109 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261 27 P.3d 702

Brain J. DONOVAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RRL CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S082570.

Supreme Court of California.

July 30, 2001. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing September 12, 2001.

*812 Brian J. Donovan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Donald Seth, Sonoma; Law Offices of S. Chandler Visher, S. Chandler Visher, Marie Noel Appel; The Harris Law Firm, Aurora Dawn Harris, Orange; Law Office of William E. Kennedy and William E. Kennedy, for National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

James G. Lewis, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

Manning, Leaver, Bruder & Berberich and Halbert B. Rasmussen, Los Angeles, for California Motor Car Dealers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Baker & Hostetler, Glen A. Smith and Megan E. Gray, for The Times Mirror Company and the California Newspaper Publishers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

Defendant RRL Corporation is an automobile dealer doing business under the name Lexus of Westminster. Because of typographical and proofreading errors made by a local newspaper, defendant's advertisement listed a price for a used automobile that was significantly less than the intended sales price. Plaintiff Brian J. Donovan read the advertisement and, after examining the vehicle, attempted to purchase it by tendering the advertised price. Defendant refused to sell the automobile to plaintiff at that price, and plaintiff brought this action against defendant for breach of contract. The municipal court entered judgment for defendant on the ground that the mistake in the advertisement precluded the existence of a contract. The appellate department of the superior court and the Court of Appeal reversed, relying in part upon Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e), which makes it unlawful for an automobile dealer not to sell a motor vehicle at the advertised price while the vehicle remains unsold and before the advertisement expires.

We conclude that a contract satisfying the statute of frauds arose from defendant's advertisement and plaintiffs tender of the advertised price, but that defendant's unilateral mistake of fact provides a basis for rescinding the contract. Although Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e), justifies a reasonable expectation on the part of consumers that an automobile dealer intends that such an advertisement constitute an offer, and that the offer can be accepted by paying the advertised price, this statute does not supplant governing common law principles authorizing rescission of a contract on the ground of mistake. As we shall explain, rescission is warranted here because the evidence establishes that defendant's unilateral mistake of fact was made in good faith, defendant did not bear the risk of the mistake, and enforcement of the contract with the erroneous price would be unconscionable. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I

While reading the April 26, 1997, edition of the Costa Mesa Daily Pilot, a local newspaper, plaintiff noticed a full-page advertisement placed by defendant. The advertisement *813 promoted a "PRE-OWNED COUP-A-RAMA SALE!/2-DAY PREOWNED SALES EVENT" and listed, along with 15 other used automobiles, a 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas. The advertisement described the color of this automobile as sapphire blue, included a vehicle identification number, and stated a price of $25,995. The name Lexus of Westminster was displayed prominently in three separate locations in the advertisement, which included defendant's address along with a small map showing the location of the dealership. The following statements appeared in small print at the bottom of the advertisement: "All cars plus tax, lie, doc, smog & bank fees. On approved credit. Ad expires 4/27/97[.]"

Also on April 26, 1997, plaintiff visited a Jaguar dealership that offered other 1995 Jaguars for sale at $8,000 to $10,000 more than the price specified in defendant's advertisement. The following day, plaintiff and his spouse drove to Lexus of Westminster and observed a blue Jaguar displayed on an elevated ramp. After verifying that the identification number on the sticker was the same as that listed in defendant's April 26 Daily Pilot advertisement, they asked a salesperson whether they could test drive the Jaguar. Plaintiff mentioned that he had seen the advertisement and that the price "looked really good." The salesperson responded that, as a Lexus dealer, defendant might offer better prices for a Jaguar automobile than would a Jaguar dealer. At that point, however, neither plaintiff nor the salesperson mentioned the specific advertised price.

After the test drive, plaintiff and his spouse discussed several negative characteristics of the automobile, including high mileage, an apparent rust problem, and worn tires. In addition, it was not as clean as the other Jaguars they had inspected. Despite these problems, they believed that the advertised price was a very good price and decided to purchase the vehicle. Plaintiff told the salesperson, "Okay. We will take it at your price, $26,000." When the salesperson did not respond, plaintiff showed him the advertisement. The salesperson immediately stated, "That's a mistake."

After plaintiff asked to speak with an individual in charge, defendant's sales manager also told plaintiff that the price listed in the advertisement was a mistake. The sales manager apologized and offered to pay for plaintiffs fuel, time, and effort expended in traveling to the dealership to examine the automobile. Plaintiff declined this offer and expressed his belief that there had been no mistake. Plaintiff stated that he could write a check for the full purchase price as advertised. The sales manager responded that he would not sell the vehicle at the advertised price. Plaintiff then requested the sales price. After performing some calculations, and based upon defendant's $35,000 investment in the automobile, the sales manager stated that he would sell it to plaintiff for $37,016. Plaintiff responded, "No, I want to buy it at your advertised price, and I will write you a check right now." The sales manager again stated that he would not sell the vehicle at the advertised price, and plaintiff and his spouse left the dealership.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this action against defendant for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence. In addition to testimony consistent with the facts set forth above, the following evidence was presented to the municipal court, which acted as the trier of fact.

Defendant's advertising manager compiles information for placement in advertisements in several local newspapers, including the Costa Mesa Daily Pilot. Defendant's advertisement published in the Saturday, April 19, 1997, edition *814 of the Daily Pilot listed a 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas but did not specify a price for that automobile; instead, the word "Save" appeared in the space where a price ordinarily would have appeared. The following Thursday afternoon, defendant's sales manager instructed the advertising manager to delete the 1995 Jaguar from all advertisements and to substitute a 1994 Jaguar XJ6 with a price of $25,995. The advertising manager conveyed the new information to a representative of the Daily Pilot that same afternoon.

Because of typographical and proofreading errors made by employees of the Daily Pilot, however, the newspaper did not replace the description of the 1995 Jaguar with the description of the 1994 Jaguar, but did replace the word "Save" with the price of $25,995. Thus, the Saturday, April 26, edition of the Daily Pilot erroneously advertised the 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas at a price of $25,995. The Daily Pilot acknowledged its error in a letter of retraction sent to defendant on April 28. No employee of defendant reviewed a proof sheet of the revised Daily Pilot advertisement before it was published, and defendant was unaware of the mistake until plaintiff attempted to purchase the automobile.

Except for the 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas, defendant intended to sell each vehicle appearing in the April 26, 1997, Daily Pilot advertisement at the advertised price. Defendant's advertisements in the April 26 editions of several other newspapers correctly listed the 1994 Jaguar XJ6 with a price of $25,995. In May 1997, defendant's advertisements in several newspapers listed the 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas for sale at $37,995. Defendant subsequently sold the automobile for $38,399.

The municipal court entered judgment for defendant. During the trial, the court ruled that plaintiff had not stated a cause of action for negligence, and it precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence in support of such a claim. After the close of evidence and presentation of argument, the municipal court concluded as a matter of law that a newspaper advertisement for an automobile generally constitutes a valid contractual offer that a customer may accept by tendering payment of the advertised price. The court also determined that such an advertisement satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds when the dealer's name appears in the advertisement. Nevertheless, the municipal court held that in the present case there was no valid offer because defendant's unilateral mistake of fact vitiated or negated contractual intent. The court made factual findings that defendant's mistake regarding the advertisement was made in good faith and was not intended to deceive the public. The municipal court also found that plaintiff was unaware of the mistake before it was disclosed to him by defendant's representatives.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment to the appellate department of the superior court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 121), limiting his contentions to the breach of contract claim. The appellate department reversed the judgment for defendant and directed the municipal court to calculate plaintiffs damages. Relying upon the public policies underlying Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e), the appellate department concluded that the advertisement constituted an offer capable of acceptance by tender of the advertised price. Section 11713.1, subdivision (e), provides that it is a violation of the Vehicle Code for a dealer to "[f]ail to sell a vehicle to any person at the advertised total price ... while the vehicle remains unsold, unless the advertisement states the advertised *815 total price is good only for a specified time and the time has elapsed." The appellate department further concluded that defendant bore the risk of the mistaken transmission of its offer, because plaintiff was unaware of the mistake.

The appellate department of the superior court certified the appeal to the Court of Appeal, which ordered the case transferred to it for hearing and decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 62(a), 63(a).) Like the appellate department, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the municipal court and held that defendant's advertisement constituted a contractual offer that invited acceptance by the act of tendering the advertised price, which plaintiff performed. Acknowledging that the question was close, however, the Court of Appeal reasoned that Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e), "tips the scale in favor of ... construing the advertisement as an offer ...." The court disagreed with the municipal court's conclusion that defendant's unilateral mistake of fact, unknown to plaintiff at the time he tendered the purchase price, precluded the existence of a valid offer. With regard to the contention that defendant should not bear the risk of an error resulting solely from the negligence of the newspaper, the Court of Appeal made a factual finding based upon the appellate record (Code Civ. Proc, § 909) that defendant's failure to review a proof sheet for the Daily Pilot advertisement constituted negligence that contributed to the placement of the erroneous advertisement.

We granted defendant's petition for review and requested that the parties include in their briefing a discussion of the effect, if any, of California Uniform Commercial Code division 2, chapter 2, sections 2201-2210, upon the present case.

II

An essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent. (Civ.Code, §§ 1550, subd. 2, 1565, subd. 2.) Mutual assent usually is manifested by an offer communicated to the offeree and an acceptance communicated to the offeror. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 128, p. 153 (hereafter Witkin).) "`"An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."' [Citations.]" (City of Moorpark v. Moorpark Unified School Dist. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 921, 930, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 896, 819 P.2d 854 (Moorpark).) The determination of whether a particular communication constitutes an operative offer, rather than an inoperative step in the preliminary negotiation of a contract, depends upon all the surrounding circumstances. (1 Corbin, Contracts (rev. ed.1993) § 2.2, p. 105.) The objective manifestation of the party's assent ordinarily controls, and the pertinent inquiry is whether the individual to whom the communication was made had reason to believe that it was intended as an offer. (1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 119, p. 144; 1 Farnsworth, Contracts (2d ed.1998) § 3.10, p. 237.)

In the present case, the municipal court ruled that newspaper advertisements for automobiles generally constitute offers that can be accepted by a customer's tender of the purchase price. Its conclusion that defendant's advertisement for the 1995 Jaguar did not constitute an offer was based solely upon the court's factual determination that the erroneous price in the advertisement was the result of a good faith mistake.

Because the existence of an offer depends upon an objective interpretation of defendant's assent as reflected in the *816 advertisement, however, the mistaken price (not reasonably known to plaintiff to be a mistake) is irrelevant in determining the threshold question whether the advertisement constituted an offer. In this situation, mistake instead properly would be considered in deciding whether a contract resulted from the acceptance of an offer containing mistaken terms, or whether any such contract could be voided or rescinded. (See Chakmak v. H.J. Lucas Masonry, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 124, 129, 127 Cal.Rptr. 404; Rest.2d Contracts, § 153; 1 Corbin, Contracts, supra, § 4.11, pp. 623-627; 2 Williston, Contracts (4th ed.1991) § 6:57, pp. 682-695.) Thus, the municipal court did not make any factual findings relevant to the issue whether defendant's advertisement constituted an offer, and we shall review the question de novo. (Richards v. Flower (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 233, 235, 14 Cal.Rptr. 228.)

Some courts have stated that an advertisement or other notice disseminated to the public at large generally does not constitute an offer, but rather is presumed to be an invitation to consider, examine, and negotiate. (E.g., Harris v. Time, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 449, 455, 237 Cal. Rptr. 584; see Rest.2d Contracts, § 26, com. b, p. 76; 1 Corbin, Contracts, supra, § 2.4, p. 116; 1 Farnsworth, Contracts, supra, § 3.10, p. 242; 1 Williston, Contracts (4th ed.1990) § 4:7, pp. 285-287, 294.) Nevertheless, certain advertisements have been held to constitute offers where they invite the performance of a specific act without further communication and leave nothing for negotiation. Advertisements for rewards typically fall within this category, because performing the requested act (e.g., returning a lost article or supplying particular information) generally is all that is necessary to accept the offer and conclude the bargain. (1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 188, p. 200; Rest.2d Contracts, § 29, com. b, illus. 1, p. 84; 1 Corbin, Contracts, supra, § 2.4, p. 119.)

Various advertisements involving transactions in goods also have been held to constitute offers where they invite particular action. For example, a merchant's advertisement that listed particular goods at a specific price and included the phrase "First Come First Served" was deemed to be an offer, because it constituted a promise to sell to a customer at that price in exchange for the customer's act of arriving at the store at a particular time. (Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store (1957) 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689, 691; Rest.2d Contracts, § 26, com. b, illus. 1, p. 76.) Similarly, external wording on the envelope of an item of bulk rate mail promising to give the recipient a watch "just for opening the envelope" before a certain date was held to constitute an operative offer accepted by performance of the act of opening the envelope. (Harris v. Time, Inc., supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 449, 455-456, 237 Cal.Rptr. 584.) In addition, an advertisement stating that anyone who purchased a 1954 automobile from a dealer could exchange it for a 1955 model at no additional cost constituted an offer that was accepted when the plaintiff purchased the 1954 vehicle. (Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co. (La.Ct.App.1955) 85 So.2d 75, 79-80; see also Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis (1989) 385 Pa.Super. 587, 561 A.2d 1248, 1249-1250 [sign at golf course stated "hole-in-one wins" an automobile at a specified price].) In such cases, courts have considered whether the advertiser, in clear and positive terms, promised to render performance in exchange for something requested by the advertiser, and whether the recipient of the advertisement reasonably might have concluded that by acting in accordance with the request a contract would be formed. (1 Williston, Contracts, supra, § 4:7, pp. 296-297; 1 Corbin, Contracts, supra, § 2.4, pp. 116-117; see, e.g., *817 Chang v. First Colonial Sav. Bank (1991) 242 Va. 388, 410 S.E.2d 928, 929-930 [bank's newspaper advertisement stating "Deposit $14,000 and receive ... $20,136.12 upon maturity in 3 ½ years" constituted an offer that was accepted by the plaintiffs' deposit of that sum for the specified period].)

Relying upon these decisions, defendant contends that its advertisement for the 1995 Jaguar XJ6 Vanden Plas did not constitute an offer, because the advertisement did not request the performance of a specific act that would conclude the bargain. According to defendant, plaintiffs assertion that the advertisement was an offer conflicts with the generally accepted "black-letter" rule that an advertisement that simply identifies goods and specifies a price is an invitation to negotiate.

This court has not previously applied the common law rules upon which defendant relies, including the rule that advertisements generally constitute invitations to negotiate rather than offers. Plaintiff observes that such rules governing the construction of advertisements have been criticized on the ground that they are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of consumers and lead to haphazard results. (See Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance (1994) 82 Cal. L.Rev. 1127, 1166-1172.) Plaintiff urges this court to reject the black-letter advertising rule.

In the present case, however, we need not consider the viability of the black-letter rule regarding the interpretation of advertisements in general. Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude that a licensed automobile dealer's advertisement for the sale of a particular vehicle at a specific price—when construed in light of Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e)—reasonably justifies a consumer's understanding that the dealer intends the advertisement to constitute an offer and that the consumer's assent to the bargain is invited and will conclude it.

Vehicle Code section 11713.1 sets forth comprehensive requirements governing a licensed automobile dealer's advertisements for motor vehicles. This statute requires, among other things, that an advertisement for a specific automobile identify the vehicle by its identification number or license number (id., subd. (a)), disclose the type of charges that will be added to the advertised price at the time of sale (id., subd. (b)), and refrain from containing various types of misleading information (id., subds. (i), (l), (o), (p), (r)).

In addition, Vehicle Code section 11713.1, subdivision (e) (hereafter section 11713.1(e)), states that it is a violation of the Vehicle Code for the holder of any dealer's license to "[f]ail to sell a vehicle to any person at the advertised total price, exclusive of [specified charges such as taxes and registration fees], while the vehicle remains unsold, unless the advertisement states the advertised total price is good only for a specified time and the time has elapsed." ^[1]

*818 The administrative regulation implementing section 11713.1(e) states in relevant part: "A specific vehicle advertised by a dealer ... shall be willingly shown and sold at the advertised price and terms while such vehicle remains unsold ..., unless the advertisement states that the advertised price and terms are good only for a specific time and such time has elapsed. Advertised vehicles must be sold at or below the advertised price irrespective of whether or not the advertised price has been communicated to the purchaser." (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 13, § 260.04, subd. (b).)^[2]

Plaintiff asserts that because a dealer is prohibited by section 11713.1(e) from failing to sell a particular vehicle at the advertised price, an advertisement for such a vehicle cannot be a mere request for offers from consumers or an invitation to negotiate, but instead must be deemed an operative offer that is accepted when a consumer tenders the full advertised price. We agree that, in light of the foregoing regulatory scheme, a licensed automobile dealer's advertisement for a particular vehicle at a specific price constitutes an offer.

As one commentator has observed, legislation can affect consumer expectations and cause reasonable individuals to regard certain retail advertisements for the sale of goods as offers to complete a bargain. (1 Corbin, Contracts, supra, § 2.4, p. 118.) By authorizing disciplinary action against a licensed automobile dealer that fails to sell a vehicle at the advertised price, section 11713.1(e) creates a reasonable expectation on the part of consumers that the dealer intends to make an offer to sell at that price, and that the consumer can accept the offer by paying the price specified in the advertisement. Interpreted in light of the regulatory obligations imposed upon dealers, an advertisement for a particular automobile at a specific price constitutes an objective manifestation of the dealer's willingness to enter into a bargain on the stated terms, and justifies the consumer's understanding that his or her assent to the bargain is invited and will conclude it. Such an advertisement therefore constitutes an offer that is accepted when a consumer tenders the advertised price.^[3]

Defendant and its supporting amici curiae contend that section 11713.1(e) was not intended to modify the common law of contracts, and that therefore the statute should not be considered in determining whether a contract arose from defendant's advertisement and plaintiffs tender of the advertised price. As we shall explain (pt. IV, post), we agree that section 11713.1(e) does not reflect a legislative intent to supplant the common law governing contracts for the sale of motor vehicles by licensed dealers. Nevertheless, the statute does govern the conduct of dealers and thus creates an objective expectation that dealers intend to sell vehicles at the *819 advertised price. Therefore, even though section 11713.1(e) does not alter the applicable common law regarding contractual offers, consumer expectations arising from the statute are relevant in determining whether defendant's advertisement constituted an offer pursuant to governing principles of contract law.

Amicus curiae California Motor Car Dealers Association further asserts that an advertisement for the sale of a vehicle does not constitute an offer because consumers have reason to believe that an automobile dealer does not intend to conclude the bargain until agreement is reached with regard to numerous terms other than price and until the contract is reduced to writing. (See Rest.2d Contracts, §§ 26, 27; 1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 142, pp. 166-167.) For example, a written contract for the sale of an automobile by a dealer typically includes terms such as the form of payment, warranties, insurance, title, registration, delivery, taxes, documentation fees, and, if applicable, financing. (See Twaite v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1989) 216 Cal. App.3d 239, 243, 264 Cal.Rptr. 598; O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc. (1970) 128 Ill.App.2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 758, 760; see also Civ.Code, § 2981 et seq. [requirements for conditional contracts for the sale of motor vehicles].) In addition, specific written disclosures, required by statute, must appear in the contract. (E.g., Veh. Code, § 11713.1, subds. (v) [retail automobile sales contract clearly and conspicuously must disclose whether the vehicle is being sold as used or new], (x) [dealer must disclose on the face of the contract whether the transaction is or is not subject to a fee received by an "autobroker" as defined in the Vehicle Code].)

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the existence of a contract is not defeated by the circumstance that he and defendant might have included additional terms in their ultimate written agreement, or that acceptance of defendant's offer might have been communicated by means other than tender of the purchase price, for example by signing a written contract. Plaintiff relies upon the following principle: "Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations." (Rest.2d Contracts, § 27.) Plaintiff also observes that "[a]n offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances," unless otherwise indicated. (Cal.U.Com. Code, § 2206, subd. (1)(a).)^[4]

Although dealers are required by statute to prepare a written contract when selling an automobile, and such a contract contains terms other than the price of the vehicle, we agree with plaintiff that a dealer's advertisement specifying a price for a particular vehicle constitutes a sufficient manifestation of the dealer's assent to give rise to a contract. As we have explained, in light of section 11713.1(e) such an advertisement objectively reflects the dealer's intention to sell the vehicle to a member of the public who tenders the full advertised price while the vehicle remains unsold and before the advertisement expires. The price almost always is the most important term of the bargain, and the dealer's intention to include other terms in a written contract does not preclude the existence of *820 mutual assent sufficient to conclude a contract.

In sum, because section 11713.1(e) makes it unlawful for a dealer not to sell a particular vehicle at the advertised price while the vehicle remains unsold and before the advertisement expires, plaintiff reasonably could believe that defendant intended the advertisement to be an offer. Therefore, we conclude that defendant's advertisement constituted an offer that was accepted by plaintiffs tender of the advertised price.

III

Defendant contends that even if its advertisement constituted an offer that was accepted by plaintiffs tender of the purchase price, plaintiff is not authorized by law to enforce the resulting contract, because there was no signed writing that satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds for the sale of goods. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that defendant's name as it appeared in the newspaper advertisement for the sale of the vehicle, constituted a signature within the meaning of the statute.

The applicable statute of frauds states in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five hundred dollars ($500) or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his or her authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon[,] but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writing." (Cal.U.Com. Code, § 2201, subd. (1), italics added.)

The California Uniform Commercial Code defines the term "signed" as including "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." (Cal.U.Com.Code, § 1201, subd. (38).) The comment regarding the corresponding provision of the Uniform Commercial Code states: "The inclusion of authentication in the definition of `signed' is to make clear that as the term is used in [the code] a complete signature is not necessary. Authentication may be printed, stamped, or written; it may be by initials or by thumbprint. It may be on any part of the document and in appropriate cases may be found in a billhead or letterhead. No catalog of possible authentications can be complete and the court must use common sense and commercial experience in passing upon these matters. The question always is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with present intention to authenticate the writing." (U. Com.Code com., reprinted at 23A West's Ann. Cal. U. Com.Code (1964 ed.) foil. § 1201, p. 65; see 1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 281, p. 273 [citing California decisions generally consistent with this comment]; Rest.2d Contracts, § 134.)

Some decisions have relaxed the signature requirement considerably to accommodate various forms of electronic communication. For example, a party's printed or typewritten name in a telegram has been held to satisfy the statute of frauds. (E.g., Hessenthaler v. Farzin (1989) 388 Pa.Super. 37, 564 A.2d 990, 993-994; Hillstrom v. Gosnay (1980) 188 Mont. 388, 614 P.2d 466, 470.) Even a tape recording identifying the parties has been determined to meet the signature requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code. (Ellis Canning Company v. Bernstein (D.Colo. 1972) 348 F.Supp. 1212,1228.)

When an advertisement constitutes an offer, the printed name of the *821 merchant is intended to authenticate the advertisement as that of the merchant. (See Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. d, illus. 2, p. 335 [newspaper advertisement constituting an offer to purchase certain goods, with offeror's name printed therein, satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds].) In other words, where the advertisement reasonably justifies the recipient's understanding that the communication was intended as an offer, the offeror's intent to authenticate his or her name as a signature can be established from the face of the advertisement.

In the present case, the parties presented no evidence with regard to whether defendant intended that its name in the advertisement constitute a signature. Therefore, the issue whether the appearance of defendant's name supports a determination that the writing was "signed" is closely related to the question whether the advertisement constituted an offer. Those characteristics of the advertisement justifying plaintiffs belief that defendant intended it to be an offer also support a finding that defendant intended that its name serve as an authentication.

As established above, defendant's advertisement reflected an objective manifestation of its intention to make an offer for the sale of the vehicle at the stated price. Defendant's printed name in the advertisement similarly evidenced an intention to authenticate the advertisement as an offer and therefore constituted a signature satisfying the statute of frauds.

IV

Having concluded that defendant's advertisement for the sale of the Jaguar automobile constituted an offer that was accepted by plaintiffs tender of the advertised price, and that the resulting contract satisfied the statute of frauds, we next consider whether defendant can avoid enforcement of the contract on the ground of mistake.

A party may rescind a contract if his or her consent was given by mistake. (Civ.Code, § 1689, subd. (b)(1).) A factual mistake by one party to a contract, or unilateral mistake, affords a ground for rescission in some circumstances. Civil Code section 1577 states in relevant part: "Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the mistake, and consisting in: [H] 1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the contract ...."^[5]

*822 The Court of Appeal determined that defendant's error did not constitute a mistake of fact within the meaning of Civil Code section 1577. In support of this determination, the court relied upon the following principle: "[A] unilateral misinterpretation of contractual terms, without knowledge by the other party at the time of contract, does not constitute a mistake under either Civil Code section 1577 [mistake of fact] or 1578 [mistake of law]." (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1422, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 (Hedging Concepts ).)

The foregoing principle has no application to the present case. In Hedging Concepts, the plaintiff believed that he would fulfill his contractual obligations by introducing potential business prospects to the defendant. The contract, however, required the plaintiff to procure a completed business arrangement. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs subjective misinterpretation of the terms of the contract constituted, at most, a mistake of law. Because the defendant was unaware of the plaintiffs misunderstanding at the time of the contract, the court held that rescission was not a proper remedy. (Hedging Concepts, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1422, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 citing 1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 379, pp. 345-346 [relief for unilateral mistake of law is authorized only where one party knows of, does not correct, and takes advantage or enjoys the benefit of another party's mistake].) Defendant's mistake in the present case, in contrast, did not consist of a subjective misinterpretation of a contract term, but rather resulted from an unconscious ignorance that the Daily Pilot advertisement set forth an incorrect price for the automobile. Defendant's lack of knowledge regarding the typographical error in the advertised price of the vehicle cannot be considered a mistake of law. Defendant's error constituted a mistake of fact, and the Court of Appeal erred in concluding otherwise. As we shall explain, the Court of Appeal also erred to the extent it suggested that a unilateral mistake of fact affords a ground for rescission only where the other party is aware of the mistake.

Under the first Restatement of Contracts, unilateral mistake did not render a contract voidable unless the other party knew of or caused the mistake. (1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 370, p. 337; see Rest., Contracts, § 503.) In Germain etc. Co. v. Western Union etc. Co. (1902) 137 Cal. 598, 602, 70 P. 658, this court endorsed a rule similar to that of the first Restatement. Our opinion indicated that a seller's price quotation erroneously transcribed and delivered by a telegraph company contractually could bind the seller to the incorrect price, unless the buyer knew or had reason to suspect that a mistake had been made. Some decisions of the Court of Appeal have adhered to the approach of the original Restatement. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of O'Connor (1996) 48 Cal. App.4th 1076, 1097-1098, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, and cases cited therein.) Plaintiff also advocates this approach and contends that rescission is unavailable to defendant, because plaintiff was unaware of the mistaken price in defendant's advertisement when he accepted the offer.

The Court of Appeal decisions reciting the traditional rule do not recognize that in M.F. Kemper Const. Co. v. City of L.A. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 696, 701, 235 P.2d 7 (Kemper), *823 we acknowledged but rejected a strict application of the foregoing Restatement rule regarding unilateral mistake of fact. The plaintiff in Kemper inadvertently omitted a $301,769 item from its bid for the defendant city's public works project— approximately one-third of the total contract price. After discovering the mistake several hours later, the plaintiff immediately notified the city and subsequently withdrew its bid. Nevertheless, the city accepted the erroneous bid, contending that rescission of the offer was unavailable for the plaintiffs unilateral mistake.

Our decision in Kemper recognized that the bid, when opened and announced, resulted in an irrevocable option contract conferring upon the city a right to accept the bid, and that the plaintiff could not withdraw its bid unless the requirements for rescission of this option contract were satisfied. (Kemper, supra, 37 Cal.2d at pp. 700, 704, 235 P.2d 7.) We stated: "Rescission may be had for mistake of fact if the mistake is material to the contract and was not the result of neglect of a legal duty, if enforcement of the contract as made would be unconscionable, and if the other party can be placed in statu quo. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 701, 235 P.2d 7.) Although the city knew of the plaintiffs mistake before it accepted the bid, and this circumstance was relevant to our determination that requiring the plaintiff to perform at the mistaken bid price would be unconscionable (id. at pp. 702-703, 235 P.2d 7), we authorized rescission of the city's option contract even though the city had not known of or contributed to the mistake before it opened the bid.

Similarly, in Elsinore Union etc. Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff (1960) 54 Cal.2d 380, 6 Cal.Rptr. 1, 353 P.2d 713 (Elsinore), we authorized the rescission of an erroneous bid even where the contractor had assured the public agency, after the agency inquired, that his figures were accurate, and where the agency already had accepted the bid before it was aware of the mistake. In this situation, t