New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe

OPINION

{1} Plaintiffs New Mexicans for Free Enterprise, the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce, and several local business owners challenge an ordinance enacted by the City of Santa Fe mandating certain city-based businesses to pay a minimum wage higher than the current state and federal minimum hourly wage. Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is beyond the power of a home rule municipality to enact and that the state minimum wage law preempts local policymaking in this area. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance is a taking of private property and that the ordinance’s exemption for small businesses violates equal protection guarantees. Finally, Plaintiffs seek to have the ordinance struck down because the City failed to follow its own rules in passing the ordinance and the trial court abused its discretion in regulating discovery for expert testimony at trial. We conclude that a home rule municipality may set a minimum wage higher than that required by the state Minimum Wage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 50-4-19 to -30 (1955, as amended through 2003), because of the independent powers possessed by municipalities in New Mexico and the absence of any conflict with state law. Unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ other arguments, we therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that the minimum wage ordinance is within the power of the City to enact and is otherwise constitutional.

BACKGROUND

{2} The significant facts in this ease are those surrounding the processes by which the City passed the ordinance as well as the particular provisions of the ordinance. In 2002, the City passed the first version of the ordinance setting a minimum wage above that of the federal and state minimum wages for its own workers, contractors doing substantial business with the City, and other businesses directly receiving city benefits. Santa Fe, N.M., Wage Requirements: Minimum Wage Payment Requirements, eh. XXVIII, § 1.5 (2003). The City also established a Living Wage Roundtable that was directed to “explore and develop” an amendment to the 2002 ordinance that would mandate a living wage for the entire city. The Roundtable reviewed a substantial amount of information regarding local wages, cost of living, the daily challenges faced by both workers and employers in Santa Fe, and the costs and benefits of minimum wage requirements. The Roundtable consisted of nine members representing both labor and business management.

{3} The Roundtable presented majority and minority recommendations to the city council, with management members writing the minority report. The majority recommended, among other things, amending the ordinance to impose minimum wage requirements on all employers citywide, except those with fewer than ten employees. The majority also recommended that there be no credits for employer-provided benefits and that tips be excluded from the wage calculation. The minority, on the other hand, recommended further study to determine the potential impact to the Santa Fe economy and unemployment prior to any further action.

{4} The city council then held public hearings on the amended ordinance proposed by the Roundtable majority, and received input from over 150 speakers on both sides of the issue. Several economists provided input on the impact minimum wage increases would have upon the local economy, businesses, and workers. One economist represented to the city council that the federal and state minimum wage has declined significantly in real dollars.

{5} The council and the Roundtable both had information detailing the Santa Fe employment scene, including figures of how many low-wage workers worked in particular businesses. Early versions of the amended ordinance excluded small businesses, which they defined as those employing fewer than ten workers. On the night that the council was to vote on the amendments to the ordinance, the council expanded the small business exemption by requiring compliance by only those businesses with twenty-five or more workers. The councilor making the proposal noted that expanding the exemption for small businesses would approximately cut in half the number of private businesses impacted while reducing the percentage of Santa Fe low-wage workers benefitting from the higher wage from around 75 percent to around 58 percent.

{6} The amendments to the ordinance passed by a vote of seven to one. The ordinance as amended requires for-profit businesses or non-profit entities that are registered or licensed in Santa Fe and that employ twenty-five or more workers (either full-time or part-time) to pay a minimum hourly wage of $8.50. Id. § 1.5(A)(4), (C). This wage increases to $9.50 in 2006 and to $10.50 in 2008; thereafter, the hourly wage is to be increased in tandem with increases in the Consumer Price Index. Id. § 1.5(B). Employers receive an hourly wage credit for employer-provided health care and childcare. Id. § 1.5(B). Tips are included in the wage calculation if the employee customarily receives at least $100 per month in tips. Id. The ordinance made a violation of its terms a misdemeanor and included provisions for enforcement by the city manager as well as by private, civil actions against an employer. Santa Fe, N.M., Wage Requirements: Enforcement; Remedies ch. XXVIII, § 1.8 (2003).

{7} In passing the amendments to the ordinance, the council issued legislative findings, including a finding that many workers in Santa Fe earn wages insufficient to support themselves and their families and that the community bore the burden when workers could not meet basic needs such as housing, food, shelter, and health care. Santa Fe, N.M., Wage Requirements: Legislative Findings ch. XXVIII, § 1.2(B), (H) (2003). The council also found that the cost of living in Santa Fe is 18 percent higher than the national average, while average earnings in Santa Fe are 23 percent below the national average. Id. § 1.2(E). In finding that Santa Fe housing is substantially more expensive than in most of New Mexico and that low-wage workers must spend a disproportionate portion of their income for housing in Santa Fe, the city council concluded:

A. The public welfare, health, safety and prosperity of Santa Fe require wages and benefits sufficient to ensure a decent and healthy life for workers and their families.

D. Minimum wage laws promote the general welfare, health, safety and prosperity of Santa Fe by ensuring that workers can better support and care for their families through their own efforts and without financial governmental assistance.

I. It is in the public interest to require certain employers benefiting [sic] from city actions and funding, and from the opportunity to do business in the city, to pay employees a minimum wage, a “living wage[,]” adequate to meet the basic needs of living in Santa Fe.

Id. § 1.2(A), (D), (I)

{8} The City, which is a home rule municipality, recited two bases for the authority to pass the ordinance: (1) the powers given to home rule municipalities by the section of our constitution which we will refer to as the “home rule amendment,” N.M. Const, art. X, § 6, and the Municipal Charter Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 3-15-1 to -16 (1965, as amended through 1990); and (2) the police and general welfare powers delegated by the legislature to all municipalities by NMSA 1978, §§ 3-17-1 to -7 (1965, as amended through 2003) and §§ 3-18-1 to -31 (1965, as amended through 2003). Santa Fe, N.M., Wage Requirements: Authority of the City of Santa Fe ch. XXVIII, § 1.3.

{9} Opponents of the ordinance filed suit in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on several of Plaintiffs’ claims, including a claim that the Minimum Wage Act preempts the ordinance. The issues remaining for trial were that the ordinance violates (1) the home rule amendment, (2) equal protection guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution, (3) procedural due process, (4) eminent domain principles, and (5)the City’s own procedural requirement to conduct a fiscal impact study. After a week-long trial devoted primarily to the eminent domain issue, the district court rejected each of Plaintiffs’ claims and held the ordinance to be effective on the date of its decision. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Both the district court and this Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to stay the ordinance during the pendency of this appeal; therefore, Santa Fe employers with more than twenty-five workers are currently required to comply with the ordinance.

DISCUSSION

{10} Plaintiffs make several arguments, which we categorize into four areas: (1) violation of municipal powers, (2) violation of equal protection and eminent domain principles, (3) illegal rate-making, and (4) procedural errors by the City in enacting the ordinance and by the district court at trial.

I. MUNICIPAL POWER AND THE PRIVATE LAW EXCEPTION

{11} Our task is to effectuate the allocation of power between state and local government as articulated in the home rule amendment. The question presented by Plaintiffs as to the power possessed by home rule municipalities involves interpretation of both a constitutional amendment and statutes. Interpretation of statutes and constitutional amendments involves questions of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. See City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 2004-NMCA-065, ¶ 9, 135 N.M. 578, 92 P.3d 24 (describing de novo review for interpretation of constitutional amendment). “Interpretation of constitutional clauses begins with the language of the text.” State v. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 139, 74 P.3d 73. “Where the constitutional clause is clear and unambiguous on its face, courts will not construe the clause.” Id,.; State v. Cleve, 1999—NMSC-017, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 (stating standard of review for statutes), modified on other grounds as recognized by State v. Perea, 2001-NMCA-002, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 46, 16 P.3d 1105. If the meaning of a clause is not clear, by virtue of having more than one fair and reasonable interpretation, then we may consider history and context to shed light on the terms used and to ascertain the will of the people. Flaska v. State, 51 N.M. 13, 18, 177 P.2d 174, 177 (1946). We construe statutes similarly, beginning with the language, resorting to other sources when necessary, and ultimately seeking to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 8-10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022.

{12} We begin by briefly summarizing the nature of municipalities in New Mexico. We then consider whether the City was authorized to pass the ordinance. See City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 81 N.M. 778, 781, 473 P.2d 917, 920 (Ct.App.1970) (noting that the question of municipal authority to act is a separate inquiry from the determination of conflict with state law). Finally, we determine whether the ordinance impermissibly conflicts with state law. § 3-17-1 (stating that municipalities may adopt ordinances as long as they are “not inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico”).

A. THE NATURE OF MUNICIPALITIES

{13} Municipalities, as units of local government, come into existence by the process of incorporation under the Municipal Act. See NMSA 1978, §§ 3-2-1 to -9 (1965, as amended through 1999). They are subordinate to the state government. City of Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Regulatory Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-028, ¶ 3, 134 N.M. 472, 79 P.3d 297 (stating that “[a] municipality is an auxiliary of the state government” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). All municipalities have been granted certain powers by the legislature, including the so-called general welfare and police powers, as set out in Sections 3-17-1(B) and 3-18-1(F), (G) respectively. Municipalities may adopt ordinances as long as they are “not inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico.” § 3-17-1.

{14} A municipality may become a home rule municipality by adopting a charter under the Municipal Charter Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 3-16-1 to -18 (1965) and N.M. Const, art. X, § 6(C). There are two benefits of becoming a home rule municipality. The first benefit is a generous grant of authority by the home rule amendment, which gives the municipality blanket authority to act as long as the legislature has not expressly denied that authority. State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 114 N.M. 627, 631, 845 P.2d 150, 154 (1992). Second, home rule municipalities have a limited form of autonomy from state interference in matters of local concern. Id. at 634, 845 P.2d at 157 (explaining that “the purpose of our home rule amendment is to delegate to municipalities autonomy in matters concerning their local community”). Because Santa Fe is a home rule municipality, we turn next to a more detailed examination of the authority granted by the home rule amendment and the limitations on that authority.

B. THE CITY’S POWER TO ADOPT THE ORDINANCE

{15} New Mexico adopted its current version of home rule in 1970 by constitutional amendment. Id. at 630, 845 P.2d at 153; see also N.M. Mun. League, Home Rule Manual for N.M. Municipalities, ch. II, § 7-12 (1976) (tracing the history of home rule in New Mexico). Home rule “was to enable municipalities to conduct their own business and control their own affairs, to the fullest possible extent, in their own way ... upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and needed than did the state at large.” Apodaca v. Wilson, 86 N.M. 516, 520, 525 P.2d 876, 880 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), modified on other grounds as recognized in Bonem, 114 N.M. 627, 845 P.2d 150. “[I]n New Mexico, ... a home rule municipality no longer has to look to the legislature for a grant of power to act, but only looks to legislative enactments to see if any express limitations have been placed on them power to act.” Apodaca, 86 N.M. at 521, 525 P.2d at 881. The home rule amendment, in pertinent part, states:

D. A municipality which adopts a charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter. This grant of powers shall not include the power to enact private or civil laws governing civil relationships except as incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power.

E. The purpose of this section is to provide for maximum local self-government. A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of municipalities.

N.M. Const, art. X, § 6(D), (E)

{16} By its phrase “may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied,” the home rule amendment was clearly intended to devolve onto home rule municipalities remarkably broad powers. In addition, the express purpose and liberal construction clauses make clear that the home rule amendment is intended to provide chartered municipalities with the utmost ability to take policymaking initiative. See Home Rule Manual for N.M. Municipalities, ch. III, § 17 (noting that New Mexico’s home rule provision is “probably among the more liberal in the nation” in terms of granting power to municipalities).

{17} But there are limits to this power. The exercise of municipal power cannot be “expressly denied by general law,” and the so-called private law exception bars a home rule municipality from “enact[ing] private or civil laws governing civil relationships except as incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power.” N.M. Const. art. X, § 6(D). We consider each limitation in turn.

1. THE MINIMUM WAGE ACT IS A “GENERAL LAW”

{18} The Minimum Wage Act is a law that might conceivably deny the City’s power to enact the ordinance because both the Minimum Wage Act and the ordinance have the same subject matter. Therefore, in order to determine whether the City’s power is “expressly denied by general law,” the first step is to determine whether the Minimum Wage Act is a general law. A general law “applies generally throughout the state, or is of statewide concern as contrasted to ‘local’ or ‘municipal’ law.” Haynes, 114 N.M. at 631, 845 P.2d at 154 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A general law impacts all inhabitants of the state rather than just the inhabitants of a municipality. Id. at 633, 845 P.2d at 156. Specifically, in determining whether the Minimum Wage Act is a general law, we consider whether there is statewide concern that the law set a minimum wage. We think an hourly minimum wage is of obvious concern to workers across the state and it applies to all workers in the state. Thus, we conclude, as the district court did, that the Minimum Wage Act is a general law because it applies generally throughout the state, relates to a matter of statewide concern, and impacts workers across the entire state.

2. THE MINIMUM WAGE ACT DOES NOT EXPRESSLY DENY THE CITY’S POWER TO ENACT THE ORDINANCE

{19} We next consider whether the general law “expressly denies” the City’s power to enact a higher minimum wage applicable municipally. This involves an inquiry into whether the Minimum Wage Act evinces any intent to negate such municipal power, whether there is a clear intent to preempt that governmental area from municipal policymaking, or whether municipal authority to act would be so inconsistent with the Minimum Wage Act that the Minimum Wage Act is the equivalent of an express denial. Id. at 634, 845 P.2d at 157 (summarizing the manner in which express denial may occur); see also ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 1999-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 10, 13, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866 (holding that the comprehensive Children’s Code contained an “express statement of the authority or power denied that is necessary to preempt a home-rule ordinance” because a city criminal curfew ordinance would frustrate and circumvent the intent of the general law (interal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Casuse v. City of Gallup, 106 N.M. 571, 573, 746 P.2d 1103, 1105 (1987) (stating that “any New Mexico law that clearly intends to preempt a governmental area should be sufficient” to do so).

{20} Plaintiffs contend that the Minimum Wage Act expresses a policy “tantamount to [a] denial” based primarily on one word in the declaration of public policy in the Minimum Wage Act. That portion of the Minimum Wage Act states that the act is “to establish minimum wage and overtime compensation standards for all workers.” § 50-4-19 (emphasis added). We disagree. The Minimum Wage Act’s application to “ah” workers simply means that the minimum wage is intended to set an hourly wage floor for all workers — it does not express that the only permissible minimum wage is that set by the Minimum Wage Act, it does not imply any preemption of this area, and it does not grant comprehensive authority to set minimum wages to the state such that municipal action would be inconsistent with state policy. See Haynes, 114 N.M. at 634, 845 P.2d at 157 (exploring preemption of municipal lawmaking by asking whether state law embodies any intent to preempt, any single statewide scheme, or any grant of authority to another governmental body). We note that, unlike the situation in ACLU, state law does not establish any type of comprehensive wage-setting program or scheme and the Minimum Wage Act does not exhaustively address the subject of minimum wages. ACLU, 1999-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 13, 15, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866 (describing how the Children’s Code, by “comprehensively” and “exhaustively” addressing behavior by children that would be criminal but for the offender’s age, preempted a municipal ordinance attempting to criminalize children’s behavior). In addition, unlike the situation in In re Generic Investigation into Cable Television Services, 103 N.M. 345, 351, 707 P.2d 1155, 1161 (1985), there is neither a constitutional nor statutory grant of authority to another governmental body over the regulation of wages that would make a municipal action so inconsistent with the Minimum Wage Act that it would be equivalent to an express denial.

{21} Moreover, in passing the Minimum Wage Act, the legislature allowed any existing local minimum wage ordinances that were more favorable to employees to stay in effect. § 50-4-29. Plaintiffs contend that by reading this section together with the policy that the Minimum Wage Act applies to “all workers,” then “it is clear that the legislature intended that no other governmental entities adopt their own wage laws.” Plaintiffs contend these sections are tantamount to an express denial of municipal authority. We do not agree that any preemption is suggested by these two sections. To the contrary, we view this recognition of existing ordinances setting higher local wages as expressly contemplating a lack of uniformity, which cuts against any intent to preempt or deny municipal power in setting minimum wages.

{22} We conclude that municipal power to set a minimum wage higher than that of the Minimum Wage Act is not “expressly denied by general law” within the meaning of the home rule amendment. We next consider the exception within the home rule amendment that the broad grant of powers to home rule municipalities “shall not include the power to enact private or civil laws governing civil relationships” and then the exemption that allows such a private or civil law when it is “incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power.” We refer to these as the private law exception and the independent power exemption, respectively.

3. THE ORDINANCE IS A PRIVATE OR CIVIL LAW

{23} Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is a private or civil law governing the civil relationship of employer and employee because it “seeks to establish legal duties between private businesses and their private employees, and it establishes a new cause of action against private businesses that do not pay the wage.” We agree. While there are no bright-line divisions between public law and private law, Terrrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Plome Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L.Rev. 643, 674 [hereinafter Sandalow], private law has been defined as consisting “of the substantive law which establishes legal rights and duties between and among private entities, law that takes effect in lawsuits brought by one private entity against another.” Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L.Rev. 671, 688 [hereinafter Schwartz] (internal footnotes omitted). That definition certainly applies to the ordinance, which sets a mandatory minimum wage term for labor contracts between private parties that the employee may enforce by bringing a civil action against the employer. The fact that the city administrator may punish violation of the ordinance as a misdemeanor does not convert the ordinance into “public law” nor does it alter the basic nature of the ordinance, which is to set and enforce a key contract term between private parties. See Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200, 206 (1970) (noting that public enforcement is not dispositive of the private law nature of an ordinance). The relationship between private employer and employee has been described as a civil relationship because it is governed by the civil law of contracts. See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 02-0991 at p. 11, 825 So.2d at 1117 (Weimer, J., concurring) (concluding that a private employee-employer relationship is both a private and civil relationship and that a minimum wage ordinance is attempting to regulate that relationship). We conclude that the ordinance is a private or civil law governing civil relationships within the meaning of the home rule amendment.

4. THE ORDINANCE IS WITHIN THE INDEPENDENT POWERS EXEMPTION

{24} Although the ordinance is a private law, nonetheless the home rule amendment permits a municipality to enact such a law if it is “incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power.” N.M. Const, art. X, § -6(D). Both commentators and courts have noted the ambiguity of this independent power exemption. For example, Professor Schwartz observed that while its “precise legal meaning can be questioned ... [it] clearly attempts to express the idea that cities have a substantial stake in private law insofar as that law may advance or support the cities’ ‘independent’ (i.e. public law) programs or enactments.” Schwartz, supra, at 718 (internal footnote omitted).

{25} Also noting the vagueness of the private law exception overall, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in Marshal House, Inc. that for an ordinance to fall within the independent power exemption, a municipality must point to an “individual component of the municipal police power” that provides it authority to act; otherwise, the private law exception might have “a very narrow range of application.” 260 N.E.2d at 206-07. The court held that the municipality failed to do this in connection with a provision establishing a rent-control and review board. The court rejected the municipality’s claims that its objective in controlling rents was to provide for the public welfare. Id. While the court recognized the link between affordable housing and the public welfare, it stated that “[r]ent control, however, is also an objective in itself designed to keep rents at reasonable levels.” Id. at 206. The court held that “it would be, in effect, a contradiction (or circuitous) to say that a by-law the principal objective ... of which is to control rent payments, is also merely incidental to the exercise of an independent municipal power to control rents.” Id. at 207 (emphasis added).

{26} Plaintiffs urge us to follow Marshal House, Inc. by requiring that the City point to an “individual component” of its police power providing the power to pass the ordinance. We decline to adopt the reasoning in Marshal House, Inc. for two reasons. First, the court in that case provided a specious answer to the question ‘What is the object of the regulation?” by concluding the object was “to control rent payments.” There, the stated “principal objective” of the municipality was not to control rent payments as an end itself, but to provide for the general health and welfare of residents by providing sufficient affordable housing. Second, because New Mexico municipalities have been delegated a generic police and general welfare power, we think that forcing a municipality to point to an “individual component” of its police power puts an unduly restrictive gloss on the exemption and reads words into the home rule amendment that are not there.

{27} The exemption refers to an “independent municipal power,” which we conclude means any power other than home rule. There is no indication in the phrase “independent municipal power” that such a power must be in some way particularized or tailored; as long as there is a power granted by the legislature that is independent from home rule power, that is enough. We take the view that as long as a municipality can point to a power that the legislature has delegated to it, and the regulation of the civil relationship is reasonably incident to, and clearly authorized by that power, the exemption can apply.

{28} The only additional limitation on a municipality’s power, which we have gleaned from the commentators, is the need for uniformity that informs any consideration of the private law exception and independent powers exemption. See Howard McBain, The Law and the Practice of Municipal Home Rule (1916) 673 (noting that, “[b]y common understanding such general subjects as crime, domestic relations, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and personal property, insurance, banking, corporations and many others have never been regarded by any one, least of all by the cites themselves, as appropriate subjects of local control”); Schwartz, supra, at 720-47 (proposing three underlying rationales for the private law exception, including “the need to retain uniformity in private law”); Sandalow, supra, at 678-79 (stating that “chaos would ensue” if all home rule municipalities could “adjust contract, property and the host of other legal relationships between private individuals”). Given this concern for uniformity, we conclude there are two prerequisites to a municipality’s regulation of a civil relationship. Where a municipality has been given powers by the legislature to deal with the challenges it faces, those may be sufficiently independent municipal powers to allow regulation of a civil relationship as long as (1) the regulation of the civil relationship is reasonably “incident to” a public purpose that is clearly within the delegated power, and (2) the law in question does not implicate serious concerns about non-uniformity in the law. This rule allows a home rule municipality to regulate a civil relationship as far as necessary within its delegated powers to address local public concerns, while preventing the harm at which the private law exception is primarily aimed. See Schwartz, supra, at 752 (stating “[h]avoc would be occasioned if city corporation codes and blue sky ordinances were enforced against corporations which engage in operations or sell securities throughout the state or nation”). See also City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376, 384 (Md.1969) (concluding that unique local conditions, such as higher cost of living and housing problems, justified additional city regulation of the minimum wage). This rule is also sufficiently flexible to allow a fact-intensive evaluation of any given municipal action by balancing the municipality’s pursuit of the public interest to address local issues against the need for stability and uniformity iñ the law across the state. See Schwartz, supra, at 747 (describing some non-uniformity as “a price we willingly pay in order to achieve the benefits of local democracy”). This rule is consistent with the home rule amendment and Municipal Code, both of which provide for liberal construction in favor of granting power to cities for a “maximum local self-government.” N.M. Const, art. X, § 6(E); § 3-15-13(B) (repeating this rule of construction).

{29} In light of this holding, we apply the rule and evaluate (1) whether the ordinance’s regulation of the civil relationship is reasonably “incident to” a public purpose that is clearly within the legislature’s delegation of specific, independent powers, and (2) whether the ordinance implicates serious concerns about non-uniformity in the law. With respect to public purpose within a municipality’s delegated powers, the legislature has given all municipalities the power to provide for the general welfare of their residents by the general welfare clause in Section 3-17-1(B). In addition, the legislature has given all municipalities the police power to “protect generally the property of its municipality and its inhabitants” and to “preserve peace and order within the municipality” by Section 3 — 18—1(F) and (G). While these are separate powers, they may be treated as one. Biswell, 81 N.M. at 780, 473 P.2d at 919 (stating that these two powers “if independent of one another, tend to merge”). We consider these powers to be independent municipal powers within the meaning of the home rule amendment because they are powers delegated to municipalities completely independent from the home rule amendment.

{30} The connection between wages and the general welfare of workers is well established in American jurisprudence

and is clearly within the police power of a state to regulate. Rui One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir.2004) (stating that “[t]he power to regulate wages and employment conditions lies clearly within a state’s or a municipality’s police power”); New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage, 02-0991, at p. 13, 825 So.2d at 1098 (affirming that the power to set a minimum wage is an exercise of the police power); City of Baltimore, 255 A.2d at 378 (holding that a municipality has authority to establish a minimum wage under its police powers). In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937), the United States Supreme Court upheld against a freedom of contract challenge a state court decision that the police power of the state permitted setting a minimum wage. Id. at 413-14, 57 S.Ct. 578. The Court concluded that wages insufficient to support basic needs are a public problem due to the impact on the entire community. Id. at 399, 57 S.Ct. 578. This conclusion was presaged by Justice Stone’s dissent in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 56 S.Ct. 918, 80 L.Ed. 1347 (1936), overruled on other grounds by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236, 61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305, (1941) when he noted:

We have had opportunity to perceive more clearly that a wage insufficient to support the worker does not visit its consequences upon him alone; that it may affect profoundly the entire economic structure of society and, in any case, that it casts on every taxpayer, and on government itself, the burden of solving the problems of poverty, subsistence, health and morals of large numbers in the community. Because of their nature and extent these are public problems.

Morehead, 298 U.S. at 635, 56 S.Ct. 918 (Stone, J., dissenting). Given this authority, we conclude that setting a minimum wage is unquestionably a public purpose and that such legislation is within the police and general welfare power of a New Mexico municipality.

{31} As to whether the City is acting incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power, there is little conclusive authority on the subject. In Marshal House, Inc., the court held that regulating the landlord-tenant relationship by setting the rental price term was a direct, rather than incidental, regulation of the relationship, yet it would have allowed regulation of the relationship for safety or health codes, such as fire prevention or hallway lighting, which it viewed as incidental to the police power.