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Sunsirae TUNSTALL, a minor, by and through her mother, Tanya TUNSTALL; Phillip Krist, a minor, by and through his grandmother and legal guardian, Frances Krist; Jeffery Coats, a minor by and through his mother, Terry Walker; Minh Thach, a minor, by and through his mother, Sopinh Thach; Jimi Hamilton; Darick Arndt; Dale Barr; and Daniel Lozano, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
v.
Teresa BERGESON, Superintendent of Public Instruction; and Joseph Lehman, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, and
Shelton School District No. 309; Peninsula School District No. 401; Cheney School District No. 360; Cape Flattery School District No. 401; Steilacoom Historical School District No. 1; Walla Walla School District No. 140; Monroe School District No. 103; and Their predecessors, successors, and assigns, Cross-Respondents.
Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
*694 Andrea Devine Orth of Garvey, Schubert & Barer, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington; Arc of Washington State; The Children's alliance; The Juvenile Law Center; People First of Washington; The Sentencing Project; TeamChild; Washington Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities; Washington State Catholic Conference; Washington State Special Education Coalition; The Faculty of Western Washington University's Woodring College of Education, Department of Special Education; The Youth Law Center; Osa Coffey, Ph.D.; Barry Krisberg, Ph. D.; Peter E. Leone, Ph.D.; Robert B. Rutherford Jr., Ph.D.
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Lisa Leann Sutton, Asst., Heather Klein, Asst., Thomas Young, Asst., Olympia, for Appellants.
Columbia Legal Services, Patricia J. Arthur, Seattle, David C. Fathi, Washington, DC, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, Patricia H. Wagner, Angela M. Niemann, Seattle, Vandeberg, Johnson & Gandara, William A. Coats, Tacoma, Michael A. Patterson, Philip B. Greenan, Karen Adell Kalzer, Seattle, for Respondents. *692
*693 IRELAND, J.
This case comes to the court on direct review from the trial court's summary judgment rulings. Plaintiffs (hereinafter "inmates"), a class of persons incarcerated in Washington State prisons who are either under 21 years of age, or disabled and under 22 years of age, brought suit concerning their right to education against Teresa Bergeson, the Washington State's Superintendent of Public Instruction, Joseph Lehman, the Secretary of Washington's Department of Corrections (together and hereinafter referred to as the "State"), and the school districts in which the prisons are located.
We hold that individuals under age 18 incarcerated in adult Washington State Department of Correction (DOC) facilities have a constitutional right to public education and that their constitutional right is satisfied by chapter 28A.193 RCW. We also hold, however, that individuals over age 18 incarcerated in DOC facilities do not have a statutory or constitutional right to public education. Furthermore, we hold that the State is not *695 required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1436, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), to provide special education services to DOC inmates between 18 and 22 years of age. Finally, we hold that the school districts may contract to provide educational services to individuals over age 18 incarcerated in DOC facilities, but are not statutorily or constitutionally obligated to do so. We reserve the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to special education for those between 18 and 22 until we have a case where the record and briefing are adequately developed.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Stipulated Facts
As of April 1998, there were approximately 100 offenders under the age of 18 and 1,027 offenders under the age of 21 incarcerated in DOC facilities.[1] The number of juvenile inmates under the age of 18 is expected to rise during the next several years due to the new mandatory declination provisions passed by the Legislature in 1997. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1678 (citing Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 7 (E3SHB 3900)). Of the 1,027 offenders under the age of 21, approximately 209 were believed to have either a high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma (GED).
Prior to the passage of chapter 28A.193 RCW, the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) had no responsibility for educational programs in any adult prison. DOC, however, provided several educational opportunities to inmates, largely through contracts with local community colleges. DOC education programs included courses in adult basic education, GED preparation, English as a second language, vocational skills training, crime related programs, and job readiness training.
In 1998, the Legislature passed the Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6600. Laws of 1998, ch. 244 (codified at RCW 28A.193). This statute provides for the education of juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons. RCW 28A.193.005. RCW 28A.193.020-.030 requires OSPI to solicit proposals from educational entities to provide education to inmates under the age of 18 in Washington State prisons.
In accordance with chapter 28A.193 RCW, DOC and OSPI contracted with two school districts[2] to provide educational services for the 1998-99 school year at the two DOC facilities in which the inmates under 18 are located.
B. Claims
Inmates brought this class action suit against the State and those school districts where DOC facilities are located. Inmates' class was certified to include:
All individuals who are now, or who will in the future be, committed to the custody of the Washington Department of Corrections, who are allegedly denied access to basic or special education during that custody, and who are, during that custody, under the age of 21, or disabled and under the age of 22.
CP at 203-04 (emphasis added).
The inmates alleged that the State's failure to provide them with basic and special education services violated article IX of the Washington Constitution; the basic education act, chapter 28A.150 RCW; the special education act, chapter 28A.155 RCW; the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1436, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); and constitutional due process and equal protection. Furthermore, the inmates alleged that recently enacted chapter 28A.193 RCW violates article IX.
*696 C. Trial Court Decision
On stipulated facts and cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the inmates on their claims under the Washington Constitution and the basic education act. The trial court also invalidated chapter 28A.193 RCW as unconstitutional because it impermissibly limited the availability of basic education to inmates under the age of 18 and failed to provide for special educational opportunities. The trial court, however, held that the statutory and constitutional obligation to provide educational services to persons incarcerated in Washington prisons ran only to the State and dismissed the school districts. The trial court also dismissed all of the inmates' federal claims.
On appeal, as appellants and cross-respondents, the State appeals the trial court's rulings regarding the inmates' state law claims. The inmates, as respondents and cross-appellants, challenge the trial court's dismissal of the school districts and the dismissal of their federal claims. Finally, the school districts, as cross-respondents, defend their dismissal from the case. This court stayed the trial court's orders pending the outcome of this appeal.
D. Standard of Review
In reviewing an order of summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. E.g., Reid v. Pierce County 136 Wash.2d 195, 201, 961 P.2d 333 (1998). Summary judgment is upheld if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Green v. A.P.C. (American Pharm. Co.), 136 Wash.2d 87, 94, 960 P.2d 912 (1998) (citing, inter alia, CR 56(c)). Because this case is reviewed on stipulated facts, the issues are solely questions of law and are reviewed de novo. See Di Blasi v. City of Seattle, 136 Wash.2d 865, 873, 969 P.2d 10 (1998) (citing case).
Where an issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, the court will avoid deciding the issue on constitutional grounds. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash.2d 148, 152, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982) (citing case). Therefore, we first examine whether the inmate class is entitled to basic and special education under state statutes. Second, we review the inmates' claim that they are entitled to basic and special education under the state constitution. Third, we consider the inmates' claims that the education programs for juvenile inmates act, chapter 28A.193 RCW, violates Washington's equal protection clause. Fourth, we analyze the inmates' claims under the federal statutes. Finally, we determine what obligation, if any, is imposed upon school districts to provide basic or special education to inmates.
II.
THE INMATES' STATUTORY RIGHT TO BASIC AND SPECIAL EDUCATION
When the relevant statutory provisions are properly read together and as a whole, it is clear the Legislature did not intend that the basic and special education acts apply to individuals incarcerated in DOC prisons. Consequently, we hold that the basic education act and the special education act do not apply to the inmate class.
A. The Basic Education Act, Chapter 28A.150 RCW
The inmates first argue that the plain language of the basic education act clearly "establishes an education system available to all students aged 5 through 21, and excluding none." Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14 (citing RCW 28A.150.220(5)) (footnote omitted).[3] Under the inmates' theory, because children incarcerated in adult prisons are not specifically exempted from the basic education act, they are covered by the act, and are thus entitled to the same education offered *697 to all other children in Washington. We disagree.
While the basic education act does not explicitly exclude youths incarcerated in adult facilities, the inquiry does not end there. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must interpret legislation consistently with its stated goals. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash.2d 128, 140, 814 P.2d 629 (1991). Another well-established principle of statutory construction provides that apparently conflicting statutes must be reconciled to give effect to each of them. E.g., State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash.2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86 (1975); see also Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash.2d 637, 648, 952 P.2d 601 (1998) (courts avoid construing statutes in way that renders any statutory language "superfluous") (citing case).
To resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more specific and more recently enacted statute. See In re Estate of Little, 106 Wash.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986) (more specific statute) (citing cases); Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 147, 821 P.2d 482 (1992).[4] Along these same lines, courts also consider "the sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter." Department of Labor & Indus. v. Estate of MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d 222, 229, 814 P.2d 194 (1991) (citation omitted). Based on these principles of statutory interpretation, we examine the Legislature's statutory scheme regarding education to determine whether the basic education act applies to the inmate class.
The basic education act, originally enacted in 1977, sets up a general program of education that does not specifically address the educational needs of DOC inmates.
Chapter 28A.193 RCW, on the other hand, was enacted in 1998 with the intent "to provide for the operation of education programs for the department of corrections' juvenile inmates." RCW 28A.193.005 (emphasis added). Under chapter 28A.193 RCW, individuals up to, and potentially including, age 18 who are incarcerated in DOC facilities may participate in DOC education programs. RCW 28A.193.030(3)-(4); see also RCW 72.09.460(2).[5] Furthermore, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, chapter 28A.225 RCW, was amended in 1998 to specifically exempt individuals who are incarcerated in adult correctional facilities from mandatory school attendance. Laws of 1998, ch. 244, § 14; RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d).[6]
Applying the previously discussed rules of interpretation, we hold that chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 RCW, not the basic education act, apply to the inmate class. First, applying the basic education act to DOC inmates would render chapter 28A.193 RCW and portions of chapter 72.09 RCW superfluous. See Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 648, 952 P.2d 601. Second, chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 are the more recent and far more specific statutes regarding inmate education, and thus should be given preference. See Little, 106 Wash.2d at 283, 721 P.2d 950; Blaker, 118 Wash.2d at 147, 821 P.2d 482.
Finally, as stipulated to by the parties, the new mandatory declination provisions passed in 1997 were expected to significantly increase the number of juveniles under 18 incarcerated in DOC facilities. Relying upon the sequence in which these statutes were enacted, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended the more recent statutes *698 and amendments to address an unmet need the education of juvenile DOC inmates. See MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d at 229, 814 P.2d 194.
In addition to their statutory construction arguments, the inmates contend that Tommy P., which held that the basic education act applies to children incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities, mandates application of the basic education act to the inmate class. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash.2d 385, 391-93, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)).[7] The inmates argue that Tommy P. stands for the proposition that children do not lose their rights to an education under the basic education act simply because they are incarcerated. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 391-93, 645 P.2d 697). We disagree, noting at least three major flaws in the inmates' arguments.
First, contrary to inmates' assertions, the holding in Tommy P. does not rest on the basic education act; rather, it is dependent upon the compulsory attendance law's applicability to juvenile detainees. RCW 28A.27 (recodified and amended by RCW 28A.225). This court specifically held: "the compulsory education law requires the provision of a program of education in juvenile detention centers." Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697 (emphasis added).[8]
Second, as previously stated, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, upon which Tommy P. was based, was amended in 1998 to specifically exclude individuals "incarcerated in an adult correctional facility." RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d); see also Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 394-98, 645 P.2d 697 (court held that, absent specific exemption, compulsory school attendance law applied to juveniles in detention facilities). Finally, Tommy P. involved offenders incarcerated in juvenile facilities, not youths who were declined to adult court or incarcerated in adult facilities. For these reasons we find Tommy P. distinguishable.
B. The Special Education Act, Chapter 28A.155 RCW
The analysis and arguments regarding whether the special education act, chapter 28A.155 RCW, applies to the inmate class parallels those regarding the basic education act above. Like the basic education act, the special education act is stated in broad terms and does not specifically address the education of juveniles in DOC facilities. The special education act's purpose is "to ensure that all children with disabilities as defined in RCW 28A.155.020 shall have the opportunity for an appropriate education at public expense as guaranteed to them by the Constitution of this state." RCW 28A.155.010 (emphasis added). "Children with disabilities" includes individuals between the ages of 3 and 22[9] who are:
in school or out of school who are temporarily or permanently retarded in normal educational processes by reason of physical or mental disability, or by reason of emotional maladjustment, or by reason of other disability, and those children who have specific learning and language disabilities resulting from perceptual-motor disabilities, including problems in visual and auditory perception and integration.
RCW 28A.155.020.
In addition to not specifically including DOC inmates, the special education act is *699 reasonably read as actually excluding them. The special education act's section titled "Superintendent of public instruction's duty and authority" states that the superintendent is, among other things, required to:
Promulgate such rules as are necessary to implement the several provisions of [the basic and special education acts] and to ensure educational opportunities within the common school system for all children with disabilities who are not institutionalized.
RCW 28A.155.090(7) (emphasis added). When reasonably read, this provision excludes from the special education act children with disabilities not "within the common school system." If the superintendent is not responsible for ensuring the "educational opportunities" of a certain group of individuals, it is reasonable to conclude that the group is not covered by the act. Otherwise, we would have the anomalous situation where the special education act applies to a group of individuals, but instructs the superintendent, the individual in charge of implementing the act, that he or she is not responsible for educating these same individuals. Finding that the special education act creates an exception for individuals not "within the common school system," we must now determine whether the inmates fall under that exception.
The basic education act defines the "common school system" as that term is used in Title 28A RCW. See RCW 28A.150.020. As we have already held, individuals incarcerated in DOC facilities are not covered by the basic education act. Thus, by definition the inmate class is outside "the common school system." Relying on the rule of statutory construction that when similar words are used in different parts of a statute the meaning is presumed to be the same throughout, we find that the special education act's "common school system" is the same as that in the basic education act. See State v. Akin, 77 Wash.App. 575, 580-81, 892 P.2d 774 (1995) (citing De Grief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 11, 297 P.2d 940 (1956)). Consequently, we are constrained to find that the inmates are not "within the common school system" under the special education act, and thus fall under an exception to the act.
Based on the special education act's silence regarding DOC inmates and its exclusion of students not "within the common school system," we hold that the special education act does not apply to the inmate class. Because we do not favorably resolve the inmates' claims to basic or special education on statutory grounds, we next analyze the inmates' constitutional rights to basic and special education under article IX of the Washington Constitution. Within this next section we also determine whether chapter 28A.193 RCW is constitutional under article IX.
III.
INMATES' STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BASIC AND SPECIAL EDUCATION UNDER ARTICLE IX
In resolving the issue of whether article IX requires the State to provide basic and special education to persons up to age 21 or 22 who are incarcerated in adult DOC prisons, we must first define the term "children" for purposes of article IX. We hold that "children" under article IX includes individuals up to age 18, including those children incarcerated in adult DOC facilities. Furthermore, we hold that chapter 28A.193 RCW, by establishing an educational program tailored for the special needs of juvenile DOC inmates, satisfies article IX.
A. "Children" under Article IX
Regarding the definition of "children" under article IX, our constitution provides little guidance, leaving the term undefined.[10] Consequently, we must look elsewhere for guidance.
At trial, the court held that the basic education act has defined "children" for the purposes of education, including article IX, as those persons up to age 22. The trial court noted that the Legislature "retains the right to restrict the age definition for children for *700 educational purposes and may change their definition as they see fit." CP at 2222. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that as long as the Legislature defines "children" as persons up to age 22, the State's constitutional duty to provide educational services runs to persons up to age 22 as well. CP at 2222, 2224. We disagree and find the trial court's reliance on the basic education act problematic.
First, the basic education act does not actually define the term "children" for purposes of article IX. The Legislature merely identifies the age group to which the statute applies. Furthermore, the statute does not actually use the term "children" as is found in article IX. See RCW 28A.150.220(5) (the basic education act "shall be accessible to all students who are five years of age ... and less than twenty-one years of age....") (emphasis added).
Second, although the legislation declares that the basic education act complies with article IX, it does not declare education to age 21 or 22 is constitutionally required. See RCW 28A.150.200.[11] This is clearly demonstrated by the Legislature's subsequent enactment of chapter 28A.193 RCW. As with the basic education act, the Legislature found that chapter 28A.193 RCW satisfied its constitutional duty to provide an education under article IX. See RCW 28A.193.005.[12] However, unlike the basic education act, the Legislature found that providing for the education of DOC inmates up to age 18, not 21, satisfied its constitutional duty. RCW 28A.193.030(3)-(4); RCW 72.09.460(2). We presume that if the Legislature actually intended to create a constitutional definition of "children" in the basic education act, it would have been constrained by that definition when it enacted chapter 28A.193 RCW. See State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash.2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86 (1975) (court's presume Legislature intended consistency between statutes).
Finally, even if the Legislature had explicitly defined the term "children" under article IX, its definition would not be controlling. "The ultimate power to interpret, construe and enforce the constitution of this State belongs to the judiciary." Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 496, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (citing cases). Having found that the basic education act does not provide the operative definition of the term "children" under article IX, we examine other statutes to determine the common understanding of the term "children" in Washington.
Under current law, only individuals under age 18 are required to attend school. RCW 28A.225.010 (children up to age 18 required to attend school, subject to certain exceptions). This statute supports the idea that individuals are treated like adults once they hit age 18, as choice is commonly recognized as a hallmark of adulthood. Furthermore, as already noted, chapter 28A.193 RCW's "definition" of children counteracts any argument that the Legislature intended to establish a child age-limit regarding education above age 18. RCW 28A.193.030(3)-(4); RCW 72.09.460(2) (act mandates that DOC inmates receive education until age 18).
Finally, although not within the education context, individuals over age 18 are generally emancipated and are able to marry without parental consent, to execute a will, to vote, to enter into a legally binding contract, to make medical decisions about their own care and those of their issue, and to sue and be sued. See RCW 26.28.010, .015(1)-(6) (under "Age of Majority" chapter, "all persons shall be deemed and taken to be full age for all purposes at the age of eighteen years[,]" unless otherwise provided).[13] These statutes *701 further demonstrate that the common understanding of the definition of "children" for most purposes in Washington, including education, includes individuals up to age 18. Consequently, we hold that the term "children" under article IX includes individuals up to age 18.[14]
The State raises the alternative argument that whatever statutory or constitutional rights to an education the inmates may have had, they disqualified themselves through their own criminal conduct. Specifically, the State contends that by engaging in conduct which compels their removal from the school system, the inmates have, by their own conduct and not through any failing of the State, disqualified themselves from the educational opportunities provided them.[15] We find the State's arguments unpersuasive and find it unnecessary to deal with this issue further since the Legislature has seen fit to provide an educational program to DOC inmates.
Having determined that the State is constitutionally required to provide educational services to children incarcerated in DOC facilities up to age 18, we need to determine whether the State is meeting its obligation. Consequently, we next examine chapter 28A.193 RCW to determine whether it satisfies article IX. We hold that it does.
B. Chapter 28A.193 RCW and Article IX
In determining whether chapter 28A.193 RCW satisfies article IX, we must first determine article IX's basic requirements. The inmates argue that chapter 28A.193 RCW violates article IX both "on its face" and "as applied" by creating a separate and inferior system of education for persons who are incarcerated in adult prisons in Washington. Under the inmates' theory, chapter 28A.193 RCW is presumed unconstitutional because it interferes with a "fundamental right." See Br. of Resp'ts at 22. While we recognize that the State's paramount obligation to provide for basic education does not end with the establishment of a public school system, we also find the State is not obligated to provide an identical education to all children within the state regardless of the circumstances in which they are found.
1. The Inmates' Facial Challenge under Article IX
It is a well-established general rule that where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, that statute is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Island County v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141, 146-47, 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (citing cases). This "demanding standard of review" is justified because, as a co-equal branch of government that is sworn to uphold the constitution, we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment. See Island County, 135 Wash.2d at 147, 955 P.2d 377. "Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced ... that the statute violates the constitution." Id. (citing cases).
In addition to the above standard of review, the court's focus when addressing constitutional facial challenges is on whether the statute's language violates the constitution, not whether the statute would be unconstitutional "as applied" to the facts of a particular case. See JJR Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wash.2d 1, 3-4, 891 P.2d 720 (1995). "`[A] facial challenge must be rejected unless there exists no set of circumstances in which the statute can constitutionally *702 be applied.'" In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (quoting with approval Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting)). The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional on its face is to render it "`utterly inoperative.'" 139 Wash.2d at 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790. Here, to effectuate the facial challenge analysis we need to first determine what article IX requires, and then determine whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances in which chapter 28A.193 RCW could satisfy article IX.
Article IX, section 2 clearly requires the State to create and "provide for a general and uniform system of public schools." (emphasis added). We have long held that this provision imposes upon the State a fundamental duty to create a common school system. In Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, we held that all children in Washington "have a `right' to be amply provided with an education[; that] `right' is constitutionally paramount and must be achieved through a `general and uniform system of public schools.'" 90 Wash.2d at 513, 537-38, 585 P.2d 71; see also Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 153, 50 P.2d 36 (1935) (duty imposed upon Legislature to provide "`a general and uniform system of public schools.'") (quoting School Dist. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 502, 99 P. 28 (1909)). The Legislature satisfied part of its general obligation under article IX through Title 28A RCW's "Common School Provisions," which includes the basic education act.
However, as we stated earlier, the State's constitutional duty to provide educational services does not end with the creation of a "general and uniform" school system. In addition to the requirements under article IX, section 2, the State has a "paramount duty ... to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders...." Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 499, 585 P.2d 71. Nothing in this provision, however, mandates that the education must be identical. We recognized as much in Tommy P. when we held that a different education program in juvenile detention centers might be necessary to "reasonably address special needs of juvenile offenders." 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697.[16]
Having outlined the general requirements of article IX, the question remains whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances in which chapter 28A.193 RCW could meet the constitutional minimum due under article IX. Here, the educational program outlined in chapter 28A.193 RCW:
must provide each offender a choice of curriculum that will assist the inmate in achieving a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma. The program of education may include but not be limited to basic education, prevocational training, work ethic skills, conflict resolution counseling, substance abuse intervention, and anger management counseling. The curriculum may balance these and other rehabilitation, work and training components.
RCW 72.09.460(2). The statute also outlines the infrastructure and support services required, and the proper allocation of money received from the Legislature's biennial appropriations. RCW 28A.193.005, .050, .080.
The inmates have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that chapter 28A.193 RCW violates article IX. This statute makes ample provision for educational programs designed to address the special educational and rehabilitative needs of children incarcerated in adult prisons. As we have often held, it is not this court's role to micromanage education in Washington. See *703 Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697 (Legislature's need to customize education programs recognized); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 520, 585 P.2d 71 ("While the Legislature must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature."). Consequently, we exercise judicial restraint and hold that under article IX's broad constitutional guidelines, chapter 28A.193 RCW is constitutional on its face. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.2d at 518, 585 P.2d 71 (judiciary required to provide broad constitutional guidelines regarding education within which Legislature may work).
2. The Inmates "As Applied" Challenge under Article IX
Regarding their "as applied" challenge, the inmates argue that chapter 28A.193 RCW is unconstitutional "as implemented by the State for the 1998-99 school year." Br. of Resp't at 26-32. We disagree.
The inmates' claim demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of "as applied" challenges. Under an "as applied" challenge, the party challenging the statute contends that the statute, as actually applied, violated the constitution. See Turay, 139 Wash.2d at 417 n. 27, 986 P.2d 790 (citing Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Here, the inmates fail to provide any specific facts demonstrating that the State's application of chapter 28A.193 RCW has violated article IX. Rather, the inmates merely speculate about constitutional problems that could result from RCW 28A.193's application.[17] Consequently, the inmates' "as applied" challenge must fail.[18]
C. Special Education and Article IX
The inmates assert that the Washington Constitution mandates that special education be provided to all children with disabilities under the age of 22. However, the inmates fail to cite any supporting legal authority for this proposition.[19] It is well established that this court will not address c