McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc.

McGregor-Doniger Inc. (“McGregor”), a New York corporation founded in 1921, is a manufacturer of apparel for both men and women. Since 1947 McGregor has sold golf jackets under the trademark DRIZZLER, and in 1965 the company registered this mark for use in connection with golf jackets. Although McGregor had in the past used the word DRIZZLER in connection with other types of apparel, by 1965 the company had ceased using the mark in connection with any goods other than golf jackets. McGregor owns a variety of other trademarks, such as BROLLY DOLLY and BERNHARD ALTMANN, which have been used in connection with goods other than golf jackets. DRIZZLER jackets sell for about $25 to $50.

Drizzle Inc. (“Drizzle”), a New York corporation established in 1969, sells only women’s coats. Drizzle’s coats, which are manufactured for Drizzle by various contractors, have been sold under the unregistered trademark DRIZZLE since the founding of the company. It appears from the record that Drizzle has to date employed no other trademark. DRIZZLE coats range in price from about $100 to $900.

In 1974 McGregor’s management first became aware of the Drizzle company and of its use of the DRIZZLE mark in connection with the sale of women’s coats. In January of 1975 McGregor notified Drizzle that if use of the DRIZZLE trademark on Drizzle’s goods continued, legal proceedings would be instituted. The warning went unheeded and in March of 1975 McGregor brought suit against Drizzle in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1 false designation of *1130 origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), 2 and, in a pendent claim, common law unfair competition. 3 McGregor sought an injunction barring Drizzle’s further use of DRIZZLE as a trademark, an accounting for profits, damages, and other relief.

After a two-day bench trial, Judge Morris E. Lasker dismissed McGregor’s complaint. 446 F.Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.1978). On appeal, McGregor challenges both the factual findings of the trial court and the trial court’s interpretation of the legal significance of the facts found. Although the trial court’s statement of the applicable principles needs modification, we conclude that reversal is not warranted.

DISCUSSION

We are once again called upon to decide when a trademark owner will be protected against the use of its mark, or one very similar, on products other than those to which the owner has applied it. See, e. g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1169 (2d Cir. 1976). As we have observed before, the question “does not become easier of solution with the years.” Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961).

The crucial issue in these cases is “whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable nümber of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.” Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979); 3 R. Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 84, at 929 (3d ed. 1969) (hereinafter Callman); Restatement of Torts § 717 and Comment b at 567 (1938). In assessing the likelihood of such confusion we consider the factors laid out in the now classic Polaroid formula:

Where the products are different, the pri- or owner’s chance of success is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities — the court may have to take still other variables into account.

Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., supra, 287 F.2d at 495, citing Restatement of Torts §§ 729, 730, 731. Accord, Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., supra, 580 F.2d at 47; Scarves by Vera, Inc. *1131 v. Todo Imports Ltd., supra, 544 F.2d at 1173; King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1972); Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097, 1099 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 1054, 90 S.Ct. 707, 24 L.Ed.2d 698 (1970); Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Internat’l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. Callman § 80.5, at 556-57. The parties agree that Judge Lasker was correct in giving consideration to each of the factors mentioned in Polaroid before reaching a decision on the ultimate question of likelihood of confusion.

(1) Strength of the Mark

The most complex issue raised by McGre-gor concerns the trial court’s attempt to gauge the strength of the DRIZZLER mark. Our prior opinions and those of the district courts of this Circuit have left litigants and judges uncertain as to the appropriate way to demonstrate and determine the strength of a mark. In the hope of providing some guidance to bench and bar, we set out in some detail our view of this issue.

The term “strength” as applied to trademarks refers to the distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous, source. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Internat’l, Inc., 393 F.Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y.1975); Callman § 82.1(1), at 755. The Restatement of Torts uses the term “distinctiveness” in place of the term “strength.” § 731(f) and Comment e at 602. The strength or distinctiveness of a mark determines both the ease with which it may be established as a valid trademark and the degree of protection it will be accorded.

In an effort to liberate this aspect of trademark law from the “welter of adjectives” which had tended to obscure its contours, we recently reviewed the four categories into which terms are classified for trademark purposes. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). Arranged in ascending order of strength, these categories are: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. A generic term can never become a valid trademark and cannot be registered. A descriptive term can be registered as a mark only if it has “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), that is, in the unfortunate parlance of the cases, only if it has acquired “secondary meaning.” Suggestive marks, falling between the merely descriptive and the arbitrary or fanciful, are entitled to registration without proof of secondary meaning, as are fully arbitrary or fanciful terms. 537 F.2d at 9-11. The boundaries between these categories are not fixed.

[A] term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another, because a term may shift from one category to another in light of differences in usage through time, because a term may have one meaning to one group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different uses with respect to a single product.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., supra, 537 F.2d at 9 (footnotes omitted).

Thus, while these categories can be useful for analytical purposes, the strength of a mark depends ultimately on its distinctiveness, or its “origin-indicating” quality, in the eyes of the purchasing public. Two familiar examples suffice to illustrate this principle. A coined term, initially suggestive or even fanciful, can lose its full trademark status if it comes to signify to the public the generic name of an article rather than the source of a particular brand of that article. See, e. g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (“thermos”); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Dec.Com.Pat.1950) (“escalator”). In contrast, a descriptive mark that is not distinctive on its face may acquire secondary meaning so as to identify the source of the goods and thus claim status as a valid mark deserving of registration and protec-

599 F.2d — 26 *1132 tion against infringement. See, e. g., W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Trim” manicure implements). In Judge Lasker’s words, “strength may derive from the intrinsic quality of a mark or from its public history.” 446 F.Supp. at 162.

The many cases announcing that a mark found to be suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful (i. e., more than merely descriptive) is entitled to protection without proof of secondary meaning are correct as far as they go, for any term that is more than descriptive can be established as a valid mark which others may not infringe. Where the products involved are competitive and the marks quite similar, for example, the senior user of a more-than-descriptive mark need not prove secondary meaning. See, e. g., American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson Chemical Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978) (fanciful mark for insect traps; “Roach Inn” held to infringe “Roach Motel”). And where the marks involved are virtually identical, even if the products are non-competitive, a senior user of a more-than-descriptive mark can carry its burden on the “strength of the mark” component of the Polaroid formula without proving secondary meaning. See, e. g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., supra, 580 F.2d at 48 (arbitrary mark). But these cases do not require us to hold that Judge Lasker erred in considering evidence of secondary meaning in determining whether McGregor is entitled to protection against the use, on non-competitive goods, of a mark similar to its own. The cases agree that it is appropriate to consider all factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion. We view evidence concerning the origin-indicating significance of a mark in the marketplace as relevant to and probative of the strength of a mark and hence useful in assessing the likelihood of confusion.

Consideration of evidence of secondary meaning will almost always work in favor of the senior user. Its mark, if registered, is presumptively distinctive. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., supra, 537 F.2d at 11. Proof of secondary meaning, acquired perhaps through successful advertising, can only enhance the strength of its mark and thus enlarge the scope of the protection to which it is entitled. On the other hand, the owner of a distinctive mark need not introduce evidence of secondary meaning in order to gain protection for its mark against the confusing similarity of others. Thus, for example, the relatively small size of a senior user’s advertising budget or sales volume will not diminish the strength of its valid mark, and the scope of protection accorded to that mark will not be narrowed because of such evidence. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., supra, 580 F.2d at 48. Only if the junior user carries the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that a term is generic is the senior user stripped of protection. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., supra, 537 F.2d at 9-10; 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c).

McGregor claims that the district court erred in requiring proof of secondary meaning. We agree with McGregor’s contention that the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office to register a mark without requiring proof of secondary meaning affords a rebuttable presumption that the mark is more than merely descriptive. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., supra, 537 F.2d at 11; West & Co. v. Arica Institute, Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1977). The trial court did in fact find the term DRIZZLER more than merely descriptive, although apparently only barely over the “suggestive” line. As a suggestive term, the DRIZZLER mark would be entitled to protection, regardless of proof of secondary meaning, if McGregor could prove that confusion of origin was likely to result from the use of a similar mark on non-competing goods. To the extent the district court held proof of secondary meaning necessary, it was in error. However, it was not error for the court to consider evidence bearing on the strength of the mark in determining the likelihood of consumer confusion and thus the scope of protection to which the DRIZZLER mark was *1133 entitled. 4 Trademark strength is “an amorphous concept with little shape or substance when divorced from the mark’s commercial context,” E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Internat’l, Inc., supra, 393 F.Supp. at 512. We see no advantage to be derived from barring judicial consideration of the realities that give content to the concept of trademark strength.

(2) Similarity of the Marks

“To the degree that the determination of ‘likelihood of confusion’ rests upon a comparison of the marks themselves, the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide the issue.” Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969). Accord, Hills Bros. Coffee, Inc. v. Hills Supermarkets, Inc., 428 F.2d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 1970); Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 909, 73 S. Ct. 650, 97 L.Ed. 1345 (1953). There are two principles especially important to performing this task.

First, even close similarity between two marks is not dispositive of the issue of likelihood of confusion. “Similarity in and of itself is not the acid test. Whether the similarity is likely to provoke confusion is the crucial question.” Callman § 82.1(a), at 601-02 (footnote omitted). For this reason eases involving the alteration, addition or elimination of only a single letter from the old mark to the new reach divergent results. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Internat’l, Inc., supra, 393 F.Supp. at 511-12. Second, in assessing the similarity of two marks, it is the effect upon prospective purchasers that is important. Restatement of Torts § 728, Comment b at 591.

The district court quite correctly took into consideration all the factors that could reasonably be expected to be perceived by and remembered by potential purchasers. “[T]he setting in which a designation is used affects its appearance and colors the impression conveyed by it.” Id. § 729 Comment b at 593. Thus while observing that the typewritten and aural similarity of the two marks “approaches identity,” the district judge noted that the context in which the respective marks are generally presented reduces the impact of this similarity. The court observed that the label in each DRIZZLER jacket prominently features the McGregor name, which is printed in striking plaid letters. In addition, although there was testimony that retail stores on occasion in independent advertisements omit the McGregor logo, the evi *1134 dence showed that McGregor always emphasizes the company name in its own advertising of DRIZZLER jackets. The fact that a trademark is always used in conjunction with a company name may be considered by the trial court as bearing on the likelihood of confusion. Warner Brothers Co. v. Jantzen, Inc., 249 F.2d 353, 354 (2d Cir. 1957); Daggett & Ramsdell, Inc. v. I. Posner, Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 952, 277 F.2d 952, 953-54 (1960).

The law does not require that trademarks be carefully analyzed and dissected by the purchasing public. “[I]t is sufficient if the impression which the infringing product makes upon the consumer is such that he is likely to believe the product is from the same source as the one he knows under the trade-mark.” Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 494 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). The court below properly focused on the general impression conveyed by the two marks. If Drizzle had chosen consistently to present its mark in red plaid lettering or to advertise its coats as the McGregor DRIZZLE line, we would be compelled to conclude that the similarity between the DRIZZLER mark and the DRIZZLE mark, as generally presented to the public, had been heightened and that the likelihood of confusion had been enhanced. Conversely, the fact that only one mark generally appears in close conjunction with the red plaid McGregor name increases the likelihood that the public, even when viewing the marks individually, will not confuse the two. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Etc. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1339 (2d Cir. 1975) (appropriate for court to consider differences in typeface of two marks). See also American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson Chemical Co., supra, at 107-08 (test should be customer reaction to products presented individually). Accord, Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 382 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976); Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 58 C.C.P.A. 751, 434 F.2d 1403, 1406 (1970). The likelihood of confusion is further reduced by Drizzle’s use of its mark to identify itself as the producer of the products advertised by it rather than as the name of a particular jacket or line of jackets, in contrast to McGregor’s practice.

The district court’s reasoning is sound. The differing methods of presentation of the two marks were properly examined. We agree with Judge Lasker’s appraisal that they reduce to some degree the potential for confusion inherent in the close similarity between the two marks.

(3) and (4) Product Proximity and Quality of Defendant's Product

The district court concluded on the basis of differences in appearance, style, function, fashion appeal, advertising orientation, and price 5 that the competitive distance between DRIZZLER jackets and DRIZZLE coats is “significant.” This conclusion is too amply supported by the evidence to be characterized as clearly erroneous.

McGregor does not claim that DRIZZLER jackets and DRIZZLE coats are directly competitive. Customers shopping for an inexpensive golf jacket are not likely to become confused by the similarity of the marks and mistakenly purchase a fashionable and expensive woman’s coat. Thus the degree of proximity between the two products is relevant here primarily insofar as it bears on the likelihood that customers may be confused as to the source of the products, rather than as to the products themselves, and the concern is not direct diversion of purchasers but indirect harm through loss of goodwill or tarnishment of *1135 reputation. Restatement of Torts § 730, Comment b at 599. It is evident that customers would be more likely to assume that DRIZZLER golf jackets and DRIZZLE golf jackets come from the same source than they would be likely to assume that DRIZ-ZLER golf jackets and DRIZZLE steam shovels come from the same source. DRIZZLE coats for women fall between the two extremes. In locating the appropriate place for DRIZZLE coats on this continuum, the district court considered many of the factors that are generally viewed as relevant.

The impression that noncompeting goods are from the same origin may be conveyed by such differing considerations as the physical attributes or essential characteristics of the goods, with specific reference to their form, composition, texture or quality, the service or function for which they are intended, the manner in which they are advertised, displayed or sold, the place where they are sold, or the class of customers for whom they are designed and to whom they are sold.

Callman § 82.2(c), at 807.

Looking at these very factors, the district judge found:

Beyond the fact that they might both be crudely classified as outerwear, the “DRIZZLER” and defendant’s products have nothing in common. McGregor’s garment is a relatively inexpensive, lightweight, waist-length, jacket — a windbreaker . . . . As is apparent from advertisements for the jacket, it is intended for casual wear, particularly in connection with sports activities. Moreover, although the DRIZZLER can be worn by either men or women, sales are pitched primarily to the former . . . . Furthermore, a DRIZZLER is ordinarily sold in the men’s department of stores which carry both men’s and women’s garments

Unlike McGregor’s products, the coats manufactured by Drizzle are distinctly and exclusively tailored for women. They are generally full-length raincoats and capes. Although it is true that Drizzle manufactures a style that might be called a jacket . . . it is longer than the DRIZZLER and entirely different in appearance. Drizzle’s garments are within the medium to high fashion range . . . The price range of Drizzle’s line, running from approximately $100 to $900 . . . reflects the coats’ position in the fashion hierarchy.

446 F.Supp. at 164 (footnotes and citations to record omitted).

In Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1974), we recognized that due to diversification in the garment business, men’s apparel and women’s apparel had in certain cases been regarded as sufficiently related to justify the denial of registration to similar marks. See, e. g., S. Rudofker’s Sons v. Genesco Inc., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821 (T.T.A.B. 1966) (After Five refused registration for women’s lingerie on opposition by After Six men’s formal wear). However, in Blue Bell we characterized the proximity between men’s sportswear and women’s sportswear as only “moderate” and held that the likelihood of confusion was reduced by the rather “detailed purchasing process” appropriate to the goods in question. 497 F.2d at 435-36. We know of no case holding that, as a matter of law, the competitive distance between men’s apparel and women’s apparel cannot be demonstrated to be significant on the basis of the many factors relevant to such a determination. The district court’s finding on this issue, based on the proper indicia and supported by the evidence, should not be disturbed.

The high quality of Drizzle’s coats is not contested by McGregor.

(5) Bridging the Gap

In assessing the likelihood of confusion, the district court was required to consider the likelihood that DRIZZLER would “bridge the gap,” that is, the likelihood that McGregor would enter the women’s coat market under the DRIZZLER banner. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., supra, 287 F.2d at 495. McGregor presented no evidence that such a step was being considered. Clearly the absence of *1136 any present intention or plan indicates that such expansion is less, rather than more, probable. Also of probative value is the fact that McGregor has for many years marketed its women’s apparel under names bearing no similarity to DRIZZLER — such as BROLLY DOLLY. See King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., supra, 454 F.2d at 68 (manufacturer of brush cleaner under “Ship Shape” mark rated low on likelihood that it would bridge the gap and manufacture hair spray under “Ship Shape” mark where its own sales of toiletries had to date been under other marks). On the other hand, the absence of a present intent to bridge the gap is not determinative. In a given case, sufficient likelihood of confusion may be established although likelihood of bridging the gap is not demonstrated. Because consumer confusion is the key, the assumptions of the typical consumer, whether or not they match reality, must be taken into account. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Internad, supra, 393 F.Supp. at 517-18; Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., supra, 544 F.2d at 1174 (where “name” designers frequently market women’s perfume under same mark as women’s apparel, confusion likely if defendant permitted to market perfume under name “Vera”; thus “no need to decide whether there is a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will enter the cosmetics and fragrances market”).

The district court’s finding that it is unlikely that DRIZZLER will bridge the gap is not clearly erroneous. Nor does the evidence presented below regarding McGregor’s own history of trademark use, as well as industry custom, compel the conclusion that, despite the improbability that McGregor will move into the women’s coat market under the DRIZZLER trademark, consumers will assume otherwise.

(6) Actual Confusion

McGregor’s claim that the district court erred in considering the absence of proof of actual consumer confusion in assessing the likelihood of confusion is without merit. Actual confusion is one of several factors to be considered in making such a determination. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., supra, 287 F.2d at 495. Although we have recognized the difficulty of establishing confusion on the part of retail customers, the district judge quite properly noted that not a single instance of consumer confusion had actually been demonstrated. See Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., supra, 580 F.2d at 48. While a plaintiff need not prove actual confusion in order to prevail, W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., supra, 435 F.2d at 661-62; Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., supra, 411 F.2d at 1100-01; Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 (2d Cir. 1960), “it is certainly proper for the trial judge to infer from the absence of actual confusion that there was also no likelihood of confusion.” Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d Cir. 1975). Accord Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., supra, 497 F.2d at 435-36.

Finally, the district court was not required, as McGregor urges, to find actual consumer confusion on the basis of the testimony of one McGregor employee that she had been momentarily confused by a DRIZZLE advertisement. The weighing of evidence, particularly where credibility judgments must be made, is for the trial judge. His determination regarding actual confusion is not clearly erroneous. 6

(7) Good Faith

McGregor contends that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on *1137 the good faith issue on McGregor rather than on Drizzle. See Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., supra, 411 F.2d at 1101 (placing burden on junior user where allegedly infringing mark was identical to that of senior user and both marks were used on women’s undergarments). However, assuming without deciding that McGregor is correct in its view of the proper placement of the burden of proof, there is simply no indication in Judge Lasker’s opinion that this burden was in fact placed on McGregor.

We recently held that adoption of the mark MUSHROOM for women’s sportswear despite actual and constructive notice of another company’s prior registration of the mark MUSHROOMS for women’s shoes was not necessarily indicative of bad faith, because the presumption of an exclusive right to use a registered mark extends only so far as the goods or services noted in the registration certificate. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., supra, 580 F.2d at 48, citing Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 613 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909, 81 S.Ct. 271, 5 L.Ed.2d 224 (1960). See also Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Internat’l Corp., supra, 308 F.2d at 199 (innocent junior user is one whose use is not attributable to intent to obtain free ride on reputation of trademark owner). Here, as in Mushrooom Makers, the district court was entitled to consider and to credit the uncontradicted testimony of Drizzle’s witnesses that the DRIZZLE mark was selected without knowledge of McGregor’s prior use of the DRIZZLER mark. “Normally, the alleged infringer’s intent is an issue for district court determination,” Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Etc. v. Steinway & Sons, supra, 523 F.2d at 1338 n.14, and findings as to such intent will be upset only if clearly erroneous. Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, supra, 408 F.2d at 509.

(8) Sophistication of Buyers

McGregor asserts that the trial court erroneously considered only the typical “sophisticated” purchaser of Drizzle’s coats, to the exclusion of the casual or unsophisticated purchaser. We do not read the decision below in this manner.

The relevant cases not only authorize but instruct the trial courts, in making a determination as to likelihood of confusion, to consider the level of sophistication of the relevant purchasers. See, e. g., Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, supra, 408 F.2d at 509; Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., supra, 287 F.2d at 495; Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., supra, 279 F.2d at 612; Restatement of Torts § 729(d) and Comment g, § 731(g) and Comment e. “The general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods, is the touchstone.” Callman § 81.2, at 577 (footnote omitted). As we observed recently in Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1978), “every product has its own separate threshold for confusion of origin.” The greater the value of an article the more careful the typical consumer can be expected to be; the average purchaser of an automobile will no doubt devote more attention to examining different products and determining their manufacturer or source than will the average purchaser of a ball of twine. The degree of reliance by consumers on labels and trademarks will also vary from product to product. Modular Cinemas of America, Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F.Supp. 578, 583 (S.D.N.Y.1972). It is easy to see that such differences in purchasing patterns affect the likelihood that confusion will result from the use of similar marks on non-competing goods from different sources.

In some cases, of course, as where the products are identical and the marks are identical, the sophistication of buyers cannot be relied on to prevent confusion. For example, in Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971), we held that even though the ordinary purchaser would be expected to make “m