Sauntio Carter v. State of Indiana
State Court (North Eastern Reporter)11/30/2016
AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
📋Key Facts
⚖️Legal Issues
📚Court Holding
💡Reasoning
🎯Significance
Estimated cost: $0.001 - $0.003 per brief
Full Opinion
FILED
Nov 30 2016, 5:28 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sauntio Carter, November 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1511-CR-1823
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Christina
Appellee-Plaintiff. Klineman, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1508-F6-30930
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 1 of 18
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Sauntio A. Carter (Carter), appeals his conviction for
battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-
1(b)(1),(c).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Carter raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the
following single issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain Carter’s
conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
[4] On August 24, 2015, Carter observed that his fourteen-year-old daughter, M.C.,
had altered her eyebrows. When Carter questioned M.C. about this, she
initially denied that she had made any changes to herself. However, M.C.
eventually admitted the truth. As punishment for her dishonesty, Carter
confiscated M.C.’s cellphone. After taking possession of M.C.’s cellphone,
Carter checked his daughter’s social media accounts and was very upset by
what he discovered. M.C. had posted photographs of herself wearing only “her
panty and bra,” and “she was talking to boys, [trying to] . . . like actually offer
1
An oral argument was held in this case on July 25, 2016, at the Indiana Supreme Court courtroom in
Indianapolis, Indiana. We thank the attorneys for their excellent advocacy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 2 of 18
herself to them.” (Tr. p. 33). In conjunction with these photographs, M.C. had
published their address, as well as her grandmother’s address, online.
[5] The next day, August 25, 2015, M.C. woke up and readied herself for school
while Carter was still asleep. Before walking out the door, M.C. retrieved her
cellphone and grabbed a pair of Carter’s shoes. When Carter awoke, he
discovered that M.C. had taken her cellphone without permission. Carter
walked to the bus stop, where he observed M.C. listening to music on her
cellphone and wearing his shoes. Carter informed M.C. that she had
disrespected him and that they needed to return home “to take [his] shoes off”
because his feet are bigger “and she was looking like a clown.” (Tr. p. 35).
[6] Although M.C. resisted at first, she eventually heeded Carter’s demands to walk
home with him. On the way, Carter, who was still upset by the content of
M.C.’s social media accounts, broke M.C.’s cellphone. M.C. threatened to run
away, to which Carter responded by stating that he would call the police to
bring her back. M.C. also responded that she would call the police over her
broken phone. When they arrived home, there is no dispute that Carter
determined that it was necessary to discipline M.C. However, Carter and M.C.
offered varying accounts as to the extent and severity of the punishment.
[7] According to Carter, when they arrived home, Carter instructed M.C. to start
cleaning the apartment while he called his father to discuss M.C.’s behavior.
While on the phone with his father, Carter was also “telling [M.C.] how she
was doing me [sic] and how wrong she was what she was doing and I was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 3 of 18
telling her the consequences and I told her, that I was going to discipline [her]
physically.” (Tr. p. 36). Based on the fact that M.C. was fourteen years old,
Carter determined that he was “going to discipline her [fourteen] times.” (Tr.
p. 36). Carter instructed M.C. “to bend over and touch the couch.” (Tr. p. 36).
Instead, Carter described that M.C. “jumped up off the couch and she raised
her hand up at me.” (Tr. p. 37). Still on the phone, Carter’s father advised him
to go take a shower before punishing M.C. so that he would be “level headed.”
(Tr. p. 37). Carter stated that after he showered, he spanked M.C. fourteen
times with his belt.
[8] On the other hand, according to M.C., as soon as they arrived home from the
bus stop, Carter directed her “to take off my sweater and everything and my
shoes that I had on and stuff. I still had on clothing and stuff and . . . he had
told me, he was like bend over the couch.” (Tr. p. 7). Carter started hitting her
with his belt on her back, legs, and buttocks. She stated that he shoved her
against a wall and pressed his forearm across her neck to the point that it was
“hard to breathe in air.” (Tr. p. 9). After hitting her again with the belt, Carter
ordered her to clean the entire apartment. When M.C. finished cleaning, Carter
asked her whether she wanted “the whooping now or later” and she “said
later.” (Tr. p. 10). Carter then showered. When he returned, Carter “hit
[M.C.] a couple times” and then had a conversation with her “[a]bout stuff
[she] should have did [sic].” (Tr. p. 10). After their conversation, Carter
continued with “the rest of this whooping.” (Tr. p. 11). Even though M.C.
begged for a reprieve of “two second[s]” or “two minutes,” Carter told her to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 4 of 18
“take it like God did when they beat him.” (Tr. p. 11). Also, at one point,
M.C. stated that she had balled up her fist, and even though she claimed that
she “wasn’t going to hit him,” Carter saw it and smacked her across the face.
(Tr. p. 13). M.C. stated that it hurt when Carter hit her with his belt “because
he was hitting [her] with all his force.” (Tr. p. 11).
[9] M.C.’s younger brother was home at the time; however, he did not witness any
of the punishment. When M.C. returned to school on August 26, 2016, she
informed her guidance counselor that her “arm was hurting.” (Tr. p. 17). The
guidance counselor observed a bruise on M.C.’s shoulder and inquired as to
what happened. After gleaning some details of the incident from M.C., the
guidance counselor informed the school nurse about the situation and contacted
the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). The nurse provided M.C.
with ice packs to treat her pain. A DCS assessment worker arrived at the
school and took photographs of bruises on M.C.’s body, which she opined to be
the result of being hit with a belt. M.C. sustained bruises to her buttocks, inner
and outer thigh, upper arm, forearm, and lower shoulder.
[10] On August 31, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Carter with Count
I, strangulation, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-9(b); and Count II, battery
resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1),(c).
On October 14 and 21, 2015, the trial court conducted a bench trial. At the
close of the evidence, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction for
battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court found
Carter not guilty of strangulation. Immediately thereafter, the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 5 of 18
sentenced Carter to 114 days—i.e., his time already served with applicable
credit time.
[11] Carter now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[12] Carter claims that there is insufficient evidence to uphold his battery conviction.
For claims of insufficient evidence, our standard of review is well-settled. “We
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We only
consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Where there is substantial evidence of
probative value to support the judgment, it will not be set aside.” Smith v. State,
34 N.E.3d 252, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[13] It is well established that “[a] parent has a fundamental liberty interest in
maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child.” Willis v. State, 888
N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. 2008). Included within this fundamental liberty interest
is “the right of parents ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children,’
including the use of reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior.”
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925)). However, the State also “has a powerful interest in preventing and
deterring the mistreatment of children[,]” and “the potential for child abuse
cannot be taken lightly.” Id. Thus, prosecutors and courts are left with the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 6 of 18
difficult task of determining “when parental use of physical force in disciplining
children turns an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal.” Id.
[14] In order to convict Carter of battery resulting in bodily injury, the State was
required to prove that Carter “knowingly or intentionally . . . touche[d] [M.C.]
in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,” which “result[ed] in bodily injury to
[M.C.]” I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1),(c). In this case, Carter asserted the affirmative
defense of the parental discipline privilege. Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1
provides that “[a] person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise
prohibited if he has legal authority to do so.” Indiana courts have construed
this provision “as including reasonable parental discipline that would otherwise
constitute battery.” Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 181. “The defense of parental
privilege, like self-defense, is a complete defense. That is to say a valid claim of
parental privilege is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Id. at
182. “The State may refute a claim of the defense of parental privilege by direct
rebuttal or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief.”
Id. “The decision of whether a claim of parental privilege has been disproved is
entrusted to the fact-finder.” Id.
[15] In order to convict a parent for battery where parental privilege is asserted, “the
State must prove that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or
(2) the parent’s belief that such force was necessary to control [his or] her child
and prevent misconduct was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Restatement of the Law
(Second) Torts, § 147 (1965)). Here, the State does not contest the
reasonableness of Carter’s belief that the use of force was necessary. Rather, the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 7 of 18
State maintains that Carter exerted unreasonable force in disciplining M.C.,
such that the parental privilege is negated.
[16] While there “are no bright-line rules” as to what is considered “proper and
reasonable parental discipline of children[,]” the Indiana Supreme Court has
adopted the view that “[a] parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or
to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she]
reasonably believes to be necessary for [the child’s] proper control, training, or
education.’” Id. at 181-82 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Restatement, supra, § 147(1)). In determining the reasonableness of a
punishment, the following factors are to be considered and “balanced against
each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate”:
(a) whether the actor is a parent;
(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;
(c) the nature of his offense and his apparent motive;
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same
family or group;
(e) whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and
appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command;
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily
degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.
Id. at 182 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150). In addition to this non-
exhaustive list of factors, “[t]here may be other factors unique to a particular
case that should be taken into consideration. Id. Similarly, “not all of the listed
factors may be relevant or applicable in every case.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 8 of 18
[17] On appeal, Carter asserts that the State failed to rebut his parental privilege
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, in part, because the evidence establishes
that “[t]he force used was reasonable under the Willis factors.” (Appellant’s Br.
p. 14). It is not apparent from the record which specific factors—Willis or
otherwise—the trial court considered in finding Carter guilty of battery.
However, looking to the first two Willis factors, the evidence establishes that
Carter is M.C.’s biological father, and M.C. was fourteen years old at the time
of the incident. The trial court noted that M.C., a female, was “as big as”
Carter. (Tr. p. 50). The State directs our attention to M.C.’s testimony that she
takes anti-anxiety medicine as evidence of her emotional instability.
[18] Regarding the nature of her offense, M.C. lied to her father about altering her
eyebrows, so Carter confiscated M.C.’s cellphone as punishment. It was then
that Carter discovered that M.C. had posted inappropriate photographs of
herself online and had “offer[ed] herself” for sexual encounters. (Tr. p. 33).
M.C. had also provided her address, as well as her grandmother’s address, to
men on the Internet. When M.C. left for school the following day, she took her
cellphone and Carter’s shoes without permission. Also, after Carter decided to
use his belt and told M.C. to bend over the couch, he observed M.C. “un-
balling [her] fist” as though she had planned to strike him. (Tr. p. 13). 2
According to Carter, it was the culmination of M.C.’s “escalating misbehavior
2
Carter testified that M.C. “jumped up off the couch and she raised her hand up at [him].” (Tr. p. 37).
Conversely, M.C. testified that, notwithstanding that she made a fist, she had no intention of actually hitting
Carter. (Tr. p. 13).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 9 of 18
and disrespect for her father’s authority” that resulted in his choice of
disciplinary measures. (Appellant’s Br. p. 15). As to the influence of M.C.’s
example upon other children in the family, no evidence was presented at the
trial except that M.C.’s younger brother was in the apartment at the time and
did not witness the punishment.
[19] The last two Willis factors require an examination of whether the parent’s force
is reasonably necessary to compel obedience and whether that force is
disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause
serious permanent harm. Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182. A parent “is not privileged
to use a means to compel obedience if a less severe method appears to be likely
to be equally effective.” Id. at 183 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. d).
In this case, Carter argues that, prior to spanking M.C. with his belt, he “used
progressive forms of discipline,” including confiscating M.C.’s cellphone;
asking his mother to speak with M.C.; and requiring M.C. to clean the
apartment, which she failed to do in a satisfactory manner. (Appellant’s Br. p.
16). According to Carter, none of these disciplinary measures were sufficient to
deter M.C.’s misbehavior. Carter acknowledges that he doled out a “painful”
punishment, but he maintains that it was an appropriate response as “M.C. was
engaging in dangerous activity and [he] saw her defiance and disrespect
escalating quickly.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 17). Carter argues that he “repeatedly
took steps to ensure the discipline was not imposed hastily or in anger” such as
by walking outside, calling his father, and taking a shower. (Appellant’s Br. p.
16). Carter also points out that his punishment was not unnecessarily
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 10 of 18
degrading because M.C. was fully clothed, and they were “in the privacy of
their home.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 17). As a result of Carter’s punishment, M.C.
had bruises on her buttocks, inner and outer thigh, upper arm, forearm, and
lower shoulder. One day after the whipping, M.C. was sore and was treated
with ice packs at school, but there is no evidence that she suffered any serious
or permanent harm.
[20] Carter likens his case to Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 183, where the supreme court
found the parent’s punishment of striking her child five to seven times “with
either a belt or an extension cord” was reasonable after the mother had
previously “used progressive forms of discipline” such as sending the child to
his room; grounding him; and withholding television, games, and time spent
outdoors, all of which were insufficient to deter the child from committing
additional offenses. Furthermore, the supreme court found “nothing
particularly degrading” about an eleven-year-old boy receiving “five to seven
swats on his buttocks, arm, and thigh for what many parents might reasonably
consider a serious offense.” Id. Even though the swats hurt, the child returned
to school the following day without any pain, and despite apparent bruising,
“there is no indication that the school nurse provided any medical attention or
even suggested that medical attention was necessary.” Id. at 184.
[21] The State counters that M.C.’s offenses did not merit Carter’s “brutal”
punishment and argues that Carter should have taken “numerous steps” to
punish M.C. instead of hitting her with his belt. (Appellee’s Br. p. 15). Because
M.C. complied with Carter’s demands to return home and clean the apartment
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 11 of 18
and because she accepted the discipline in a “docile” manner, the State
contends that “M.C. was not an errant child who could not be reasoned with.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 16). The State further asserts that M.C.’s beating “was
unnecessarily degrading, particularly because it was not limited to M.C.’s
buttocks and back.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 14). Rather, “M.C. sustained severe
bruising to her shoulders, arms, forehead,[ 3] buttocks, back, and legs.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 14). The State concedes that the punishment did not lead to
any permanent damage but nonetheless contends that Carter “used all of his
force” and caused so much pain that M.C. “was unable to sit in school the next
day.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 14).
[22] The State posits that the present case is more akin to Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d
252, 253-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), where a parent beat her thirteen-year-old
daughter with two different belts ten to twenty times on her arms, shoulder, and
legs. There, as in the present case, the mother discovered that her teenaged
daughter “was having conversations with boys on social media sites that were
‘very sexual in nature’” among other dangerous behaviors. Id. at 253. Prior to
whipping her child, the mother imposed a substantial number of progressive
disciplinary measures, including withdrawing the child from public school and
replacing the child’s wardrobe with more modest clothing. Id. We found that
the parent had inflicted an unreasonable punishment, and in so finding, we
3
State’s Exhibits 3 and 15 depict, respectively, the left and right sides of M.C.’s forehead. Neither picture
appears to show any bruising. During the trial, M.C. testified that Carter smacked her in the face, but there is
no evidence that provides any reason as to why M.C. would have bruises on both sides of her forehead.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 12 of 18
emphasized the fact that the mother had “engaged in a fighting match” with her
child. Id. at 257. The State also relies on Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 141
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986), wherein a parent whipped his fifteen-year-old daughter
with a belt approximately fifteen times, resulting in a facial laceration and
numerous contusions on her buttocks, arms, legs, and shoulder. We held the
privilege of parental discipline did not apply because the defendant “cruelly beat
his daughter.” Id. at 142.
[23] In this case, there is no question that Carter was justified in his assessment that
some form of punishment was necessary in order to control and deter M.C.’s
escalating defiance and dangerous behavior. As to Carter’s choice of
disciplinary measures, it is apparent that the trial court struggled with
ascertaining the line between reasonable and unreasonable force. Prior to
imposing a sentence, the trial court remarked to Carter:
. . . [N]ot only do I believe that you um, had cause[] to discipline
her, I do. . . . I also strongly believe that—that kids should be
subject to discipline punishment under certain circumstances, I
do. I have boys myself. If I had a girl who was posing half
necked [sic] on social media, I would also be wearing orange
because you would not be able to hold me back from her. So, I
totally understand why you were as angry as you were, and why
you did what you did. Because I’m assuming you were trying to
prevent her from living a life you don’t want her to live . . . .
Which is, getting pregnant at a young age, dropping out of
school, getting her[]self physical[ly] assaulted, things like that. I
assumed why you did what you did. . . . Um, unfortunately, I
think we’re in this universe now, where parents don’t just get to
do whatever they want. And when they make decision[s] like
you did, they subject themselves to going to jail for it. I would go
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 13 of 18
to jail for it, if I thought it was going to help my kids, I really
would. Um, and [if] some little girl was posting on my son[’]s
Facebook page, pictures half necked [sic], I probably would be
after her too. I think under these circumstances though, I don’t
know what you[’re] supposed to do. I’m not—I can’t give you
any guidance because I don’t know what you do. That girl was
as big as you are, she was definite (Phonetic), she probably did
look like a clown wearing your shoes, um and I’m not sure what
you[’re] supposed to do. Because taking away her phone is not
going to do the trick. You may have done the trick but you got
yourself put in jail doing it. So, I think that um, I think it was
over the top but I don’t have—I don’t have the solution for you.
I [am] going to find you NOT GUILTY for [s]trangulation; I’m
going to find you GUILTY for [b]attery as a Class A
[m]isdemeanor. Giving [sic] all of that, I will take everything I
heard in consideration during sentencing because I don’t—there
is not [an] easy solution to this problem. I’m not sure what you
do. Cause if you allow them to act that way and they become
bad people you get blamed for that too. So, I don’t know what
you do. . . .
(Tr. pp. 49-50).
[24] Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Carter’s use of force—i.e., at least
fourteen strikes with a belt which resulted in significant bruising and lasting
pain—exceeded reasonableness, and on appeal, we are mindful of the trial
court’s role in weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility to
determine whether a parent’s actions were justified as reasonable parental
discipline. See Smith, 34 N.E.3d at 255. Although we are troubled by the lack
of clear guidance for parents to be able to distinguish between reasonable
discipline and battery, it was the trial court’s duty to balance the Willis factors,
and we decline to reweigh the evidence. Thus, we conclude that there is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 14 of 18
sufficient evidence to support Carter’s conviction for battery resulting in bodily
injury.
CONCLUSION
[25] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
to support Carter’s conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury.
[26] Affirmed.
[27] Robb, J. concurs
[28] Crone, J. concurs with separate concurring opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 15 of 18
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sauntio Carter, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1511-CR-1823
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
Crone, Judge, concurring.
[29] As noted above, “prosecutors and courts are left with the difficult task of
determining ‘when parental use of physical force in disciplining children turns
an otherwise law-abiding citizen into a criminal.’” Slip op. at 6-7 (quoting
Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 180). I write separately to suggest that our supreme court
made that task much more difficult by importing the vague reasonableness
standard of the Restatement of Torts into the criminal arena.
[30] When does reasonable punishment become unreasonable? The trial court
clearly struggled with this question, as have we at the appellate level. Would
thirteen strikes with a belt have been reasonable? Or perhaps fifteen strikes with
less bruising and pain? What if Carter had inflicted the same punishment with
a rolled-up newspaper? What if M.C.’s transgressions had been slightly more
egregious, or what if her brother had witnessed her punishment? With the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 16 of 18
possible exception of sentencing, I cannot think of any other area in criminal
law that is so fraught with subjectivity. Everyone agrees that a line needs to be
drawn, but current caselaw offers little guidance as to where that line is. 4
[31] There may not be any area where reasonable minds differ more in our current
society than corporal punishment of children. Attitudes vary dramatically by
and within generations and cultures. 5 If the purpose of the criminal law is to
put a person on notice of what conduct is proscribed and what is permitted,
then how can one’s guilt or innocence depend upon how someone else
disciplines his or her children when there is no consensus about what is
appropriate?
[32] That being said, courts must step in where legislatures decline to tread, so
unless and until the General Assembly enacts clearer guidelines for parental
discipline (or our supreme court adopts a more workable standard), trial judges
and jurors must rely on their experience and judgment to determine when
parents cross over the blurry line that separates lawful from unlawful conduct,
and appellate courts must give those determinations significant deference. For
4
The lead opinion cites several reported cases with minor factual differences yet markedly different results.
5
Some who use the oft-quoted biblical phrase “spare the rod and spoil the child” to justify corporal
punishment may be unaware that “the rod” as used in biblical times referred to a shepherd’s staff, which was
primarily used for redirecting and not striking the flock. A refugee from Myanmar recently relied on a
similar biblical passage to justify beating her seven-year-old son with a plastic coat hanger, which resulted in
thirty-six bruises. Vick Ryckaert, Mom cites religious freedom in beating son, pleads guilty, USA TODAY, Oct. 29,
2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/10/28/indiana-religious-freedom-act-
defense/92906838/. The woman, who was charged with felony battery and neglect, invoked Indiana’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and “cultural differences” as a defense but ultimately agreed to plead
guilty to misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to a year of probation. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 17 of 18
that reason, I reluctantly concur in my colleagues’ affirmance of Carter’s battery
conviction.
[33]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1511-CR-1823 | November 30, 2016 Page 18 of 18