N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 86. {dissenting). The question of whether Act 23 violates the Wisconsin Constitution is at the intersection of profound democratic principles: the right of qualified Wisconsin citizens to vote, as explicitly guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution,1 and the undisputed principle that the state has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections through regulations.2 Voter identification provisions are one way the state may choose *510to protect the legitimacy of elections. Such provisions may be constitutionally imposed even if they severely burden a person's right to vote as long as they are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. However, Act 23's photo identification requirements severely burden eligible voters without being narrowly tailored to achieve the state's compelling interests of reducing voter fraud and increasing voter confidence in the outcomes of elections.3 For that reason, Act 23 is an unconstitutional election regulation, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 87. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 4 which upheld Indiana's voter identification statute, does not persuade me that Act 23 is constitutional. This is because there are substantial differences between this case and the Crawford case. First, the record in the Crawford case was not nearly as developed as the record in this case. This factor certainly influenced the Supreme Court's decision.5 Second, Indiana's voter identification statute is not as stringent as Act 23. Most *511importantly, the Indiana law provides for an affidavit exception that allows certain individuals to vote without photo identification.6 In upholding Indiana's voter identification law, Justice Stevens' lead opinion commented that the severity of the burden imposed by the photo identification requirement "is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted."7 Finally, while Act 23 applies to both in-person and absentee voting, Indiana's photo identification requirements do not apply to absentee voting. Therefore, the Crawford case is neither controlling nor persuasive.
¶ 88. The majority opinion claims to approach the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to Act 23 as a purely facial challenge.8 In doing so it purports to evaluate Act 23 using the framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). However, it ultimately turns to a different legal theory to conclude that Act 23 imposes an unconstitutional de facto poll tax9 on voters, which imposes a severe bur*512den.10 The de facto poll tax to which it refers is not the cost of the identification card itself, which is available free of charge, but the cost of obtaining a birth certificate, which a voter is required to have to obtain an identification card for voting.11 After concluding that the costs of obtaining a birth certificate impose an unconstitutional de facto poll tax that severely burdens eligible Wisconsin voters, the majority then crafts a remedy which allows individuals to obtain certified copies of their birth certificates free of charge.12 The majority concludes that its remedy lessens the burden imposed by. Act 23 on eligible Wisconsin voters to such a degree that Act 23 easily passes constitutional muster.13
¶ 89. I cannot agree with the majority opinion's characterization and analysis of the plaintiffs' challenge. The majority incorrectly characterizes the challenge as a purely facial challenge. It fails to apply the Anderson/Burdick framework correctly. It improperly relies on poll tax case law. Even if I were to assume that poll tax analysis applied, the majority's attempt to alleviate the de facto poll tax for eligible Wisconsin voters results in an unworkable solution that fails to cure the unconstitutionality of Act 23. Specifically, the majority opinion's remedy appears to leave in place the discretion of DMV administrators to issue or refuse to issue Act 23-compliant identification where a fee is *513required for supporting documents. If the majority opinion leaves in place the discretion of DMV administrators to issue exceptions to those burdened by the cost of obtaining underlying documentation,14 then it fails to guarantee constitutional protections against poll taxes. On the other hand, if the majority opinion requires DMV administrators to issue photo identification cards to individuals who are burdened by the cost of obtaining required underlying documentation,15 it is directing a non-party to take specific action, which it has no authority to do. In sum, the remedy imposed by the majority, under either approach, is flawed. It impinges on the legislature's role by interpreting administrative code provisions that are not part of this challenge and by directing an administrative agency that is not a party to this case. I urge the legislature to take action to cure the unconstitutionality of Act 23. Without such action, the remedy crafted by the majority leaves Act 23 unconstitutional.
¶ 90. The appropriate framework to analyze the plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 is the modified facial challenge approach, which the United States Supreme Court has applied16 in comparable cases. Under a modified facial challenge, a "law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a 'substantial number' of its applications are unconstitutional, 'judged in rela*514tion to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' "17 This differs from a purely facial challenge, which necessarily fails if any application of the challenged law is constitutional.
¶ 91. A modified facial challenge is appropriate in this type of case because neither a purely facial challenge nor an as-applied challenge is practical in these circumstances. A purely facial challenge requires that a party prove that a law is unconstitutional under all circumstances.18 Based on the burden that it imposes, a purely facial challenge to Act 23 fails without question because the photo identification requirements of the law could be constitutionally applied to any Wisconsin voter who already possesses the appropriate identification. In contrast to a purely facial challenge, an as-applied challenge looks at whether a law violated the constitutional rights of a particular person under the facts presented.19 Here, the record developed before the circuit court established that a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters lack Act 23-compliant identification and are severely burdened by its requirements. A requirement that each burdened individual bring an as-applied challenge would perpetuate uncertainty about the constitutionality of Act 23, as well as result in an extreme volume of litigation that would take a significant amount of time and resources to conclude. Since the purely facial and as-applied frameworks cannot appropriately address the constitutionality of Act 23,1 would apply a modified facial approach as utilized by the United States Supreme Court in analogous situations discussed in more detail herein.
*515¶ 92. Under a proper application of the Anderson/ Burdick framework, a modified facial challenge to Act 23's constitutionality succeeds in establishing a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution. The only proper remedy is invalidation of the law. This is because Act 23 imposes severe burdens on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters who do not currently possess an Act 23-compliant form of identification, and that burden cannot be remedied by this court. First, and most importantly, even though the identification card itself can be obtained at no cost, there are costs associated with acquiring the underlying documents required to obtain an identification card. Those costs impose a severe burden on certain eligible Wisconsin voters, both those born in Wisconsin and those born in other states and other countries. Second, for certain voters the time and effort required to obtain Act 23-compliant identification adds to the severity of the burden.
¶ 93. The majority recognizes that a severe cost burden exists, but instead of considering such burden in a straightforward manner under the well-established Anderson/Burdick framework, it applies poll tax analysis and crafts a remedy that purports to alleviate the burden imposed by Act 23. The majority concludes that the costs associated with obtaining a free voter identification card are the functional equivalent of an unconstitutional poll tax. No party or amicus brief advanced this argument. Instead all recognized the Anderson/ Burdick test as the applicable framework. That test requires that a heightened level of scrutiny apply to any voting regulation that imposes a severe burden.20 I conclude that Act 23 imposes such a burden on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters. This *516means Act 23 must be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling governmental interests if it is to be upheld. I conclude that Act 23 does not meet this standard.
¶ 94. In contrast to my approach, the majority opinion makes a radical departure from the well-established Anderson/Burdick framework. This is because instead of balancing the benefits and burdens of Act 23 as the Anderson/Burdick framework instructs and reaching the conclusion compelled by the record, the majority intervenes to lessen the severity of the burden by crafting a remedy that allows for individuals to obtain a certified copy of their birth certificate, a document necessary to obtain a free voter identification card, free of charge. Furthermore, the majority opinion's remedy reworks the framework in which Act 23 operates, which is not the court's role. It is the legislature and not this court that must craft a constitutional voter identification law considering the framework in which that law operates, policy objectives, and budgetary constraints. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I. THE MODIFIED FACIAL CHALLENGE APPROACH
¶ 95. The majority opinion asserts that it is addressing a purely facial challenge to Act 23.21 The majority's analysis, however, reveals that it is not actually doing so. We have consistently said that a purely facial challenge to a law may succeed only when the challenger proves that the law cannot be constitutionally applied under any circumstance.22 Because Act 23 imposes a minimal burden on eligible Wisconsin voters *517who already possess an approved form of identification, the law would survive a purely facial challenge on that basis alone. However, the challenge before this court is not purely facial. Instead, it is better understood and analyzed as a modified facial challenge.
¶ 96. In certain contexts, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a modified approach to facial challenges.23 "Our cases recognize a second type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a 'substantial number' of its applications are unconstitutional, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' "24
¶ 97. The United States Supreme Court used this type of analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 333-35 (2010). There, the Court reasoned, "In the exercise of its judicial responsibility, it is necessary then for the Court to consider the facial validity of § 441b. Any other course of decision would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by § 44 lb's prohibitions on corporate expenditures."25 Essential to the Court's reasoning was that requiring plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges to the law would cause uncertainty and prolonged litigation, which would not be appropriate considering the importance of speech in the context of elections.26
*518¶ 98. A discussion of purely facial constitutional challenges and as-applied constitutional challenges demonstrates why the modified facial approach is appropriate in this case. A purely facial challenge requires that the party challenging the law prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the law is unconstitutional under all circumstances.27 "If a challenger succeeds in a facial attack on a law, the law is void 'from its beginning to the end.' "28 Furthermore, in considering a purely facial constitutional challenge, we presume that the law is constitutional.29
¶ 99. An as-applied challenge, in contrast, determines whether a law violated the constitutional rights of a particular person under the facts presented.30 "Under such a challenge, the challenger must show that his or her constitutional rights were actually violated. If a challenger successfully shows that such a violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the party asserting the claim."31 Therefore, in an as-applied challenge, a court should not presume that the statute has been applied in a constitutional manner.32
¶ 100. The majority opinion's claim that it is treating this challenge as a purely facial challenge *519upsets the well-drawn distinction between purely facial and as-applied challenges. Treating this as a purely facial challenge is not appropriate because the plaintiffs do not actually allege that Act 23 is unconstitutional under all applications. They acknowledge that the photo identification requirements of the law could be constitutionally applied to any eligible Wisconsin voter who already possesses Act 23-compliant identification.33 Instead of making a purely facial challenge, the plaintiffs argue that Act 23 presents a severe burden on a substantial number of eligible voters.
¶ 101. Similarly, because the challenge here alleges a potential burden to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters,34 it is inappropriate to require that each affected individual bring an as-applied challenge. While the exact number of individuals without identification *520who would be substantially burdened or unable to obtain identification is not established, requiring an as-applied approach would mean that each burdened individual or group of individuals would have to challenge Act 23 separately. This would lead to an unnecessarily large volume of litigation that would take a substantial amount of time and resources to conclude. Requiring that individuals bring as-applied challenges would perpetuate uncertainty about the application of the law to different groups and could strip individuals with unresolved but meritorious cases of the right to vote at election time.
¶ 102. This court should look to the United States Supreme Court's modified facial challenge approach, which stems from the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine because it fits equally well in the election regulation context. As I have previously discussed, this approach makes sense because of the problems associated with treating the plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 as either a purely facial challenge or as an as-applied challenge.
¶ 103. In addition to these practical reasons, a modified facial challenge approach to laws that allegedly burden the right to vote is justified because of the importance of the right as well as theAnderson/Burdick framework in which voting regulations are analyzed.35 When a voting regulation is challenged as unconstitutional because of an alleged chilling effect on a large number of eligible voters, the challengers should not be required to prove that the law is invalid in all circumstances. This is due to the significance of the right, which requires a court to fully consider the challenge *521and the record before it to carefully and fully analyze the voting restriction under the Anderson/Burdick framework, which, depending on the severity of the burden imposed, may require the use of a heightened level of scrutiny. In other words, a purely facial challenge approach is unnecessarily rigid and simply does not recognize the fundamental importance of the right to vote. Therefore, under a modified facial challenge approach, I evaluate whether a substantial number of Act 23's applications are unconstitutional "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."36
II. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE ANDERSON/BURDICK BALANCING TEST
¶ 104. I agree with the majority opinion37 that the plaintiffs' challenge to Act 23 must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Anderson38 and Bur-dick.39 Under the Anderson/Burdick test, a court addressing a constitutional challenge to a voting regulation weighs the benefits and the burdens of the particular regulation at issue.40 Not all voting regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.41 Instead, the level of judicial scrutiny that a court applies to a challenged voting regulation depends on the severity of the burden imposed by that regulation.42 Therefore, a court must first consider the burden imposed by the voting regulation under review. A voting regulation that imposes a severe burden is constitutional only if it is narrowly *522tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.43 On the other hand, a voting regulation that does not impose a severe burden on voters will be found constitutional as long as it is reasonably related to a governmental interest.44
¶ 105. Although the majority opinion cites to the Anderson/Burdick balancing test,45 it does not engage in a straightforward application of the framework. Rather, instead of directly discussing the cost burden imposed by Act 23, as evidenced by the record, it unnecessarily considers whether the fees associated with obtaining a certified copy of a Wisconsin birth certificate, a requirement to obtain a free identification card for voting purposes, function as an unconstitutional poll tax.
¶ 106. The discussion of poll tax case law is misplaced for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs did not challenge Act 23 as an unconstitutional de facto poll tax; therefore, this issue was not briefed or argued by the parties. Second, and more importantly, the plaintiffs' challenge, brought under the Anderson/Burdick framework, requires this court to carefully evaluate the cost burden that Act 23 places on eligible voters. The Anderson/Burdick framework, rather than poll tax *523analysis, is appropriate because the photo identification requirements at issue are related to election qualifications.46 In contrast, poll tax analysis is appropriate when the cost imposed on voters is not related to voter qualifications.47 By evaluating the cost burden through the framework of poll tax cases, the majority opinion conflates two separate types of analysis and fails to consider sufficiently the cost burdens, which are well-established by the record, under the Anderson/Burdick balancing test. Although the majority concludes that the costs associated with obtaining Act 23-compliant identification impose an unconstitutional de facto poll tax that results in a severe burden, it improperly crafts a remedy, which purports to alleviate the burden by eliminating the cost of certified Wisconsin birth certificates under some circumstances. This remedy allows the majority to conclude that the burdens of Act 23 are minimal. By applying poll tax analysis and by crafting this remedy in the midst of the Anderson/Burdick framework, the majority has unnecessarily muddled an otherwise straightforward and tested analytical framework.
¶ 107. Even if I were to assume that poll tax analysis applied to this case, I am not persuaded that the majority opinion's remedy cures the unconstitutionality of Act 23. Anyone who thinks Act 23's constitutional problem is that it creates a de facto poll tax should want to guarantee that such a de facto poll tax is not imposed on any eligible voter. The majority concludes that Act 23 imposes a de facto poll tax; however, there is no support in the law for the proposition that a court may leave to *524the discretion of a governmental agency whether to approve an exception to a poll tax. If the majority leaves in place the discretion of DMV administrators to issue or refuse to issue Act 23-compliant identification where a fee is required for supporting documents,48 it fails to guarantee constitutional protections against poll taxes. Such an approach also leaves the potential for future litigation brought by individuals who were denied the exception. This leaves the constitutionality of Act 23 unsettled unless the legislature acts to repair this defect.
¶ 108. If, however, the majority opinion is requiring DMV administrators to issue photo identification to individuals who cannot afford to obtain underlying documentation,49 it is directing a non-party to take specific action, which it cannot do.
¶ 109. Therefore, rather than relying on the majority opinion's poll tax analysis, I would apply the well-established Anderson/Burdick framework, which requires the conclusion that Act 23 places a severe burden on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters. The severity of the burden dictates that this court may uphold Act 23 only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The record demonstrates that Act 23 is not narrowly tailored to the state's goals of reducing voter fraud or increasing the public's confidence in elections because the Act is unlikely to further either of these goals in any meaningful way. Therefore, Act 23 is unconstitutional.
*525A. THE BURDENS IMPOSED BY ACT 23 ARE SEVERE
¶ 110. The plaintiffs allege that the costs, time, and effort associated with obtaining an Act 23-compliant form of identification impose a significant burden on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters. I agree with the circuit court that these burdens are severe.
1. A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE WISCONSIN VOTERS LACK
ACT 23-COMPLIANT IDENTIFICATION
¶ 111. The circuit court found that "[a] reasonable, reliable and accurate estimate of the number of people eligible to vote in Wisconsin who do not have a form of identification that would permit them to vote under Act 23 is 333,276."50 Before reaching this conclusion, the circuit court heard the expert testimony of Professor Kenneth R. Mayer, the plantiffs' expert, as well as the testimony of Professor M.V Hood and Dr. Peter Morrison, who both served as expert witnesses for the state.
¶ 112. The circuit court found Professor Mayer and Professor Hood to be qualified experts in terms of establishing the number of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification. In contrast, the circuit court did not find Dr. Morrison qualified to give expert testimony on the number of eligible voters *526in Wisconsin lacking Act 23-compliant identification. Although the circuit court considered the testimony of both Professor Mayer and Professor Hood, the circuit court ultimately relied on Professor Mayer's expert testimony.
¶ 113. As the majority opinion correctly states, this court will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.51 The circuit court's reliance on Professor Mayer's estimate that 333,276 eligible Wisconsin voters lack Act 23-compliant identification was not clearly erroneous.
¶ 114. Professor Mayer utilized the "exact-match" method to estimate the number of registered voters who lacked Act 23-compliant identification. Under this method, Professor Mayer matched the records of registered voters appearing in the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), maintained by the Government Accountability Board (GAB), with records of individuals listed as having either a Wisconsin driver's license or a Wisconsin identification card in a Department of Transportation (DOT) database. The comparison of the SVRS database with the DOT database allowed Professor Mayer to form an initial estimate of the total number of registered voters who lack two of the primary forms of Act 23-compliant identification. Professor Mayer also estimated the number of non-registered, but otherwise eligible, voters who lacked proper identification and the number of individuals who possessed student, tribal, or military identification that would allow them to vote under Act 23.
*527¶ 115. Professor Mayer's estimates controlled for individuals who appeared in the DOT database but who had either moved out of state or who had passed away. For example, he utilized census data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate that 277,000 individuals listed as having a Wisconsin driver's license in DMV records had moved out of state. Professor Mayer also relied on a sample of obituaries and the rate at which licenses and identification cards expire each year to determine that approximately 114,690 individuals listed in the DOT database as having photo identification are actually deceased. Finally, Professor Mayer removed duplicate listings of individuals who appeared in the DOT database as having both a driver's license and a state identification card.
¶ 116. Professor Mayer presented clear and concise testimony that relayed his expert report findings to the circuit court. These findings pointed out a variety of imperfections with the DOT database upon which Professor Mayer and Professor Hood relied. In contrast to Professor Mayer, Professor Hood was unable to provide an estimate of the number of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification. In reference to relying on Professor Mayer instead of Professor ■ Hood, the circuit court logically explained that Professor Hood did not "adequately explain or justify [his] conclusion that the Wisconsin data available, when evaluated using the 'exact [m]atch' method was not sufficiently reliable to estimate the number of eligible voters who lack the required Photo ID."
¶ 117. Furthermore, the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the state's other expert witness, Dr. Morrison, did not "possess sufficient training or experience to prepare or to offer reliable expert testimony as to election procedures generally nor, spe*528cifically, the proportion of persons eligible to vote in Wisconsin who lack a Photo ID required by Act 23." The circuit court identified several problems with Dr. Morrison's testimony. These included Dr. Morrison's failure to consider a "significant source of relevant, reliable information, the SRVS listing of eligible Wisconsin voters" and his failure to "recognize or take into account the limitations of the WisDOT data."
¶ 118. Although the circuit court found that an estimated 333,276 eligible Wisconsin voters do not possess Act 23-compliant identification, this finding alone does not indicate the severity of the burden that individuals would face in obtaining a compliant form of identification. However, the record provides ample evidence of the severity of the burden Act 23 imposes.
2. THE COST INCURRED BY ELIGIBLE WISCONSIN VOTERS OBTAINING
ACT 23-COMPLIANT IDENTIFICATION IMPOSES A SERVERE BURDEN
¶ 119. The most significant burden that Act 23 imposes on individuals lacking Act 23-compliant identification is the cost burden that results from the administrative framework in which Act 23 operates. As the majority opinion explains, typically, an individual must produce a certified copy of his or her birth certificate, among other documents, to receive a no-cost identification card for voting purposes.52 The legislature has dictated, under the current administrative framework, that a certified copy of a Wisconsin birth certificate costs $20.53 The majority concludes that the $20 cost of a certified Wisconsin birth certificate functions as an unconstitutional fee or poll tax that imposes *529a severe burden.54 However, this conclusion unnecessarily muddles poll tax analysis with the Anderson/ Burdick framework. In addition, the majority opinion does not fully address the cost burden imposed on eligible Wisconsin voters who need to obtain a birth certificate from another state to obtain photo identification for voting purposes. Finally, the majority opinion does not consider the severity of the burden that Act 23 places on naturalized citizens who are eligible to vote in Wisconsin.55 In sum, the majority's remedy does not relieve the cost burden placed on eligible Wisconsin voters born in other states or countries.
¶ 120. The circuit court found that "[t]he cost and the difficulty of obtaining documents necessary to apply for a DMV Photo ID is a substantial burden which falls most heavily upon low income individuals."56 The circuit court's finding is supported by the record; therefore, it is not clearly erroneous.
¶ 121. The circuit court specifically noted the cost burden that Act 23 imposed upon several different individuals in its decision and order. For example, the *530experiences of Ruthelle R. Frank and Ricky T. Lewis indicate that they would be forced to incur significant costs to correct errors in their birth certificates to obtain Act 23-compliant photo identification. At the time Lewis sought photo identification, his affidavit indicated that his sole income is his fixed veteran's pension of $986 per month and that he has no savings.57 He stated that his attempts to obtain identification have resulted in what he considered to be "substantial costs." Additionally, the circuit court noted that Sequoia Cole's only income is $600 per month in Social Security benefits, and in her deposition she stated that the $20 fee for a birth certificate was a burden.
¶ 122. The record also contains numerous affidavits and depositions from individuals regarding the cost burden that Act 23 imposes. The majority of these individuals have low incomes. For example, Ndidi Brownlee's deposition indicates that she has no savings and that she lives month to month on her income. Johnnie Garland's affidavit states that she relies on Social Security benefits that total $678 per month to cover her essential expenses and that she was required to pay $28 to obtain her birth certificate from another state. Kristen Green was unemployed at the time she obtained photo identification, and her deposition indicates that she could not afford the extra bus fare she needed to travel to a DMV office. Danettea Lane's affidavit indicates that she had to pay $20 to obtain her birth certificate and that she supports herself and her four children on $608 per month. In addition, Willie Watson and Eldridge King both indicated in their depositions that they lived on fixed amounts of $683 per month and $1000 per month, respectively.
*531¶ 123. In Frank v. Walker, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin recently considered a challenge to Act 23 brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Voting Rights Act.58 While I do not rely on the district court's analysis in Frank, the similarities between the Frank case and this case make many of the district court's findings quite persuasive. In Frank, the district court made persuasive findings in regard to the cost burden that Act 23 imposes.59 Like the circuit court in this case, the district court considered the testimony of individuals lacking Act 23-compliant photo identification to conclude that the cost burden imposed by the Act is severe.60 The district court concluded,
[I]n light of the evidence presented at trial, it is also clear that for many voters, especially those who are low income, the burdens associated with obtaining an ID will be anything but minor. Therefore, I conclude that Act 23 will deter a substantial number of eligible voters from casting a ballot."61
¶ 124. Based on the record in this case, which is remarkably similar to the record before the district court in Frank, it was not clearly erroneous for the circuit court to conclude that Act 23 places severe cost burdens on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification.
*5323. THE TIME AND EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN ACT 23-COMPLIANT
IDENTIFICATION CONTRIBUTES TO THE SEVERITY OF THE BURDEN
¶ 125. Contrary to the majority opinion, I conclude that the time spent and difficulties encountered by individuals trying to obtain Act 23-compliant identification are significant and contribute to the severity of the burden.62 The fact that the majority of the plaintiffs in this case eventually obtained a photo identification card for voting purposes does not mean that no burden exists.63 This is because the burden analysis requires the court to consider the time spent, the obstacles encountered, and the costs paid in obtaining the identification, and not merely the end result of these efforts.
¶ 126. Here, the circuit court found, "Procuring a DMV Photo ID can easily be a frustrating, complex, and time-consuming process." It further concluded that "[t]he cost and the difficulty of obtaining documents necessary to apply for a DMV Photo ID is a significant burden upon the opportunity of Wisconsin citizens to vote."
¶ 127. The circuit court relied on affidavits and depositions from numerous individuals who described the time spent and difficulties incurred in obtaining or attempting to obtain Act 23-compliant identification. In its decision and order, the circuit court specifically relied upon the experiences of Ruthelle R. Frank and Ricky T. Lewis who each had frustrating experiences in attempting to obtain photo identification. Errors on birth certificates caused this difficulty and prevented *533both individuals from obtaining photo identification. Lewis estimated in his deposition that he spent 10 to 15 hours attempting to obtain identification. The circuit court also relied upon the experiences of Sequoia Cole, Brittany Cramer, and Joel Torres who all explained that obtaining photo identification took a substantial amount of time — up to 6.5 hours in one case. A majority of the individuals cited by the circuit court made multiple trips to DMV service centers and other state agencies in attempting to obtain Act 23-compliant photo identification.
¶ 128. In addition to the individuals cited in the circuit court's decision, the record also contains a number of other affidavits and depositions that describe the time and difficulty burden that Act 23 imposes. For example, Ndidi Brownlee spent several hours traveling to and then waiting at the DMV Cheryl Edwards' affidavit states that she spent roughly nine hours assisting family members who needed to obtain photo identification for voting purposes. Kristen Green's affidavit indicates that she made multiple trips to the DMV to obtain photo identification and that her combined trips totaled almost five hours. Danettea Lane's affidavit states that she spent nearly 10 hours during the process of obtaining identification. Mary McClintock, who uses a wheelchair, was required to arrange special transportation and spent approximately nine hours in the process of obtaining identification. The record also reflects that Jennifer Platt's trip to the DMV took three hours. Speciall Simmons stated in his affidavit that it took him three hours to obtain identification. Willie Watson spent approximately four hours arranging transportation that would allow him to apply for identification. John Wolfe's affidavit and deposition testimony indicated that the closest DMV was 30 to 40 miles out of his way.
*534¶ 129. As the previous discussion demonstrates, the record fully supports the circuit court's conclusions pertaining to the time, effort, and difficulty burdens. Therefore, the circuit court's determination that the difficulties imposed by Act 23 result in a severe burden was not clearly erroneous.
¶ 130. In coming to the opposite conclusion, the majority opinion notes that photo identification is part of the reality of daily life.64 This may be true; however, that does not diminish the burdens that Act 23 imposes on individuals who accomplish their daily responsibilities without any form of photo identification that would meet the requirements of Act 23. In Frank, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin addressed the impact that Act 23 has on individuals who currently conduct their daily lives without any form of Act 23-compliant identification.65 The district court stated,
[A] person whose daily life did not require possession of a photo ID prior to the imposition of the photo ID requirement is unlikely to derive any benefit from possessing a photo ID other than the ability to continue voting. Yet that person must pay the same costs — -in the form of the hassle of obtaining the underlying documents and making a trip to the DMV — as the person who obtained the ID for driving.66
¶ 131. The district court in Frank, relying on the testimony of numerous individuals lacking Act 23-compliant identification, also specifically considered the time and difficulty burden imposed by Act 23. In doing *535so, it considered the number of DMV service centers in the state and noted that only two centers in the entire state are open past 5 p.m. and that only one DMV service center in the state is open on the weekend.67 This fact led the district court to conclude that individuals will likely have to take time off of work and forfeit hourly wages to obtain a voter identification card from a DMV center during business hours.68 If an individual is required to obtain underlying documents from other state agencies, then the amount of time and lost wages increases.69
¶ 132. The district court also heard testimony that indicated that not all DMV centers are accessible by public transportation.70 In reaching its conclusion that Act 23 imposes severe burdens on individuals, it considered these transportation difficulties especially in light of low-income Wisconsin residents who rely primarily on public transportation.71
¶ 133. The majority opinion's reliance on the Crawford72 decision's discussion of the time required and other obstacles faced, such as "life's vagaries,"73 fails to convince me that the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. The majority opinion cites to *536Crawford for the proposition that trips to the DMV and other difficulties suffered to obtain a voter identification card cannot constitute a severe burden.74 However, the majority opinion's selective reliance on portions of Crawford ignores the fact that the United States Supreme Court was satisfied that the affidavit exception75 to Indiana's voter ID law alleviated some of the burdens of "life's vagaries."76 In addition, the majority opinion ignores the following language from Crawford,
Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may take judicial notice, however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number of persons. They include elderly persons born out of State, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate; persons who because of economic or other personal limitations may find it difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to assemble the other required documentation to obtain a state-issued identification; homeless persons; and persons with a religious objection to being photographed. If we assume, as the evidence suggests, that some members of these classes were registered voters when SEA 483 was enacted, the new identification requirement may have imposed a special burden on their right to vote.77 _
*537¶ 134. In sum, both the record in this case and the Frank decision support the circuit court's finding that the time, effort, and difficulty burden that Act 23 imposes is severe.
B. ACT 23 IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE ANY COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
¶ 135. The circuit court's finding that Act 23 places a severe burden on a substantial number of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack Act 23-compliant identification must be upheld; therefore, the Act is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.78
¶ 136. The state asserts that Act 23 has two primary and compelling benefits: the reduction of voter fraud and the increase of voter confidence in the outcome of elections. In considering these alleged benefits, the circuit court found that "[t]he Photo ID requirements of Act 23 are unlikely to protect the electoral process" and "[t]he Photo ID requirements of Act 23 are not narrowly tailored to achieve a goal of voter verification." Specifically, the circuit court found,
Since 2004, voter fraud investigations have been undertaken by the Milwaukee Police Department, by the Mayor of Milwaukee and by the Wisconsin Department of Justice, working with various county prosecutors *538working through the Attorney General's Election Fraud Task Force. None of these efforts have produced a prosecution of a voter fraud violation that would have been prevented by the voter ID requirements of Act 23.
¶ 137. Finally, in referencing voter fraud and summarizing its holding, the circuit court stated,
Act 23 addresses a problem which is very limited, if indeed it exists. It does not appear to recognize or to account for the difficulty its demands impose upon indigent and elderly citizens who are eligible under the constitution to vote. It offers no flexibility, no alternative to prevent the exclusion of a constitutionally qualified voter. Given the sacred, fundamental interest at issue, it is clear that Act 23, while perhaps addressing a legitimate concern, is not sufficiently narrow to avoid needless and significant impairment of the right to vote. The enactment steps beyond the proper authority of the legislature and is in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
The circuit court's findings in regard to the lack of benefits associated with Act 23 and its determination that the Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve these benefits are supported by the record, and thus, are not clearly erroneous; therefore, the circuit court's findings must be upheld.
¶ 138. In regard to the allegation that Act 23 reduces voter fraud, the circuit court heard testimony regarding incidents of voter fraud and considered the current penalties in place to deter voter fraud.79 One *539indication that Act 23 is not narrowly tailored to reduce voter fraud is that incidents of voter fraud in general are almost non-existent. An even greater indication that Act 23 is not narrowly tailored to prevent voter fraud is that the photo identification requirements of the Act would not prevent the types of voter fraud that have been uncovered during recent investigations.
¶ 139. The circuit court heard testimony from Professor Mayer regarding a lack of voter fraud in Wisconsin generally as well as a lack of impersonation voter fraud, which Act 23 is most likely to prevent. Professor Mayer based his testimony on academic studies of voter fraud, as well as studies conducted in 2004 and 2008 of voter fraud in Wisconsin. He concluded and testified that "there is virtually no evidence at all that in-person voter impersonation at the polling places occurs with any frequency, if it occurs at all."
¶ 140. Professor Mayer also reviewed incidents of voter fraud detected by a 2008 Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation. The DOJ investigation followed the 2008 presidential election. As a result of the investigation, the State brought charges in 20 cases of election fraud. These charges included eleven cases of felons voting, two double voting cases,