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Full Opinion
ZINERMON ET AL.
v.
BURCH
Supreme Court of United States.
*114 Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General.
Richard M. Powers argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.[*]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Respondent Darrell Burch brought this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1982 ed.)[1] against the 11 petitioners, who are physicians, administrators, and staff members at Florida State Hospital (FSH) in Chattahoochee, and others. Respondent *115 alleges that petitioners deprived him of his liberty, without due process of law, by admitting him to FSH as a "voluntary" mental patient when he was incompetent to give informed consent to his admission. Burch contends that in his case petitioners should have afforded him procedural safeguards required by the Constitution before involuntary commitment of a mentally ill person, and that petitioners' failure to do so violated his due process rights.
Petitioners argue that Burch's complaint failed to state a claim under § 1983 because, in their view, it alleged only a random, unauthorized violation of the Florida statutes governing admission of mental patients. Their argument rests on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981) (overruled in part not relevant here, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 330-331 (1986)), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984), where this Court held that a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state employee's random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy. The Court in those two cases reasoned that in a situation where the State cannot predict and guard in advance against a deprivation, a postdeprivation tort remedy is all the process the State can be expected to provide, and is constitutionally sufficient.
In the District Court, petitioners did not file an answer to Burch's complaint. They moved, instead, for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted that motion, pointing out that Burch did not contend that Florida's statutory procedure for mental health placement was inadequate to ensure due process, but only that petitioners failed to follow the state procedure. Since the State could not have anticipated or prevented this unauthorized deprivation of Burch's liberty, the District Court reasoned, there was no feasible predeprivation remedy, and, under Parratt and Hudson, the State's postdeprivation tort remedies provided Burch with all the process that was due him.
*116 On appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal; it, too, relied on Parratt and Hudson. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., 804 F. 2d 1549 (1986). The Court of Appeals, however, upon its own motion, ordered rehearing en banc. 812 F. 2d 1339 (1987). On that rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court and remanded the case. 840 F. 2d 797 (1988). Since Burch did not challenge the constitutional adequacy of Florida's statutory procedure, the court assumed that that procedure constituted the process he was due. Id., at 801, n. 8. A plurality concluded that Parratt did not apply because the State could have provided predeprivation remedies. 840 F. 2d, at 801-802. The State had given petitioners the authority to deprive Burch of his liberty, by letting them determine whether he had given informed consent to admission. Petitioners, in the plurality's view, were acting as the State, and since they were in a position to give Burch a hearing, and failed to do so, the State itself was in a position to provide predeprivation process, and failed to do so. Five judges dissented on the ground that the case was controlled by Parratt and Hudson. 840 F. 2d, at 810-814.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict so evident in the divided views of the judges of the Eleventh Circuit that has arisen in the Courts of Appeals over the proper scope of the Parratt rule.[2] 489 U. S. 1064 (1989).
*117 Because this case concerns the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the question before us is a narrow one. We decide only whether the Parratt rule necessarily means that Burch's complaint fails to allege any deprivation of due process, because he was constitutionally entitled to nothing more than what he received an opportunity to sue petitioners in tort for his allegedly unlawful confinement. The broader questions of what procedural safeguards the Due Process Clause requires in the context of an admission to a mental hospital, and whether Florida's statutes meet these constitutional requirements, are not presented in this case. Burch did not frame his action as a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of Florida's mental health statutes. Both before the Eleventh Circuit and in his brief here, he disavowed any challenge to the statutes themselves and restricted his claim to the contention that petitioners' failure to provide constitutionally adequate safeguards in his case violated his due process rights.[3]
*118 II
A
For purposes of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the factual allegations of Burch's complaint are taken as true. Burch's complaint, and the medical records and forms attached to it as exhibits, provide the following factual background:
On December 7, 1981, Burch was found wandering along a Florida highway, appearing to be hurt and disoriented. He was taken to Apalachee Community Mental Health Services (ACMHS) in Tallahassee.[4] ACMHS is a private mental health care facility designated by the State to receive patients suffering from mental illness.[5] Its staff in their evaluation forms stated that, upon his arrival at ACMHS, Burch was hallucinating, confused, and psychotic and believed he was "in heaven." Exhibit B-1 to Complaint. His face and chest were bruised and bloodied, suggesting that he had fallen or had been attacked. Burch was asked to sign forms giving his consent to admission and treatment. He did so. He remained at ACMHS for three days, during which time the facility's staff diagnosed his condition as paranoid schizophrenia and gave him psychotropic medication. On December 10, the staff found that Burch was "in need of longer-term stabilization," Exhibit B-2 to Complaint, and referred him to FSH, a public hospital owned and operated by the State as a mental health treatment facility.[6] Later that day, Burch *119 signed forms requesting admission and authorizing treatment at FSH. Exhibits C-1 and C-2 to Complaint. He was then taken to FSH by a county sheriff.
Upon his arrival at FSH, Burch signed other forms for voluntary admission and treatment. One form, entitled "Request for Voluntary Admission," recited that the patient requests admission for "observation, diagnosis, care and treatment of [my] mental condition," and that the patient, if admitted, agrees "to accept such treatment as may be prescribed by members of the medical and psychiatric staff in accordance with the provisions of expressed and informed consent." Exhibit E-1 to Complaint. Two of the petitioners, Janet V. Potter and Marjorie R. Parker, signed this form as witnesses. Potter is an accredited records technician; Parker's job title does not appear on the form.
On December 23, Burch signed a form entitled "Authorization for Treatment." This form stated that he authorized "the professional staff of [FSH] to administer treatment, except electroconvulsive treatment"; that he had been informed of "the purpose of treatment; common side effects thereof; alternative treatment modalities; approximate length of care"; and of his power to revoke consent to treatment; and that he had read and fully understood the Authorization. Exhibit E-5 to Complaint. Petitioner Zinermon, a staff physician at FSH, signed the form as the witness.
On December 10, Doctor Zinermon wrote a "progress note" indicating that Burch was "refusing to cooperate," would not answer questions, "appears distressed and confused," and "related that medication has been helpful." Exhibit F-8 to Complaint. A nursing assessment form dated December 11 stated that Burch was confused and unable to state the reason for his hospitalization and still believed that "[t]his is heaven." Exhibits F-3 and F-4 to Complaint. Petitioner Zinermon on December 29 made a further report on Burch's condition, stating that, on admission, Burch had been "disoriented, semimute, *120 confused and bizarre in appearance and thought," "not cooperative to the initial interview," and "extremely psychotic, appeared to be paranoid and hallucinating." The doctor's report also stated that Burch remained disoriented, delusional, and psychotic. Exhibit F-5 to Complaint.
Burch remained at FSH until May 7, 1982, five months after his initial admission to ACMHS. During that time, no hearing was held regarding his hospitalization and treatment.
After his release, Burch complained that he had been admitted inappropriately to FHS and did not remember signing a voluntary admission form. His complaint reached the Florida Human Rights Advocacy Committee of the State's Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services (Committee).[7] The Committee investigated and replied to Burch by letter dated April 4, 1984. The letter stated that Burch in fact had signed a voluntary admission form, but that there was "documentation that you were heavily medicated and disoriented on admission and . . . you were probably not competent to be signing legal documents." Exhibit G to Complaint. The letter also stated that, at a meeting of the Committee with FSH staff on August 4, 1983, "hospital administration was made aware that they were very likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent." Ibid.
In February 1985, Burch filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He alleged, among other things, that ACMHS and the 11 individual petitioners, acting under color of Florida law, and "by and through the authority of their respective positions as employees at FSH . . . as part of their regular and official employment at FSH, took part in admitting Plaintiff to FSH *121 as a `voluntary' patient." App. to Pet. for Cert. 200.[8] Specifically, he alleged:
"Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known that Plaintiff was incapable of voluntary, knowing, understanding and informed consent to admission and treatment at FSH. See Exhibit G attached hereto and incorporated herein.[9] Nonetheless, Defendants, and each of them, seized Plaintiff and against Plaintiff's will confined and imprisoned him and subjected him to involuntary commitment and treatment for the period from December 10, 1981, to May 7, 1982. For said period of 149 days, Plaintiff was without the benefit of counsel and no hearing of any sort was held at which he could have challenged his involuntary admission and treatment at FSH.
". . . Defendants, and each of them, deprived Plaintiff of his liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants acted with willful, wanton and reckless disregard of and indifference to Plaintiff's Constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law." Id., at 201-202.
*122 B
Burch's complaint thus alleges that he was admitted to and detained at FSH for five months under Florida's statutory provisions for "voluntary" admission. These provisions are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme under which a person may be admitted to a mental hospital in several different ways.[10]
First, Florida provides for short-term emergency admission. If there is reason to believe that a person is mentally ill and likely "to injure himself or others" or is in "need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf," he may immediately be detained for up to 48 hours. Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(a) (1981). A mental health professional, a law enforcement officer, or a judge may effect an emergency admission. After 48 hours, the patient is to be released unless he "voluntarily gives express and informed consent to evaluation or treatment," or a proceeding for court-ordered evaluation or involuntary placement is initiated. § 394.463(1)(d).
Second, under a court order a person may be detained at a mental health facility for up to five days for evaluation, if he is likely "to injure himself or others" or if he is in "need of care or treatment which, if not provided, may result in neglect or refusal to care for himself and . . . such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his well-being." § 394.463(2)(a). Anyone may petition for a court-ordered evaluation of a person alleged to meet these criteria. After five days, the patient is to be released unless he gives "express and informed consent" to admission and treatment, or unless involuntary placement proceedings are initiated. § 394.463(2)(e).
Third, a person may be detained as an involuntary patient, if he meets the same criteria as for evaluation, and if the facility *123 administrator and two mental health professionals recommend involuntary placement. §§ 394.467(1) and (2). Before involuntary placement, the patient has a right to notice, a judicial hearing, appointed counsel, access to medical records and personnel, and an independent expert examination. § 394.467(3). If the court determines that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary placement, it then decides whether the patient is competent to consent to treatment. If not, the court appoints a guardian advocate to make treatment decisions. § 394.467(3)(a). After six months, the facility must either release the patient, or seek a court order for continued placement by stating the reasons therefor, summarizing the patient's treatment to that point, and submitting a plan for future treatment. §§ 394.467(3) and (4).
Finally, a person may be admitted as a voluntary patient. Mental hospitals may admit for treatment any adult "making application by express and informed consent," if he is "found to show evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for treatment." § 394.465(1)(a). "Express and informed consent" is defined as "consent voluntarily given in writing after sufficient explanation and disclosure . . . to enable the person . . . to make a knowing and willful decision without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coercion." § 394.455(22). A voluntary patient may request discharge at any time. If he does, the facility administrator must either release him within three days or initiate the involuntary placement process. § 394.465(2)(a). At the time of his admission and each six months thereafter, a voluntary patient and his legal guardian or representatives must be notified in writing of the right to apply for a discharge. § 394.465(3).
Burch, in apparent compliance with § 394.465(1), was admitted by signing forms applying for voluntary admission. He alleges, however, that petitioners violated this statute in admitting him as a voluntary patient, because they knew or should have known that he was incapable of making an informed *124 decision as to his admission. He claims that he was entitled to receive the procedural safeguards provided by Florida's involuntary placement procedure, and that petitioners violated his due process rights by failing to initiate this procedure. The question presented is whether these allegations suffice to state a claim under § 1983, in light of Parratt and Hudson.
III
A
To understand the background against which this question arises, we return to the interpretation of § 1983 articulated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) (overruled in part not relevant here, by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 664-689 (1978)). In Monroe, this Court rejected the view that § 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Constitution or are torts under the State's common law. It explained that § 1983 was intended not only to "override" discriminatory or otherwise unconstitutional state laws, and to provide a remedy for violations of civil rights "where state law was inadequate," but also to provide a federal remedy "where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 365 U. S., at 173-174. The Court said:
"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id., at 183.
Thus, overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the question of the existence of a cause of action under § 1983. A plaintiff, for example, may bring a § 1983 action for an unlawful search and seizure despite the fact that the search and seizure violated the State's Constitution or statutes, and *125 despite the fact that there are common-law remedies for trespass and conversion. As was noted in Monroe, in many cases there is "no quarrel with the state laws on the books," id., at 176; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.
This general rule applies in a straightforward way to two of the three kinds of § 1983 claims that may be brought against the State under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Clause incorporates many of the specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. A plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 for state officials' violation of his rights to, e. g., freedom of speech or freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Second, the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S., at 331. As to these two types of claims, the constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is complete when the wrongful action is taken. Id., at 338 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments). A plaintiff, under Monroe v. Pape, may invoke § 1983 regardless of any state-tort remedy that might be available to compensate him for the deprivation of these rights.
The Due Process Clause also encompasses a third type of protection, a guarantee of fair procedure. A § 1983 action may be brought for a violation of procedural due process, but here the existence of state remedies is relevant in a special sense. In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or property" is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law. Parratt, 451 U. S., at 537; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259 (1978) ("Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, *126 or property").[11] The constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law.
In this case, Burch does not claim that his confinement at FSH violated any of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.[12] Burch's complaint could be read to include a substantive due process claim, but that issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari, and we express no view on whether the facts Burch alleges could give rise to such a claim.[13] The *127 claim at issue falls within the third, or procedural, category of § 1983 claims based on the Due Process Clause.
B
Due process, as this Court often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation. To determine what procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh several factors:
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).
Applying this test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property. See, e. g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) (" `[T]he root requirement' of the Due Process Clause" is " `that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected interest' "; hearing required before termination of employment (emphasis in original)); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 606-607 (1979) (determination by neutral physician whether statutory admission standard is met required before confinement of child in mental hospital); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 18 (1978) (hearing required before cutting off utility service); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 579 (1975) (at minimum, due process requires "some kind of notice and . . . some kind of hearing" (emphasis in original); informal hearing required before suspension of students from *128 public school); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974) (hearing required before forfeiture of prisoner's goodtime credits); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80-84 (1972) (hearing required before issuance of writ allowing repossession of property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970) (hearing required before termination of welfare benefits).
In some circumstances, however, the Court has held that a statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common-law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process. See, e. g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 436 (1982) (" `[T]he necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation process' " may mean that a postdeprivation remedy is constitutionally adequate, quoting Parratt, 451 U. S., at 539); Memphis Light, 436 U. S., at 19 ("[W]here the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures . . . are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination," a prior hearing may not be required); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 682 (1977) (hearing not required before corporal punishment of junior high school students); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 619-620 (1974) (hearing not required before issuance of writ to sequester debtor's property).
This is where the Parratt rule comes into play. Parratt and Hudson represent a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, in which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide. In Parratt, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action because prison employees negligently had lost materials he had ordered by mail.[14] The prisoner did not dispute that he had a postdeprivation remedy. Under state law, a tort-claim procedure *129 was available by which he could have recovered the value of the materials. 451 U. S., at 543-544. This Court ruled that the tort remedy was all the process the prisoner was due, because any predeprivation procedural safeguards that the State did provide, or could have provided, would not address the risk of this kind of deprivation. The very nature of a negligent loss of property made it impossible for the State to predict such deprivations and provide predeprivation process. The Court explained:
"The justifications which we have found sufficient to uphold takings of property without any predeprivation process are applicable to a situation such as the present one involving a tortious loss of a prisoner's property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee. In such a case, the loss is not a result of some established state procedure and the State cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur. It is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place." Id., at 541.
Given these special circumstances, it was clear that the State, by making available a tort remedy that could adequately redress the loss, had given the prisoner the process he was due. Thus, Parratt is not an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but rather an application of that test to the unusual case in which one of the variables in the Mathews equation the value of predeprivation safeguards is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. Therefore, no matter how significant the private interest at stake and the risk of its erroneous deprivation, see Mathews, 424 U. S., at 335, the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.
In Hudson, the Court extended this reasoning to an intentional deprivation of property. A prisoner alleged that, during a search of his prison cell, a guard deliberately and maliciously destroyed some of his property, including legal *130 papers. Again, there was a tort remedy by which the prisoner could have been compensated. 468 U. S., at 534-535. In Hudson, as in Parratt, the state official was not acting pursuant to any established state procedure, but, instead, was apparently pursuing a random, unauthorized personal vendetta against the prisoner. 468 U. S., at 521, n. 2, 532. The Court pointed out: "The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct." Id., at 533. Of course, the fact that the guard's conduct was intentional meant that he himself could "foresee" the wrongful deprivation and could prevent it simply by refraining from his misconduct. Nonetheless, the Court found that an individual state employee's ability to foresee the deprivation is "of no consequence," because the proper inquiry under Parratt is "whether the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process." 468 U. S., at 534 (emphasis added).
C
Petitioners argue that the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper because, as in Parratt and Hudson, the State could not possibly have provided predeprivation process to prevent the kind of "random, unauthorized" wrongful deprivation of liberty Burch alleges, so the postdeprivation remedies provided by Florida's statutory and common law necessarily are all the process Burch was due.[15]
*131 Before turning to that issue, however, we must address a threshold question raised by Burch. He argues that Parratt and Hudson cannot apply to his situation, because those cases are limited to deprivations of property, not liberty.[16]
Burch alleges that he was deprived of his liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital without either informed consent[17] or the procedural safeguards of the involuntary placement process. Petitioners do not seriously dispute that there is a substantial liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-492 (1980) (commitment to mental hospital entails " `a massive curtailment of liberty,' " and requires due process protection); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S., at 600 (there is a "substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979) ("[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (due process requires at least that the nature and duration of commitment to a mental hospital "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose" of the commitment). Burch's confinement at FSH for five months without a hearing or any other procedure to determine either that he validly had consented to admission, or that he met the statutory standard for involuntary placement, clearly infringes on this liberty interest.
Burch argues that postdeprivation tort remedies are never constitutionally adequate for a deprivation of liberty, as opposed to property, so the Parratt rule cannot apply to this *132 case. We, however, do not find support in precedent for a categorical distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of property. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one"); Wolff, 418 U. S., at 557-558 (a hearing is generally required before final deprivation of property interests, and "a person's liberty is equally protected"). In Parratt itself, the Court said, 451 U. S., at 542, that its analysis was "quite consistent with the approach taken" in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), a liberty interest case.
It is true that Parratt and Hudson concerned deprivations of property. It is also true that Burch's interest in avoiding five months' confinement is of an order different from inmate Parratt's interest in mail-order materials valued at $23.50. But the reasoning of Parratt and Hudson emphasizes the State's inability to provide predeprivation process because of the random and unpredictable nature of the deprivation, not the fact that only property losses were at stake. In situations where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking. See Loudermill, 470 U. S., at 542; Memphis Light, 436 U. S., at 18; Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 80-84; Goldberg, 397 U. S., at 264. Conversely, in situations where a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake, see Ingraham, 430 U. S., at 682, or where the State is truly unable to anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest, post-deprivation remedies might satisfy due process. Thus, the fact that a deprivation of liberty is involved in this case does not automatically preclude application of the Parratt rule.
To determine whether, as petitioners contend, the Parratt rule necessarily precludes § 1983 liability in this case, we must ask whether predeprivation procedural safeguards could address the risk of deprivations of the kind Burch alleges. *133 To do this, we examine the risk involved. The risk is that some persons who come into Florida's mental health facilities will apparently be willing to sign forms authorizing admission and treatment, but will be incompetent to give the "express and informed consent" required for voluntary placement under § 394.465(1)(a). Indeed, the very nature of mental illness makes if foreseeable that a person needing mental health care will be unable to understand any proffered "explanation and disclosure of the subject matter" of the forms that person is asked to sign, and will be unable "to make a knowing and willful decision" whether to consent to admission.[18] § 394.455(22) (definition of informed consent). A person who is willing to sign forms but is incapable of making an informed decision is, by the same token, unlikely to benefit from the voluntary patient's statutory right to request discharge. See § 394.465(2)(a). Such a person thus is in danger of being confined indefinitely without benefit of the procedural safeguards of the involuntary placement process, a process specifically designed to protect persons incapable of looking after their own interests. See §§ 394.467(2) and (3) (providing for notice, judicial hearing, counsel, examination by independent expert, appointment of guardian advocate, etc.).
Persons who are mentally ill and incapable of giving informed consent to admission would not necessarily meet the statutory standard for involuntary placement, which requires either that they are likely to injure themselves or others, or that their neglect or refusal to care for themselves threatens their well-being. See § 394.467(1)(b).