23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239 104 P.3d 813

AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF OAKLAND et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S119869.

Supreme Court of California.

January 31, 2005.

*455 Severson & Werson, Mark Joseph Kenney, Jan T. Chilton and Donald J. Querio, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Arnold & Porter, Laurence J. Hutt, Los Angeles, Dennis G. Lyons, Howard N. Cayne, Michael C. O'Brien and Nancy L. Perkins, Washington, D.C., for California Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet and Bradley S. Pauley, Encino, for National Home Equity Mortgage Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

John A. Russo, City Attorney, Barbara J. Parker, Chief Assistant City Attorney, John Truxaw and Daniel Rossi, Deputy City Attorneys; Cotchett, Pitre, Simon & McCarthy, Joseph W. Cotchett, Burlingame, Marie Seth Weiner, Redwood City, Steven N. Williams, Burlingame and Jamie N. Gonzalez, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Appellants.

Norma P. Garcia for Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Kevin D. Stein for California Reinvestment Committee as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Maeve Elise Brown for the National Housing Project, AARP, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Congress of California Seniors, Consumer Credit Counseling Service of the East Bay, Lao Family Community Development, Inc., and Spanish Speaking Unity Council of Alameda County, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Paul S. Cohen for Centro Legal de la Raza and La Raza Centro Legal as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Robert Gnaizda, San Francisco, for Greenling Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Patricia G. Price for Legal Assistance for Seniors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

John T. Fellows III, City Attorney (Torrance) for The League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

*454 BROWN, J.

"Predatory lending" is a term generally used to characterize a range of abusive and aggressive lending practices, including deception or fraud, charging excessive fees and interest rates, making loans without regard to a borrower's ability to repay, or refinancing loans repeatedly over a short period of time to incur additional fees without any economic gain to the borrower. Predatory lending is most likely to occur in the rapidly growing "subprime" mortgage market, which is a market generally providing access to borrowers with impaired credit, limited income, or high debt relative to their income. Mortgages in this market tend to be in smaller amounts, and with faster prepayments and significantly higher interest rates and fees, than "prime" mortgages.

In 2001, California enacted legislation to combat predatory lending practices that typically occur in the subprime home mortgage market. (Fin.Code,^[1] §§ 4970-4979.8 (Division 1.6).)^[2] Eight days before *456 Division 1.6 was signed into law by the Governor, the City of Oakland adopted an ordinance regulating predatory lending practices in the Oakland home mortgage market.^[3]

We consider whether the Ordinance is preempted by Division 1.6, and if not, whether the Ordinance is nevertheless preempted by Civil Code section 1916.12. We conclude that the Ordinance is preempted by Division 1.6, and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[4]

On October 15, 2001, American Financial Services Association (AFSA) filed this action against the City of Oakland and the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland (City) seeking a declaration that the Ordinance was preempted by state law, and an injunction against its enforcement. On October 25, 2001, by stipulated order, the Ordinance was stayed pending, as relevant here, final resolution of this action. In December 2001, the trial court denied AFSA's motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance, and AFSA appealed from that order.

The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On June 21, 2002, the trial court entered an order finding that the Ordinance was preempted to the extent that it exempted federally chartered lending institutions from its restrictions. The court held that the sentence exempting such institutions should be severed from the Ordinance. Subject to elimination of the federal exemption, the court denied AFSA's summary judgment motion and granted the City's. Judgment was entered severing the sentence exempting federal lenders, dismissing AFSA's complaint, and deeming the Ordinance valid as modified.

AFSA appealed from the judgment, and the City cross-appealed. The Court of Appeal ordered the appeals and cross-appeal consolidated. The court held the Ordinance was not preempted by either Division 1.6 or Civil Code section 1916.12. It reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it ordered severance of the portion of the Ordinance exempting federally chartered lenders from its coverage. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. AFSA's appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot.

We granted AFSA's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Background

According to its legislative history, the purpose of Division 1.6 was to regulate and thereby curtail predatory lending practices that typically occur in the sub-prime *457 mortgage market.^[5] Division 1.6 applies to any "covered loan," which is a "consumer loan in which the original principal balance of the loan does not exceed" $250,000 "in the case of a mortgage or deed of trust," and either of two conditions are met.^[6] (§ 4970, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B).) A "consumer loan" is defined as "a consumer credit transaction that is secured by real property located in this state used, or intended to be used or occupied, as the principal dwelling of the consumer that is improved by a one-to-four residential unit." (§ 4970, subd. (d).) A consumer loan does not include a bridge loan, a reverse mortgage, an open line of credit as defined by federal regulation, or a "consumer credit transaction that is secured by rental property or second homes." (§ 4970, subd. (d).)

Division 1.6 contains numerous prohibitions and limitations with respect to covered loans. For example, a person who originates covered loans shall not (1) "make a covered loan that finances points and fees in excess of" the higher of $1,000 or 6 percent of the original principal balance, exclusive of points and fees (§ 4979.6); (2) "make or arrange a covered loan unless at the time the loan is consummated, the person reasonably believes the consumer ... will be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the obligation based" on specified factors (§ 4973, subd. (f)(1)); (3) "pay a contractor under a home-improvement contract from the proceeds of a covered loan other than by an instrument payable to the consumer," both the consumer and the contractor, or under certain circumstances to a third party escrow agent (id., subd. (g)); (4) "recommend or encourage a consumer to default on an existing consumer loan or other debt in connection with the solicitation or making of a covered loan that refinances all or any portion of the existing consumer loan or debt" (id., subd. (h)); (5) "refinance or arrange for the refinancing of a consumer loan such that the new loan is a covered loan that is made for the purpose of refinancing, debt consolidation or cash out, that does not result in an identifiable benefit to the consumer" after considering various factors (id., subd. (j)); (6) "steer, counsel, or direct any prospective consumer to accept a loan product with a risk grade less favorable than the risk grade that the consumer would qualify for" based on certain information (id., subd. (l)(1)); (7) "finance, directly or indirectly, into a consumer loan or finance to the same borrower within 30 days of a consumer loan any credit life, credit disability, *458 credit property, or credit unemployment insurance premiums, or any debt cancellation or suspension agreement fees, provided that credit insurance premiums, debt cancellation, or suspension fees calculated and paid on a monthly basis shall not be considered financed by the person originating the loan" (§ 4979.7); (8) structure a loan transaction as an open-end credit plan for the purpose of evading Division 1.6 if the "loan would have been a covered loan if the loan had been structured as a closed end loan" (§ 4973, subd. (m)(1)); (9) divide any loan transaction into separate parts for the purpose of evading Division 1.6 (§ 4973, subd. (m)(2)); or (10) "act in any manner, whether specifically prohibited by this section or of a different character [sic], that constitutes fraud" (id., subd. (n)).

Moreover, a covered loan shall not (1) include a "prepayment fee or penalty after the first 36 months after the date of" loan consummation, but "may include a prepayment fee or penalty up to the first 36 months after the date of" loan consummation under certain conditions (§ 4973, subd. (a)); (2) "contain a provision for negative amortization such that the payment schedule for regular monthly payments causes the principal balance to increase, unless the covered loan is a first mortgage" and appropriate disclosure made (id., subd. (c)); (3) "include terms under which periodic payments required under the loan are consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds" (id., subd. (d)); (4) "contain a provision that increases the interest rate as a result of a default" except under certain circumstances (id., subd. (e)); (5) generally "contain a call provision that permits the lender, in its sole discretion, to accelerate the indebtedness" (id., subd. (i)); or (6) be made unless a seven-paragraph disclosure form set forth in section 4973, subdivision (k)(1), which includes encouragement to the borrower to consider financial counseling, is provided to the consumer no later than three business days before signing of the loan documents. A "covered loan with a term of 5 years or less may not provide at origination for a payment schedule with regular periodic payments that when aggregated do not fully amortize the principal balance as of the maturity date of the loan." (§ 4973, subd. (b)(1).) "For a payment schedule that is adjusted to account for the seasonal or irregular income of the consumer, the total installments in any year shall not exceed the amount of one year's worth of payments on the loan." (§ 4973, subd. (b)(2).) In addition, a "person who provides brokerage services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by soliciting lenders or otherwise negotiating a consumer loan secured by real property, is the fiduciary of the consumer, and any violation of the person's fiduciary duties shall be a violation of" section 4979.5. (§ 4979.5, subd. (a).) "Except for a broker or a person who provides brokerage services," however, "no licensed person or subsequent assignee shall have administrative, civil, or criminal liability for a violation of" section 4979.5. (§ 4979.5, subd. (b).)

Similarly, the Ordinance regulates predatory lending practices in home loans in Oakland. (Oak.Mun.Code, §§ 5.33.010, 5.33.030.) A "home loan" does not include a reverse mortgage, and is defined as a "loan of money, including without limitation a line of credit or an open-end credit plan," if certain criteria apply. (Id., § 5.33.030.) One criteria is that the "principal amount of the loan does not exceed the current conforming first mortgage loan size limit for a single-family dwelling as established by the Federal National Mortgage Association." (Ibid.) Since January *459 1, 2005, that amount has been $359,650.^[7] In addition, the borrower must incur the loan primarily for personal, family, or household uses, and the loan must be secured in whole or in part by a deed of trust, mortgage, or similar security device on real property located within Oakland. (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.030.) The real property must (or will) contain either one-to-four residential units or "individual residential units of condominiums or cooperatives," one of which is or will be the borrower's principal dwelling. (Ibid.)

A "high-cost" home loan is a home loan that meets one of two specified thresholds.^[8] (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.030.) The Court of Appeal observed that the "`high-cost home loan' interest rate and fee thresholds are both lower than the threshold levels for `covered loans' set by [Division 1.6]...." "[I]t is undisputed that the high-cost loan provisions of the Ordinance would apply to all home loans falling under the `covered loan' provisions of the state statute, and also reach some loans that do not come under the state law provisions."

Like Division 1.6, the Ordinance contains numerous prohibitions and limitations with respect to home loans and "high-cost" home loans. The Ordinance prohibits prepayment penalties for high-cost and certain refinanced home loans, and limits prepayment penalties for other home loans. (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.040(A).) For home loans generally, no lender may (1) "finance any credit life, credit disability, credit property, or credit unemployment insurance, or any other life or health insurance premiums when making a home loan"; (2) "recommend or encourage a borrower to default or not to make a payment on a home loan or any other debt, when such lender action is in connection with the closing or planned closing of a home loan that refinances all or part of the borrower's debt"; or (3) "make a home loan that violates any applicable provision" of certain federal laws regulating lending. (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.040(B), (C), (D).)

In addition, the following practices are prohibited for high-cost home loans: (1) making the loan without obtaining written *460 certification from an independent and approved housing or credit counselor that the borrower has contacted the counselor and either received counseling about the advisability of the loan transaction or waived in writing the counseling option; (2) making a loan unless the lender reasonably believes the borrower will be able to make the scheduled payments based on certain detailed criteria; (3) financing points and fees exceeding $800 or 5 percent of the loan amount, whichever is greater; (4) making a loan "that includes terms under which more than two periodic payments required under the loan are consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the borrower"; (5) charging a fee to modify, renew, extend, or amend a loan or defer any payment, except under certain conditions; (6) including terms that allow the lender to accelerate the indebtedness in its discretion except for certain circumstances; (7) including a provision increasing the interest rate if the borrower defaults or is delinquent, except in certain circumstances; (8) making a loan that "pays off all or part of an existing home loan or other debt of the borrower, and the borrower does not receive a reasonable and tangible net benefit from the new high-cost home loan considering all the circumstances," as delineated; and (9) making a loan that "pays off all or part of an existing home loan, and such existing loan" is a specified government or nonprofit loan unless an independent housing or credit counselor has determined that the refinance is in the borrower's best interests. (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.050.)

Thus, Division 1.6 and the Ordinance are similar in that they regulate the same subject matter, i.e., predatory lending practices in home mortgages. However, Division 1.6 and the Ordinance differ in significant respects with regard to how they regulate these predatory practices. For example, Division 1.6 does "not impose liability on an assignee that is a holder in due course" and the provisions of the division do not apply to "persons chartered by Congress to engage in secondary mortgage market transactions." (Fin.Code, § 4979.8.) The Ordinance expressly applies to a holder in due course. (Oak. Mun. Code, § 5.33.070 ["Any person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a home loan is subject to all claims, actions and defenses related to that home loan that the borrower, the City Attorney, or others could assert against the original lender"].) Moreover, Division 1.6 permits prepayment penalties under certain conditions during the first 36 months of the loan; the Ordinance prohibits them for all high-cost and certain refinanced home loans, and limits them for other home loans. (Fin. Code, § 4973, subd. (a); Oak. Mun.Code, § 5.33.040(A).) In addition, Division 1.6 requires that borrowers be encouraged in writing to seek loan counseling; the Ordinance prohibits a high-cost home loan being made without either the borrower receiving loan counseling or giving the credit counselor a written waiver of counseling. (Fin.Code, § 4973, subd. (k)(1); Oak. Mun. Code, § 5.33.050(A).)

In addition to other enforcement mechanisms, Division 1.6 and the Ordinance both allow for civil and criminal penalties and for civil enforcement by borrowers, including punitive damages. (Fin.Code, §§ 4975, subd. (c), 4977, subds. (b), (c), 4978, subds. (a), (b)(2); Oak. Mun.Code, §§ 5.33.080, 5.33.100.) However, Division 1.6 imposes civil penalties up to $25,000 per violation; the Ordinance imposes such penalties up to the amount of $50,000. (Fin.Code, § 4977, subd. (b); Oak. Mun.Code, § 5.33.080(D).) Under Division 1.6, the amounts collected from such civil penalties are to be used by the "licensing agency, subject to appropriation by the Legislature, for the purposes of education and *461 enforcement in connection with abusive lending practices." (Fin.Code, § 4977, subd. (g).) The amounts collected by the Ordinance presumably simply go into the city coffers. Punitive damages are available under Division 1.6 "upon a finding that such damages are warranted pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code," which requires "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice" (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (a)); the Ordinance allows punitive damages "if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the lender has shown reckless disregard for the rights of the borrower." (Fin.Code, § 4978, subd. (b)(2); Oak. Mun. Code, § 5.33.080(A)(5).) Division 1.6 provides that nothing in section 4978, which addresses civil liability, "is intended, nor shall be construed, to abrogate existing common law provisions prohibiting double recovery of damages." (Fin.Code, § 4978, subd. (c).) The Ordinance, however, expressly notes its remedies "are cumulative. The protections and remedies provided under this chapter are in addition to other protections and remedies that may be otherwise available under law. Nothing in this chapter is intended to limit the rights of any injured person to recover damages or pursue any other legal or equitable action under any other applicable law or legal theory." (Oak.Mun.Code, § 5.33.080(E).)

We now turn to the question of whether these similarities and differences may coexist or, if instead, the Ordinance is preempted by Division 1.6.

B. Analysis

"Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, `[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.'" (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534 (Sherwin-Williams).) In addition, charter cities such as Oakland may adopt and enforce ordinances that conflict with general state laws, provided the subject of the regulation is a "municipal affair" rather than one of "statewide concern." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5;^[9] Oak. City Charter, § 106; see Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 399, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 841 P.2d 990.) Here, however, the City reasonably concedes regulation of predatory practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide concern. Under these circumstances, the parties agree that if the Ordinance conflicts with state law, it is preempted.

A conflict between state law and an ordinance exists if the ordinance duplicates or is coextensive therewith, is contradictory or inimical thereto, or enters an area either expressly or impliedly fully occupied by general law. (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.) Relying solely on the Legislature's failure to include express preemption language and the unique local interests of Oakland, the City contends that Division 1.6 sets only "statewide minimum standards, not statewide uniform standards, for subprime home mortgage lending." We conclude *462 that in enacting Division 1.6 the Legislature has impliedly fully occupied the field of regulation of predatory practices in home mortgage lending, and hence the Ordinance is preempted on this ground.

"[I]t is well settled that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by statute." (Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280 (Tolman).) "[L]ocal legislation enters an area that is `fully occupied' by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to `fully occupy' the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent: `(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the' locality [citations]." (Sherwin-Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.)

Here, of course, there is no express preemption language in Division 1.6. However, there are clear indications of the Legislature's implicit intent to fully occupy the field of regulation of predatory lending tactics in home mortgages.

"Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme." (Tolman, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 712, 249 P.2d 280; Wilson v. Beville (1957) 47 Cal.2d 852, 859, 306 P.2d 789 (Wilson) [same]; In re Lane (1962) 58 Cal.2d 99, 102-103, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (Lane).) "State regulation of a subject may be so complete and detailed as to indicate an intent to preclude local regulation. [Citations.] In this connection it may be significant that the subject is one which ... requires uniform treatment throughout the state." (Chavez v. Sargent (1959) 52 Cal.2d 162, 177, 339 P.2d 801 (Chavez), disapproved on other grounds in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Emp., Laundry Drivers and Helpers (1960) 53 Cal.2d 455, 474-475, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76.)

"The denial of power to a local body when the state has preempted the field is not based solely upon the superior authority of the state. It is a rule of necessity, based upon the need to prevent dual regulations that could result in uncertainty and confusion. Thus, the term `conflict' as used in section 11 of article XI has been held not to be limited to a mere conflict in language, but applies equally to a conflict of jurisdiction." (Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1960) 53 Cal.2d 674, 682, 3 Cal.Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974.) "Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire control over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases as far as local legislation is concerned." (Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 102, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897; id. at p. 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 ["where the state has fully occupied the field, there is no room for additional requirements by local legislation"]; Wilson, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 859, 306 P.2d 789 ["general rule that charter provisions cannot control in matters of statewide concern where the state has occupied *463 the field"].) "Where a statute and an ordinance are identical it is obvious that the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been occupied by state legislation." (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 371, 125 P.2d 482.)

Thus, in Wilson, supra, 47 Cal.2d at page 856, 306 P.2d 789, we held that a person seeking compensation for a municipal taking does not lose his claim by failing to file it with the city as required by the city charter. We observed the "exercise of the power of eminent domain is a matter of statewide concern." (Id. at p. 859, 306 P.2d 789.) "The Legislature has provided a complete and detailed system for exercising the right of eminent domain and assessing compensation," such that charter provisions making more onerous the recovery of compensation were invalid. (Id. at pp. 859-861, 306 P.2d 789; id. at p. 860, 306 P.2d 789 ["The Legislature has fully occupied the field of eminent domain"].) "If the city may enact such legislation or charter provisions the land owner is denied equal protection of the laws for the state statute would fix the limitation where the condemnor was a public utility but a different one would prevail where the condemnor was a municipal corporation. There is no distinction between such condemnors. The city along with public utilities are made equally liable by the Constitution." (Id. at p. 861, 306 P.2d 789.)

Similarly, in Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 29 Cal.2d 661, 664-665, 177 P.2d 558 (Eastlick), the plaintiff's claim in a personal injury action based on state law "concededly was complete as measured by the requirements of the state law." However, the city argued judgment in the plaintiff's favor should be reversed because of her failure to itemize the damages in her claim as required by the city charter. (Id. at pp. 664-665, 177 P.2d 558.) We held that the Legislature had provided "a general scheme for the presentation of such liability claims to be effective throughout the state.... [W]ith respect to the subjects covered, the [state] statute occupies the entire field and it impliedly precludes control to that extent by municipal or local regulation." (Id. at p. 666, 177 P.2d 558.) A municipality "may not impose more onerous conditions affecting any other matter covered by the statute, such as the contents of the claim." (Id. at p. 667, 177 P.2d 558.) "[T]he provisions of that statute `are exclusive' in regulating the presentation of claims arising under the Public Liability Act, and no city charter provisions relating to the presentation of claims whether adopted before or after the effective date of the statute, are applicable within the field covered thereby." (Id. at p. 668, 177 P.2d 558.)

Likewise in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 152, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001, we held that a charter city's "requirement that landlords obtain certificates of eviction before seeking repossession of rent-controlled units cannot stand in the face of state statutes that fully occupy the field of landlord's possessory remedies." We observed that requiring "landlords to fulfill the elaborate prerequisites for the issuance of a certificate of eviction by the rent control board before they commence the [state] statutory proceeding would nullify the intended summary nature of the remedy." (Id. at p. 151, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001.) Citing Wilson, supra, 47 Cal.2d 852, 306 P.2d 789, and Eastlick, supra, 29 Cal.2d 661, 177 P.2d 558, we also noted that "[c]ity charter provisions purporting to impose far less burdensome prerequisites upon the exercise of statutory remedies have been held to be invalid invasions of the field fully occupied by the statute." (Birkenfeld, at p. 152, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001; Healy v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 118, 122, 258 P.2d 1 *464 [If "there is any conflict between charter provisions and the compensation sections of the Labor Code, the latter must prevail. Under power expressly granted to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has established a complete system of workmen's compensation which obviously is a subject of state-wide concern, and it is well settled that in such matters the general law is paramount"]; Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 103-105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 ["city ordinance attempting to make sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other criminal is in conflict with the state law and is void" given the "Penal Code sections covering the criminal aspects of sexual activity are so extensive in their scope that they clearly show an intention by the Legislature to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of this subject," and "although living in a state of cohabitation and adultery is prohibited [citation], neither simple fornication or adultery alone nor living in a state of cohabitation and fornication has been made a crime in this state"]; Isaac v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 586, 599, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 752 (Isaac) [ordinance giving a utility lien priority over other recorded liens invalid "because it disrupts California's statewide statutory scheme of lien priority"]; id. at p. 600, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 ["lien priorities on real property a matter of statewide concern because statewide uniformity in lien priority is essential"].)

Like the statutory schemes considered in Wilson, Eastlick, and Birkenfeld, Division 1.6 comprehensively regulates predatory lending practices in home mortgages. It delineates at length what mortgages are covered, what lending acts are prohibited, who can be held liable for violations of Division 1.6, the various enforcement mechanisms available, who may invoke such enforcement mechanisms, and defenses to such violations. The provisions of Division 1.6 "are so extensive in their scope that they clearly show an intention by the Legislature to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of" predatory lending tactics in home mortgages. (Lane, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 103, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897.)

Moreover, in regulating such lending tactics in home mortgages, the Legislature was not suddenly entering an area previously governed by municipalities and unexplored at a statewide level. To the contrary, as the City acknowledges, regulation of mortgage lenders has historically occurred at the state, not the municipal, level. (See, e.g., Fin.Code, §§ 5000 et seq. [Savings Association Law], 50000 et seq. [California Residential Mortgage Lending Act]; Civ.Code, §§ 2947-2955.5 [mortgage of real property provisions].) In determining whether the Legislature intended to occupy the field of regulation of predatory home mortgage lending, we consider this historical role, and view Division 1.6 not in isolation, but as part of an overall legislative scheme addressing mortgage lending. As the Legislative Counsel's Digest to Division 1.6 notes, "Existing law provides for regulation of banks and savings associations by the Department of Financial Institutions. Existing law provides for regulation of real estate brokers by the Department of Real Estate. Existing law provides for regulation of finance lenders and residential mortgage lenders by the Department of Corporations. Existing law provides that willful violations of provisions governing savings associations, real estate brokers, and residential mortgage lenders are crimes. [¶] This bill would impose various requirements on consumer loans secured by specified real property, defined as `covered loans.'" (Stats.2001, ch. 732.)

Indeed, when asked at oral argument, the City could point to no other instance in *465 over 150 years of state history where a municipality had attempted to regulate mortgage lending. Thus, state activity in the area of regulation of mortgage lending was not only historically dominant, it was exclusive. (Cf. United States v. Locke (2000) 529 U.S. 89, 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 [finding no presumption against federal preemption regarding regulation of maritime commerce]; compare Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 974, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422 [strong presumption against federal preemption of state wine label regulation given that state activity in this area historically extensive and dominant].) Thus, mortgage lending is unlike the area of gun control law, on which the City and the dissent rely, in which courts have concluded that the Legislature has chosen to legislate narrowly, and "rather than intending to deprive municipalities of