Town of Burlington v. Department of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Town of Burlington v. Department of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, John Doe, Etc., Town of Burlington v. Department of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

On appeal to this court a second time, all parties urge that the district court committed reversible errors in a case arising under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA or Act), 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401-1461. The first appeal generally involved motions for preliminary injunctions concerning the interim educational placement and funding for a learning disabled child, there referred to as John Doe, Jr.,1 see Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir.1981) (hereinafter Burlington I). The current appeal presents a wide variety of novel issues under the Act. These include: the choice of law to be utilized in the state due process hearings; the impact of a school system's regulatory violations on the validity of a child's IEP; the weight to be accorded to the state administrative record and the hearing officer's findings upon appeal; the meaning of the term "additional evidence" as used in the Act; the appropriate burden of proof at trial for the years subsequent to the contested IEP; and the significance of a diagnostic determination by the trial judge. Reimbursement issues include the effect of a unilateral parental transfer of the child to a school not authorized by the individualized educational program (IEP) formulated by the school system; the impact of parental reliance on and implementation of a state administrative decision; and bad faith as a bar to reimbursement.

In view of the protracted procedural background of the case which has included two published opinions, see id. and Doe v. Anrig, 561 F.Supp. 121 (D.Mass.1983) (Aldrich, J., sitting by designation) (consolidated case including Burlington I on remand), we will first recount its procedural history. The factual background may be found in the above-cited opinions. We shall then review the alleged errors according to the chronological progression of the case beginning with those alleged to have occurred at the state administrative level.

John had completed the third grade at a regular public school when his parents invoked the administrative appeals process in July 1979 to review an IEP and placement the Town of Burlington (Town) proposed to implement the following September. Mediation failed and in August the parents placed the child in a private school, the Carroll School. A state due process hearing was held by the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) over four days in the autumn of 1979. The BSEA hearing officer rendered a decision in January 1980 in favor of the private school placement, holding the Town's IEP to be inadequate and inappropriate for the child's special needs. The Town then commenced a two-count action in the district court against the State and the Does, seeking to reverse the BSEA order on the basis of both the federal Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2), and the corollary state Act, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 71B, Secs. 1 et seq. The federal and state acts have different standards of review.

The district court denied the Town's request for a stay of the BSEA order that the Town fund the child's education at the Carroll School, and on the state count found in favor of the defendants on a motion for summary judgment.

On appeal to this court we, inter alia, vacated the grant of summary judgment and directed that the pendent state count be dismissed, holding that the "federal specification for review, when invoked, seems to us designed to occupy the field over an inconsistent state provision." Burlington I, 655 F.2d at 431. The federal claim was remanded for trial.

At the conclusion of a four-day trial, the district court, Zobel, J., reversed the State BSEA finding and held that the Town's IEP was adequate and appropriate. The case was then transferred and consolidated with two others to determine whether the Town's remedies included reimbursement for tuition and travel expenses. The district court, Aldrich, J., sitting by designation, determined that reimbursement was available to the Town as the prevailing party.2 The case was transferred back to the original district court and an order issued requiring the parents to repay the Town the tuition, transportation costs, and other expenses related to the child's education at the Carroll School for the prior three years. This appeal ensued with the Department and the parents alleging both legal and factual errors in the district court. The Town cross-appeals on the limited issue of the method used to calculate the appropriate reimbursement and the amount thereby awarded. It must be emphasized that the State is not, as is usually the case, aligned with the Town on this appeal. The State's position parallels that of the Does. It urges that the district court erred in reversing the decision of the state educational agency as to the appropriate educational placement for the child.

Since our opinion focuses on 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415, which is reproduced in its entirety as an appendix, some basic observations are in order. This section of the Act requires state and local educational agencies to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards for handicapped children and their parents or guardians. Sec. 1415(a).

Subsection (b)(1) sets forth the required procedures, which "shall include, but shall not be limited to--

(A) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of a handicapped child to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child, and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child;

(B) [procedures when parents and guardians are not known or when child is a ward of the state];

(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the child whenever such agency or unit--

(i) proposes to initiate or change, or

(ii) refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child;

(D) [notice of all available procedures required to be in parents' or guardian's native language];

(E) an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.

Whenever a complaint has been received under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency....

Subsection (c) gives "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered" in the hearing under (b)(2) the right of an "appeal to the State educational agency which shall conduct an impartial review of such hearing." Subsection (d) enumerates the rights accorded parties to hearings.

Subsection (e)(2) opens the courtroom doors to any party aggrieved by the decisions rendered under subsections (b) and (c) by providing that such party

shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.

Subsection (e)(3) is addressed to the placement of the child during the pendency of the section 1415 proceedings. Subsection (e)(4) vests jurisdiction in the district courts of the United States.

For the reasons set forth in detail in the main part of our opinion, we find that Sec. 1415 gives the federal court the authority to enforce both federal and relevant state law. "Relevant" state law is law which is not inconsistent with the federally-mandated requirements--both substantive and procedural--of the Act. "Relevant" state law includes, inter alia, procedural safeguards which are more stringent than the required procedures set forth in subsection (b). This is made evident by the first sentence of the subsection: "The procedures required by this section shall include, but shall not be limited to ...," Sec. 1415(b)(1) (emphasis added). State law that is inconsistent with the federally-mandated procedures cannot, of course, be enforced by a federal court; it is not within Sec. 1415(e)(2) jurisdiction. In this case, we deal with state statutes and regulations that are consistent with but higher than the federally-mandated standards. Section 1415 mandates that the federal court enforce such statutes and regulations. We now turn to an exegesis of the federal Act and an analysis of the specific issues.

In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the Supreme Court discussed the proper scope of judicial review in actions brought under 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2): "First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" Id. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnotes omitted). In view of the state hearing officer's findings that the Town violated numerous state and federal laws in handling the child's special educational plans, the State and the Does--appellants here--challenge the failure of the district court to determine whether the Town complied with the procedures mandated by the federal Act and the corollary state Act. The Town responds by arguing that the hearing officer's findings were essentially ultra vires. The resolution of this question requires us to determine whether the state due process hearing, a central feature of the federal Act, was defective.

The appellants urge as error the district court's refusal to give any weight to the hearing officer's determination that the Town violated numerous state substantive and procedural regulations plus several federal provisions in its handling of the child's special education. The Town's response is that findings concerning past practices regarding compliance with state educational standards and procedures were irrelevant to the question appropriately before the hearing officer, viz., is the IEP proposed by the Town adequate and appropriate? Thus, in the Town's view, the district court properly ignored those findings. The Town raises two other objections to the findings. First, it argues that it was not given fair notice of the procedural or reimbursement issues in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 1, and the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 30A, Sec. 11(1) (West 1979), and, second, that the hearing officer's consideration of the prior years of the boy's education was unnecessary and erroneous. We first address the question of notice.

We note at the outset that the impartial due process hearings authorized by the Act are to be conducted in accordance with state law. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(a).3 This principle is limited only where the federal Act and regulations mandate different or more stringent procedural protection on a given point than does state law. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(1) ("The procedures required by this section shall include, but shall not be limited to ..."). In regard to notice, the federal Act speaks only to "written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the child" regarding certain actions a state or local educational agency might take in relation to a disabled child, see Sec. 1415(b)(1)(C). We find no federal procedural provision preempting state law on the question of fair notice of issues to be decided at the due process hearing. We turn, then, to state law.

The Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act in pertinent part provides:

(1) Reasonable notice of the hearing shall be accorded all parties and shall include statements of the time and place of the hearing. Parties shall have sufficient notice of the issues involved to afford them reasonable opportunity to prepare and present evidence and argument. If the issues cannot be fully stated in advance of the hearing, they shall be fully stated as soon as practicable. In all cases of delayed statement, or where subsequent amendment of the issues is necessary, sufficient time shall be allowed after full statement or amendment to afford all parties reasonable opportunity to prepare and present evidence and argument respecting the issues.

Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 30A, Sec. 11(1). The Town's claim of inadequate notice of the procedural issues is disingenuous. In a memorandum dated November 28, 1979, submitted by the Town to the state hearing officer, one section is entitled "There is no proof of procedural irregularity and no harm or prejudice to the [Does]." Additionally, uncontroverted testimony and exhibits submitted at the administrative hearing indicate that Mr. Doe met with the Town's School Committee in executive session to alert it to what he viewed as substantive and procedural irregularities in the handling of his child's special education. Adequate notice was provided to the Town on the procedural issues.

We also find that the Town had adequate notice under Sec. 11(1) of the reimbursement issues. While the corroborating documents were not put into evidence until the last day of the hearing, testimony from Mr. Doe on the first day of the hearing (September 26, 1979) and from Mrs. Doe on the last day (November 1) was directed to whether the Town had provided them with the information regarding their right to an independent evaluation of their son, as required by 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.503; and Mass.Admin.Code tit. 603, Sec. 328, and what independent evaluations the parents actually had obtained. We believe that the natural implication of the Does' testimony that the Town denied them notice of their right to and payment for independent evaluations is that they would expect to be reimbursed for the expenditures the law required of the Town. This inference is reasonable in view of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Amherst-Pelham Regional School Committee v. Department of Education, 376 Mass. 480, 381 N.E.2d 922 (1978), which validated the Department's power to order reimbursement to parents who obtained necessary services for their child because of the school committee's failure to provide them.

The hearing officer, moreover, provided an opportunity to both parties to submit rebuttal evidence as well as argument in written closing statements. At the request of both parties, the deadline was extended an additional three weeks. The Town did not utilize this evidentiary opportunity but claimed that procedural due process required that they be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding the bills. The hearing officer found, however, and we agree, that all the submitted bills corresponded to testimony given at the hearing by witnesses examined and cross-examined by the Town. We find no authority for construing the provision "reasonable opportunity to prepare and present argument respecting the issues," Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 30A, Sec. 11(1), to require that a second opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses must be provided. Nor do we construe 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415 to mandate such an opportunity. Rather, we think that the hearing officer provided the procedural due process required by the statute and, in any event, no prejudice has been shown. We discern no basis for a constitutional claim of denial of due process on either issue.

B. Extent of the Hearing Officer's Consideration of Prior Years

The hearing officer took into consideration all years of John's education because she found that the Town had provided the parents with an incomplete notice of their appeal rights in June 1977, at the close of John's first year, and no written transmission of any information about parents' rights subsequent to that time. The hearing officer therefore concluded that "the parents cannot be held responsible for any delay in requesting appeal and that the matter is legitimately before the Bureau4 at this time." In Re BSEA # 2867 at 12 (Jan. 20, 1980). The Town challenges the consideration by the Bureau of prior years as well as the relevance of past alleged illegalities to a judgment regarding a prospective IEP. The cases on which it relies are inapposite, however. In both New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co. v. Board of Assessors of Dartmouth, 368 Mass. 745, 335 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1975), and Canron, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Everett, 366 Mass. 634, 322 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1975), the Supreme Judicial Court undertook to interpret Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 59, Sec. 59, regarding the timeliness of tax abatement petitions; no rulings were made interpreting the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 30A, Secs. 10, 11, which governed this case at the state hearings.

Moreover, the state Act, consistent with the requirements of the federal Act, expressly charges the school system with the responsibility of notifying parents of their procedural and appellate rights. Compare Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 71B, Sec. 3 with 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(1)(D). See also Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1984). In Rowley, the Court commented on the importance of the procedural safeguards in Sec. 1415:

When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in Sec. 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, see, e.g., Secs. 1415(a)-(d), as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.

Rowley 458 U.S. at 205-6, 102 S.Ct. at 3050-1. The Court further noted that "adequate compliance with the procedures described would assure much of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." Id. Lack of notice to the parents, then, regarding their procedural rights drives a stake into the very heart of the Act.

Since the Town failed to give the parents proper notice, and since such notice might have led them to appeal earlier, it was reasonable for the State to hear those appeals despite their falling outside of the specified time frame, and to view the Town's lack of notice as a waiver of any time bar objection that might otherwise apply. Here, complete procedural information should have been provided to the parents in June 1977. Although the federal Act was not yet effective on that date, the state Act's provisions were in force. The hearing officer was, therefore, empowered to take into consideration the events the parents could have appealed on that date.

The practical effect of examining the entire course of events is limited. No hearing officer or court can turn back the clock and provide a disabled child an appropriate education for prior years; prospective relief, except for reimbursement under certain circumstances, Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d at 919-21, generally comprises the remedy under the Act. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1210-13 (7th Cir.1981). The value of considering a broader period of time, therefore, is basically evidentiary, to show procedural bad faith or a history of nonimplementation of IEPs. Further, while we do not reach the question, certain prospective relief, such as compensatory education, may arguably be ordered on the basis of prior defaults in the provision of a free appropriate public education. See Timms v. Metropolitan School District of Wabash County, 722 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1983); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2761-62, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). We conclude that interpreting the reach of the hearing officer in this manner comports with the court's responsibility to do substantial justice. Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d at 917.

The "cooperative federalism" that has been identified as a central hallmark of the Act, Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir.1983); Battle v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 278 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 3123, 69 L.Ed.2d 981 (1981); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 231 (1st Cir.1983), is specifically reflected in 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(a). That section, as already noted, indicates that the procedures governing the "impartial due process hearing[s]," including the procedures due parties, are to be determined on the basis of state law unless more stringent federal provisions control. Here, in order to determine whether the state hearing officer was permitted to consider the Town's alleged violations of state special education regulations, we must decide whether the federal Act requires any differentiation in the choice of substantive law to be applied in state administrative hearings.

Under the federal Act, a state is free to accept or reject the participation of the federal government in its educational programs for the disabled. See Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d at 916 n. 4. For states that contract for inclusion, the Act expressly authorizes and requires a state and local administrative apparatus to effectuate both its substantive and procedural guarantees in the first instance. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1412-1415; 34 C.F.R. Secs. 300.122, 300.128-.130, 300.220-.227, 300.300, 300.304. While compliance with the minimum standards set out by the federal Act is mandatory for the receipt of federal financial assistance, Smith v. Cumberland, 703 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1983), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 334, 78 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983), the Act does not presume to impose nationally a uniform approach to the education of children with any given disability; it requires only that a "free appropriate ... education," 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1), in conformity with the state's educational standards, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401(18)5, 1412(6)6, be provided to each disabled child upon individualized evaluation and planning. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(18)-(19) and Rowley 458 U.S. at 200-04, 102 S.Ct. at 3047-50. "Cooperative federalism" in this context, then, allows some substantive differentiation among the states in the determination of which educational theories, practices, and approaches will be utilized for educating disabled children with a given impairment. Rowley at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. at 3051-52.7 This approach also permits substantive variations in the level of remedial educational services states provide, once the federal minimum standard of a "free appropriate public education" is met. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(6). We find no indication in either the statutory language or the legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to create either a substantive or procedural ceiling regarding the rights of the disabled child. Thus, under our reading of the Act, states are free to elaborate procedural and substantive protections for the disabled child that are more stringent than those contained in the Act. Accord Eberle v. The Board of Public Education of the School District of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 444 F.Supp. 41, 43 (W.D.Pa.1977).

We believe that under the "cooperative federalism" approach the proper construction of Sec. 1415 is that state substantive law supplements the federal Act in prescribing the determinations to be made at the due process hearing. It seems plain that the Congress drew the procedural and substantive contours of education for disabled children, but left the shading and tinting of the details largely to the states. States are responsible for filling in the numerous interstices within the federal Act through their own statutes and regulations. Congress provided for federal executive oversight through states' annual plans to assure basic compliance with the federal minimum standards but the states supply the machinery necessary to effectuate the guarantees provided by the federal Act on a daily basis.8

Given the crucial role Congress has assigned to the states in effectuating a "free appropriate public education" for all disabled children, we hold that states have the right to enforce their own laws and regulations at the due process hearings authorized by Sec. 1415,9 and not merely those skeletal federal provisions designed as minimum standards.10 Any other construction would render the states powerless to effectuate the federal Act fully or to provide greater protection and services for disabled children than the Act requires. We find no support in the legislative history of a congressional intention to supplant the states' historic direction of education within their boundaries.11

We now evaluate the Town's claim that the hearing officer deviated from the only question properly before her and allowed extraneous considerations to taint her decision that the Town's IEP was inadequate for John's needs. The hearing officer framed the issues at the outset of her opinion:

1. Whether the educational plan and placement proposed by Burlington ... a 502.4 prototype,12 is adequate and appropriate to meet [John's] special needs.

2. Whether the Burlington Public Schools have violated the procedural requirements of Chapter 766 in significant and prejudicial ways.

3. Whether, in the alternative, the Carroll School, a 766 approved private day school is the least restrictive, adequate program and placement which meets [John's] special educational needs.4. Whether Burlington Public Schools is responsible for payment of certain evaluations.

The Town does not object to issue one, nor to the correlative inquiry contained in issue three; it concentrates its attack on issue two.13 The hearing officer's inquiry, however, is mandated by the crucial role of state regulations in effectuating the guarantees of the federal Act. Further, the officer did not merely enumerate the state and federal regulations she found the Town to have violated, but discussed how many of those illegalities seriously compromised John's right to an appropriate education.

Since there is no claim of federal preemption here, the only question remaining is whether the hearing officer properly applied state substantive law. In Isgur v. School Committee of Newton, 9 Mass.App. 290, 400 N.E.2d 1292 at 1292 (1980), the court posed the pertinent question: "[D]oes the failure to comply with the regulation[§ identified] go to the essence of rights granted by c. 766 [and the federal Act]?"14 We have no difficulty in finding that the hearing officer properly answered this question affirmatively. Accordingly, we hold that the hearing officer did not err in linking the Town's violations of John's essential rights to the conclusion that the Town lacked the capacity to implement the IEP as written.

The parties present several questions regarding the scope of the district court's review of the state administrative proceedings. The Act provides in pertinent part:

In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.

20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2). The district court's review raises the following issues: the proper interplay between the federal and state Acts; the weight to be accorded the administrative record and the deference due the administrative findings; the construction and application of the "additional evidence" provision; and the omission of a diagnostic determination. Our resolution of these issues follows the spirit of "cooperative federalism." We must strive for an interpretation of the federal Act that does not limit the states to the federal floor, but allows them to achieve greater aspirations by higher commitments.

We first turn our attention to the district court's treatment of the state administrative finding that the Town violated numerous statutory and regulatory provisions governing procedures in special education, some federal and some state. The hearing officer found that the Town had violated, inter alia: the extensive regulations of both bodies of law regarding parental notification and written consent to evaluations which are, or may be, used to determine classroom placement and program; both federal and state regulations regarding the writing of an educational plan in 1977; the state regulation requiring that an evaluation team issue an educational plan or a finding of no special needs at the conclusion of an evaluation; regulations requiring that all members of an evaluation team meet together to discuss the child's educational needs, rather than in smaller groups seriatim; and the regulations mandating parental notification prior to modifications of an IEP already in force.

The district court did not take these findings into consideration. Instead, the court framed the procedural question before it as "whether the state had complied with the procedures set forth in the Act." Town of Burlington v. Department of Education and Doe, Memorandum of Decision at 9 (August 13, 1982). That issue, in the district court's view, required it not only to " 'satisfy itself that the State has adopted the State plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act,' but also [to] determine that the State has created an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the requirements of Sec. 1401(19)." Id. (quoting Rowley). The district court then found that "Massachusetts has conformed with all of the Act's procedural requirements"15 and that the "parents have been afforded the right to complain" and appeal.

We believe that the district court framed the procedural inquiry too narrowly by looking only to the State's procedural compliance. Here, the Town, not the State, was alleged to have violated the Does' procedural rights. Both federal and state regulations extensively govern the responsibilities of towns or local educational agencies (LEAs) under the Act, as well as those of States. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. Secs. 300.180-300.240; 300.452; 300.530-.534; Mass.Admin.Code tit. 603, Secs. 200.0-211.0; 300.0-328.4. The federal statute itself places obligations upon the LEAs and designates the states as the enforcers of compliance with the federal laws. See 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1412(6); 1414(a)(5)-(7). See also Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Report No. 94-168, 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1425, 1448 (Act designed to "assure a single line of responsibility with regard to the education of handicapped children"). The Supreme Court in Rowley emphasized the crucial significance of the procedural protections and enumerated some of the very provisions the state hearing officer held the Town to have violated. See Rowley 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. at 3050. Finally, under the federal statute, the complaint may concern "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education of such child." Sec. 1415(b)(1)(E). This language obviously includes