Norwilton Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, Beloit Power Systems, Inc., in No. 78-2224. Cross Appeal of Norwilton Murray, in No. 78-2225

OPINION OF THE COURT

This appeal raises several issues, including novel and important questions as to whether a comparative negligence statute may be applied and, if so, to what extent, in an action for personal injuries brought under twin theories of strict products liability and common law principles of negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Norwilton Murray, in the sum of two million dollars against the manufacturer, Beloit Power Systems, Inc. (Beloit). The jury, in response to a special interrogatories, found that plaintiff’s negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries and that he was at fault to the extent of five percent. The trial judge re *652 duced the verdict accordingly and judgment was thereupon entered for the plaintiff. Beloit’s motion for a new trial was denied and it appealed. Murray has also cross-appealed contending that the trial court erred in applying contributory negligence as a defense to a products liability action grounded on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and that it should not have reduced his verdict because of his own contributory negligence. We find no error on Beloit’s appeal and we reject Murray’s cross-appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

At the time of the accident, Norwilton Murray, a thirty-four year old experienced instrument fitter, was employed by Litwin Corporation, an installer of equipment. On July 21, 1974, Murray and a co-worker were installing an electrical control panel at the Hess Oil Refinery in the Virgin Islands. The panel was built by Beloit to Litwin’s specifications and Litwin’s engineer approved it at Beloit’s factory before it was shipped. Litwin intended to install the panel on a platform over an open space approximately ten feet above the concrete floor of the refinery. There was evidence, however, that Beloit had not been so informed. At Litwin’s request the unit had been purposely left open at the bottom so that conduits from below could be attached to it. The control panel was removed from its shipping crate and a cherry-picker hoisted it by its metal lifting eyes onto the platform. In order to protect the integrity of the delicate instrumentation inside the panel, Beloit had attached two iron cross-members to the open bottom of the unit in order to stabilize it during shipping. Murray’s task was to align the holes in the base of the control panel with pre-drilled holes in the platform and secure the unit with mounting bolts. Because the holes were *653 not perfectly aligned when the cherry-picker deposited the unit on the foundation. Murray chose to use a crow-bar to rock the approximately one and a half ton unit into alignment.

The accident occurred when Murray put his weight on one of the iron cross-members by leaning over the open space at the bottom of the unit to bolt it to the platform. The cross-member gave way and Murray fell approximately ten feet to the concrete floor incurring severe injuries to his spine. It was determined at trial that the cross-member gave way because it had been only temporarily or “tack-welded” to the unit, instead of being secured by a permanent or “butt-weld.” Murray’s spinal injuries led to two operations for a herniated disc. The most severe injury, however, was to the group of spinal nerves called the cauda equina, which affect sexual and urinary functions. As a consequence of this nerve damage, Murray is incontinent and sexually dysfunctional. The prognosis for improvement in his condition is poor, and it is possible that his injuries may ultimately cause him to be confined to a wheelchair and may reduce his life-span. He has not returned to work since the accident.

Murray brought a products liability action against Beloit alleging alternative theories of strict liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and common law negligence. He contended that the control panel was defective because the cross-member had been only tack-welded to the unit. Beloit defended with expert evidence to prove that Murray’s method of installation was highly dangerous and Beloit argued that Murray assumed the risk of injury posed by his manner of installation. The district court, holding that the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute, 5 V.I.C. § 1451 (1978) 1 was ap *654 plicable to a strict products liability action, instructed the jury that if they found Beloit liable and Murray negligent, to reduce Murray’s award by the percentage attributable to his fault. 2

The jury returned a verdict finding Beloit liable under both the strict products liability and the negligence counts. The jury also found Murray’s negligence in installing the unit to constitute five percent fault for the injuries. The jury awarded Murray $2,000,000 in damages. This sum, when reduced by the five percent fault attributable to Murray and the reduction to present value of his future earnings, amounted to $1,747,000. Although noting that the verdict was very high, the district court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.

On appeal to this court, Beloit essentially raises three 3 questions: First, it was error for plaintiff’s counsel to specifically request the jury to return a verdict, which it apparently honored, for $2,000,000. Second, the district court *655 erred in not granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive and third, in not granting a new trial because the jury fixed Murray’s fault at only five percent, even though the jury found that his own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.

Beloit first contends that it was improper for the trial court to permit Murray’s counsel to plead for a specific sum of damages in his closing remarks to the jury. 4 Beloit maintains that counsel’s plea for a $2,000,000 verdict was highly improper and incited the jury to award a high verdict not in accordance with the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in the precise sum urged by counsel Beloit relies primarily on Joyce v. Smith, 269 Pa. 439, 442-43, 112 A. 549 (1921), which held that the amount of damages claimed is not to be determined by an estimate of counsel “but by the jury from the evidence before them, and any suggestion to the jury of an arbitrary amount is highly improper . . . .” Although a few courts do take the view that a reference by counsel to a specific sum of damages in a personal injury action 5 is improper, the majority do not. See Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 182 A.2d 451 (1962); Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill.2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962); Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Skerman, 247 F. 269 (2d Cir. 1917). See cases collected at Annot. 14 A.L.R.3d 541, 545 (1967). Some courts apparently do not pass upon the propriety of reference to a specific amount, but require a showing of prejudice before reversal is warranted. See Symons v. Great Northern R. Co., 208 Minn. 240, 293 N.W. 303 (1940).

*656 We need not decide the issue, however, because we find no objection in the record by the defendant to opposing counsel’s reference to a specific ad damnum. Counsel’s failure to object precludes him from seeking a new trial on the grounds of the impropriety of opposing counsel’s closing remarks. Gilmore v. Strescon Industries, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 146, 152 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975). We decline to review the matter as plain error.

We turn next to Beloit’s contention that the verdict was excessive. The final adjusted figure of $1,747,000 awarded Murray appears to be the highest damage award in a Virgin Islands personal injury action. Judge Young, the trial judge, however, declined to order a remittitur or new trial on the issue of damages. He noted that although he personally would not have awarded as high a verdict, “[i]t is not enough that the Court, as the trier of fact, would have awarded a lesser amount of damages. Rather, the damages assessed by the jury must be so unreasonable as to offend the conscience of the Court. See also, Tann v. Service Distributors, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973).” Judge Young declined to set aside the jury’s verdict and concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record upon which it could have based its award.

In exercising our power of review over the damage award in this case, we are mindful that the scope of our review is extremely narrow. In Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. CIE., Chambon, 562 F.2d 215, 225-226 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978) we stated:

The question of the excessiveness of a verdict is primarily a matter to be addressed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and we may not disturb his determination unless a “manifest abuse of discretion” be shown .... Stated another way, we may reverse the determination of the district judge and grant a new trial only if the verdict is “so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience.” (Citations omitted.)

*657 We cannot perceive an abuse of discretion merely because we would have found the damages to be considerably less than those awarded and would have set them aside had we been the district court. Id. at 226; Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1961). The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and assess whether the jury’s verdict is rationally based. Edynak, supra, 562 F.2d at 226-227 citing Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 133 U.S. App. D.C. 110 409 F.2d 145, 148, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835, 90 S.Ct. 93, 24 L.Ed.2d 85 (1969). Nevertheless, there is a limit beyond which an appellate court must reverse an award as grossly excessive. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that we must “make a detailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages” in deciding whether a verdict is excessive. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159 (1968). We must therefore turn to the record to see if the district court was correct in concluding that the jury’s award was not the product of irrational behavior.

The jury’s initial award of $2,000,000 represented $1,700,000 for “lost income (past), mental anguish, past and future, loss of enjoyment of life, past and future,” and $300,000 for impaired future earning capacity. The plaintiff did not prove any specific amount of either past or anticipated medical expenses. The lost future earnings award was reduced to a present value of $153,612.00. The verdict was then adjusted by the five percent attributed to Murray’s fault, making the final figure $1,747,000.00. Thus, the jury’s award almost totally represents an award for mental suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. 6 However, as we have noted, “[e]vidence of pain and suffering is particularly ill-suited to review upon only a written record.” Edynak, supra, 562 F.2d at 227 n.16. According to this record, Murray sustained severe and de *658 bilitating injuries. Direct examination of Dr. Hiram Mercado, a neurologist and Murray’s chief medical expert revealed that Murray sustained two severe injuries to his spine. 7 The fall resulted in a herniated disc and damage to the cauda equina, which control urinary, fecal, and sexual functions. Murray was initially hospitalized for seventeen days following the accident during which time he was placed in bedrest with leg traction. During his hospitalization Murray experienced problems with micturition (passing of water). He was released from the hospital but was unable to walk properly because of severe pain. He subsequently underwent two spinal operations to remove a herniated disc. Murray, however, continued to experience back pain.

Murray’s most damaging injury was to his cauda equina. The damage to these nerves resulted in a neurogenic bladder, which causes spontaneous urine elimination. Murray is forced to wear a genital clamp to control his bladder. The bladder condition also poses the threat of recurrent infections, which might eventually endanger the kidneys. Dr. Sidney Weinberg, a urologist treating Murray, testified that the bladder condition has worsened and that there is a reasonable possibility that the kidneys may become fatally damaged. There is also evidence that Murray’s spinal injuries have resulted in sexual dysfunction. Murray’s prostate gland also might have to be removed to protect his kidneys. This would not cure, and might worsen his incontinence and render him sexually impotent. Murray is taking drugs which help to reduce the frequency of urination but the overall prognosis is poor. Murray testified that pain from sitting forces him to lie down for two or three hours at a time. *659 He claimed severe psychic damages; he is now divorced and he no longer has a healthy relationship with his children and friends.

On cross-examination, Dr. Mercado admitted that some of Murray’s treating physicians had noticed improvement in his condition and that he could resume some light work. Murray admitted that he had fathered a child since the accident, but complained that he was almost completely dysfunctional. There also was evidence that Murray was able to drive a car because he was involved in an automobile accident after the fall.

Faced with this record, we cannot unequivocably conclude that the jury’s damage award was irrational or so excessive as to shock our conscience. The jury was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the medical evidence and the record reveals a sufficient basis for its ultimate award. Murray will continue to suffer the debilitating consequences of his injuries which perforce will limit the quality of his life-style and probably the extent of his life-span. Although we believe that the jury’s award was very high and that more severely injured plaintiffs have often received less compensation, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce the verdict as excessive.

III.

We now turn to the claims of both parties that damages were improperly apportioned. Murray has cross-appealed and we shall first consider whether his award should have been reduced by the five percent fault attributed to his negligence in causing his injuries. We must determine whether the district court was correct in applying the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute, 5 V.I.C. § 1451 in a strict products liability action.

In a traditional strict products liability action brought *660 under Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, the plaintiff need prove only three elements to recover: (1) the existence of a defect, (2) in an unreasonably dangerous condition, (3) which proximately causes the injury. 8 Although the defendant is held strictly liable for the condition of his product, that liability is not absolute. The Restatement recognizes the defense of voluntary unreasonable assumption of the risk, although contributory negligence in the sense of failing to discover or guard against the defect is not a defense. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment n. Thus, mere carelessness in using the product will not bar the plaintiff from recovery. See, e.g., Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 787 n.6 (Mo. 1978); Cepada v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 76 N.J. 152, 164, 386 A.2d 816, 832 (1976). The Restatement does provide, however, that assumption of the risk will bar recovery: “If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment n. In addition to assumption of the *661 risk, product misuse unforeseeable to the defendant is also an absolute defense to a strict products liability action. 9 See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 119-28 (1972); Dale and Hilton, Use of the Product — When is it Abnormal?, 4 Willamette L.J. 350, 352 (1967). Thus, although the impediments to plaintiff’s recovery are greatly diminished by the strict product liability doctrine, nonetheless, the defendant may be relieved from liability when plaintiff’s conduct is especially egregious.

In the present case, Beloit requested a jury instruction that Murray’s voluntary assumption of risk would constitute a complete bar to recovery. Murray, on the other hand, requested an instruction that ordinary contributory negligence was not a defense to a section 402A action. The district court declined to issue either instruction and instead, applying the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute, instructed the jury that they could reduce any award for Murray by whatever fault they ascribed to his negligence in causing the accident. 10 Judge Young later explained his position:

The Court is of the opinion that neither of the positions advanced by the parties should govern the law of strict products liability in the Virgin Islands, but that both plaintiff’s want of ordinary due care in his use of the product and plaintiff’s unreasonable exposure *662 to a known and appreciable risk of injury should work to diminish plaintiff’s recovery in a § 402A type action in proportion to the amount of causative culpable conduct attributable to plaintiff. The mere failure of plaintiff to discover or guard against the existence of a defect where plaintiff had no reason to suspect the same would not constitute a defense in a § 402A type action.

Murray v. Beloit Power Systems, Inc., 450 F.Supp. 1145, 1147 (D.V.I. 1978) (footnote omitted).

Judge Young admitted that the elimination of assumption of risk as a total bar to recovery was contrary to the Restatement position but concluded that under the Virgin Islands statute the application of comparative negligence principles to strict products liability actions “will provide the most equitable means of ascertaining ultimate tort liability.” Id. at 1147. It is the wisdom of this last statement which we must assess in deciding whether comparative negligence should apply, and to what extent, to a section 402A action.

IV.

We are faced with an initial problem not fully considered by the district court. As indicated above, comparative negligence has been adopted by statute in the Virgin Islands, 5 V.I.C. § 1451. The statute provides that contributory negligence is replaced by comparative negligence “[i]n any action based upon negligence to recover for injury to person or property . ...” 5 V.I.C. § 1451(a) (emphasis supplied).

Some form of comparative negligence has been adopted by the majority of American jurisdictions in ordinary negligence actions to replace the harsh rule of contributory negligence which absolutely bars a plaintiff from recovery, even if his negligence is slight when compared with the defendant’s. The advent of comparative negligence has been widely praised by legal scholars and courts who believe that it offers a more equitable apportionment of damages. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 67 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, our *663 first inquiry must be whether we may apply the statute in the strict products liability context.

The almost universal recognition by courts and legislators of the doctrine of strict products liability has provided consumers with a powerful legal weapon against merchants of defective products. Since Justice Traynor’s seminal decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the past fifteen years have witnessed a virtual explosion of litigation in the products liability field. By eliminating the impediments of contractual privity and proof problems associated with negligence theory, the strict products liability action, as recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, has become an extremely attractive vehicle which plaintiffs can mount to achieve legal recovery. Further, because contributory negligence generally has not been recognized as a defense to a section 402A action, the possibility that a plaintiff might be barred from recovery because of his own misconduct has been significantly narrowed to those cases in which voluntary assumption of the risk or product misuse occurs.

The use of comparative negligence principles in the strict products liability arena has generated a debate among courts and legal commentators concerning the conceptual feasibility and doctrinal desirability of comparing the misconduct of the plaintiff with the strict liability imposed on the defendant under section 402A. Several courts have indicated a willingness to apply comparative principles to strict products liability doctrine in an effort to achieve a more equitable distribution of the loss resulting from injuries to which the plaintiff may himself have contributed. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Cal. 1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Inc., *664 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976). On the other hand, several courts have viewed comparative negligence principles as fundamentally incompatible with strict products liability and have declined to extend comparative negligence statutes to section 402A cases. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law); Kinard v. The Coats Company, Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1977).

Of the states with comparative negligence statutes, there is a division of authority as to whether the statute may be applied in strict products liability cases. Some have declined to apply their comparative negligence statute because the statute is limited to negligence actions. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367-68 (Okla. 1974). Other jurisdictions with comparative negligence statutes facially limited to negligence actions have nevertheless invoked the statute in a strict products liability context. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F.Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976), Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The rationale has been either that strict products liability is akin to “negligence per se,” and thus within the purview of the comparative negligence statute, or that the legislature, having expressed no opinion about the statute’s applicability to prod-ducts liability law, therefore left open the possibility that comparative principles should apply. Compare Dippel, supra, 37 Wis.2d at 461, 155 N.W.2d at 64 with Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., 457 F.Supp. 740, 752 (D.Kan. 1978). Faced with this equivocal history of the application of comparative negligence statutes in strict products liability cases, we must decide whether we should *665 extend the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute to strict liability cases predicated on section 402A.

In applying the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute to this suit, the district court expressly adopted the “position and policy considerations advanced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis.2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974) and Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).” 450 F.Supp. at 1147. The Dippel case was the first decision to apply a comparative negligence statute to a strict products liability action. Wisconsin’s modified comparative negligence statute bars the plaintiff from recovery if his negligence is “as great as” that of the defendant. Wis. Stat. § 895.045. The Wisconsin approach is to view the strict products liability action as “akin to negligence per se” and therefore within the purview of the comparative negligence statute. 155 N.W.2d at 64. By adopting the Wisconsin approach, the district court justified the application of the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute, arguably limited to negligence actions, to strict products liability.

We disagree with the district court’s adoption of Wisconsin’s gloss on section 402A actions as negligence per se. The Restatement makes it quite clear that strict liability is imposed on the defendant even if he has exercised “all possible care in the preparation and sale of his products.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2) (a). The focus of the strict products liability action is on the condition of the product and not on the conduct of the defendant. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Wisconsin view stating: “Once the plaintiff has proven the product was not reasonably safe, the defendant is liable in damages and cannot absolve itself by proving lack of negligence.” Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438, 444 (1977). When the Restatement recognized the doctrine of strict products liability, we be *666 lieve the drafters envisioned a form of tort liability separate and apart from negligence theory. The advantage of strict products liability theory is that the plaintiff need only prove the existence of a product defect and not that negligence caused it. The problem is that products liability cases are often tried on alternative theories of negligence and strict liability and the temptation to view strict liability as a species of presumptive negligence is inviting. We decline any such invitation because we believe that a satisfactory union of strict liability and comparative negligence principles cannot be conceptually achieved by converting an action predicated upon a product defect into a hybrid action adulterated by proof of personal misconduct.

If strict products liability cannot be analogized to negligence per se, is there any authority in the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute to support its application to Restatement § 402A? Although the Virgin Islands statute is expressly applicable to “any action based upon negligence,” the legislature has expressed no opinion as to whether the statute is applicable to section 402A. The comparative negligence statute is made expressly inapplicable only to statutorily based absolute liability actions. 5 V.I.C. § 1451(b). However, a strict products liability action under the Restatement involves neither statutorily based liability nor absolute liability. Thus, although the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute does not expressly authorize its application to strict products liability actions, it does not expressly forbid it. In such a case, “it is just as reasonable to assume the passage of a comparative negligence statute was not designed to preclude a comparison of fault in strict liability actions, . . . and to extrapolate that if the principle is helpful and fair, 'it should be applied by [a] court as a principle of common law. . . .’ ” Stueve, supra, 457 F.Supp. at 751 (citations *667 omitted). 11 We are therefore left with the complex task of determining how comparative principles should operate in strict products liability cases.

V.

We agree with the district court that the use of comparative principles in section 402A actions can achieve a more equitable allocation of the loss from product related injuries. We are mindful, however, of the current conceptual confusion among the courts, and the difficulties confronting us in comparing plaintiff’s personal conduct with the strict liability of the defendant for his product defect.

Comparative negligence principles have often been referred to interchangeably as systems of comparative fault. Under such systems, contributory negligence is seen as a misnomer. Daly, supra, 515 P.2d at 1168. Negligence theory sees the imposition of a duty of care as requiring one not to expose another to an unreasonable risk of harm. When a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he does not violate a duty owed to another, but instead creates an unreasonable risk of harm to himself. Prosser, supra, § 65 at 418. Thus, it is more accurate to term contributory negligence as “contributory fault.” Id.; Daly, supra, 575 P.2d at 1168. “Conduct that is characterized as negligent is commonly recognized as fault.” Wade, Products Liability and *668 Plaintiff’s Fault — The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 373, 376 (1978).

“Fault,” however, is not a term without its own conceptual difficulties. The term in its popular usage connotes moral blameworthiness. Although fault when used to describe criminal conduct often reflects a moral judgment by society, it has no such implications in tort law.

There is a broader sense in which “fault” means nothing more than a departure from a standard of conduct required of a man by society for the protection of his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one, and the defendant cannot help it, it is none the less a departure, and a social wrong.

Prosser, supra, § 75 at 493.

Thus, in tort law, fault is a shorthand way of describing conduct that falls below the standard of care of a reasonable person irrespective of the subjective motives of the actor.

Comparative fault would seem to function smoothly in those negligence cases in which the defendant is at fault for violating a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by exposing him to an unreasonable risk of harm and the plaintiff is at fault for enhancing the danger by exposing himself to an unreasonable risk of harm. The jury is simply asked to compare the conduct of the parties. But in strict products liability actions, where the focus is on the product defect and not on the defendant’s personal misconduct, can comparative fault principles be applied effectively?

Strict products liability evolved by stripping away certain problems of proof plaintiffs encountered under either negligence or warranty theories. Daly, supra, 575 P.2d at 1168 (quoting cases). By focusing the legal inquiry on the product defect rather than the defendant’s conduct and thereby easing the plaintiff’s burden of proof, strict liability theory endeavors to place the risk of eco *669 nomic loss on the manufacturers of defective products, thereby spreading the loss and not saddling it solely on an innocent injured consumer. Stueve, supra, 457 F.Supp. at 753-54; Daly, supra, 575 P.2d at 1168. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963). Because manufacturers bear the loss, strict products liability also has the desirable effect of deterring manufacturers and sellers from introducing unsafe products into the stream of commerce.

The elimination of the need to prove defendant’s negligence has led some to view strict products liability as a “no-fault” doctrine to which the application of comparative negligence principles is simply not conceptually feasible. See, e.g., Daly, supra, 575 P.2d at 1185 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ; H. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault & No Fault, 14 San Diego L.Rev. 337, 351 (1977). According to Dean Wade, however, fault is still present in strict products liability cases despite the focus on the product defect:

In the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the nature of the product. The product is “bad” because it is not duly safe; it is determined to be defective and (in most jurisdictions) unreasonably dangerous .... [S]imply maintaining the bad condition or placing the bad product on the market is enough for liability .... One does not have to stigmatize conduct as negliligent in order to characterize it as fault.

Wade, supra, 29 Mercer L.Rev. at 377 (footnotes omitted). Dean Aaron Twerski adds perspective on the relationship between defect and fault: “In this imperfect world it is not an outrageous inference that a bad defect most probably stems from serious fault — even if the fault need not nor cannot be established.” Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault — Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq.L.Rev. 297, 331 (1977).

The substitution of the term fault for defect, however, *670 would not appear to aid the trier of fact in apportioning damages between the defect and the conduct of the plaintiff. The key conceptual distinction between strict products liability theory and negligence is that the plaintiff need not prove faulty conduct on the part of the defendant in order to recover. The jury is not asked to determine if the defendant deviated from a standard of care in producing his product. There is no proven faulty conduct of the defendant to compare with the faulty conduct of the plaintiff in order to apportion the responsibility for an accident. Although we may term a defective product “faulty,” it is qualitatively different from the plaintiff’s conduct that contributes to his injury. A comparison of the two is therefore inappropriate. The characterization of both plaintiff’s negligent conduct and the defect as faulty may provide a semantic bridge between negligence and strict liability theories, but it provides neither a conceptual nor pragmatic basis for apportioning the loss for