Jim Wayne in His Official Capacity as State Representative v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of the Governor Matthew Bevin in His Official Capacity as Governor

OPINION OF THE COURT BY

This case presents two questions. First, does the Attorney General or an. individual member of the General Assembly have *359standing to challenge the Governor’s actions as violating a statute or the constitution? The Court concludes that the Attorney General has standing but that the individual legislators in this case do not. Second, may the Governor reduce the amount of money made available to a state university under a legislative appropriation whether by revising the university’s allotment under KRS § 48.620(1), by withholding the allotment to the extent the university has adequate trust and agency funds under KRS § 45.253(4), or by otherwise requiring a state university not to spend appropriated funds? This Court concludes that the Governor does not have that authority. The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is thus reversed.

I. Background

Upon taking office in 2016, Governor Matt Bevin ordered an across-the-board 4.5% budget reduction for the executive branch in the fourth quarter of the 2015-2016 fiscal year. This reduction extended to the state’s nine institutions of higher education, which consist of several universities and the eonimunity college system (collectively, “the Universities”).

The Universities’ reductions were delineated in a letter to the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet and -the State Budget Director directing that their fourth-quarter allotments be reduced. The letter was dated March 31, 2Ó16- and stated in relevant part:

Pursuant to the authority provided to me in KRS § 48.620(1), this is to certify that the allotments for. the following budget -units of the Executive Branch for April 1, 2016 drawn-downs- [sic] by each unit under the 2015-2016 Executive Branch budget should be reduced by 4.5% of the-2015-2016 allotments:

• Eastern Kentucky University

• Kentucky State University

• Morehead State University

• Murray State University

• Northern Kentucky University

• University of Kentucky

• University of Louisville

• Western Kentucky University

• Kentucky Community and Technical College System • ■

On April 19, 2016, the Governor sent another letter, again to the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet and the State Budget Director. This letter recounted the previous letter’s contents and then ordered “pursuant to the same statutory authority that the 2015-2016 allotments to each ... institution! ] should be further revised.” As to Kentucky State University, the 4.5% reduction was' restored. As to the other eight institutions, the letter ordered that their budget reductions be amended from 4.5% to 2%.1

The Attorney General filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor, the State Budget Director, the. Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and the State Treasurer challenging this action,2 Three members of the House of Representatives joined as intervening *360plaintiffs. By agreed order, the funds at issue were placed in a separate account and were “recorded as a disbursement of FY 2016 appropriations but w[ould] not be transferred until further order of the Court at which time the funds w[ouId] be disbursed to the institutions or returned to the Commonwealth’s general fund.”

The Governor moved to dismiss the case, claiming both that the Attorney General and the legislators lacked standing and that his actions were legal. As to the latter claim, he relied primarily on two statutes, KRS § 48.620(1), which was cited in his letters, and KRS § 45.258(4). He claimed that KRS § 48.620(1) allowed him to reduce the “allotments” to the Universities without changing the legislative appropriations. He claimed that KRS § 45.258(4) allowed him to withhold appropriations until the Universities had spent their trust and agency funds (that is, funds generated by tuition, etc.). The statutes combined, he claimed, gave him “great discretion” in whether to provide the appropriated funds.

The Attorney General disputed that KRS § 48.620 gave the Governor such broad authority and argued that any such reading of the statute would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and constitute an improper delegation of authority by the General Assembly. The Attorney General also claimed that the Governor’s actions would unlawfully suspend the budget bill and that KRS § 45,253(4) did not apply to the Universities, which had elected to operate under KRS Chapter 164A.

The Franklin Circuit Court concluded that the Attorney General had standing to bring the suit, but nevertheless granted summary judgment in the Governor’s favor on the merits. The court concluded primarily that KRS § 48.620(1) and KRS § 45.253(4) delegated the authority “to address budget concerns within the executive branch.” Specifically, the court concluded that these “statutes ... grant [the Governor] the authority to revise downward the Universities’ allotments.” The court also stated: “The Universities ... are under the Governor’s control as part of the executive branch,” at least in the context of the budget bill. The court concluded that the Governor’s actions did not violate Kentucky’s strict separation-of-powers doctrine. In this respect, the court concluded that the allotment revision was not, in fact, a reduction in the appropriation by another name, and was instead an exercise of legislatively granted power. Finally, the court concluded that there remained a check on the Governor’s power, in that the judiciary could “realign! ] the balance of power” if he “purports to wield divine power over another branch, or even over a division, cabinet or program within the executive branch, to the point that funding levels reached constitutionally impermissi-bly low levels.”

The Attorney General and the House members filed notices of appeal and a motion to transfer the case from the Court of Appeals to this Court. That motion was granted, and thus the appeal is before this Court.

II. Standing

Before reaching the merits of this dispute, this Court must address the claim that the Attorney General and intervening state representatives lack standing to prosecute this action. We answer this question first because if neither the Attorney General nor the individual legislators have standing to challenge the Governor’s actions, then we would be left with a non-justiciable cause of action, which would call for dismissal without addressing the merits. See, e.g., Lawson v. Office of Att’y Gen., 415 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Ky.2013) (“‘Standing,’ of course, in its most basic *361sense, refers to an integral component of the ‘justiciable cause’ requirement underlying the trial court’s jurisdiction.” (citing Ky. Const. § 112; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989))).

A. The Attorney General has standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate the public interest against alleged unauthorized and unconstitutional actions of the Governor.

To have standing to sue in Kentucky, the basic rule is that the person must have a “judicially recognizable interest-in the subject matter of the suit.” E.g., Ashland v. Ashland FOP No. 3, 888 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Ky.1994). Does the Attorney General have such an interest in the Governor’s reductions of the Universities’ budgets?

At the outset, the Attorney General argues that this Court’s holding in Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d 152 (Ky.2009), on the issue of the Attorney General’s standing to sue other executive branch officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, should control outright without need for further analysis. In that case, we overruled our prior decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610 (Ky.1992), to the extent that it required the Attorney General to have a “personal interest” in the outcome of the case to have standing. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d at 172-74. In doing so, we “state[d] categorically ... that the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky has standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth.” Id. at 172. That was because “the Attorney General ha[d] a sufficient personal right in these' types of cases by virtue of the office and the duties commensurate with that high office.” Id. at 173 (emphasis added).

That italicized language, clarifying our holding in Thompson, is indeed the key to unlocking the issue of the Attorney General’s standing in this case. Further analysis, however, is required to determine whether in this case duty calls upon the Attorney General (and, thus, confers on him standing) to vindicate the public rights of the people of the Commonwealth. As we explain below, guided by history and precedent, we conclude that it does.

As we alluded in Thompson, the Attorney General’s standing is dictated by the powers and duties of that office. Under the Kentucky Constitution, the Attorney General is an elected constitutional officer whose “duties ... shall be such as prescribed by law.” Ky. Const. § 91; see also id. § 93 (“The duties and responsibilities of the[] [constitutional] officers shall be prescribed by law_”). The General Assembly has prescribed the Attorney General’s duties and responsibilities in KRS § 15.020, which in relevant part provides:

The Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky ... and shall exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment. ... [H]e shall appear for the Commonwealth in all cases in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals wherein the Commonwealth is interested, and shall also commence all actions or enter his appearance in all cases, hearings, and proceedings in and before all other courts, tribunals, or commissions in or out of the state, and attend to all litigation and legal business in or out. of the state required of him by law, or in which the Commonwealth has an interest ....

Whether the Attorney General has the power to bring a given action on behalf of the people of the Commonwealth (at least where there is no statute governing *362the subject) turns on whether that action falls under the “common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney General under the common law,” and whether the action is one “in which the Commonwealth has an interest.” KRS § 15.020.

Historians, scholars, and jurists agree that clearly defining the Attorney General’s common-law duties is not easily done. See generally Comm, on the Office of Att’y Gen., Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., Common Law Powers of State Attorneys General 13-19 (Jan. 1975) (summarizing historical commentary and judicial holdings on the common-law powers of the Attorney General).3 An exhaustive definition of the Attorney General’s common-law powers and duties is not required today. Instead, it suffices to analyze the parameters of that office’s prerogative to seek, on behalf of the people, injunctive relief against other government actors when the Commonwealth has an interest in the case.

To begin, we reiterate: “It is unquestioned that ‘[a]t common law, [the Attorney General] had the power to institute, conduct and maintain suits and proceedings for the enforcement' of the laws of the state, the preservation • of order, and the protection of public rights.’” Thompson, 300 S.W.3d at 173 (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Ky.1974)). Significantly, the Attorney General was empowered under the common law to bring any action thought “necessary to protect the public interest.” Id. (quoting 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney General § 6 (2009)). Indeed, the Attorney General has not only the power to bring suit when he believes the public’s legal or constitutional interests are under threat, but appears to have even the duty to do so. Cf. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d at 618 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (“It is the Attorney General’s responsibility to file suit to vindicate-public rights, as attorney for the people of the State of Kentucky.”). And, notably, this “broad grant of authority ... includes the power to act to enforce the state’s statutes.” Thompson, 300 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney General § 6 (2009)).

It is widely recognized that the Attorney General’s common-law authority to represent the interests of the people derives from the broad powers that office initially possessed in representing the legal interests of the English crown. As one former Attorney General succinctly explained:

As guardian of royal prerogative, the Attorney General of England possessed a broad range of powers. ... [WJhen state governments were organized and recognized in this country, there was no monarch in whom the government prerogatives were vested. Since the essential power of government resided and emanated from the people, the prerogatives had to be exercised on their behalf. Just as the Attorney General safeguarded royal prerogatives at common law, similarly, the official authority, an obligation to protect public rights and enforce public duties on behalf of the general' public, became vested by the states in the Attorney General. And it is this obligation inherited from the common law to represent the public interest which has shaped and colored the role which the Attorney General fulfills today.

Common Law Powers of State Attorneys General, supra, at 2 (quoting Arthur Sills, Proceedings of the Conference of the Nat’l *363Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. 102 (1967)). Based on that widely accepted understanding of the nature of the.Attorney General’s inherited prerogatives, it is clear that the Attorney General has a judicially cognizable interest here, namely, in fulfilling his common-law obligation to protect public rights and interests by ensuring that our government acts legally and constitutionally.

Our predecessor court long ago recognized and adopted this view of the Attorney General’s authority. Indeed, that court stated:

[T]he source of authority of the Attorney General is the people who establish the government, and his primary obligation is to the people. ... The Attorney General, as chief law officer of this Commonwealth, charged with the duty of protecting the interest of all the people ... had such a vital interest in this litigation that he had a right to intervene at least insofar as the public issues advanced in the action were involved.

Hancock v. Terry Elkhom Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Ky.1974); accord Paxton, 516 S.W.2d at 867 (“But under the democratic form of government now prevailing the people are the king,- so the Attorney General’s duties are to that sovereign rather than to the machinery of government.” (citation omitted)). Our predecessor court made clear that KRS § 15.020, “in stating at the outset that the Attorney General is ‘the chief law officer of the Commonwealth,’ intends that in case of a conflict of duties the Attorney General’s primary obligation is to the Commonwealth, the body politic, rather than to its officers, departments, commissions, or agencies.” Paxton, 516 S.W.2d at 868. Thus, in addition to the unquestioned “right of the Attorney General to appear and be heard in a suit brought by someone else in which the constitutionality of a statute is involved,” id. (citing CR 24.03; KRS § 418.075),4 the Court held that the Attorney General’s “constitutional, statutory and- common law powers include the power to initiate a suit questioning the constitutionality of a statute,” id.

The holding in Paxton thus leads to an inevitable conclusion: If the Attorney General has the power to initiate a suit questioning-the constitutionality of a statute, he must also have the power to initiate a suit questioning the constitutionality or legality of an executive action. There are no grounds for treating allegedly unconstitutional executive actions differently from allegedly unconstitutional legislative actions. It is certainly in “the interest of all the people” that there be no unconstitutional or illegal governmental conduct. And standing must be determined at the beginning of an action, not retrospectively after the merits have been sorted out.

A plain reading of Thompson and Pax-ton and other authorities thus establishes that the Attorney General has standing to bring this action questioning the authority for and constitutionality of the Governor’s actions.

The Governor, however, argues that the Attorney General’s authority and standing to bring suit in the public interest should be limited to only those eases where there are no identifiable parties with particularized injuries (such as the Universities in this case). In support of this position, he cites Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942), for the proposition that by enacting KRS § 12.210, which authorizes state agencies to hire outside counsel, the Gen*364eral Assembly acted to limit the Attorney General’s common-law power.

This is an overreading of Johnson. That case answered only whether the legislature “may withdraw [discrete common-law] powers and assign them to others or may authorize the employment df other counsel for the departments and officers of the state, to perform them.”. Id. at 829. In other words, Johnson signed off on the General Assembly’s authority to divest some of the powers of the Attorney General (i.e., serving as legal counsel to a given state entity) and invest them in another (i.e., private counsel of the entity’s choosing). It. did not hold, as the Governor states, that “when a state agency hires, or can hire,- its own attorneys pursuant to statutory authority, the Attorney General no longer has authority to unilaterally decide to act for that agency.” To the contrary, Johnsmi explicitly left that question open:

As to what extent [KRS § 12.210] should be construed as affecting the supremacy of the Attorney General as the chief,law.officer of the .Commonwealth, or to what extent it deprives him of the power and right to represent the Commonwealth as a distinct entity in litigation in which any of the departments employing counsel are involved, or in any other respect, we express no opinion, for they are questions not presented in this suit.

Id. at 829. Indeed, our predecessor thought it sufficient to express only its “opinion that the Act does not deprive the Attorney General of his hereditary and statutory prerogatives to the extent or degree that it can be said that he is left without substantial duties, responsibilities and rights.” Id. KRS § 12.210, as interpreted by Johnson, is not nearly the limitation on the Attorney General’s authority as the Governor claims.

But the “supremacy of the Attorney General as the chief law officer of the Commonwealth” is squarely before us here. The simple answer is that delegating day-to-day operational powers—in this case, to the Universities’ own counsel— does not preclude a need for the Attorney General to protect “the interest of all the people” when unconstitutional or unlawful conduct is claimed either by or toward those universities. The Governor’s invitation to so constrain the traditional powers and duties of the Attorney General to protect the interests of the people of the Commonwealth could result in unconstitutional or unlawful conduct that would go unaddressed, against the interest of the people, if the Universities and their counsel for political, financial, or other reasons chose not to seek redress.

There is no valid justification for cutting off the “hereditary” prerogative of the Attorney General to challenge the legality and constitutionality of a state action merely because the state actor has (or could) employ other legal counsel. Indeed, the words of our predecessor in Paxton, by extension, ring just as true here as they did there: “We think that if the Constitution is threatened by an item of legislation [or act of the Executive], the Attorney General may rise to the defense of the Constitution by bringing a suit, and is not required to wait until someone else sues.” 516 S.W.2d at 868. Likewise, the Attorney General must defend duly adopted statutory enactments that are not unconstitutional.

In fact, the soundness of this position becomes even more apparent in light of the realities (and costs) to public entities of challenging executive or legislative actions. The ongoing functions of such entities and the costs of such litigation, in money and political good will, could make a legal challenge prohibitive despite whatever dis*365agreement they may have with a Governor’s or legislature’s action. Because the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Commonwealth, he is uniquely suited to challenge the legality and constitutionality of an executive or legislative action as a check on an allegedly unauthorized exercise of power. Cf. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bd. of Equalization, 123 Neb. 259, 242 N.W. 609, 610 (1932) (“[T]he Attorney General has the right, in cases where ... the interests of the public are directly concerned, to institute suit ... for their protection. The state is not left without redress in its own courts, because no private citizen chooses to encounter the difficulty of defending it, but has appointed this high public officer, on whom it has cast the responsibility, and to whom, therefore, it has given the right of appearing in its behalf and invoking the judgment of the court on such questions of public moment.”); Comment, An Attorney General’s Standing before the Supreme Court to Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 624, 631 (1959) (“[T]he basic constitutional principle that the judiciary is to serve as a check on the legislature would be avoided unless the Attorney General is granted standing to present the constitutional question concerning legislation which seriously jeopardizes the interests of the government as a whole.”).5

This view of the authority of the Attorney General is in line with that taken by most of our sister jurisdictions. Indeed, the facts of a fairly recent case from South Carolina are notably similar to the facts presented here. In State ex rel. Condon v. Hodges, 349 S.C. 232, 562 S.E.2d 623 (2002), the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the power of the Attorney General to sue to enjoin the Governor from circumventing provisions of an appropriations bill. Noting that “[t]he way in which public funds are handled.- and whether a violation of the separation of powers doctrine has occurred are clearly questions in which the State has an interest,” id. at 627, the South Carolina Supreme Court, held that “the Attorney General has the authority to sue the Governor when he is bringing the action in the name of the State for the purpose of asserting that a separation of powers violation has occurred,” id. at 628. See also id. (“[T]he Attorney General can bring an action against the Governor when it is necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the State, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights.”).

And courts in numerous other states have reached similar conclusions about the powers and .duties of the Attorney General. See, e.g., State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934); People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Bd., 54 Ill.2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285 (1973); Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554 (Me.1973); Jacobson v. Parks & Rec. Comm’n, 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963); Att’y Gen. v. Trustees of Boston Elevated R.R. Co., 319 Mass. 642, 67 N.E.2d 676 (1946); Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So.2d 998 (Miss.1995); State ex rel. Douglas v. Thone, 204 Neb. 836, 286 N.W.2d 249 (1979); State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972); Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (Pa.1973); Yett v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837 (Tex.1926); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969). Of the minority of states that have ruled oth*366erwise, their Attorneys General are typically invested with no common-law powers. See, e.g., State v. Rankin, 282 N.E.2d 851 (Ind.1972); State v. Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9, 481 A.2d 785 (1984). In contrast, Kentucky’s Attorney General is expressly given such powers by statute.

Finally, we find particularly apt the following comments by Justice Erwin of the Florida Supreme Court:

The Attorney General is elected by the people; he is entrusted by them with the common law power to legally represent them or some of them in matters deemed by him to affect the public interest. He has a discretionary duty under the common law rarely modified by statute to protect the public interests of any of the people who elected him.

It is his discretionary duty to choose those legal matters in the area of public litigation or quasi-judicial administration in which he believes it is his official duty to intervene, except in those instances when it is mandated by the legislature for him to intervene or to refrain from intervening. If he is mistaken in his legal advocacy, the courts and quasi-judicial tribunals always retain the power to rule against him and often do on the merits but this power does not affect his standing to become a party of interest in the cause or proceeding. Regardless of the effectiveness of his efforts in particular public legal situations, at least the people have the continuing satisfaction of knowing that their elected Attorney General has the right to exercise his conscientious official discretion to enter into those legal matters deemed by him to involve the public interest, even though not expressly authorized by statute. The presumption is that he will not enter strictly private litigation and a great degree of latitude must of necessity be extended to him in the exercise of his right- to intervene in behalf of public interests.

State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So.2d 891, 895 (Fla.1972) (Erwin, J., specially concurring); see also Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921) (“A broad discretion is vested in [the Attorney General] in determining what matters may, or may not, be of interest to the people generally,”).

In the end, we are left with only one conclusion: the Attorney General, as chief law officer of Kentucky, has broad authority to sue for declaratory and in-junctive -relief- against state actors, including the Governor, whose actions the Attorney General believes lack legal authority or are unconstitutional. It is that power which the Attorney General-has invoked to support bringing the present action—to wit, the Attorney General seeks to enjoin the Governor’s reductions of the final quarterly allotments of the Universities’ 2015-2016 appropriations as exceeding the Governor’s statutory and constitutional authority and violating the separation-of-powers doctrine. And we must take these allegations at face value in undertaking this standing analysis. See City of Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Tr. Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Ky.1992) (“[I]t is neither the province of the trial court nor of this Court to consider whether Appellant- may be able to-prove its allegations or ultimately prevail. On review, this Court will confine itself to a determination of whether the matters alleged in the complaint establish appellant’s standing to bring the action or whether it is without a ‘substantial interest’ in the subject matter of the controversy.” (citations omitted)).

The Attorney General, therefore, has standing in this ease.

B. The individual legislators do not have standing.

*367The intervening individual legislators claim to have standing in this case because the Governor’s actions constituted a “grave infringement of their fundamental Constitutional [sic] duty to enact a biennial budget on behalf of their constituents.” As the Governor describes it, they claim, in essence, that he has nullified their votes in favor of the budget bill.

We begin with the legislators’ claim that it has been the practice of this Court to allow members of the General Assembly to “defend the Kentucky Constitution’s ‘forceful command’ that the powers of the Legislative Branch be protected from invasion by the Executive Branch.” This Court’s practice, at least in the cases cited by the legislators, has not been nearly so broad as claimed. The legislators cite, for example, Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852 (Ky.2005), in which many members of the General Assembly, including at least one of the members in this case, intervened to challenge gubernatorial action. The question of the legislators’ standing, however, was not raised in that case. And, as this Court has held, a claimed lack of standing is a defense that must be timely raised or else be deemed waived. Harrison v. Leach, 323 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Ky.2010). Thus, while Fletcher may be a factual precedent for individual legislators’ having intervened in a- ease, it is not legal precedent for their having standing to challenge the Governor’s actions.

As to the legal substance, of the claim, unlike the Attorney General, • individual legislators do not have the role of chief legal officer for the public. The individualized role of a legislator is to represent those who have elected him or her and to participate in the decision-making that becomes the laws of the Commonwealth, including participating in the passage, of budget bills. The idea that individual legislators have standing to challenge an action by the Governor—-under the premise of an injury to an interest in a statute being carried out properly or the legislators’ duty to vote on legislation—is simply too attenuated to create a justiciable controversy. A legislator has no individual ownership of any enacted piece of legislation and certainly can pass no legislation as an individual. Asserting that a governor’s disposition of budgeted funds is an infringement on their duty to enact a budget is a non sequitur.

Nonetheless, the legislators claim that this Court has seemed in the past to take a “broad[ ] view of when a public official can go to court to defend the prerogatives of office.” (Quoting Paul E. Salamanca, The Constitutionality of an Executive Spending Plan, 92 Ky. L.J. 149, 200 (2004)). In this context, Professor Salamanca discussed Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky.1984), wherein the Legislative Research Commission sued “to validate its authority under certain parts of the legislation, and the original defendants, the Governor and Attorney General of Kentucky, had by counterclaim called in question other parts.” Salamanca, supra, at 200. But Brown, like Fletcher, is not support for the existence of individual-legislator standing, if only because individual legislators were not the plaintiffs in that case. More importantly, standing again was not raised in that case, at least hot before this Court. See id, (noting that “the issue of representative standing was not addressed in the Legislative Research Commission court’s opinion”),

Obviously, legislators with a particularized, personal injury have standing to seek redress for that injury. Thus, for example, a legislator could sue for the loss of salary. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 *368(1969). But that is not what we have here. Instead, the legislators are claiming some nebulous harm to their duties as legislators.

Individual legislators simply do not have a sufficient personal stake in a dispute over the execution or constitutionality of a statute, even when the claim is that another branch of government is violating the separation of powers. The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when members of Congress sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act in the 1990s. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). There the Court held that “individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.” Id. Although Article III does not dictate the contours of the law of standing before this state’s courts, we generally require the same particularized, personal injury when individuals seek to bring a claim.

The individual legislators have not shown that they are representative of the entire body of the General Assembly. They “have not been authorized to represent their respective Houses ... in this action.” Id. at 829,