Sz Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Eagle Point Solar v. Iowa Utilities Board, a Division of the Department of Commerce, State of Iowa

In this case, we consider whether SZ Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Eagle Point Solar (Eagle Point) may enter into a long term *444financing agreement related to the construction of a solar energy system on the property of the city of Dubuque under which the city would purchase from Eagle Point, on a per kilowatt hour (kWh) basis, all of the electricity generated by the system. Prior to proceeding with the project, Eagle Point sought a declaratory ruling from the Iowa Utilities Board (the IUB) that under the proposed agreement (1) Eagle Point would not be a “public utility” under Iowa Code section 476.1 (2011), and (2) Eagle Point would not be an “electric utility” under Iowa Code section 476.22. If Eagle Point was a public utility or an electric utility under these Code provisions, it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the city, who were located within the exclusive service territory of another electric utility, Interstate Power and Light Company (Interstate Power). See Iowa Code § 476.25(3).'

The IUB concluded that under the proposed business arrangement, Eagle Point would be a public utility and thus was prohibited from selling the electricity to the city under the proposed arrangement. Because of its ruling on the public utilities question, the IUB found it unnecessary to address the question of whether a party who was not a public utility could nevertheless be an electric utility under the statute.

Eagle Point brought a petition for judicial review. See id. § 17A.19(1). The district court reversed. According to the district court, Eagle Point’s provision of electric power through a “behind the meter” solar facility was not the type of activity which required a conclusion that Eagle Point was a public utility. The district court further found that although it was conceivable under some circumstances that an entity that was not a public utility could nevertheless be an electric utility under the applicable statutory provisions, Eagle Point’s proposed arrangement with the city did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The IUB and intervenors MidAmerican Energy Company, Interstate Power, and Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives, appealed. Eagle Point filed a cross-appeal challenging the reasoning, but not the result, of the district court’s electric utility holding.

For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

A. Introduction. Eagle Point is in the business of providing design, installation, maintenance, monitoring, operational, and financing assistance services in connection with photovoltaic solar electric (PV) generation systems. The city of Dubuque desires to develop renewable energy for the use of the city.

Eagle Point proposed to enter into a business relationship known as a third-party power purchase agreement (PPA) with the city that would provide the city with renewable energy. Under the PPA, Eagle Point would own, install, operate, and maintain an on-site PV generation system at a city-owned building to supply a portion of the building’s electric needs. The city would purchase the full electric output of Eagle Point’s solar power generation facility on a per kWh basis, which escalated at a rate of three percent annually. The payments by the city would not only provide consideration for the electricity provided by the project, but would also finance the cost of acquiring the generation system, monetize offsetting renewable energy incentives related to the system, and cover Eagle Point’s costs of operating and maintaining the system. Eagle Point would also own any renewable energy credits associated with the generation system but would credit to the city one third *445of any revenues received from the sale of those credits. At the conclusion of the agreement, Eagle Point would transfer all ownership rights of the PV generation system to the city.

The PV generation system constructed by Eagle Point would be on the customer side of the electric meter provided by the city’s electric utility, Interstate Power. This means that electricity generated by the system would not pass through Interstate Power’s electric meter. Due to size limitations, Eagle Point’s PV generation system would not be able to generate enough electricity to power the entire building. The city would remain connected to the electric grid and continue to purchase electric power from Interstate Power to meet its remaining needs at the premises.

B. Proceedings Before the IUB. Eagle Point filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the IUB.1 See id. § 17A.9(1) (a). Eagle Point sought a declaration from the IUB that it was not a public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1 and was not an electric utility under Iowa Code section 476.22. If Eagle Point was not a public utility or an electric utility under these Code provisions, its proposed relationship with the city would not run afoul of Iowa’s statutory scheme that provides for exclusive service territories for Iowa’s electric utilities. See id. § 476.25(3). On the other hand, if Eagle Point were operating as a public utility and an electric utility under these Code provisions, its proposed arrangement with the city would be an unlawful incursion into the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power. See id.

The IUB held that under the proposed arrangement, Eagle Point would be acting as a public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1. The IUB recognized that in Iowa State Commerce Commission v. Northern Natural Gas Co. Northern Natural Gas I, this court held that in order to be a public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1, the record must show “sales to sufficient of the public to clothe the operation with a public interest and ... not ... willingness to sell to each and every one of the public without discrimination.” 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968). The IUB also noted that in Northern Natural Gas I the court referred to an eight-factor test in Natural Gas Service Co. v. Serv-Yu Cooperative, Inc., 70 Ariz. 285, 219 P.2d 324, 325-26 (1950), to help determine whether the business was “clothed with a public interest.” Northern Natural Gas I, 161 N.W.2d at 114-16.

The IUB, however, distinguished Northern Natural Gas I by noting that the exclusive service territorial statutes applicable to electric utilities do not apply to gas utilities. See Iowa Code § 476.25(3). The IUB noted that one of the purposes of exclusive territorial arrangements was to ensure that utilities do not duplicate each other’s facilities or make existing facilities unnecessary. See id. § 476.25. The *446IUB also observed that the exception to regulation for self-generation in Iowa Code section 476.1 applies to certain electric utilities but not to gas utilities. Because Eagle Point in the proposed PPA would be selling electricity to the city, the IUB concluded that the requirement of self-generation was not present. Further, the IUB believed the limited language excluding certain self-generation units from the definition of public utility implies that other arrangements that do not fall within the scope of the exception are necessarily included in the term public utility.

The IUB placed strong emphasis on the fact that unlike the usual arrangement in an ordinary facilities lease, Eagle Point was selling electricity on a per kWh basis. Further, the IUB observed that Eagle Point’s promotional materials indicated that it would offer its services to other members of the public and would not limit its activities to the city. While recognizing that there was not always a bright line regarding what activities constitute the activities of a public utility, the IUB concluded that Eagle Point would cross the line if it were allowed to proceed.

Finally, the IUB recognized that it was possible that an entity could be an electric utility without being a public utility. Nonetheless, because the IUB had found that Eagle Point was a public utility, it was not necessary to address the question in this case.

C. Proceedings Before the District Court. Eagle Point sought judicial review of the IUB ruling. As a preliminary matter, the district court ruled that IUB’s interpretation of the relevant statutes was not entitled to deference under NextEra Energy Resources LLC v. Iowa Utilities Board, 815 N.W.2d 30, 36-38 (Iowa 2012) and Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 784 N.W.2d 8, 14-15 (Iowa 2010). On the merits, the district court concluded that Eagle Point would not be operating either as a public utility or as an electric utility.

In reaching its conclusion that Eagle Point’s proposed activities would not bring it within the definition of public utility, the district court noted that the IUB did not apply the analysis of Northern Natural Gas I or the eight-factor approach of Serv-Yu on the ground that regulation of electricity was different from regulation of natural gas. Additionally, the district court found that the IUB’s analysis of the exception contained in Iowa Code section 476.1 was flawed. According to the district court, the exception did not simply relate to the definition of public utility but provided that all provisions of “this chapter” shall not apply to qualifying self-generation. Thus, the exception was not targeted to the definition of public utility but instead to all aspects of Iowa Code chapter 476. Further, the district court found that the exception at least suggests some willingness on the part of the legislature to allow exceptions for smaller providers.

The district court next considered whether the fact that electric utilities were subject to exclusive territorial provisions provided a basis for distinguishing the Northern Natural Gas I case. The district court concluded that there was no basis for this distinction and held that the exclusive territory provisions applied only with respect to electric utilities. The district court reasoned that before the question of whether Eagle Point was an electric utility could be considered, a threshold determination needed to be made on the question of whether Eagle Point was a public utility.

The district court further noted that both gas and electric utilities were included in the same section, Iowa Code section 476.1, where the term “to the public” appears. The district court thus believed *447any test for determining the meaning of “to the public” should apply both to gas and electric utilities.

Additionally, to the extent the exclusive territorial structure might be considered in determining whether Eagle Point’s activities would make it a public utility, the district court believed that the countervailing policy of Iowa Code section 476.41 must be considered. This provision states that “[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage the development of alternate energy production facilities ... in order to conserve our finite and expensive energy resources and to provide for their most efficient use.” Id. § 476.41.

The district court thus concluded that the IUB committed legal error in failing to follow the approach of Northern Natural Gas I and its endorsement of the eight-factor approach of Serv-Yu. In light of the legal error and the lack of deference to be afforded to the IUB, the district court proceeded to apply the eight Serv-Yu factors to the facts of the case.

The district court began its evaluation by noting that it should not consider just one of the Serv-Yu factors in isolation, but should engage in a “practical approach,” considering “the nature of the actual operations conducted and its effect on the public interest.” Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd. (Northern Natural Gas II), 679 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Iowa 2004). In order to make such an evaluation, the district court examined each of the eight Serv-Yu factors, recognizing that the eight factors were not necessarily controlling of the question of whether Eagle Point was a public utility, but instructive on such question.

The first Serv-Yu factor involves consideration of “[w]hat the corporation actually does.” Northern Natural Gas I, 161 N.W.2d at 115 (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 325). The district court concluded that the primary business of Eagle Point was the installation of solar panels and the economic exchange that occurred between Eagle Point and its customers was incidental to what the company “actually does.” Id. It noted that a behind-the-meter solar facility had the same impact on the customer’s demand of the utility-supplied electricity as behind-the-meter energy efficiency technologies, a similarity which the district court observed had previously been recognized by the IUB. See In re Interstate Power & Light Co., Iowa Utils. Docket No. EEP-2008-0001 at 11 (June 24, 2009), available at https://efs.iowa.gov/ efs (“The Board can discern no difference between the use of renewable technologies and classic energy efficiency measures when those activities take place on the customers’ side of the meter.”). The district court found the IUB’s distinction between behind-the-meter electrical generation by a customer and by a third party as lacking the “practical” analysis required by Northern Natural Gas II. See 679 N.W.2d at 633. The district court believed that whether a behind-the-meter energy project was structured as a PPA or a lease did not change the essential character of the project or what Eagle Point “actually does.” Therefore, the district court found this factor did not favor a finding that Eagle Point was a public utility.

The second Serv-Yu factor involves “a dedication to public use.” Northern Natural Gas I, 161 N.W.2d at 115 (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 325). The district court concluded that the case only involved a sale to a single customer on a single site. Eagle Point did not provide service to a large segment of the population, nor was its activities integral to the provision of electricity to the public at large. As a result, the second Serv-Yu factor favored a *448finding that Eagle Point was not a public utility.

The third Serv-Yu factor involves the “[ajrticles of incorporation, authorization, and purposes” of the entity. Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 325). The district court found this factor to be unhelpful and somewhat irrelevant, concluding that there was no evidence of any intent to act as a public utility to the public at large in Eagle Point’s certificate of organization, its operating agreement, or its sales brochures.

The fourth Serv-Yu factor is whether the activity is “[djealing with the service of a commodity in which the public has been generally held to have an interest.” Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 326). The district court recognized that this factor might seem to cut in favor of a determination that Eagle Point was a public utility but noted that the electricity provided was not dependent upon any common facilities that served the public and was generated and consumed behind the meter on the customer’s premises. A shutdown of Eagle Point facilities would be far less serious than the effects of a shutdown of services by electric utilities such as Interstate Power. The district court did not specifically evaluate the impact of the fourth Serv-Yu factor, but seemed to suggest that while it tipped in favor of a finding that Eagle Point would be a public utility, the impact of the factor was substantially weakened as a result of the behind-the-meter context.

The fifth Serv-Yu factor is “[mjonopoliz-ing or intending to monopolize the territory with a public service commodity.” Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 326). The district court found that third-party renewable energy developers were not “natural monopolies,” like electric and natural gas providers, and that there was ample competition in the marketplace. Further, the fact that the host always had an electric utility to fall back upon ensured that PPAs would not produce unbalanced bargaining power. The district court therefore found that this factor weighed against finding Eagle Point to be a public utility.

The sixth Serv-Yu factor is “[ajcceptance of substantially all requests for service.” Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 326). The district court concluded that the record was inadequate to address this point and made no conclusions related to it.

The seventh Serv-Yu factor states that “[sjervice under contracts and reserving the right to discriminate is not always controlling.” Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 326). The district court noted that the PPA involved in this case was an individually detailed contract. Further, the district court observed that Eagle Point certainly retained the right to discriminate with whom it contracted. The district court found the seventh Serv-Yu factor weighed against a finding that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the PPA.

The last Serv-Yu factor is “[ajctual or potential competition with other corporations whose business is clothed with public interest.” Id. (quoting Serv-Yu, 219 P.2d at 326). Here, the district court found some degree of competition, but noted that Eagle Point would never be able to totally replace the electricity provided by Interstate Power. The district court stated that Eagle Point was not trying to replace or sever the relationship between Interstate Power and the city. The district court thus did not believe this factor would weigh in favor of finding Eagle Point to be a public utility.

Based on the nature of Eagle Point’s actual operations, their effect on the public interest, an evaluation of the eight Serv-Yu factors and Iowa’s legislative policies supporting energy conservation and renewa*449ble energy development, the district court concluded that Eagle Point did not furnish electricity to the public and thus was not a public utility.

The next question confronted by the district court was whether Eagle Point nevertheless might be considered an electric utility under Iowa Code section 476.22 even though it was not a public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1. The relevant section of 476.22 provides that an “‘electric utility’ includes a public utility furnishing electricity as defined in section 476.1 and a city utility as defined in section 390.1.” Id. As all parties agreed that Eagle Point was not a “city utility” under section 390.1, the sole issue was whether the term electric utility in context here could have a broader meaning than public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1. While the district court, like the IUB, recognized the theoretical possibility that an entity could be an electric utility without being a public utility, the district court held that nothing in this case was sufficient to sustain the expanded interpretation. The court therefore concluded that Eagle Point was not an electric utility as defined in section 476.22 and as used in the exclusive service territory statutes in sections 476.23-.26.

II. Standard of Review.

A. Introduction. Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) controls judicial review of an agency decision. See Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Iowa 2004). In reviewing an agency interpretation of statutory provisions, the initial question is “whether the legislature clearly vested the agency with the authority to interpret the statute at issue.” NextEra, 815 N.W.2d at 36. If we determine that the legislature has vested such authority with the IUB, we defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute and will reverse the agency’s interpretation only if it is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l); Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 10. If we determine that the legislature did not vest the IUB with authority to interpret the statute, then our review is for errors at law and we therefore are not bound by the agency’s interpretation and may substitute our own to correct a misapplication of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c); NextEra, 815 N.W.2d at 37; Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 219 (Iowa 2006).

B. Positions of the Parties. The IUB 2 maintains that it is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the terms public utility and electric utility contained in sections 476.1 and 476.22 respectively. It recognizes that in NextEra, this court held that the IUB was not entitled to deference with respect to the statutory interpretation questions raised in that case. 815 N.W.2d at 38. The IUB asserts, however, that a different result should occur here because unlike the statutory language involved in NextEra, the terms public utility and electric utility are substantive terms within the specific expertise of the IUB. It further argues that the question of subject matter jurisdiction requires an understanding of complex technical issues such as the purpose of the exclusive service territory statute and whether Eagle Point’s proposed project would undermine economical, efficient, and adequate electric service to the public.

While the IUB concedes that the legislature has provided a definition for the terms public utility and electric utility, a *450factor which ordinarily cuts against a finding that the legislature vested deference with the agency, the IUB argues that this factor alone is not determinative. See Ev-ercom Sys., Inc. v. Iowa Utils., Bd., 805 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (Iowa 2011). It further draws our attention to a number of other cases where we have granted deference to the IUB in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., City of Coralville v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 750 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Iowa 2008) (holding the IUB’s interpretation of “rates and services” in section 467.1(1) was entitled to deference); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 744 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2008) (interpreting the “unauthorized-change-in-service” provisions in section 476.103); AT & T Commc’ns of the Midwest, Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 687 N.W.2d 554, 561 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam) (holding the IUB’s interpretation of section 476.101(9) was entitled to deference).

Eagle Point3 believes the IUB is not entitled to deference in its interpretation of the statutory terms involved in this case. It points to our statement in Renda that “‘[njormally, the interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law over which agencies are not delegated any special powers by the General Assembly.’ ” 784 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting Arthur E. Bon-field, Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Report on Selected Provisions to Iowa State Bar Association and Iowa State Government 62 (1998) [hereinafter Bonfield]). In addition, Eagle Point contends that the vesting of the IUB with rulemaking authority does not necessarily mean that the IUB has interpretive power under the statute. See NextEra, 815 N.W.2d at 38.

Eagle Point further notes the legislature provided specific definitions for public utility and electric utility in the statute, an important factor militating against a finding that the IUB is vested with interpretive power. See Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div., 831 N.W.2d 138, 145 (Iowa 2013); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 423-24 (Iowa 2010). In any event, Eagle Point argues that the terms “public utility” and “electric utility” are not specialized and that the court has already interpreted the term “public utility” without giving deference to the agency. See Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14. Further, Eagle Point notes that the term “public utility” is used in other sections of the Code and that it is important to have a uniform meaning established through judicial decision rather than a specialized and differentiated meaning determined by the IUB. See id.

C. Analysis of Deference Issue. We begin our analysis with a recognition that principles established in Renda suggest we should not give interpretive deference to the IUB in this case. Renda states that as a general proposition, agencies are not given deference by this court to an interpretation of law without some clear indication that the general assembly intended this result. Id. at 11. In addition, we noted in Renda and a number of other cases that where the general assembly provides an agency with a definition of legal terms in a statutory provision, the use of definitions is a significant factor weighing against an interpretation requiring deference. See id. at 12; Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 208 (Iowa 2014); Iowa Dental Ass’n, 831 N.W.2d at 145; Sherwin-Williams, 789 N.W.2d at 423-24. Finally, in Renda, we noted that the use of statutory terms that are not highly specialized, but are used in other *451sections of the Code, point in the direction of lack of deference. See 784 N.W.2d at 14.

We do not conclude that these principles mean that the IUB will never be granted deference. We focus on the particular statutory provision at issue in a given case. See id. at 13. Even where definitions have been supplied by the legislature and the terms are not terms of art, we leave open the possibility that the structure or subject matter of the legislation is of sufficient complexity to require that this court defer to agency legal interpretations. See id. at 14. We do believe, however, that parties seeking to require this court to defer to legal determinations of the IUB face an uphill battle where, as in this case, the legislature has provided definitions of terms that do not on their face appear to be technical in nature.

We do not believe that the IUB or parties arguing in support of its decision have made the case for deference. At the outset,4 we note that no provision in chapter 476 explicitly grants the agency the authority to interpret the terms “public utility” and “electric utility.” See Next-Era, 815 N.W.2d at 37-38 (“[S]imply because the general assembly granted the [IUB] broad general powers to carry out the purposes of chapter 476 and granted it rulemaking authority does not necessarily indicate the legislature clearly vested authority in the [IUB] to interpret all of chapter 476.”); see also Hawkeye Land Co., 847 N.W.2d at 208; Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14 (“[B]road articulations of an agency’s authority, or lack of authority, should be avoided in the absence of an express grant of broad interpretive authority.”). Further, after reviewing the “ ‘language of the statute, its context, ... purpose ... and the practical considerations involved,’ ” we are not “firmly convinced” the legislature intended to vest the IUB with authority to interpret the terms at issue here. Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14 (quoting Bonfield, at 63) (emphasis added). Two sub-conclusions lead us to this determination.

First, the legislature has provided a definition for both “public utility” and “electric utility,” a significant factor weighing against requiring deference. See Iowa Code § 476.1; id. § 476.22; Hawkeye Land Co., 847 N.W.2d at 208; Iowa Dental Ass’n, 831 N.W.2d at 145 (“[T]he legislature has provided its own definition of the term at issue. This presents an ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to a determination that the insurance commissioner has been vested with interpretive authority over ‘covered services.’ Instead, it indicates we ought to apply the legislative definition ourselves.” (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co., 789 N.W.2d at 422-24)); Sherwin-Williams Co., 789 N.W.2d at 423-24 (“The insurmountable obstacle to finding the department [of revenue] has authority to interpret the word ‘manufacturer’ in this context is the fact that this word has already been interpreted, i.e., explained, by the legislature through its enactment of a statutory definition.”). Additionally, in interpreting former chapter 490A, now chapter 476, the court gave no deference to the agency’s interpretation of “public utility.” See Northern Natural Gas I, 161 N.W.2d at 113 (“The legislature has defined public *452utility for the purposes of Chapter 490A.... We therefore start with the familiar statement that the legislature is its own lexicographer when it deems it advisable to define a word or phrase”).

Second, the terms “public utility” and “electric utility” are not very complex and are not “uniquely within the subject matter expertise of the agency,” as they are used elsewhere in the Code. See Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14; Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 344 (Iowa 2013). While the IUB decides some highly complex and technical terms under Iowa Code chapter 476 that require this court to defer with respect to the IUB’s legal interpretations, see, e.g., City of Coralville, 750 N.W.2d at 527 (“rates and services” in section 476.1); Office of Consumer Advocate, 744 N.W.2d at 643 (“unauthorized-change-in-service” in section 476.103), we can determine the scope of the legislatively defined terms in this case without any unusual expertise.

Additionally, as the Gartner court explained, “[t]hese terms are not exclusively within the expertise of the [IUB].” 830 N.W.2d at 344. “Instead, the legislature utilized these terms throughout the Iowa Code.” Id. “For instance, the term [‘public utility1] appears in statutes that the [IUB] has no role in enforcing.” Id.; see, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 412.5, 422.93, 480A.2(4).

Further, in our recent decision Hawkeye Land Co., we concluded that the IUB was not entitled to deference with respect to its determination that a company involved in electrical transmission lines was a public utility under Iowa Code section 476.1. 847 N.W.2d at 218. We see no basis to depart from that approach here.

For these reasons, we conclude that under Renda principles as applied in Hawk-eye Land Co. and other cases, the legal interpretations of the IUB in this case are not subject to deference by this court. See Hawkeye Land Co., 847 N.W.2d at 218; Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14. As a result, the legal issues presented in this appeal must be decided by us de novo. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c); Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14-15.

III. Background of Third-Party PPAs and Public Utility Regulation.

A. Introduction to the Third-Party PPA. Traditionally, electricity has been provided in the United States by large enterprises that made heavy capital investments to provide power over transmission lines to customers. See Gregory C. Jantz, Note and Comment, Incentives for Electric Generation Infrastructure Development, 2 Tex. J. Oil, Gas, & Energy L. 373, 373-77 (2007) (describing the country’s electricity market before the 1990s). Over time, the utilities providing electric service came to be highly regulated in