order constituted a clear violation of Russian law which requires an executable judgment of a creditor in order to place a business into involuntary bankruptcy. (Am. Compl.ira 221, 225.) Moreover, the plaintiffs claim that NKAZ was never bankrupt. (Am.ComplA 226.)

The plaintiffs contend that Chernyshev proceeded to issue a series of unreasonable information requests on MIKOM and used MIKOM’s failure to satisfy the requests promptly as a basis for his petition to remove the company as NKAZ’s manager. 5 (Am.Compl.1ffl 231-236.) Kuzbass also petitioned the arbitrazh court to remove MI-KOM using information supplied by Cher-nyshev from his investigation. The gist of the information was that MIKOM was hiding money that should have been used to pay current debts. (Am.Compl.Ilt 237-38.) In an allegedly unusual step, the local Kemerovo procurator filed a separate petition for bankruptcy against NKAZ at the behest of Tuleyev. (Am.Compl.1ffl 239-41.) The plaintiffs claim that the procurator did so “to signal to the Kemerovo court that the local political authorities supported Chernyshev’s position and Kuzbass’ petition.” (Am.ComplA 239.) At an alleged sham hearing on February 16 and 17, 2000 the arbitrazh court summarily granted the motions for MIKOM’s removal and Cher- *688 nyshev’s appointment. (Am.Compl.1flI 245, 252-57.) The plaintiffs claim that the BMT Plaintiffs, NKAZ, and MIKOM were denied important procedural rights at the hearing, including the full opportunity to present evidence and to properly cross-examine witnesses, as well as timely access to an interpreter. (Am.Compl.lffl 252-56, 258-59.)

Once installed as Acting Manager, Cher-nyshev instructed NKAZ’s attorneys to cease to pursue the actions preceding the award and to withdraw prosecution of NKAZ’s claims against Kuzbass. (Am. Compile 261-64.) Chernyshev proceeded to recognize a series of allegedly fictitious claims against NKAZ by companies controlled by the Conspirators totaling approximately $70 million. (Am. CompLIffl 265-67.) Recognition of the false creditors provided the Conspirators with voting power at subsequent creditor meetings where control of the agenda was proportional to the sums due to each creditor. (Am.Compl.f 268.) At the same time, Chernyshev allegedly refused to recognize valid claims asserted by BMT Ltd. and Alucoal worth approximately $60 million. (Am.CompU 269.) These maneuvers altered the balance of power at future creditor meetings because prior to the allegedly illegal takeover the BMT Plaintiffs allegedly held the majority of NKAZ’s debt. (Am.ComplA 270.)

At the first creditors’ meeting, the new creditors voted to place NKAZ under external management and to appoint Cher-nyshev to the position of External Manager. (Am.Compl^ 272.) The Kemerovo Arbitrazh Court confirmed the appointment on March 20, 2000, enabling Cher-nyshev to cancel NKAZ’s contracts with the BMT Plaintiffs for the supply of raw materials and subsequent purchase of finished aluminum. (Am.Compl.lffl 272-76.) Chernyshev then entered into substitute purchase and supply contracts with companies controlled by the Conspirators. (Am. Compl.lHl 276-290.)

While not referred to in the Amended Complaint, BMT SA, supported by MI-KOM, sought review of the Arbitrazh Court’s March 20, 2000 decision in the West Siberian Circuit Federal Arbitrazh Court. The Circuit Court rejected all of the grounds for appeal finding, among other things, that NKAZ was insolvent. (Declaration of Paul B. Stephan III (“Stephan”) dated Jan. 28, 2002 (“Stephan 2002 DecI.”) ¶ 29; Decree of the Federal Arbitration Court of the West Siberian District dated July 3, 2000 (“West Siberian District July 3, 2000 Decree”) attached as Ex. 112 to Second Declaration of Sergei Chernysh-ev dated Jan. 27, 2002 (“Chernyshev Decl.”).)

The Conspirators allegedly reached a subsequent agreement with an unnamed powerful Russian oligarch to form Russian Aluminum, thus establishing a monopoly over the Russian aluminum industry. (Am.Compl^ 305.) This partnership freed the Conspirators from their need to partner with Kuzbass, and Chernyshev subsequently attempted to remove Kuzbass from NKAZ’s list of outstanding creditors. (Am.Compl.1ffl 306-10.) Tying up further loose ends, Tuleyev accused Zhivilo of conspiring to have him murdered. (Am. ComplA 302.) As a result, allegedly false charges were filed against Zhivilo before he sought asylum in France in February 2001. (Am.Compl.lffl 302-04.)

In or about August 2000, the Conspirators secured total control of NKAZ by allegedly forcing its shareholders to sell their stock at distressed prices to four unspecified companies controlled by the Conspirators. (Am.Compl.lffl 312-13.) At a final creditors’ meeting on March 6, 2001, through the votes of the allegedly false creditors recognized by Chernyshev, the Conspirators won approval of a bank *689 ruptcy settlement. (Am.Compl^ 315.) The settlement was allegedly highly prejudicial to NKAZ’s legitimate creditors, including the BMT Plaintiffs. (Am. Comply 316.) The Kemerovo Arbitrazh Court approved the allegedly sham settlement on April 3, 2001. (Am.Compl^ 317.) Again, while not referred to in the Amended Complaint, BMT SA and others appealed the April 3, 2001 decision of the Kemerovo Arbitrazh Court to the West Siberian Circuit Federal Arbitrazh Court. On September 6, 2001, a panel of three judges, different from those who heard the previous appeal, approved the settlement agreement terminating the bankruptcy. (Stephan 2002 Decl. ¶ 30; Resolution of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Western-Siberian Circuit dated Sept. 6, 2001 (“West Siberian Circuit Sept. 6, 2001 Resolution”) attached as Ex. 133 to Chernyshev Deck)

The Conspirators allegedly remain in control of NKAZ today and use the sales and purchasing power of the company to benefit their affiliates, including defendants Metcare, RUAL, Bauxal and Unime-tal. (Am.Compl^ 321.) The plaintiffs claim that the Conspirators also siphon profits from the company while failing to pay the legitimate debts owed to the NKAZ Plaintiffs. (Am.Compl^ 322.)

(B)

The Amended Complaint contains a new series of claims not present in the Original Complaint and in which the BMT Plaintiffs play no part. The claims involve a conspiracy to take over GOK, “Russia’s largest vanadium ore mining factory.” (Comply 5.) GOK is located in the Sverd-losk Oblast which is situated on the east side of the Ural Mountains north of central Kazakhstan. Six new plaintiffs bring these allegations: Davis, Holdex, Foston and Omni (collectively the “Davis Plaintiffs”), as well as Nexis and Polyprom (collectively the “GOK Plaintiffs”). These allegations can be divided into two parts. First, the Davis Plaintiffs allege the fraudulent transfer of their shares in GOK which collectively totaled over 70% of the company. (Am.Compl.1ffl 32-36.) Second, the GOK Plaintiffs allegedly maintained contracts and loan agreements with GOK that GOK then breached. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-39.)

The plaintiffs’ narrative of the events involving GOK similarly begins with claims of extortion and threats of violence. In December 1998, Jalol Khaidarov (“Khaida-rov”) became general director of GOK after having worked as a financial advisor for Chernoi and Makhmudov. (Am. Comply 341.) In April 1999, Khaidarov allegedly met twice with his former employers in Paris to discuss GOK. (Am. Comply 342.) At the second meeting, Chernoi allegedly instructed Khaidarov to convince GOK’s shareholders to transfer their shares to Chernoi and Makhmudov and reminded Khaidarov that, “Some people refuse my offers. But for the rest of their lives, they wear bullet proof jackets.” (Am.Compl^ 343.)

In response to ongoing threats, GOK’s controlling shareholders agreed preliminarily to sell 20% of their shares to a company controlled by the Conspirators. (Am.Compl^ 344.) Makhmudov and Cher-noi made a $5 million down payment on the shares with money allegedly wired through an unnamed United States bank. (Am. Comply 345.) However, Makhmudov and Chernoi were soon unsatisfied and demanded that Khaidarov arrange for the transfer of additional shares. (Am. Compkt 346.) Believing that the two men would never be satisfied, the shareholders returned the $5 million and cancelled the transfer. (Am.Compl^ 347.)

Similar to -the allegations concerning the NKAZ takeover, the plaintiffs allege that the Conspirators bribed the local Governor to aid in their scheme. (Am. *690 CompLM 352-55.) Eduard Roussel (“Roussel”), Governor of the Sverdlovsk Oblast as of 1999, was allegedly paid for “protection” and “help” in support of the Conspirators’ efforts to do business in the region. (Am.Compl.U 352-53, 355.) Ma-khmudov and Chernoi allegedly paid Rous-sel “more than $850,000 in bribes ... so that Roussel would allow them to use the police to take over GOK and would exercise his influence over the corrupt Sverdlovsk judiciary.” (Am.ComplJ 458.) These “payments were made by Pan-Anerican and Blonde Management through banks in the United States to MDM Bank for conversions into cash for payment at the direction of Roussel.” (Am.ComplJ 354.)

On or about January 28, 2000, with the support of regional authorities, Makhmu-dov and Chernoi allegedly sent a group of armed thugs to take over GOK physically. (Am.ComplJ 356.) The Conspirators then used bribes and threats of physical force to convince four members of GOK’s Board of Directors to vote to remove Khaidarov as general director and to replace him with Andrey Kozitsin (“Kozitsin”), an alleged agent of the Conspirators. (Am. ComplJ 357.) This vote allegedly violated GOK’s charter which required five votes in order to remove the general director. (Am.ComplJ 357.) The Complaint alleges that the three remaining board members asked prosecutors in the Kachkanar and Sverdlovsk areas to initiate criminal proceedings in connection with the GOK takeover. (Am.ComplJ 358.) However, the Kachkanar City Court upheld the Board’s vote in a decision dated February 1, 2000. (Ruling of the Kachkanar City Court dated Feb. 1, 2000 attached as Ex. 41 to Declarations of Oleg S. Kozyrev (“Kozyrev”) (no date) and Samir Kapoura (“Kapoura”) (no date) (“Kozyrev/Kapoura Decís.”).)

To thwart any further efforts by GOK shareholders to reacquire control of the company, the Conspirators and MDM Bank allegedly arranged for GOK to incur massive false debts in February 2000. (Am.Compl.U 371-86.) By the end of this brief period, a series of sham transactions left a small company named Leybout in possession of approximately $39 million in demand promissory notes issued by GOK. (Am.Compl.U 373-86.) The Conspirators then caused Krasnouralskmezhraigaz (“Kras Gas”), a local natural gas company in the Sverdlovsk Region, to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against GOK on March 24, 2000. (Am.ComplJ 387.) Although the plaintiffs claim that the petition should not have been granted under Russian law because Kras Gas’ receivables were not overdue, the Sverdlovsk Arbi-trazh Court did just that and appointed Oleg Kozyrev (“Kozyrev”) Provisional Manager of GOK on March 30, 2000. (Am.CompLU 388-89.) After he was appointed Provisional Manager, Kozyrev refused to recognize what the plaintiffs contend was a $7 million valid claim by Nexis arising from a “certain” loan agreement with GOK. (Am.ComplJ 390.)

At the time of the GOK creditors’ initial meeting, Leybout’s allegedly fraudulent claims left that company with 94% of the creditor votes. (Am.ComplJ 391.) At the meeting the creditors nominated Kozyrev as External Manager. (Am.ComplJ 392.) On March 30, 2000, the Sverdlovsk Arbi-trazh Court approved Kozyrev’s appointment, having been signaled allegedly to do so by Roussel’s Sverdlovsk Oblast government. (Am.ComplJ 392-94.)

What came next, according to the Davis Plaintiffs, was a series of fraudulent transfers of their shares in GOK, often through defendant New Start, and ultimately to defendants Venitom, Unidale, and Invest-land. (Am.Compl.U 397-423.) The plaintiffs claim that these four companies are owned and controlled by the Conspirators. *691 (Am.Compl.1 431.) Defendant Kislin allegedly arranged for the incorporation of the companies, a process paid for with funds from Blonde Management or Pan-American. (Am.Compl.ll 433-34.)

The first step in the fraudulent transfers was allegedly to install VRK Company, a company “friendly” to the Conspirators, as GOK’s registrar of shares. (Am. Compl.l 397.) VRK Company then improperly “registered a transfer of about 35 million shares of GOK from Davis to New Start ...” while disguising the transfer as a legitimate sale. (Am.Compl.ll 399-^402.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the “Davis [s]hares, in whole or in part, are currently registered in the name of Invest-land, Unidale, and/or Venitom, having been transferred to them by New Start.” (Am. Comp.l 403.)

Omni’s shares in GOK, allegedly purchased from “various entities who had acquired the shares as a result of a judicial sale that occurred in September 1998,” were transferred as the result of a lawsuit filed in the Chelyabinsk Arbitrazh Court in the spring of 2000 to set aside the judicial sale. (Am.Compl.ll 404-06.) The Chelyabinsk Oblast, in which the Chelyabinsk Arbitrazh Court is located, is situated south of the Sverdlosk Oblast and just north of Kazakhstan. In October 2000, the Appellate Instance for the Arbitrazh Court for the Chelyabinsk Region affirmed the lower court’s decision setting aside the judgment and ordered that the stock be re-registered to Omni’s detriment. (Am. Comply 407.) The plaintiffs contend that “[cjontrary to Russian law, Omni was never notified of or participated in these proceedings and did not learn of the transfer until two months after it took place.” (Am.Compl.1409.) While the Complaint does not mention the fact, the October 2000 decision of the Appellate Instance for the Arbitrazh Court for the Chelyabinsk Region was affirmed by the Arbitrazh Court for the Urals Circuit on December 4, 2001. (Ruling by the Urals Circuit Federal Arbitrazh Court dated Dec. 4, 2001 attached as Ex. 85 to Kozyrev/Kapoura Decís.) Omni’s shares in GOK are alleged to be registered currently, in whole or in part, in the name of Investland, Unidale, and/or Venitom. (Am.Compl.1 410.)

In 2000, three Russian plaintiffs sued Foston in the Solntsevo Intermunicipal Court in Moscow for a declaration requiring Foston to transfer its shares in GOK. (Am.Compl.1411.) Foston allegedly received no notice of the suit and instead a forged power of attorney was submitted to the court on the company’s behalf. (Am. Comply 412.) On September 29, 2000 the Intermunicipal Court ordered the unopposed transfer of 1.2 million GOK shares to three companies. (Am.Compl.l 413.) The Amended Complaint never identifies these companies except to say that they are owned and controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Conspirators. (Am. Compl.1 413.) Foston allegedly did not know of the proceedings or of the transfer until October 31, 2000 and subsequently won a reversal of the decision in the Moscow City Court. (Am.Compl.ll 414-15.) However, the plaintiffs claim that Foston no longer has control of its shares as a result of the Intermunicipal Court’s original decision, and they are instead in the possession of Investland, Unidale, and/or Venitom. (Am.ComplJ 416.)

Finally, the Amended Complaint alleges that in 2000, at the direction of the Conspirators, GOK filed suit in the Kalmykia Arbitrazh Court against Polyprom seeking a declaration that GOK’s original sale of shares to Polyprom was invalid. (Am. Compl.li 417, 423.) Kalmykia is located in the southwestern part of Russia bordering the Caspian Sea. Polyprom had sold the shares obtained from GOK to Holdex. (Am.Compl.1417.) The arbitrazh court *692 ruled in favor of GOK on November 22, 2000 and ordered that the GOK shares then owned by Holdex be re-registered to an unnamed Russian company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 418.) The plaintiffs contend that the arbitrazh court’s decision was based on a forged contract purported to have been signed by GOK and Polyprom in January 1999. (Am. Compl. ¶ 418.) The plaintiffs claim that, in violation of Russian law, neither Holdex nor Polyprom was notified of the proceedings and that neither learned of the re-registration until months after the November 2000 order. (Am.ComplJ 419.) On April 17, 2001 the Federal Arbitrazh Court for the Caucasus Circuit, which is located in Krasnodar, reversed the decision of the Kalmykia Arbi-trazh Court and remanded the case for further fact finding. (Resolution of the North Caucasus Circuit Federal Arbitrazh Court attached as Ex. 79 to Kozyrev/Ka-poura Decís.) The plaintiffs claim that Holdex and Polyprom did not receive notice of the subsequent hearing before the Kalmykia Arbitrazh Court. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 421-22.) Holdex’s shares in GOK are alleged to have been transferred to Investland, Unidale, and/or Venitom. (Am.ComplA 423.)

Once the transfer of shares was complete, the plaintiffs claim, the Conspirators had no use for further bankruptcy proceedings. (Am.ComplA 424.) GOK thus entered into a sham settlement agreement with its creditors. (Am.Compl^ 424.) The settlement was allegedly structured so as to make the debt owed to legitimate creditors worthless while transferring control of GOK to the new shareholders— New Start, Venitom, Unidale and/or In-vestland. (Compl. ¶¶ 428-30.)

While not discussed in the Amended Complaint, the settlement of the GOK bankruptcy was approved by the Arbitrazh Court for the Sverdlosk Oblast on April 19, 2001, despite the objection of Nexis, and that decision was affirmed on June 27, 2001 by the Appellate Instance of the Ar-bitrazh Court for the Sverdlovsk Oblast. (Determination of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Arbitrazh Court dated Apr. 19, 2001 attached as Ex. 3 to Kozyrev/Kapoura Decís.; Determination of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Arbitrazh Court dated June 27, 2001 attached as Ex. 21 to Kozyrev/Ka-poura Decís.) That decision was affirmed in turn by the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Urals Circuit on August 21, 2001. (Determination of the Federal Arbitrazh Court for the Urals Circuit dated Aug. 21, 2001 (“Urals Circuit Aug. 21 2001 Determination”) attached as Ex. 22 to Kozyrev/Ka-poura Decís.)

II.

The defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 6 “[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens contemplates the dismissal of lawsuits *693 brought by plaintiffs in their favored forum in favor of adjudication in a foreign court.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir.2000). Pursuant to the recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, resolution of a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens requires a three step analysis: first, determination of the degree of deference to be afforded to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum; second, analysis of whether an adequate alternative forum exists; and third, consideration of the private and public factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73-74 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc). Each step is discussed below.

(A)

As an initial matter, the Court must determine the degree of deference that should be afforded to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum in this case. See Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 70-73; accord Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz Of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d Cir.2002); DiRienzo v. Philip Services Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir.2002); Varnelo v. Eastwind Transport, Ltd., No. 02 Civ.2084, 2003 WL 230741, at *6 & n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.3, 2003). In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court instructed that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the Supreme Court’s instruction to mean that “a court reviewing a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens should begin with the assumption that the plaintiffs choice of forum will stand unless the defendant meets the burden of demonstrating” the factors discussed below. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 71.

"While any plaintiff's selection of a forum is entitled to deference, that deference increases as the plaintiffs ties to the forum increase.” Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 101 (collecting cases). Accordingly, “[w]here a foreign plaintiff is concerned ... its choice of forum is entitled to less deference.” Varnelo, 2003 WL 230741, at *7 (quoting Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290 (2d Cir.1996)). This is not due to any prejudice against foreign plaintiffs, but because courts defer to a plaintiffs choice of the home forum “because [the home forum] is presumed to be convenient. In contrast, when a foreign plaintiff chooses a U.S. forum, it is ‘much less reasonable’ to presume that the choice was made for convenience.” Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 71 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981)); see also Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 102; Varnelo, 2003 WL 230741, at *7-8.

In Iragorri, the Court of Appeals clarified the degree of deference that courts should afford to a United States resident’s choice of forum when that plaintiff files suit in a district other than the one in which the plaintiff resides. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 71. The Court of Appeals sought guidance from two types of the Supreme Court’s prior forum non conveniens cases, those involving a plaintiff who sued in a home forum, and those cases in which a foreign plaintiff brought suit in the United States. Id. at 71-72. Based on those precedents, the Court of Appeals concluded that:

The more it appears that a domestic or foreign plaintiffs choice of forum has been dictated by reasons that the law recognizes as valid, the greater the deference that will be given to the plaintiffs forum choice. Stated differently, the greater the plaintiffs or the lawsuit’s bona fide connection to the United States and to the forum of choice and the more it appears that considerations of convenience favor the conduct of the *694 lawsuit in the United States, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to gain dismissal for forum non conve-niens .... On the other hand, the more it appears that the plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum was motivated by forum-shopping reasons ... the less deference the plaintiffs choice commands....

Id. at 71-72.

Little deference should be given to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum in this case. As this litigation was originally brought, not one plaintiff was a citizen or resident of the United States. BMT SA is a Swiss company, BMT Ltd. is organized under the laws of Guernsey, Channel Islands, and Alucoal is organized under the laws of Cyprus. 7 (Am.Compl.1ffl 23, 25, 27.) After the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the BMT Plaintiffs added a Russian plaintiff to the NKAZ claims, MIKOM. (Am. Comply 29.) The plaintiffs also brought in six other new plaintiffs to assert separate claims arising from the GOK bankruptcy. 8 The new plaintiffs included Foston, another company organized under the laws of Cyprus; another Russian company, Poly-prom; Omni, an English company; and three corporations organized under the *695 laws of Virginia, Texas, and Utah, respectively, namely Davis, Holdex and Nexis. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 32-35, 37-38.) 9

With regard to plaintiffs Davis’, Holdex’, and Nexis’ connections with the United States, the Amended Complaint states only that the companies are organized under the laws of West Virginia, Texas, and Utah, respectively (Am.Compl.ff 32-33, 37.) The record contains no evidence that any of the companies maintain offices in New York. This is a fact that Iragorn instructs is not dispositive but that the Court may consider in assessing the relative convenience of bringing this case in this district.

The defendants allege that Davis, Hol-dex, and Nexis are mere shell companies whose choice of forum should be afforded little deference. In view of the scant information in the record about the American plaintiffs’ ties to the United States, the Court asked plaintiffs’ counsel to submit affidavits as to the identity of the three companies’ officers, directors, and shareholders, including their citizenship, the location of the companies’ offices, and the precise nature of their operations in the United States. (Tr. 65-66.) Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to supplement the record and subsequently filed a second declaration by Joseph Traum (“Traum”), the managing director of Davis and beneficial owner of Nexis. (Declaration of Joseph Traum dated Sept. 14, 2002 (“First Traum Deck”) ¶ 1; Second Declaration of Joseph Traum dated Feb. 19, 2003 (“Second Traum Deck”) ¶ 33.) The submission is telling for how little information it provides about the American plaintiffs.

Traum informs the Court that Davis was organized under the laws of West Virginia in December 1998 by two offshore corporate service companies that served as “nominee members” solely for organizational services. (Second Traum Deck ¶¶ 4-5.) Traum asserts that the use of nominee registration to form the company “is common in doing business in Russia in order to maintain the confidentiality of the identity of the beneficial owners for reasons of personal safety.” (Second Traum Deck ¶ 6.) Davis now has two “members”, a term Traum does not define, one being Traum himself. (Second Traum Deck ¶ 12.) While Traum tells the Court that “[n]one of the members or officers of Davis are Russian citizens,” he identifies only one “member” and one officer by name besides himself, Sara Ofen (“Ofen”) and Isaac Savion (“Savion”). (Second Traum Deck ¶¶ 12, 14, 16.) Traum identifies himself as “an international businessman and native citizen of Israel.” (Second Traum Deck ¶ 2.) He advises that he has lived two years in the United States but it is not clear when that was. (Second Traum Deck ¶3.) Ofen and Savion are allegedly United States citizens but neither’s place of residence is revealed. (Second Traum Deck ¶¶ 12, 14.) Nor have either of them submitted an affidavit to the Court with further information about themselves or their roles at Davis. The only other information that Traum provides about Davis’s operations, besides its registered address *696 in Charleston, West Virginia, is that “Davis was organized for the purpose of serving as a holding company to own various investments, including the shares in [GOK] that are at issue in this case.” (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.)

The second American plaintiff, Holdex, was also organized by two nominee members under the laws of Texas in September 1999 for the “purpose of serving as a holding company to own various investments, including shares of Kachkanarsky GOK.” (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶ 21, 24.) The beneficial owners of Holdex are both citizens of Israel. (Second Traum Decl. ¶ 27). Traum provides no other information linking Holdex to the United States besides a registered address in Austin, Texas. (Second Traum Decl. ¶ 23.)

Finally, Nexis is a company organized under the laws of-Utah in October 1996 for the purposes of “serving as an operating company for various investments, including more than U.S. $13 million for trade financing with Kachkanarsky GOK and more than U.S. $ 4.5 million in investments in trade with a fertilizer plant in Kazakhstan.” (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶ 30, 34.) Traum is the beneficial owner of Nexis, and the only other individual identified in association with the company is Isaac Sa-vion, who serves as an officer in the company but whose exact title is not specified. (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶33, 40.) Traum claims that Nexis planned to open an electronics refurbishing center in San Diego, California. (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Not only has this not happened, but the e-commerce business that Nexis intended to establish in Canada to “compliment” the San Diego work has yet to come to fruition. (Second Traum Decl. ¶¶ 35-36.) No other ties to the United States are disclosed except for a registered address in Midale, Utah. (Second Traum Decl. ¶ 32.)

Traum’s Second Declaration is the plaintiffs’ sole submission provided to answer the Court’s questions about the American plaintiffs’ ties to the United States. It provides no bona fide reason for the plaintiffs to have sued in this Court. The declaration does not tell the Court why it would be more convenient for the parties to litigate this case here rather than in Russia. Nor does the declaration effectively counter the defendants’ allegation that Davis, Holdex, and Nexis are nothing more than shell corporations whose choice of forum deserves little deference.

To the extent that the plaintiffs rely simply on the status of three of the ten plaintiffs as United States corporate citizens as the basis for bringing suit in New York, this strategy is without merit. These three plaintiffs appear to be nothing more than holding companies for shares of GOK and possibly other stocks. “[W]here an American plaintiff chooses to invest in a foreign country and then complains of fraudulent acts occurring primarily in that country, the plaintiffs ability to rely upon citizenship as a talisman against forum non conveniens dismissal is diminished.” Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 801 F.Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d, 990 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam). Cf. Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir.2000) (“This is not a case where the plaintiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign courts.”).

The record before the Court points to nothing but forum shopping by the plaintiffs. All of the NKAZ Plaintiffs are foreign citizens whose complaints arise out of activities in connection with business that was transacted in Russia. All of the GOK plaintiffs are also complaining about activities that arise from the conduct of business in Russia. The contracts that are at issue in this case demonstrate that the plaintiffs *697 should not have expected that any of their disputes would be litigated in the United States. This makes sense in view of the fact that the contracts were for services to be performed in Russia. For example, the management contract (and subsequent