Montana Cannabis Industry Ass'n v. State

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The State of Montana (State) appeals an order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of certain provisions of the 2011 Montana Marijuana Act §§ 50-46-301 to -344, MCA (Act). Montana Cannabis Industry Association, Mark Matthews, Shelly Yeager, Jesse Rumble, John Stowers, M.D., Point Hatfield, and Charlie Hamp (collectively “Plaintiffs”) cross-appeal the District Court’s refusal to enjoin other provisions of the Act. We address the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Act’s provision requiring the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) to notify the Board of Medical Examiners of any physician who certifies 25 or more patients in a year for medical marijuana (§ 50-46-303(10), MCA) fails rational basis review.

2. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Act’s commercial prohibitions (§§ 50-46-308(3), (4), (6)(a),(b), MCA) fail rational basis review.

3. Whether the District Court erred in applying strict scrutiny review to the Act’s provision prohibiting advertising by providers of medical marijuana (§ 50-46-341, MCA), thereby concluding that the provision unconstitutionally infringes free speech.

4. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Act’s provision prohibiting probationers from becoming registered cardholders for medical marijuana use (§ 50-46-307(4), MCA) withstands a facial challenge under rational basis scrutiny.

5. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Act’s provision allowing warrantless inspections of medical marijuana providers’ businesses by the Department and law enforcement agencies (§ 50-46-329, MCA) comports with the U.S. and Montana Constitutions’ guarantees against unreasonable searches.

¶2 We affirm in part and reverse in part.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3 This is the State’s second appeal from the First Judicial District Court’s injunctions preventing implementation of certain provisions of the Act. Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State, 2012 MT 201, 366 Mont. 224, 286 P.3d 1161 (hereafter MCIA I). The Act repealed the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act (2004 Act) — which was *259established by voter initiative (1-148) — and replaced it with a new statutory framework. The Act contains multiple provisions that limit both the eligibility of patients to qualify for its protections and the activities of medical professionals and providers of marijuana for medical purposes.

¶4 In the first case, the District Court preliminarily enjoined several of the Act’s provisions, including: its ban on the commercial sale of medical marijuana; its ban on provider advertising; its authorization of warrantless inspections; and the 25-patient physician review trigger. In its first order, the court reasoned that those provisions implicated Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights, triggering strict scrutiny analysis. The State agreed to a preliminary injunction against several of the challenged provisions pending consideration of the constitutional merits, but appealed the injunction against the commercial ban on the ground that the District Court erred in applying strict scrutiny analysis to the provisions in the absence of an infringement on fundamental rights.

¶5 In MCIA I, we determined that the commercial ban did not implicate the fundamental rights to employment, to health, or to privacy, and that Plaintiffs had no fundamental right to medical marijuana. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the case to the District Court to apply rational basis scrutiny. MCIA I, ¶ 35.

¶6 Following remand, Plaintiffs moved the District Court for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Order to Show Cause. On October 26, 2012, the District Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order and set a Preliminary Injunction Hearing.1 At that hearing, Plaintiffs presented testimony from several witnesses to support their contention that many medical marijuana users and providers would suffer irreparable harm if certain provisions of the Act did not remain preliminarily enjoined. Several witnesses who suffered from debilitating medical conditions testified that they had very negative experiences with prescription drugs and that medical marijuana was the only treatment that provided them effective relief from their conditions. Providers of medical marijuana testified that without the injunction, it would not be feasible for them to continue their medical marijuana businesses.

¶7 The State urged the District Court to deny the preliminary *260injunction and to extend the temporary restraining order for a period to allow the Legislature to consider further amendments to the Act. To support its argument, the State referenced several abuses that occurred under the 2004 Act and that were discussed during the June 2011 preliminary injunction hearing. The State referenced telemedicine (the practice of some physicians to certify patients without ever actually seeing the patient), traveling caravans, and a disproportionate number of medical marijuana users in the “chronic pain category” who falsified or exaggerated their need for medical marijuana. The State also emphasized that one-third of medical marijuana users were growing their own supply at that time.

¶8 Following the hearing, on January 16, 2013, the court issued an order maintaining its preliminary injunction against the Act’s commercial prohibitions. The court concluded that “[pjroperly registered and eligible cardholders will be injured or irreparably harmed if the Court does not preserve the status quo ... [because] cardholders will be unable to grow their own medical marijuana or will be unable to obtain it from a provider.” Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court heard oral argument on the summary judgment motions on April 15, 2014.

¶9 On January 6, 2015, the District Court issued a Corrected Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In its decision, the court reviewed the commercial ban and the 25-patient review trigger for a rational basis, and concluded that both provisions were invalid. The court applied strict scrutiny to the advertising prohibition, and enjoined it on the basis that the prohibition impermissibly restricted content-based political and educational speech. The District Court declined to enjoin the warrantless inspection provision and the ban on access to medical marijuana by probationers. The court entered its final judgment on January 8, 2015.

¶10 The State appeals the injunctions against the commercial ban, the 25-patient physician review trigger, and the advertising ban. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the District Court’s decision to uphold the warrantless inspection provision and the ban on probationer use. This Court heard oral argument on November 4, 2015.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the criteria set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56. Walters v. Flathead Concrete Prods., 2011 MT 45, ¶ 8, 359 Mont. 346, 249 P.3d 913. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *261Walters, ¶ 8. If there are no genuine issues of material fact, we review for correctness a district court’s conclusion that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zinvest, LLC v. Hudgins, 2014 MT 201, ¶ 11, 376 Mont. 72, 330 P.3d 1135.

¶12 This Court exercises plenary review of constitutional issues. Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 2012 MT 320, ¶ 16, 368 Mont. 66, 291 P.3d 1231 (citation omitted). The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, “unless it conflicts with the constitution, in the judgment of the court, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Powell v. State Comp. Fund., 2000 MT 321, ¶ 13, 302 Mont. 518, 15 P.3d 877. If any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the statute. Powell, ¶ 13. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proof. Big Sky Colony, ¶ 16.

DISCUSSION

¶13 We begin by acknowledging the proverbial “elephant in the room.” Marijuana is a Schedule I Controlled Substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812, under whichits cultivation and distribution are illegal. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a). In this case, no challenge is brought to the Act on the ground that it is preempted by federal law, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and the State expressly disclaimed such a challenge during oral argument. In the face of action in numerous states to legalize marijuana for medical or even recreational purposes,2 the United States Department of Justice has issued guidance (discussed below) concerning enforcement priorities in an apparent effort to minimize conflict with state actions while *262maintaining the primacy of federal law. The Act is the Montana Legislature’s attempt to navigate shifting public policy toward marijuana in the absence of Congressional action to resolve state and federal differences.3 We are not called upon in this case to review the broad question of Montana’s authority to act on the subject of medical marijuana. Rather, we address only the question whether, having taken action on the subject, the Legislature’s means of addressing this conflict are permissible under defined standards of constitutional analysis.

¶14 Plaintiffs allege denial of equal protection and due process rights under article II, sections 4 and 17 of the Montana Constitution. Plaintiffs bring their constitutional claims as facial challenges to certain statutes within the Act. Analysis of a facial challenge to a statute differs from that of an as-applied challenge. See e.g., State v. Whalen, 2013 MT 26, ¶¶ 20-22, 368 Mont. 354, 295 P.3d 105. In order to prevail on their facial challenges, Plaintiffs must show that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged sections] would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987)). See also In re Marriage of K.E.V., 267 Mont. 323, 336, 883 P.2d 1246, 1255 (1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “a facial challenge to a legislative act is of course the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no circumstances exist under which the act would be valid”).

Equal Protection

¶15 The principal purpose of the Montana Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, art. II, § 4, is to ensure that Montana’s citizens are not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory state action. Powell, ¶ 16. When presented with an equal protection challenge, “we first identify *263the classes involved and determine whether they are similarly situated.” Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440, ¶ 23, 354 Mont. 133, 227 P.3d 42. If we determine that the challenged statute creates classes of similarly situated persons, we next decide whether the law treats the classes in an unequal manner. Caldwell v. MACo Worker’s Comp. Trust, 2011 MT 162, ¶ 16, 361 Mont. 140, 256 P.3d 923. Thus, to state a meritorious equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” Bustell v. AIG Claims Serv. Inc., 2004 MT 362, ¶ 20, 324 Mont. 478, 105 P.3d 286 (citing Powell, ¶ 22).

¶16 A law may create a classification even if the classification is not expressed “on the face” of the statute. State v. Spina, 1999 MT 113, ¶ 85, 294 Mont. 367, 982 P.2d 421 (citing John E. Nowak, et al., Constitutional Law , 600 (2d ed. 1983)). “[A] law may contain no classification, or a neutral classification, and be applied evenhandedly. Nevertheless the law may be challenged as in reality constituting a device designed to impose different burdens on different classes of persons.” Spina, ¶ 85 (citing Nowak, supra, at 600). Plaintiffs argue that the Act creates different classifications:

1. The class of persons with debilitating medical conditions: (a) some of whom have conditions for which marijuana is the single most effective medical treatment; (b) others who effectively may be treated with other pharmaceutical drugs.

2. Among those who are solely or optimally treated with marijuana: (a) those who have the physical ability and the means, including suitable space, to grow their own; (b) those who do not.

The District Court concluded that the Act “do[es] impose different burdens on different classes of persons as described by [Plaintiffs] and, therefore, do[es] create a classification.”

¶17 We concluded in Caldwell that a statute denying rehabilitation benefits to workers’ compensation claimants based on a claimant’s age-based eligibility for social security benefits created two classes of similarly-situated claimants because it distinguished by age between workers who had similar work-related injuries. Caldwell, ¶ 18. The statutes at issue here concern a group of persons who all suffer from a debilitating medical condition but are distinguished by the manner in which they may obtain relief. Some may be treated effectively with pharmaceutical drugs; for others, marijuana is the sole or most effective treatment. The identifying factor that distinguishes them is the method of treatment. As we recognized in MCIA I, the Act *264regulates a person’s right to a particular treatment for his or her medical condition. MCIA I, ¶ 24. We observed in Caldwell that whether the challenged statute creates a discriminatory classification is informed by the statute’s purpose. Caldwell, ¶ 19. In Caldwell, as in Reesor v. Montana State Fund , 2004 MT 370, 325 Mont. 1, 103 P.3d 1019, age was “the only identifiable distinguishing factor between the two classes;” we concluded in both cases that age was “unrelated to a person’s ability to engage in meaningful employment.” Caldwell, ¶ 19; Reesor, ¶ 12. In contrast, we concluded in Wilkes v. Montana State Fund, 2008 MT 29, 341 Mont. 292, 177 P.3d 483, that where “actual wages” was the single distinguishing factor between workers’ compensation claimants, that was a “fundamental distinction” between the two classes sufficient to defeat similarity for purposes of the plaintiffs equal protection claim. Wilkes, ¶ 20. We reasoned that one stated purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act was that “the wage-loss benefit should bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost as a result of work-related injury or disease.” Wilkes, ¶ 26 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting § 39-71-105(1), MCA).

¶18 The reasoning in Wilkes applies here. One stated purpose of the Act is to “provide legal protections to persons with debilitating medical conditions who engage in the use of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms of the debilitating medical condition.” Section 50-46-301(2)(a), MCA. There is no need for the Legislature to provide legal protections to persons using prescribed pharmaceutical medication. “The distinguishing factor between the two classes, [their use of medical marijuana], plainly relates to the underlying justification of the statute.” Wilkes, ¶ 20. We conclude that the distinctions in regulation of different substances for medical treatment does not create two legitimate classes for an equal protection challenge because the single identifying factor — use of a substance prohibited by federal law — is a fundamental difference that sufficiently distinguishes the two classes to render them dissimilar.

Substantive Due Process

¶19 Although there is considerable overlap between an equal protection analysis and a substantive due process analysis, “each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry.” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405, 105 S. Ct. 830, 841 (1985). Equal protection “emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable,” while due process “emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be *265treated.” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405, 105 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2443 (1974)). “For example, if a state prohibited all persons from purchasing or using a certain drug or medicine, a challenge to that law would be based on substantive due process.” 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 15.4(a) at 824 (5th ed. 2012). Because Plaintiffs essentially claim that the Act’s regulation of marijuana for medical purposes “restrict[s] the freedom of all persons in society without a constitutionally legitimate justification,” their challenges appropriately are analyzed under the due process clause, Montana Constitution Article II, Section 17. Rotunda & Nowak, supra, at 824.

¶20 Substantive due process also reflects a principle distinct from that protected by procedural due process:

If an individual asserts that the government must provide him with some type of procedural safeguards before the government takes an interest from him, he must demonstrate that the interest constitutes life, liberty, or property.... There is no need to define life, property or liberty for substantive due process analysis.... All laws might be said to restrict [an] individual’s use of property rights or personal liberty, in the sense of restricting which actions the individual can take in society. Laws regulating property or liberty that do not restrict the exercise of a fundamental right should be upheld unless the person attacking the law can overcome the presumption of constitutionality and demonstrate that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate interest.

Rotunda & Nowak, supra, § 15.5 at 847-48.

¶21 This Court analyzes substantive due process in the same fashion. Where a fundamental right is not implicated, “[s]ubstantive due process analysis requires a test of the reasonableness of a statute in relation to the State’s power to enact legislation.” Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 2009 MT 368, ¶ 33, 353 Mont. 265, 222 P.3d 566 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell, ¶ 29). “Since the State cannot use its power to take an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action against an individual, a statute enacted by the legislature must be reasonably related to a permissible legislative objective in order to satisfy guarantees of substantive due process.” Satterlee, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell, ¶ 29). See Newville v. State Dep’t of Family Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 249, 883 P.2d 793, 800 (1994). We analyze substantive due process claims by examining (1) whether the legislation in question is related to a legitimate governmental concern, and (2) whether the means *266chosen by the Legislature to accomplish its objective are reasonably related to the result sought to be attained. Walters, ¶ 18.

¶22 In determining whether the statute’s objective is legitimate, we examine the legislation’s purpose, whether expressly stated or otherwise. Satterlee, ¶¶ 34, 37 (examining the purpose of worker’s compensation laws to determine whether they serve a permissible legislative objective); Goble v. Mont. State Fund, 2014 MT 99, ¶ 41, 374 Mont. 453, 325 P.3d 1211 (examining the stated policy provisions of the worker’s compensation system to determine whether it serves a legitimate governmental interest). The legislation’s purpose “does not have to appear on the face of the legislation or in the legislative history, but may be any possible purpose of which the court can conceive.” Walters, ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Satterlee, ¶ 34). See Kottel v. State, 2002 MT 278, ¶ 55, 312 Mont. 387, 60 P.3d 403.

¶23 In this case, we need not surmise possible purposes for the legislation because the Act makes explicit several purposes on its face. See Walters, ¶¶ 31-32; Goble, ¶ 41. Section 50-46-301, MCA, provides that the purposes of the Act are to:

(a) provide legal protections to persons with debilitating medical conditions who engage in the use of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms of the debilitating medical condition;

(b) allow for the limited cultivation, manufacture, delivery, and possession of marijuana as permitted by this part by persons who obtain registry identification cards;

(c) allow individuals to assist a limited number of registered cardholders with the cultivation and manufacture of marijuana or marijuana-infused products;

(d) establish reporting requirements for production of marijuana and marijuana-infused products and inspection requirements for premises; and

(e) give local governments a role in establishing standards for the cultivation, manufacture, and use of marijuana that protect the public health, safety, and welfare of residents within their jurisdictions.

Section 50-46-301(2), MCA. In addition, the legislative history demonstrates that the Act was enacted in response to the Legislature’s concern about a number of abuses that occurred following passage of the 2004 Act. As we noted in MCIA I, the 2011 Act was passed “in response to a drastic increase of caregivers and medical marijuana users.” MCIA I, ¶ 2. The goal of the Act, according to its sponsor, was “to repeal a system that is obviously broken, cleanse the system out, *267and then restore the laws of the State of Montana in a fashion that will recognize the intent of the Montana voters in 2004.” Hearing on SB 423 Before the S. Jud. Comm. 62nd Leg. Reg. Sess. 07:46-08:01 (Mont. 2011).

¶24 Plaintiffs argue that they produced evidence proving the Legislature’s premises to be unfounded. They maintain that the District Court’s ruling correctly parsed the Act and struck down provisions that were shown not to be needed to address the Act’s legitimate objectives, while leaving intact other provisions that more effectively accomplished the Act’s purposes. Citing Brewer v. Ski-Lift, 234 Mont. 109, 115, 762 P.2d 226, 230 (1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Kopekin v. Moonlight Basin Mgmt., LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 936, 941 (Mont. 2013), Plaintiffs argue that the District Court properly enjoined provisions of the Act that are “needlessly overbroad and go far beyond the stated purposes of the statute.”

¶25 Brewer, however, says nothing about consideration of post-enactment evidence to prove a statute’s basis irrational. In concluding that the statute at issue in that case lacked a rational basis, this Court relied on the absence of reasons in the legislation to impose a strict assumption of risk standard on skiers in contradiction to state comparative negligence statutes that applied to other inherently dangerous activities. Brewer, 234 Mont. at 115, 762 P.2d at 230-31. We applied well-established principles of constitutional analysis: “ ‘The courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose ....’ ” Brewer, 234 Mont. at 112, 762 P.2d at 229 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law , 1440 (2d ed. 1988)). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), is misplaced because that case involved consideration of empirical evidence to support an injunction, not a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.

¶26 As in Conant, the District Court properly considered the Plaintiffs’ evidence in the context of their motions for preliminary injunctive relief. Section 27-19-201, MCA; Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier, 2013 MT 166, ¶ 28, 370 Mont. 410, 303 P.3d 794 (noting that a district court must consider “the equities of all interests involved”). But in the context of the constitutional analysis of the Act, “[o]ur role is not to second guess the prudence of a legislative decision.” Satterlee, ¶ 34.

As with all legislative compromises, the [Act] is not infallible and *268the legislative decisions made in adopting the [Act] are subject to honest debate. Nevertheless, once a statute has been duly approved by the legislative branch, this Court’s role is not one of second guessing the prudence of the conclusions reached.

Satterlee, ¶ 37. Rational basis is the most deferential standard of review. See e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1653 (1988); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976). Under the due process clause, “the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464 (1955). In light of the Act’s stated purposes, unless Plaintiffs establish that the statutes are unreasonable or arbitrary, the Legislature’s judgment should not be disturbed. Walters, ¶ 18.

¶27 As we noted in Walters, it may be “easy to opine that the Legislature could have done better” in providing for available means of accessing treatment once it determined to authorize marijuana use for certain medical conditions; the law, however, “requires us to recognize that ‘such a debate involves issues and decisions about public policy that are clearly of the sort much better suited to the halls of the legislature.’ ” Walters, ¶ 33 (quoting Satterlee, ¶ 38).

¶28 We conclude that the Act’s purposes serve a legitimate state interest. The Legislature was highly cognizant of the fact that marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance, illegal for all purposes, under federal law. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 845. The Legislature also took notice of the United States Attorney General’s direction to federal prosecutors that “[t]he prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority in the Department’s efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs ....” Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected United States Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1 (Oct. 19, 2009). (hereafter “Ogden Memorandum”).4 The Attorney General issued a new directive in August 2013 that refined and stated more clearly the objectives of *269particular importance to the United States government. They include, among numerous others, “[plreventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; [and] [plreventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity.” Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcemenfl-2 (Aug. 29,2013) (hereafter “Cole Memorandum”). While Plaintiffs emphasize that the Ogden and Cole Memoranda encourage federal prosecutors -to decline prosecution of state-regulated marijuana dispensaries in most circumstances, “it’s Congress that passes the laws, Congress that saw fit to enact 21 U.S.C. § 841, and Congress that in § 841 made the distribution of marijuana a federal crime.” Feinberg v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 808 F.3d 813, 816 (10th Cir. 2015). As such, there is no basis for concluding that informal agency memoranda alter the U.S. government’s authority to enforce federal law. Moreover, “[t]here’s always the possibility, too, that the next (or even the current) Deputy Attorney General could displace th[o]se memoranda at anytime.” Feinberg, 808 F.3d at 816. After this case was argued, Plaintiffs called the Court’s attention to a recent Congressional Appropriations Act that prohibits the Justice Department from spending funds that would prevent states — including Montana — from implementing their own laws authorizing the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. 114-113, § 542 Div. B, tit. V, 223 (2015). We take judicial notice of this action pursuant to M. R. Evid. 202(b). While the measure does evince developing attitudes in Congress, the substantive criminal prohibitions in federal law remain intact.

¶29 The Legislature is presumed to be cognizant of guiding constitutional principles, under which federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Legislature sought to resolve prior abuses and to avoid entanglement with feder