Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation v. Major League Baseball Players Association

The owners of the twenty-four Major League Baseball Clubs seek reversal of a judgment of the District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The court refused to set aside and ordered enforced an arbitration panel's award rendered in favor of the Major League Baseball Players Association. The arbitration panel was established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Club Owners and the Players Association. The award relieved pitcher Andy Messersmith of any contractual obligation to the Los Angeles Dodgers, and pitcher Dave McNally of any similar obligation to the Montreal Expos. It directed the Dodgers and Expos to remove Messersmith and McNally, respectively, from their reserve or disqualified lists. It ordered the American and National Leagues to inform and instruct their member clubs that the provisions of Major League Rule 4-A (reserve list rule) and Rule 3(g) (no-tampering rule) do not inhibit, prohibit or prevent such clubs from negotiating or dealing with Messersmith and McNally with respect to employment.

We hold that the arbitration panel had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, that its award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and that the relief fashioned by the District Court was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

* On February 25, 1973, the Club Owners and the Players Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement to be in effect from January 1, 1973 to December 31, 1975.

Article X of the agreement set forth a comprehensive procedure for the resolution of certain grievances. "Grievance" was defined as "a complaint which involves the interpretation of, or compliance with, the provision of any agreement between the Association and the Clubs or any of them, or any agreement between a Player and a Club * * *." Certain disputes not pertinent here were excepted.1 A player having a grievance was first required to present the matter to his club. Either the player or Players Association could then appeal the matter to the clubs' Player Relations Committee and to the appropriate League President. Grievances not satisfactorily resolved by these procedures could be submitted to a tripartite panel for binding arbitration. The panel was comprised of one member to be appointed by the Club Owners, one member to be appointed by the Players Association, and an impartial chairman to be chosen jointly by the other two members. The agreement defined the arbitrators' authority as follows:

With regard to the arbitration of Grievances, the Arbitration Panel shall have jurisdiction and authority only to interpret, apply or determine compliance with the provisions of agreements between the Association and the Clubs or any of them, and agreements between individual Players and Clubs. The Arbitration Panel shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agreements.

On October 7, 1975, the Players Association filed a grievance on behalf of Andy Messersmith. The grievance alleged that Messersmith played for the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1975 under a renewed 1974 contract, that the renewal year was completed on September 28, 1975, that Messersmith thus became a free agent on that date, and that the Club Owners had denied him his right to deal with other teams for his services in 1976. The Players Association asked that the Club Owners be ordered to treat Messersmith as a free agent and to compensate him for any financial detriment he might incur due to their delay in doing so.

On October 9, 1975, the Players Association filed a companion grievance on behalf of Dave McNally, alleging similar circumstances.2

The Club Owners responded to both grievances on October 24, 1975. Their primary contention was that the claims raised fell outside the scope of the agreed upon grievance procedures and were, therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel. They argued that Article XV of the 1973 agreement excluded disputes concerning the "core" or "heart" of the reserve system from the grievance procedures set forth in Article X. Article XV provided:

Except as adjusted or modified hereby, this Agreement does not deal with the reserve system. The Parties have differing views as to the legality and as to the merits of such system as presently constituted. This Agreement shall in no way prejudice the position or legal rights of the Parties or of any Player regarding the reserve system.

During the term of this Agreement neither of the Parties will resort to any form of concerted action with respect to the issue of the reserve system, and there shall be no obligation to negotiate with respect to the reserve system.

With respect to the merits of the dispute, the Club Owners argued that under the Uniform Player's Contract, the Dodgers and the Expos had the right to renew Messersmith's and McNally's contracts from year to year for a reasonable number of years. They alternatively argued that under the Major League Rules, the two clubs could obligate the pitchers to play for them and no other Major League Club, simply by placing their names on the clubs' reserve lists.

The arbitration panel set the matter for hearing. Thereafter, on October 28, 1975, the Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri seeking a declaratory judgment that the aforesaid grievances were non-arbitrable and an injunction prohibiting the Players Association from proceeding with arbitration. The remaining twenty-three Major League Clubs then joined the action as plaintiffs-intervenors. Subsequently, the Players Association filed a counterclaim, pursuant to § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate.

At a pretrial conference on November 6, 1975, the parties agreed to go forward with the scheduled arbitration. It was stipulated that the arbitration panel should initially determine its own jurisdiction, but that the question could later be presented to the District Court on the basis of the record compiled in the arbitration proceeding as well as any other relevant and material evidence which either side might wish to present.

In accordance with the stipulation, the Messersmith-McNally grievances were submitted to arbitration. Three days of hearings were held, at which voluminous evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was adduced. Four additional days of executive sessions then ensued. On December 23, 1975, the panel3 rendered its decision, holding that the grievances were within the scope of its jurisdiction and that Messersmith and McNally were free agents. It directed that both parties be removed from the reserve or disqualified lists of their respective clubs, and that the leagues promptly notify their member clubs that they may negotiate with Messersmith and McNally with respect to future employment. The panel denied the Players Association's prayer for damages as premature, but retained jurisdiction as to that and other questions pertaining to the appropriate nature and extent of relief.

Following the issuance of the arbitrators' decree, the dormant District Court action was revived in accordance with the parties' stipulation of November 6, 1975. The Club Owners renewed their efforts to have the dispute declared outside the scope of the arbitration panel's jurisdiction, and the Players Association amended its counterclaim, asking that the Club Owners be directed to comply with the arbitration panel's award.

The court admitted into evidence the record compiled in the arbitration proceeding. It also conducted three days of evidentiary hearings at which it received in evidence a wealth of exhibits, including various portions of the record compiled in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972); a copy of the "Celler Report," a House Report of the Subcommittee on Monopoly Power, 82nd Cong. 1952; records reflecting other arbitration proceedings had under baseball's grievance procedures; and copies of contemporaneous notes taken by several participants in meetings held pursuant to or in the course of negotiating baseball's various collective bargaining agreements.

The District Court held that the Messersmith-McNally grievances were within the scope of the arbitration panel's jurisdiction, and that neither the arbitrators' resolution of the merits nor the relief awarded exceeded the bounds of the panel's authority. It ordered enforcement of the arbitration panel's award.4

The Club Owners perfected a timely appeal.5 On appeal, they renew their contention that the Messersmith-McNally grievances are not within the purview of the arbitration panel's jurisdiction. They additionally argue that the arbitration panel's award exceeded the scope of its authority. They further maintain that the District Court's decree is fatally defective in that it operates against persons who were not parties to the proceedings before the arbitration panel or the court, and that it is ambiguous and indefinite.

The Supreme court articulated the legal principles applicable to the arbitration of labor disputes in the Steelworkers trilogy,6 and recently reaffirmed them in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974).

A party may be compelled to arbitrate a grievance only if it has agreed to do so. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, supra; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); International Union, Etc. v. I.T. & T., 508 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1975); Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye House Workers International Union, Local 93 v. Mahoney, 491 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825, 95 S.Ct. 42, 42 L.Ed.2d 49 (1974). The question of arbitrability is thus one of contract construction and is for the courts to decide. See, e. g., Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964); General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 554 v. Young & Hay Transportation Co., 522 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1975).

In resolving questions of arbitrability, the courts are guided by Congress's declaration of policy that arbitration is the desirable method for settling labor disputes. See § 203 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 173(d). Accordingly, a grievance arising under a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration must be deemed arbitrable " unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 582-583, 80 S.Ct. at 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1417, cited with approval in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, 414 U.S. at 377-388, 94 S.Ct. at 636-637, 38 L.Ed.2d at 592 and Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye House Workers International Union, Local 93 v. Mahoney, supra, 491 F.2d at 1032. Consistent with these principles, a broad arbitration provision may be deemed to exclude a particular grievance in only two instances: (1) where the collective bargaining agreement contains an express provision clearly excluding the grievance involved from arbitration; or (2) where the agreement contains an ambiguous exclusionary provision and the record evinces the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the grievance from arbitration. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra; Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, supra; Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye House Workers International Union, Local 93 v. Mahoney, supra.

If it is determined that the arbitrator had jurisdiction, judicial review of his award is limited to the question of whether it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960), cited with approval in General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 554 v. Young & Hay Transportation Co., supra, 522 F.2d 567-568 and International Union, Etc. v. White Motor Corp., 505 F.2d 1193, 1197 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1588, 43 L.Ed.2d 789 (1975). We do not sit as an appellate tribunal to review the merits of the arbitrator's decision.

We turn first to the question of the jurisdiction of the panel to arbitrate the Messersmith-McNally grievances.

We begin with the proposition that the language of Article X of the 1973 agreement is sufficiently broad to require arbitration of the Messersmith-McNally grievances. We think this clear because the disputes involve the interpretation of the provisions of agreements between a player or the Players Association and a club or the Club Owners. The grievances require the construction of agreements manifested in paragraphs 9(a) and 10(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract.

9.(a) The Club and the Player agree to accept, abide by and comply with all provisions of the Major League Agreement, the Major League Rules, the Rules or Regulations of the League of which the Club is a member, and the Professional Baseball Rules, in effect on the date of this Uniform Player's Contract, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this contract or the provisions of any agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association, provided that the Club, together with the other Clubs of the American and National Leagues and the National Association, reserves the right to modify, supplement or repeal any provision of said Agreement, Rules and/or Regulations in a manner not inconsistent with this contract or the provisions of any then existing agreement between the Major League Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Asociation (sic).

10.(a) On or before December 20 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding business day) in the year of the last playing season covered by this contract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that year by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be given, then at his last address of record with the Club. If prior to the March 1 next succeeding said December 20, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player at said address to renew this contract for the period of one year on the same terms, except that the amount payable to the Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice; provided, however, that said amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be an amount payable at a rate not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the next preceding year and at a rate not less than 70% of the rate stipulated for the year immediately prior to the next preceding year.

The interpretation of paragraph 9(a), in turn, requires the construction of Major League Rules 3(g) and 4-A(a).

3(g) TAMPERING. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent the enticement of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be no negotiations or dealings respecting employment, either present or prospective, between any player, coach or manager and any club other than the club with which he is under contract or acceptance of terms, or by which he is reserved, or which has the player on its Negotiation List, or between any umpire and any league other than the league with which he is under contract or acceptance of terms, unless the club or league with which he is connected shall have, in writing, expressly authorized such negotiations or dealings prior to their commencement.

4-A(a) FILING. On or before November 20 in each year, each Major League Club shall transmit to the Commissioner and to its League President a list of not exceeding forty (40) active and eligible players, whom the club desires to reserve for the ensuing season; and also a list of all its players who have been promulgated as placed on the Military, Voluntarily Retired, Restricted, Disqualified, Suspended or Ineligible Lists; and players signed under Rule 4 who do not count in the club's under control limit. On or before November 30 the League President shall transmit all of said lists to the Secretary-Treasurer of the Executive Council, who shall thereupon promulgate same, and thereafter no player on any list shall be eligible to play for or negotiate with any other club until his contract has been assigned or he has been released.

The Messersmith-McNally grievances might also be viewed as involving construction of the 1973 collective bargaining agreement itself. The provisions set forth above were made a part of that agreement under Article III, which incorporated by reference the terms of the Uniform Player's Contract.

Although we find that the grievances are arbitrable under Article X standing alone,7 we cannot ignore the existence of Article XV, which provides, inter alia, that the agreement "does not deal with the reserve system."

The provisions of the Uniform Player's Contract and the Major League Rules cited above are among the many contract provisions and rules which together constitute the reserve system.8 In fact, the Club Owners maintain that they are the very "core" or "heart" of the reserve system. The Club Owners argue that Article XV removed grievances arising out of the cited clauses from the coverage of Article X, and that when the agreement is read as a whole, as it must be, the Messersmith-McNally grievances are not arbitrable.

The District Court rejected this argument. It recognized that the agreement must be construed as a whole, but concluded that Article XV could not be interpreted to exclude any grievances from the procedures set forth in Article X.

We find the question more difficult than did the District Court. We cannot say that Article XV, on its face, constitutes a clear exclusionary provision. First, the precise thrust of the phrase "this Agreement does not deal with the reserve system" is unclear. The agreement incorporates the provisions which comprise the reserve system. Also, the phrase is qualified by the words "except as adjusted or modified hereby." Second, the impact of the language "This Agreement shall in no way prejudice the position * * * of the Parties" is uncertain. Third, the "concerted action" which the parties agree to foregodoes not clearly include bringing grievances. Fourth, Article XV affords no basis for the Club Owners' distinction between the "core" and the periphery of the reserve system. Finally, Article X(A)(1), which declares certain disputes non-grievable, is silent as to the reserve system. We find, however, that Article XV creates an ambiguity as to whether the grievances here involved are arbitrable. Accordingly, we must look beyond the face of the agreement and determine whether the record as a whole evinces the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude these grievances from arbitration. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra.9

We proceed to an examination of the evidence presented to the District Court pertaining to the parties' intent. Of particular relevance is the history of collective bargaining between the parties.

A. 1968 Basic Agreement.

The Players Association and Club Owners entered into their first collective bargaining agreement on February 19, 1968.10 The agreement was retroactive to January 1, 1968, and expired on December 31, 1969.

The 1968 agreement established the grievance procedures which continued in effect through the 1973 agreement. The agreement excluded disputes relating to benefit plans and the dues check-off agreement from the grievance and arbitration procedures.11 The Commissioner of Baseball was designated as the impartial arbitrator.

During the period that the 1968 agreement was in force, the provisions of the Uniform Player's Contract and the Major League Rules set forth above were in effect in substantially similar form. The 1968 agreement incorporated by reference those provisions in the same manner as the later agreements.

The 1968 agreement contained no provision analogous to Article XV of the 1973 agreement. With respect to the reserve system, Article VIII provided:

The parties shall review jointly the matters of (a) the length of the championship season and (b) possible alternatives to the reserve clause as now constituted.

The joint review of the matter of the length of the championship season shall commence as early as practicable and shall be completed prior to the drawing up of the preliminary schedules for 1969.

The joint review of the reserve clause shall be completed prior to the termination date of this Agreement.

Subject to Article III, Section B, it is mutually agreed that the Clubs shall not be obligated to bargain or seek agreement with the Players Association on either of the above matters during the term of this Agreement.

Pursuant to Article VIII, the parties held three meetings to discuss possible modification of the reserve system. No agreement was reached. At trial, Marvin Miller, Executive Director of the Players Association and a participant in those meetings, testified that no further discussions were held because the Club Owners refused to consider significant changes in the reserve system.

B. 1970 Basic Agreement.

The Club Owners and Players Association entered into their second collective bargaining agreement on May 12, 1970. This agreement was in force from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1972.

The 1970 agreement provided for grievance procedures similar to those established in 1968. Two significant changes were made which were carried over into the 1973 agreement. First, the tripartite panel replaced the Commissioner of Baseball as the impartial arbitrator. Second, the agreement excepted two additional categories of disputes from the grievance procedures, namely complaints involving actions against players taken by the Commissioner involving the integrity of the game, and complaints involving pictures and public appearances.12

The 1970 agreement incorporated the Uniform Player's Contract and the Major League Rules in the same manner as the 1968 and 1973 agreements.

During the negotiations leading up to the 1970 agreement, the Players Association submitted a number of proposed modifications of the reserve system, including a provision which would give each player the option of becoming a free agent once every three years. The Club Owners rejected these proposals as unacceptable, stating that they went to the heart of the game and the reserve system. In February, 1970, it became apparent that the parties had reached an impasse on the reserve system. Richard Moss, General Counsel to the Players Association, recollected that Marvin Miller then suggested:

We are not making any progress on modifications in the Reserve System. We are running out of time, in terms of the date of the negotiations, the approach of the season, and if it is mutually desirable to make an agreement we have got to do something about this issue that we are not making any progress on, and therefore we ought to set it aside.

At approximately the same time that the 1970 negotiations were reaching an impasse on the reserve system, Curt Flood, an outfielder traded by the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies, filed suit in federal court challenging the validity of the reserve system.13 Flood's complaint defined the reserve system as a number of provisions designed to bind a player to a particular club for the duration of his career. He claimed that the reserve system violated federal antitrust laws.14

The Club Owners asserted, as a defense to the Flood action, that the parties had agreed to the reserve system through collective bargaining, and that the system was, therefore, exempt from federal antitrust laws. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 85 S.Ct. 1596, 14 L.Ed.2d 640 (1965).15 As a result of the assertion of that defense, Arthur Goldberg, Chief Counsel for Flood, suggested to the Players Association's negotiators that a provision be included in the 1970 agreement which would obviate the Jewel Tea defense.

In accordance with Goldberg's suggestion, and their desire to enter into a collective bargaining agreement despite the parties' differences on the reserve system, the Players Association proposed that the following provision be included in the 1970 agreement:

Regardless of any provision herein to the contrary, the Basic Agreement does not deal with the reserve system. The parties have differing views as to the merits of such system as presently constituted. This Agreement shall in no way prejudice the parties or any player's position or legal rights related thereto.

During the pendency of any present litigation relating to the reserve system, it is agreed that the parties will not during the term of this Agreement resort to strike or lockout on that issue. However, upon the rendering of a final court decision in such litigation, either party may upon the giving of 30 day's written notice to the other party, reopen this Agreement and thereafter the parties may resort to any legal and appropriate action in support of their respective positions on this issue. (Emphasis added.)

Richard Moss testified that the proposal was designed to insure that the agreement would not prejudice the Flood litigation; to provide for reopening the agreement on the subject of the reserve system upon the termination of the lawsuit; and to immunize the Players Association from any potential liability as a co-conspirator in an agreement claimed to be in violation of federal antitrust laws.

Louis Hoynes, Counsel to the National League, testified that he was aware of the Players Association's desire to neutralize the Jewel Tea defense, but was unsure as to what other motivations the Association had in making the proposal set forth above. He stated:

(T)here was a lot of discussion among ourselves that evening as to exactly what the Association had in mind, what its purposes, its motives were. We were well satisfied then as we have continued to be satisfied throughout the rest of our relationship with the Association that the reasons that they gave as their motive for certain proposals need not bear any relationship to the real motive that they have and that is true of people generally.

He later testified that both parties were often less than candid in disclosing the purposes behind bargaining proposals.

According to Hoynes, the Club Owners' objections to the Players Association's proposal centered primarily around the language "the Basic Agreement does not deal with the reserve system." They were concerned that the reserve system would be unenforceable if totally excluded from the agreement. They also wanted to retain the Jewel Tea defense in the Flood case. They were further apprehensive that the language would remove the reserve system from the coverage of the "zipper clause," which provided that there was no obligation to negotiate on bargainable subjects during the term of the collective bargaining agreement.

The Club Owners were also dissatisfied with the Players Association's proposal regarding the means by which the parties could seek to further their respective positions on the reserve system. Although the proposal proscribed strikes and lockouts, the Club Owners felt that it permitted other types of actions which could be equally disruptive to their operations.

In an effort to obviate these objections, the Club Owners submitted the following counterproposal:

Regardless of any provision herein to the contrary, this Basic Agreement does not constitute an agreement between the parties as to the merits or legality of the reserve system. This Agreement shall in no way prejudice the position or legal rights of the parties or of any player regarding the reserve system.

It is agreed that during the term of this Agreement neither of the parties will resort to any form of concerted action, or encourage or support, directly or indirectly, any claim or litigation (other than Flood v. Kuhn, et al., pending in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of N. Y.) on the issue of the reserve system, or any part thereof, and neither of the parties shall be obligated to negotiate regarding the reserve system. (Emphasis added.)

The parties finally agreed upon the following language, which became Article XIV of the 1970 agreement:

Regardless of any provision herein to the contrary, this Agreement does not deal with the reserve system. The parties have differing views as to the legality and as to the merits of such system as presently constituted. This Agreement shall in no way prejudice the position or legal rights of the Parties or of any Player regarding the reserve system.It is agreed that until the final and unappealable adjudication (or voluntary discontinuance) of Flood v. Kuhn et al., now pending in the federal district court of the Southern District of New York, neither of the Parties will resort to any form of concerted action with respect to the issue of the reserve system, and there shall be no obligation to negotiate with respect to the reserve system. Upon the final and unappealable adjudication (or voluntary discontinuance) of Flood v. Kuhn et al., either Party shall have the right to reopen negotiations on the issue of the reserve system as follows:

a. in the event such adjudication (or discontinuance) occurs between October 15 in any year and January 15 in the following year, inclusive, either Party may thereafter reopen such negotiation, upon 10 days' prior written notice, provided that such notice is given on or before January 15;

b. in the event such adjudication (or discontinuance) occurs between January 16 and October 14, inclusive, in any year, either Party may thereafter reopen such negotiation on or after November 1, upon 10 days' prior written notice, provided that such notice is given on or before January 15 in any following year.

Hoynes testified that the Club Owners agreed to accept the language "this Agreement does not deal with the reserve system" on the basis of assurances given by Miller. Hoynes stated that during negotiations, he questioned the enforceability of the reserve system. He quoted Miller as responding: "It is going to be outside the Agreement. It will not be subject to the Agreement, but we will acquiesce in the continuance of the enforcement of the rules as house rules and we will not grieve over those house rules." Evidence that Miller made a statement that the Players Association would not grieve over house rules appears in contemporaneous notes of attorneys representing the Club Owners. Miller denies that he made the statement attributed to him.16

The Club Owners also compromised on their desire to retain the Jewel Tea defense. They felt that the language finally agreed upon weakened but did not necessarily destroy the defense.

Both parties compromised on the question of reserve system negotiations, addressing that issue expressly in the second paragraph of Article XIV. Both parties also compromised on the actions they could take in furtherance of their positions on the reserve system. They agreed that "neither of the parties will resort to any form of concerted action with respect to the reserve system."

Richard Moss testified that Article XIV, as finally agreed upon, excluded the reserve system from the 1970 agreement for purposes of litigation only. It did not preclude arbitration of any grievances otherwise arbitrable.

Prior to the start of the 1971 season, Marvin Miller informed the players that, in his view, a player could become a free agent by playing for one year under a renewed contract. It does not appear, however, that any player played for a full year under a renewed contract while the 1970 agreement was in effect.17 In 1972, the St. Louis Cardinals renewed the contracts of Jerry Reuss and Ted Simmons. Reuss was thereafter traded to the Houston Astros and signed a new contract. Simmons agreed to terms with the Cardinals in mid-season.

During the term of the 1970 agreement, a few grievances which involved one or more of the provisions that comprise the reserve system were submitted to arbitration. The Club Owners raised no jurisdictional objections. They felt that the grievances did not concern the "core" or "heart" of the reserve system, and that they were, therefore, arbitrable.

C. 1973 Basic Agreement.