AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
Estimated cost: $0.001 - $0.003 per brief
Full Opinion
Barry KEENAN, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Frank Sinatra, Jr., Real Party in Interest.
Supreme Court of California.
*4 Rohde & Victoroff and Stephen F. Rohde, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
Dilan A. Esper; Peter J. Eliasberg and Mark D. Rosenbaum, Los Angeles, for ACLU Foundation of Southern California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, R. Bruce Rich, Jonathan Bloom, Heather R. Goldstein, New York, NY, Josh A. Krevitt, Redwood Shores, and Christopher J. Cox, Springfield, VA, for The Association of American Publishers, Inc., The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., and PEN American Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Corbett & Steelman, Richard B. Specter and Mark M. Monachino, Irvine, of Real Party in Interest.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carole Ritts Kornblum, Assistant Attorney General, Peter K. Shack and Kelvin C. Gong, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
BAXTER, J.
We confront a claim that California's "Son of Sam law" facially violates constitutional protections of speech by appropriating, as compensation for crime victims, all monies due to a convicted felon from expressive materials that include the story of the crime. We conclude that these provisions of the California statute are facially invalid under both the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution[1] as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 2, subd. (a)).[2]
The California law was first enacted in 1983 as Civil Code section 2224.1.[3] (Stats. 1983, ch. 1016, § 2, pp. 3581-3584.) In 1986, the law was renumbered as section 2225 (Stats.1986, ch. 820, §§ 7, 8, pp. 2730-2733), and it has since been amended on several occasions (see Stats.1992, ch. 178, § 2, p. 882; Stats.1994, ch. 556, § 1, p. 2823; Stats.1995, ch. 262, § 1; Stats.2000, ch. 261, § 2). As currently in effect, the law seeks to prevent a convicted felon, or a profiteer, from exploiting the felon's *5 crimes for financial gain while victims of crime go uncompensated.
One prong of the California statute, in effect since the law's inception, imposes an involuntary trust, in favor of damaged and uncompensated crime victims as "beneficiaries]," on a convicted felon's "proceeds" from expressive "materials" (books, films, magazine and newspaper articles, video and sound recordings, radio and television appearances, and live presentations) that "include or are based on" the "story" of a felony for which the felon was convicted, except where the materials mention the felony only in "passing ..., as in a footnote or bibliography." (§ 2225, subds.(a)(4), (6), (7), (9), (b)(1); see former § 2224.1, subds. (a)(4), (6), (7), (9), (b), Stats.1983, ch. 1016, § 2, p. 3581.) For convenience, we sometimes hereafter refer to this portion of the statute, governing proceeds from expressive materials that include the story of the crime, by its operative provision, section 2225, subdivision (b)(1) (section 2225(b)(1)).
More recent amendments to the California statute attack the financial exploitation of crime from a second, distinctly different angle. Since 1994, the law's involuntary trust provisions have also applied to "profits" received by the felon, or his or her representative, from the sale or transfer of any "thing" or "right," the value of which "is enhanced by the notoriety gained from the commission of a felony for which a convicted felon was convicted." (§ 2225, subd. (a)(10), italics added; see also id., subd. (b)(2).) In 2000, the involuntary trust provisions were further extended, with limited exceptions, to "profiteer[s] of the felony," i.e., "any person[s]" who derive income by selling memorabilia, property, rights, or things for values enhanced by their felony-related notoriety. (§ 2225, subds.(a)(3)(B), (10), (b)(2)). As necessary, we sometimes hereafter refer to this prong of the statute, governing profits from things sold for their felony-related notoriety value, by its operative provision, section 2225, subdivision (b)(2) (section 2225(b)(2)).[4]
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court held that a somewhat similar New York law violated the First Amendment. (Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd. (1991) 502 U.S. 105, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (Simon & Schuster).) In provisions somewhat like California's section 2225(b)(1), the statute at issue confiscated, for the benefit of crime victims, all monies a criminal was due under contract with respect to a "reenactment" of the crime, or from the expression of his or her personal thoughts or feelings about the crime, in a film, broadcast, print, recording, or live performance format.
Finding the New York law facially invalid, the Simon & Schuster majority reasoned that the statute, as a direct regulation of speech based on content, must fall unless it satisfied a strict level of constitutional scrutiny. The New York law failed this test, said the majority, because although the state had a compelling interest in compensating crime victims from the fruits of crime, the statute at issue was not narrowly tailored to that purpose. (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 121-123, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.)
The flaw most clearly identified by the Simon & Schuster majority was that the *6 New York statute was overinclusive. The majority noted two respects in which the New York law regulated speech too broadly for its compelling purpose. First, the law applied to expressive works in which one merely admitted crimes for which he or she had not been convicted. Second, it confiscated all profits from expressive works in which one made even incidental or tangential mention of his or her past crimes for nonexploitative purposes. (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 121, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.)
California's analogous provision, section 2225(b)(1), similarly imposes a contentbased financial penalty on protected speech. Yet section 2225(b)(1), like its New York counterpart, fails to satisfy strict scrutiny because it, too, is overinclusive. Section 2225(b)(1) contains the fundamental defect identified in Simon & Schuster; it reaches beyond a criminal's profits from the crime or its exploitation to reach all income from the criminal's speech or expression on any theme or subject, if the story of the crime is included.
Though section 2225(b)(1), unlike the New York law, applies only to persons actually convicted of felonies, and states an exemption for mere "passing mention of the felony, as in a footnote or bibliography" (id., subd. (a)(7)), these differences do not cure the California statute's constitutional flaw. By any reasonable construction, the California statute is still calculated to confiscate all income from a wide range of protected expressive works by convicted felons, on a wide variety of subjects and themes, simply because those works include substantial accounts of the prior felonies.
Because we conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that section 2225(b)(1) is invalid, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
FACTS
On July 8, 1998, Frank Sinatra, Jr. (Sinatra, Jr.), son of the late singer, filed a complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court. Named as defendants were Barry Keenan, Joseph Amsler, John Irwin, Peter Gilstrap, Columbia Pictures (a division of Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.), and New Times, Inc. (New Times).
As pertinent here, the complaint alleged as follows: In 1963, Keenan and Amsler, acting pursuant to a conspiracy with Irwin, kidnapped Sinatra, Jr., from his Nevada hotel room and drove him to Los Angeles, where he was held until his father paid a ransom. During his captivity, Sinatra, Jr., suffered economic loss, physical suffering, and emotional distress. Keenan, Amsler, and Irwin were later apprehended, tried, convicted of felony offenses, and incarcerated under California law.[5] Following their arrests, the kidnappers made media statements, since admitted to be false, that Sinatra, Jr., had conspired in his own kidnapping to extract money from his father. These defamatory statements caused further damage to Sinatra, Jr.'s business and reputation.
The complaint further alleged: In January 1998, Keenan and one or both accomplices arranged with Gilstrap, or with New Times (publisher of New Times Los Angeles, a tabloid magazine), for Gilstrap to interview Keenan about the kidnapping. *7 The purpose was to produce a story for sale to print, broadcast, and film media. Monies derived from exploiting the kidnapping story would be split among Gilstrap, New Times, and the kidnappers. An article entitled Snatching Sinatra, authored by Gilstrap, appeared in a January 1998 issue of New Times Los Angeles. In late January 1998 and thereafter, other magazines reported that Columbia Pictures had bought the motion picture rights to Snatching Sinatra for up to $1.5 million. In February 1998, citing section 2225, Sinatra, Jr., made demand on Columbia Pictures to withhold from the kidnappers, and from Gilstrap and New Times as the kidnappers' "representatives," any monies otherwise due such persons or entities for the motion picture rights. Columbia Pictures refused to do so without a court order.
The complaint asserted that under section 2225, all monies due to the kidnappers, or to their "representatives" Gilstrap and New Times, for preparation for sale of the story of Sinatra, Jr.'s, kidnapping, the sale of the rights to the story, or the sale of materials that included or were based on the story, were "proceeds" as defined by subdivision (a)(9) and "profits" as defined by subdivision (a)(10), and were thus subject to an involuntary trust in favor of Sinatra, Jr., a statutory "beneficiary" (id., subd. (a)(4)(A)). The complaint sought an order that the defendants, particularly Columbia Pictures and New Times, hold such present and future proceeds and profits in trust for Sinatra, Jr. It also sought an injunction to (1) prevent Columbia Pictures and New Times from paying such proceeds and profits to any other defendant, and (2) require that all such payments be made instead to Sinatra, Jr., to the extent of his damages or, in the alternative, to the superior court for distribution for the benefit of the victims of the kidnapping.
On August 5, 1998, after a hearing at which only Sinatra, Jr., Columbia Pictures, and New Times appeared, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Columbia Pictures, during the pendency of the action, from paying any monies to Keenan, Amsler, Irwin, or their representatives or assigns in connection with the motion picture rights to the story of Sinatra, Jr.'s, kidnapping.[6]
On November 19, 1998, Keenan first appeared in the action by filing, on his own behalf only, a demurrer to the complaint. At the same time, Keenan moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The demurrer asserted, among other things, that section 2225 was facially invalid under the speech clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Keenan's constitutional attack was based solely on a comparison between section 2225 and the New York law struck down in Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.
In this regard, Keenan noted that because the California statute, like its New York counterpart, targeted a criminal's income from telling the story of his crime, it penalized the content of speech, required strict scrutiny, and was not narrowly tailored to compensate crime victims from the profits of crime. Keenan urged that, by the standards set forth in Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476, the California statute was both underinclusive, because it reached only expressive activity, not other *8 sources of crime-related income, and overinclusive, because it penalized all expressive works by convicted felons which included more than passing mention of their crimes.
In response, Sinatra, Jr., asserted that the Simon & Schuster majority had only found New York's law overinclusive. Sinatra, Jr., argued that section 2225 solves the overinclusiveness problem identified in Simon & Schuster by covering only "convicted" felons and exempting expressive materials that contain only a "passing mention of [the] felony." Moreover, he contended, section 2225 is not underinclusive because it is precisely drawn to ensure that victims of crime are compensated before the felon profits from telling the story of their victimization.
On December 22, 1998, the trial court issued an order overruling Keenan's demurrer "for the reasons stated in [Sinatra, Jr.'s,] opposition papers." In the same order, the court denied Keenan's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, reiterating its findings, made when the injunction was granted, that "section 2225[is] not unconstitutional as written ... [and] ... was narrowly drafted to overcome the over-inclusive effects found by the Supreme Court" in Simon & Schuster.
On December 31, 1998, Keenan filed in the Court of Appeal the instant petition for mandate or other appropriate relief. The petition requested a writ directing the superior court to vacate its orders overruling his demurrer and granting the preliminary injunction, to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and to dissolve the preliminary injunction. On January 14, 1999, the Court of Appeal stayed proceedings in the trial court, ordered the parties to appear for oral argument on the merits of the petition, and called for the filing of a return and reply.[7]
The parties' briefs in the Court of Appeal, like those in the trial court, focused entirely on comparisons between California's Son of Sam law and the New York counterpart addressed in Simon & Schuster. Again Keenan claimed the California statute singled out expressive activity for regulation on the basis of content, required strict scrutiny, and was both overinclusive and underinclusive by the standards set in that case. Again Sinatra, Jr., urged that section 2225 solved the overinclusiveness problem identified in Simon & Schuster because, unlike the New York statute, California's law applied only to convicted felons and exempted expressive materials which made mere "passing mention" of the felony.
The Court of Appeal denied writ relief, concluding, among other things, that section 2225 does not infringe constitutional rights of speech. In this regard, the Court of Appeal accepted Sinatra, Jr.'s, arguments that section 2225 lacks the defects of overbreadth identified in Simon & Schuster, because it is limited to convicted felons and does not confiscate a felon's proceeds from expressive materials that contain mere "passing mention" of the felony.
The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether the California statute was impermissibly underinclusive. The court reasoned it need not do so because, contrary to Keenan's insistence, Simon & Schuster had not expressly found the New York statute underinclusive. Because Keenan "does not otherwise elaborate on the issue *9 of underinclusiveness," said the court, "[a]nd since [his] attack on section 2225 is limited to those issues considered in Simon & Schuster, our discussion of the statute is similarly limited." We granted review.[8] We now reverse.
DISCUSSION
In the late 1970's, New York was terrorized by serial killer David Berkowitz, popularly known as the Son of Sam. By the time Berkowitz was apprehended, publicity about the case had enhanced the value of the rights to his story. New York's Legislature sought to prevent Berkowitz and other notorious criminals from exploiting for profit the tales of their sensational crimes while their victims went uncompensated. The resulting statute, discussed in greater detail below, was dubbed the "Son of Sam law." (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 108-110, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.) In 2000, the United States and over 40 states, including California, had some form of Son of Sam law. (See Kealy, A Proposal for a New Massachusetts Notoriety-for-Profit Law: The Grandson of Sam (2000) 22 W. New Eng. L.Rev. 1, 22; Comment, Son of Sam Laws: Killing Free Speech or Promoting Killer Profits? (1999) 20 Whittier L.Rev. 949, 953, & fns. 48, 49.)[9]
California's version, as pertinent here, provides that all past and future "proceeds" (§ 2225, subds.(a)(9), (b)(1)) paid or owing to a "convicted felon" (id., subds. (a)(1), (b)(1)) from the sale of expressive "materials"[10] or the rights thereto (§ 2225, subds.(a)(6), (b)(1)) are subject to an involuntary trust for designated "beneficiaries" (§ 2225(b)(1)) if the materials "include or are based on the story" of the felony (ibid.). A "convicted felon" is one "convicted ..., or found not guilty by reason of insanity" (id., subd. (a)(1)) of a felony, as defined by "any California or United States statute" (id., subd. (a)(2)), which was committed in California (id., subd. (a)(1)). "Story" means "a depiction, portrayal, or reenactment of a felony" but "shall not be taken to mean a passing mention of the felony, as in a footnote or bibliography." (Id., subd. (a)(7).) A "beneficiary" is one who has a legal claim against the convicted felon, including a survivorship or wrongful death claim, for physical, mental, or emotional injury, or pecuniary loss, caused by the felony. (Id., subd. (a)(4).)
The trust continues for five years from the conviction, or from the payment of any covered proceeds to the felon, whichever is later. (§ 2225(b)(1).) The felon's unpaid obligations for restitution, restitution and penalty fines, and crime-related attorney *10 fees have first priority against the trust. (Id., subd. (d).) Within the five-year trust period, beneficiaries may bring actions to recover their respective interests in the remaining funds (id., subd. (c)(1),(2)), and the filing of such an action extends the trust period until such actions are concluded (id., subd. (b)(1)). Each beneficiary's interest is an equitable share, given the funds available, of his or her recoverable damages from the crime, less any compensation already received from the felon or from the Restitution Fund (id, subds. (a)(5), (d)). Payment to the beneficiary may be ordered from proceeds already received by the felon and, as necessary, from proceeds to be received in the future. (Id, subd. (c)(3).)
Within one year after the conviction or the felon's receipt of covered proceeds, whichever is later (§ 2225, subd. (e)(2)), the Attorney General may also bring an action to impose an "express trust" on covered proceeds, thus requiring their placement in a bank depositary (id., subd. (e)(1); see also id., subd. (e)(3)), if he proves it is "more probable than not" that there are beneficiaries entitled to compensation for the felony (id., subd. (e)(3)). Either a beneficiary or the Attorney General may, in appropriate circumstances, obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent waste of proceeds subject to the involuntary trust. (Id, subd. (f)(1), (2).)
Funds subject to the trust, but not claimed by a beneficiary at the end of the trust period, do not revert to the felon's ownership. Instead, they must be transferred to the Controller for allocation to the Restitution Fund. (§ 2225(b)(1); see also id, subd. (e)(3).)
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court struck down a similar New York law in Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476. We conclude the analysis of Simon & Schuster governs this case and renders section 2225(b)(1) invalid as well. Both the New York and California laws impose content-based financial penalties on protected speech. Thus they must, at a minimum, satisfy strict constitutional scrutiny. Both laws seek to serve compelling interests in preventing criminals from exploiting their crimes for profit, and in compensating crime victims from the profits of crime. Yet both laws are overinclusive for those purposes, because they confiscate all income from all expressive materials, whatever their general themes or subjects, that include significant discussions of their creators' past crimes.
Our reasoning requires, of course, a detailed examination of Simon & Schuster. The New York statute there at issue provided that if any person "accused or convicted of a crime in this state" was due money under contract with respect to a "reenactment" of the crime "`by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, [or] live entertainment of any kind,'" or for expressions of the person's thoughts or feelings about the crime, the contract must be reported to the New York State Crime Victims Board (New York Board), and the money due must be paid over to the New York Board to be placed in an escrow account, primarily for the benefit of victims who, within five years thereafter, won money judgments against the criminal. (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 109, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476; see N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(l), (4) (McKinney 1982 & 1991 supp.).) The statute defined "convicted" persons to include those who had "voluntarily and intelligently admitted" crimes for which they were not prosecuted. . (Simon & Schuster, supra, at p. 110, 112 *11 S.Ct. 501, italics omitted; N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(10)(b).)[11]
While the law was in effect, Simon & Schuster, Inc., contracted to finance and publish a book by Henry Hill, a former gangster turned government witness. The book would tell the story of Hill's organized crime career. After considerable investment of time and effort by Hill and his coauthor, the book, Wiseguy, was published in 1986. Its colorful account of Hill's many criminal exploits, and of life inside the Mafia, met with commercial and critical success.
When the New York Board learned of Wiseguy's publication, it invoked the Son of Sam law. After reviewing the book, and Simon & Schuster's contract with Hill, the New York Board determined that all monies paid or owed to Hill under the contract were subject to the statute's escrow provisions. Simon & Schuster was ordered to pay the New York Board all future sums due to Hill, and Hill was ordered to pay the New York Board all sums already remitted to him. Simon & Schuster filed a federal suit, seeking a declaration, under 42 United States Code section 1983, that the New York law was facially invalid under the First Amendment. The federal district court granted the New York Board's motion for summary judgment, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 115, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.)
The United States Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed.[12] Six justices, in an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, first noted that "[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991).... [¶] ... In the context of financial regulation, it bears repeating, as we did in Leathers, that the government's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. 499 U.S. at 448-449, 111 S.Ct. 1438. The First Amendment presumptively places this sort of discrimination beyond the power of the government." (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 115-116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.)
New York's Son of Sam law was a presumptively invalid content-based burden on speech, said the majority, because "[i]t singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, ... is directed only at works with a specified content," and "plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content." (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.) Because the statute penalized speech on the basis of its content, the majority concluded, the law must survive "strict" constitutional scrutiny, i.e., "`the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn *12 to achieve that end.' [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 118, 112 S.Ct. 501.)
The majority emphasized that the state had no compelling interest in shielding readers and victims from negative emotional responses to a criminal's public retelling of his misdeeds. Indeed, the majority observed, the protection of offensive and disagreeable ideas is at the core of the First Amendment. (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 118,112 S.Ct. 501,116 L.Ed.2d 476.) On the other hand, the majority agreed, states do have compelling interests in "ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them" (ibid.), "preventing wrongdoers from dissipating their assets before victims can recover" (ibid.), "ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes" (id., at p. 119, 112 S.Ct. 501), and transferring the fruits of crime from the criminals to their victims (id, at pp. 119-120, 112 S.Ct. 501). Moreover, the majority concluded it could "assume without deciding" that royalties from a criminal's book about his crimes, the form of income at issue in the case before it, "represent ] the fruits of crime." (Id., at p. 119, 112 S.Ct. 501.)
Of course, the majority observed, New York could not defend its statute by narrowly defining the interest at stake in terms of the actual operation of its law. New York claimed a compelling interest in preventing criminals from retaining the profits of storytelling about their crimes before their victims were compensated. However, the majority noted, the state could not show why it had a greater interest in compensating crime victims from the profits of such storytelling than from the criminal's other assets. "Nor [could the state] justif[y] ... a distinction between this expressive activity and any other activity in connection with its interest in transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims." (Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105, 119-120, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.) "In short," the majority concluded, "the State has a compelling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime." (Id., at pp. 120-121, 112 S.Ct. 501.)
Accordingly, the majority reasoned, it must examine whether New York's statute was "narrowly tailored to advance the former, not the latter, objective." (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 121, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.) The New York statute was not so tailored, the majority determined, for "[a]s a means of ensuring that victims are compensated from the proceeds of crime, the Son of Sam law is significantly overinclusive." (Ibid., italics added.) In the majority's view, two factors in particular illustrated the statute's overbreadth. First, "the statute applies to works on any subject, provided that they express the author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally. [Citation.]" (Ibid., italics in original.) Second, "the statute's broad definition of `person convicted of a crime' enables the Board to escrow the income of any author who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
"These two provisions," said the majority, "combine to encompass a potentially very large number of works. Had the Son of Sam law been in effect at the time and place of publication, it would have escrowed payment for such works as The Autobiography of Malcolm X, which describes crimes committed by the civil rights leader before he became a public figure; Civil Disobedience, in which Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes *13 and recalls his experience in jail; and even the Confessions of Saint Augustine, in which the author laments `my past foulness and the carnal corruptions of my soul,' one instance of which involved the theft of pears from a neighboring [orchard]. [Citations.] Amicus Association of American Publishers, Inc., has submitted a sobering bibliography listing hundreds of works by American prisoners and ex-prisoners, many of which contain descriptions of the crimes for which the authors were incarcerated, including works by such authors as Emma Goldman and Martin Luther King, Jr. A list of prominent figures whose autobiographies would be subject to the statute if written is not difficult to construct: The list could include Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason after a dubiously conducted 1603 trial; Jesse Jackson, who was arrested in 1963 for trespass and resisting arrest after attempting to be served at a lunch counter in North Carolina; and Bertrand Russell, who was jailed for seven days at the age of 89 for participating in a sit-down protest against nuclear weapons. The argument that a statute like the Son of Sam law would prevent publication of all of these works is hyperbolesome would have been written without compensationbut the Son of Sam law clearly reaches a wide range of literature that does not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while a victim remains uncompensated." (Simon & Schuster, supra, 502 U.S. 105, 121-122, 112 S.Ct. 501, Additional Information