United States v. Michael R. Dougherty, United States of America v. Michael Slaski, United States of America v. Robert T. Begin, United States of America v. Dennis J. Moloney, United States of America v. Joseph F. O'rourke, United States of America v. Arthur G. Melville, United States of America v. Joann Malone

Seven of the so-called "D.C. Nine" bring this joint appeal from convictions arising out of their unconsented entry into the Washington offices of the Dow Chemical Company, and their destruction of certain property therein. Appellants,1 along with two other defendants who subsequently entered pleas of nolo contendere,2 were tried before District Judge John H. Pratt and a jury on a three count indictment alleging, as to each defendant, one count of second degree burglary, 22 D.C.Code Sec. 1801(b), and two counts of malicious destruction of property valued in excess of $100, 22 D.C.Code Sec. 403. On February 11, 1970, after a six-day trial, the seven were each convicted of two counts of malicious destruction. The jury acquitted on the burglary charges but convicted on the lesser-included offense of unlawful entry. The sentences imposed are set forth in the margin.3

Appellants urge three grounds for reversal as follows: (1) The trial judge erred in denying defendants' timely motions to dispense with counsel and represent themselves. (2) The judge erroneously refused to instruct the jury of its right to acquit appellants without regard to the law and the evidence, and refused to permit appellants to argue that issue to the jury. (3) The instructions actually given by the court coerced the jury into delivering a verdict of guilty. On the basis of defendants' first contention we reverse and remand for new trial. To provide an appropriate mandate governing the new trial, we consider the second and third contentions, and conclude that these cannot be accepted.

The undisputed evidence showed that on Saturday, March 22, 1969, appellants broke into the locked fourth floor Dow offices at 1030-15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., threw papers and documents about the office and into the street below, vandalized office furniture and equipment, and defaced the premises by spilling about a bloodlike substance. The prosecution proved its case through Dow employees who testified as to the lack of permission and extent of damage, members of the news media who had been summoned to the scene by the appellants and who witnessed the destruction while recording it photographically, and police officers who arrested appellants on the scene.

Initially, the court appointed separate counsel for each defendant. Following their arraignment on June 20, 1969, all save appellant Robert Begin elected interim joint representation by Philip Hirschkop, Addison Bowman and Caroline Nickerson. Mr. Begin was represented by Edward Bennett Williams. All attorneys were court-appointed.

At the pre-trial conference held on January 29, 1970, in his chambers, Judge Pratt indicated he had received a letter from Mr. Hirschkop to the effect that appellants JoAnn Malone, Arthur Melville, and Joseph O'Rourke no longer wished to be represented by counsel. On his own behalf, appellant Begin had written the Court requesting that the appointment of Mr. Williams be terminated, and that he be permitted a pro se defense. Judge Pratt deferred a ruling on the pro se motions in order to give the matter further consideration, observing that to waive counsel

is not quite as easy as merely getting up and saying that you want to represent yourself. You've got the matter of the waiver being knowing and intelligent, and we are going to take testimony on that; and furthermore, the possibility of prejudice, not only to themselves but also to their co-defendants. (Tr. 3)

Later in the conference he indicated how important he felt the lawyer's role was likely to be in achieving tranquility at trial:

[L]et me emphasize as strongly as I can that the way this case is handled is presumably my responsibility, but the decorum in the courtroom-I'm talking particularly about the defendants themselves-will be affected to a great degree by the advice and example that they get from their own lawyers. (Tr. 14).

The day before, it seems, Judge Pratt had attended a seminar on the problems of disruption encountered in multi-defendant trials, and he was concerned that "there have been rumors that maybe some disruptive tactics are going to be employed." (Tr. 15, 174). Defense counsel assured him that they knew of no such rumors and that they anticipated no disruptive behavior. In any event, Judge Pratt scheduled a hearing for February 3, 1970, on the four defendants' requests as a matter preliminary to the trial.

At a "supplementary" conference the next day, January 30, the Judge acceded to Mr. Williams's request that his associate, William McDaniels, be substituted as Begin's counsel of record. Mr. Williams's request stemmed from statements of emphatic, indeed vitriolic, dissatisfaction with Mr. Williams's representation contained in Begin's motion for a pro se defense.

At the February 3, 1970, hearing on the pro se motions, the four original movants were joined by appellant Dougherty. For approximately three-quarters of an hour the court heard from the five defendants and from their lawyers. The judge showed particular interest in the defendants' education, and specifically whether any of the five had had formal legal training. None had, although appellant Begin asserted he had "taken pains to familiarize (himself) with courtroom procedure." In general, the testimony showed that the five movants were quite articulate and highly educated. It also appeared that all five movants-indeed all defendants save appellant Slaski-were associated with a religious order, either at that time or in the recent past and, in varying degrees, had been active in work among the poor and underprivileged, in this country and in Latin America.

After a brief recess, the court denied defendants' motions in an oral opinion, set forth in the margin.5 The judge indicated that he was not troubled by defendants' general educational background, nor, importantly, by their motivation. However, he emphasized their lack of formal legal training, the multi-defendant context of the trial, and the seriousness of the charges. The interplay of those factors he felt created too great a risk of disruption of the trial, and risk of jury prejudice against movants and their co-defendants. After the judge delivered his ruling, there was some confused interchange between the court, counsel and several defendants. At Mr. Hirschkop's request, court was recessed in order that counsel and defendants could determine how to proceed in light of the judge's ruling.

When court reconvened after lunch, all defendants were present and a panel of prospective jurors sat in the rear of the courtroom. At that time the remaining four defendants, Catherine Melville, Dennis Moloney, Michael Slaski and Bernard Meyer, made oral motions to represent themselves. These new motions were prompted in large part by the judge's earlier emphasis on prejudice to co-defendants with counsel as a ground for denying the original motions. After some discussion between the court and the defendants, out of the presence of the veniremen, the judge, treating the four new motions as timely made, formally denied them for the reasons given in his oral opinion.

Some collateral matters were then disposed of, including a request-denied-by Mr. Hirschkop that Judge Pratt disqualify himself. When the court began its voir dire examination of prospective jurors, there was some dispute about the judge's decision to question the jurors himself rather than to follow the procedure of examination by counsel, but appellants do not bring that issue into this appeal. Similarly, appellants do not complain of the presence or absence of certain questions for the prospective jurors, about which there was controversy at the time.

Selection of the jury was reasonably rapid, requiring only a part of the afternoon of Feb. 3 and part of the next morning. As noted, the court conducted the voir dire. Defendants were, however, permitted to exercise their peremptory challenges in propria persona.

The trial formally began on the afternoon of February 4. Judge Pratt required that motions, objections, and examination of witnesses be made through counsel. He did, however, agree to permit each defendant to make a five minute opening statement and to testify, in narrative form, at reasonable length without a specific time limit. After the prosecution's opening statement, Mr. Hirschkop made a brief statement on behalf of all defendants. Then five of the defendants-including appellants Dougherty, Begin and Arthur Melville- made opening statements.

The prosecution's case was completed by the end of the next day, February 5. Prior to the opening of the defense case, defendants Catherine Melville and Bernard Meyer entered pleas of nolo contendere to one count of malicious destruction of property; the remaining charges were dismissed; and they are not before us on this appeal.

On Friday, February 6, after an opening statement by Mr. Bowman, appellants O'Rourke and Malone made opening statements on their own behalf, as the other defendants had done prior to the Government's case. They directed their remarks, as had the others, to an attack on the role of Dow Chemical Company and other unspecified corporations in supporting American military efforts in the Vietnam War. When Sister Malone referred to Vietnam, Judge Pratt interjected: "the war in Vietnam is not an issue in this case." A disruption ensued. Events happened too quickly for the court reporter to provide a complete record. The court later inserted this description of what happened, Supplement to Transcript, p. 595:

The record being unclear as to what transpired in the courtroom shortly before the Court adjourned Friday, February 6, 1970, the following is a recital of those events.

Defendant JoAnn Malone, while making her opening statement, referred to the Vietnam War. (T. 594) The Court ruled that "the War in Vietnam is not an issue in this case." (T. 594) Defendant Arthur Melville rose to object and was ordered by the Court to be seated. Defendant Michael Slaski also objected and when he failed to obey the Court's order to be seated, the Marshals were ordered to seat him. (T. 595) While this was taking place, two spectators in the rear of the courtroom then stood and shouted to the bench concerning the relevancy of the War in the case on trial. Marshals moved to eject these two persons. The first was removed without incident. While the second was being ejected with some difficulty, a woman member of the DC-Nine Defense Committee seated in the front row in back of the defendants rose and ran to the back of the courtroom to impede the Marshals and assist the two spectators being removed. When the Marshals resisted her, she screamed at them. Defendant Michael Slaski then wrestled free from the Marshals who were attempting to seat him, hurdled the rail and engaged in an altercation with the Marshals at the rear of the courtroom. During these events the jury was ushered from the courtroom. The Court ordered the courtroom cleared and took a recess. It is reported that the fighting involving defendant Slaski ceased after two or three minutes and the Marshals began clearing the courtroom amid shouts of "pigs" and obscenities. Loud shouting occurred during the entire incident. A number of spectators refused to leave the courtroom and had to be ejected forcibly. The Court returned after the courtroom had been cleared and the press, counsel and the defendants had been readmitted. The jury was recalled, admonished to disregard what it had seen, and sent home. The Court then adjourned until Monday, February 9, 1970.

When the trial resumed on Monday, February 9, defendant Slaski was cited for contempt for his role in the disturbances and the judge sternly admonished the spectators and remaining defendants against further outbreaks. Appellants Slaski and Moloney did not make opening statements. After appellant Malone finished her statement, the case for the defense began. It consisted entirely of defendants' testimony. Appellants Arthur Melville, O'Rourke, Malone and Begin testified. During the testimony there were several further disruptions requiring a brief recess at one point and ejection of a spectator from the courtroom at another.6 The judge confined closing argument to counsel. He instructed the jury on the three counts of each indictment as well as on the lesser-included offense of unlawful entry under the burglary count. He refused to instruct the jury that it could disregard the law as he gave it to them, and refused to instruct the jury that "moral compulsion" or "choice of the lesser evil" constituted a legal defense.

In defendants' view, Judge Pratt violated their constitutional and statutory rights when he refused to permit them to represent themselves. They say the right to dispense with counsel is correlative to the guarantee of the right to counsel and is therefore "implicit" in the Sixth Amendment. They rely as well on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1654 which provides:

In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

The Government responds that a defendant's right to represent himself is not protected by the Sixth Amendment but only exists by virtue of Sec. 1654, and that this is significant (a) because statutory rights are generally subject to the "harmless error" principle, and (b) Sec. 1654 rights can be limited when, in the judge's view, they would be likely to lead to disruption of the trial or threaten to interfere with effective presentation of the defendant's case.

A. Absence of Controlling Precedent on Source of Pro Se Right

The Supreme Court has never directly determined whether the Constitution guarantees the pro se right. Appellants rely on Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) where the Court observed:

[t]he right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law. . . [T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

However, Adams's "correlative right" language was not an essential ingredient of its holding, which was simply that a defendant who has intelligently waived his right to counsel may also waive his right to a jury trial. Moreover, in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), holding a defendant's waiver of right to a jury trial subject to the assent of the prosecution and the trial judge, the Court said that "the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist on the opposite of that right." 380 U.S. at 34-35, 85 S.Ct. at 789. It pointed out that

[t]he Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result. Id. at 36, 85 S.Ct. at 790.7

There are conflicting indications from the circuits. The Second Circuit in United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964), recognized constitutional status for the pro se right. In accord with Plattner, see Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1048, 90 S.Ct. 1378, 25 L.Ed.2d 660 (1970); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 194, 27 L.Ed.2d 191 (1971); United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971); Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969). But compare Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966).

In our court, Brown v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 264 F.2d 363 (en banc 1959), left the issue unresolved. Reversal was sought because the trial judge failed to instruct a defendant of his right to represent himself when his court-appointed attorney informed the court that defendant was dissatisfied with the attorney's pessimism about the outcome of the case. There was no opinion for a majority of the court. Judge Miller, joined by Judges Prettyman, Danaher and Bastian, stated that the pro se right is statutory only, and therefore (a) defendant must assert the right in order to be entitled to it and (b) in any event no reversal was required since no prejudice could be discerned.

The opinions of the other five judges are consistent with a view that the Constitution is the basis for the right, although only one expressly discussed its source. Judge Burger, concurring in part, differed with the others voting to affirm because he treated defendant's expression of "dissatisfaction" as the equivalent of a request for removal of counsel, but held it within the court's discretion to deny the request so long as it was sufficiently apprised of the cause of the "dissatisfaction."

The four dissenters joined in an opinion stating that the reasons for the "dissatisfaction" were not made sufficiently clear to the court to permit the exercise of its informed discretion on the matter, and hence the judge should have inquired further into the basis for defendant's attitude and should have specifically informed defendant of his right to proceed alone. The pro se alternative, they felt, is one of fundamental importance, and a defendant can make an informed decision on how best to conduct his defense only if he is made aware that he is free to dispense with counsel. The principal dissent, however, made no mention of the Constitution. Only Judge Bazelon, in a separate dissent, said the pro se right was grounded in the Constitution.

B. Need for Recognition of Statutory Right-If Timely Asserted, Not Waived, And Accompanied by Waiver of Right to Counsel

The Government says the pro se right is statutory and subject to "extensive qualifications," discerning in the decisions seven "factors" on the basis of which the pro se right may be partially or entirely denied.8

This case does not require final resolution of the constitutional question. That would be unavoidable had Congress attempted to narrow or qualify the pro se right along the lines advocated by the Government on this appeal. But that is not the case. The right of pro se representation was enacted by our very first Congress. The language declaring the pro se right is not qualified, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1654. The statute was passed in a context of colonial tribunals largely manned by laymen, and of pioneer modes of thought emphasizing the virtues of common sense and self-reliance.9 Its constitutional aura is under-scored by the proposal the very next day of the Sixth Amendment.10

In sum, whether or not the right of pro se representation has a constitutional foundation it is patently a statutory right, see Sec. 1654; this right was not only conferred by Congress in 1789 but has wide reverberation in organic state law11 and was recognized by Congress as a fundamental right. We conclude that this right must be recognized if it is timely asserted, and accompanied by a valid waiver of counsel, and if it is not itself waived, either expressly, or constructively, as by disruptive behavior during trial.12

The precedents relied on by the Government as subjecting the pro se right to "extensive qualifications" do no more than establish these basic elements: timely assertion; need for intelligent waiver of counsel; and possibility of waiver of the pro se right. A number of cases involved the special circumstance of defendants whose mental capacity was impaired.13 The bulk of the cases cited to us involved requests made after commencement of trial,14 and do no more than apply the recognized principle that the fundamental right to conduct the case pro se is one that must be claimed timely, before the trial begins. Just as a defendant who has unrestricted right to retain counsel of his own choosing must seek permission of the court once his choice has been made, to select a different retained counsel, and is subject to the sound discretion of the court when he seeks to make a change after his trial has commenced, so a defendant must obtain the court's permission when he seeks to make a change in order to select himself as counsel.

When the pro se right is claimed after trial has begun, the court exercises its discretion. It may weigh the inconvenience threatened by defendant's belated request against the possible prejudice from denial of defendant's request. In exercising discretion the judge may take into account the circumstances at the time, whether there has been prior disruptive behavior by defendant, whether the trial is in an advanced stage, etc. E. g., Seale v. Hoffman, supra, note 14; United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y.1949). The right to self-representation, though asserted before trial, can be lost by disruptive behavior during trial, constituting constructive waiver. But that is a far different situation from that presented by the instant case, where appellants unequivocally claimed the right to represent themselves, see Brown v. United States, supra, 105U.S.App.D.C. at 81, 264 F.2d at 367 (Burger, J.), United States ex rel. Higgins v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1966), well in advance of the beginning of trial and selection of the jury, see United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. United States v. Thomas, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 450 F.2d 1355 (1971).

C. "Possible" Disruption as a Basis for Denying Pro Se Defense

The Government seeks to sustain the denial of appellants' pro se motions on a theory of "possible disruption." A list of five factors is offered15 which, it is said, "taken together" support the judge's finding of risk of disruption.

Given the general likelihood that pro se defendants have only rudimentary acquaintanceship with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol, a measure of unorthodoxy, confusion and delay is likely, perhaps inevitable, in pro se cases.16 The energy and time toll on the trial judge, as fairness calls him to articulate ground rules and reasons that need not be explained to an experienced trial counsel, can be relieved, at least in part, by appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the defendant.17 If defendant refrains from intentionally obstructive tactics, amicus would be available to provide advice on procedure and strategy. The utility of an amicus appointment is dependent on explanation to and cooperation by defendant, and on understanding, too, that he may claim with some merit that his pro se rights include his right to appear before the jury in the status of one defending himself, and that this is defeated if a too conspicuous role is played by an attorney, unless it clearly appears to the jury that he does not have the status of defense counsel.18

On the other hand, a potentially unruly defendant may and should be clearly forewarned that deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior may operate in effect as a waiver of his pro se rights and, in that event, amicus will be ready to assume exclusive control of the defense.19 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that even constitutional litigation prerogatives of a defendant are available to give choice in the conduct of a trial, and do not extend so far as to permit subversion of the core concept of a trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The same principle means that obstreperous behavior may constitute waiver of the pro se right.20

Appointment of amicus counsel would not have resolved all the problems presented by pro se defenses in the multidefendant context involved in this case. Thus, the prospect of repetitious interrogation of witnesses would persist. But the joint trial that the prosecution seeks in the interest of efficiency cannot set aside the fundamental right of pro se representation. The trial judge must proceed by skill and suasion, by obtaining defendants' cooperation, not by denying their pro se rights.

We need not here consider whether or in what circumstances withholding of reasonable cooperation may be held equivalent to unruly action as a waiver of the right of self-representation. In the case before us, defendants and counsel assured the court, on several occasions, of their lack of disruptive intent, e. g., Tr. 23, 24. The judge in his oral opinion noted that his fears of disruption did not stem from concern over defendants' "motivations." Furthermore, the record shows how reasonable cooperation was obtained from defendants, by a reasonable accommodation of interests. When defendants expressed concern over their exclusion from bench conferences, Judge Pratt made, and defendants accepted (Tr. 333-335), a suggestion permitting a "representative" defendant to participate in bench conferences as an observer. A similar approach might have obviated any serious problems of repetitious interrogation.21 In the last analysis, however, if the assertion of a pro se right makes a multidefendant trial unmanageable, or unfair to the other defendants, the remedy lies in severance. Rule 14, F.R.Crim.P.

In effect the unqualified right of self representation rests on an implied presumption that the court will be able to achieve reasonable cooperation. The possibility that reasonable cooperation may be withheld, and the right later waived, is not a reason for denying the right of self representation at the start.

D. Lack of Foundation for Government Claims of Prior Disruptive Behavior

The Government argues that in this case there was disruptive behavior on the part of defendants which sustains the judge's denial of pro se representation. We assume, without deciding, that where there has been experience with the particular defendants that is plainly identifiable as disruptive in character, such as to overturn the premise of reasonable cooperation, and permit a finding of anticipatory breach and waiver, that would be a predicate for denying the pro se right. We do not think any such predicate appears in this case.

We begin by rejecting the Government's approach of using "disruptive" incidents following the denial of the pro se motions as reasons to support that denial.22 This is like using the fruit of an unreasonable search to provide a cause making the search reasonable. Nearly all of the incidents cited by the Government concerned assertions of the right to self-representation. It would be anomalous to hold that the denial of one's rights can be justified by reference to the nature of subsequent complaints protesting that denial.

As to defendants' actions prior to the denial of their pro se requests, these were not the kind of "disruptive" actions that warranted denial on that basis alone. We are aware of the occasions prior to the pro se ruling when defendants interrupted the pre-trial hearing without obtaining the court's prior leave. However, most of the interruptions stemmed from defendants' confusion over the exclusion of the public from the pre-trial hearing, a matter that had been arranged at the pre-trial conference in which defendants had not participated, and which was subject to reasonably prompt clarification without repetition.

Thus, during Sister Malone's testimony, in which she inquired of the court the reasons for the exclusion of the public, appellant Dougherty interrupted to observe that he thought the courtroom was large enough to accommodate the people who could be expected to attend. This followed by moments an "interruption" by Mr. O'Rourke to make a request, joined in by Sister Malone, that two of their relatives be permitted to observe the progress of the hearing- a request that the court granted.

None of the incidents can be characterized as "disruptive" in the sense of evincing defendants' intent to upset or unreasonably delay the hearing. Indeed to some extent the defendants, not trained in courtroom decorum, had reason to suppose their behavior was within proper bounds. At the hearing and during the early trial, Judge Pratt not only took considerable care to explain his ruling on the pro se motions, but also permitted the defendants to participate personally in jury selection. The record also shows that Judge Pratt engaged defendants in colloquies on various matters directly rather than through counsel. We do not disapprove, we rather commend, Judge Pratt's willingness to handle this case with some flexibility. The Supreme Court has emphasized that one of the most important functions of criminal trials is, within reason, to make plain to defendants and society at large that justice is done in our courts,23 and Judge Pratt's approach likely had that effect in this case. But the latitude previously granted to appellants must be taken into account in appraising whether their later requests manifest disruptive conduct.24 We cannot agree their pre-ruling behavior can be considered as so "disruptive" as to constitute a constructive, anticipatory waiver of a fundamental right.

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E. Application of the Doctrine of Harmless Error

The Government finally contends that, assuming arguendo error in the denial of pro se defense, reversal as inappropriate because no prejudice resulted. We may assume, without deciding, that the harmless error doctrine-either in its ordinary formulation, or the more refined "harmless constitutional error" version25-applies even in cases involving denial of a fundamental statutory right approximating or equalling the rights expressly stated in the Constitution. But we do not think it applicable to this case.

The principal characteristic of "harmless error" doctrine is its "resultorientation." Its normal operation is in cases where the challenged error concerns a right given the defendant in order to permit his defense to operate at maximum competence26 or to insulate him from the effects of suspect evidence.27 In such cases there is reason to consider whether claimed error is harmless because it plainly did not affect the result adversely to defendant, for then the reason for the right lapses.

Courts have recognized a measure of result-orientation in the right of pro se representation. The Second Circuit, for example, perceives a basis for the pro se right in the need not to force a defendant to accept a lawyer in whom he has little confidence. Without such confidence, lawyer-client communication is likely to be unsatisfactory and "defendant may be better off representing himself," United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, supra, 348 F.2d at 15.

However, a salient aspect of the pro se right, in our view, is directed to considerations distinct from the objective of achieving what would be the best result in the litigation from a lawyer's point of view. As the Supreme Court said in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, supra, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 241, the "right to dispense with a lawyer's help . . . . rest[s] on considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law." It is designed to safeguard the dignity and autonomy of those whose circumstances or activities have thrust them involuntarily into the criminal process. An accused has a fundamental right to confront his accusers and his "country," to present himself and his position to the jury not merely as a witness or through a "mouthpiece," but as a man on trial who elects to plead his own cause. He is not obliged to seek what counsel would record as a victory but what he sees as tantamount to condemnation or doubt rather than vindication. A defendant has the moral right to stand alone in his hour of trial. The denial of that right is not to be redeemed through the prior estimate of someone else that the practical position of the defendant will be enhanced through representation by another, or the subsequent conclusion that defendant's practical position has not been disadvantaged.

In guaranteeing counsel for the accused, the Sixth Amendment conferred a right for the benefit of the accused. As implemented by Congress, this right is not an imperative requirement that may be thrust upon him when in his judgment, as a person without impaired mental capacity, it is against his interest. Even if the defendant will likely lose the case anyway, he has the right-as he suffers whatever consequences there may be-to the knowledge that it was the claim that he put forward that was considered and rejected, and to the knowledge that in our free society, devoted to the ideal of individual worth, he was not deprived of his free will to make his own choice, in his hour of trial, to handle his own case.28

In the case at bar defendants believed they would be vindicated by their peers by presenting their positions without law-trained counsel as intermediary. They may or may not be right about the relative effectiveness of a lawyer's presentation of their case. Ordinarily representation by an attorney has structure and clarity that enables a jury to better understand defendants' positions. Presentation of a case pro se will often be artless and confusing. Yet the normal disadvantage of confusion may be offset by the enhanced intensity and appearance of greater sincerity of a defendant's presentation.29

While we cannot apply the doctrine of "harmless error" in case of denial of right of pro se representation on the ground that this would likely have resulted in the same verdict as counseled representation, a different question arises as to whether the overall format of the trial was such, in terms of the latitude given to the defendants, that they in effect had the substance though not the form of pro se representation.