Daniel Cowin v. Charles S. Bresler

Bresler & Reiner, Inc. is a publicly-owned company incorporated in the State of Delaware and engaged in the development and management of residential and commercial properties in the District of Columbia. In late 1980, Daniel Cowin, a Bres-ler & Reiner shareholder, sued the company and its directors on his own behalf. Cowin has a minority interest in the company. The individual directors-appellees, with their families, own in excess of 79% of the company’s stock. Appellees Bresler and Reiner together hold more than 70% of the company’s outstanding shares, and their control of the corporation is undisputed.

The thrust of Cowin’s charges is that the appellees have manipulated the business for their personal profit at the expense of the minority shareholders. The complaint alleges numerous instances of corporate mismanagement, fraud, and self-dealing, all in breach of the common law fiduciary duty owed by the directors of the company to the appellant as a shareholder. Several of the challenged transactions involve deals between the company and certain limited partnerships in which the appellees, including Bresler and Reiner, have significant interests. The complaint also charges Bresler and Reiner with forcing the company to engage in a stock repurchase program at a time when the company was in default on its notes payable and having severe cash flow problems. Cowin alleges that appellees used, and are still using, the repurchase plan to “severely limit[] the public market for trading in Company stock”; according to appellant, their ultimate intent is to “covert[ ] the Company to a private corporation owned solely by” them for their own benefit. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 14. To remedy the alleged common law violations, Cowin seeks damages for the diminished value of his stock and injunctions against the allegedly wrongful transactions. He also requests the appointment of a receiver to liquidate the company for his benefit and the benefit of the other.shareholders.

The remainder of the complaint charges appellees with violations of the federal securities laws, primarily in connection with the transactions detailed above. Specifically, Cowin claims that Bresler and Reiner caused the company to “disseminate reports to the public shareholders which were materially deceptive” and concealed material information in violation of Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 15. The complaint also charges appellees with violating section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), by causing the company to issue deceptive proxy materials. Cowin seeks to require the disclosure of *413 the material concealed in alleged violation of the Act and, among other things, to invalidate the elections for directors based on the alleged proxy violations.

Appellees moved promptly to dismiss the complaint. They also sought, and received from the district court, an order barring all discovery pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. As a result, no discovery was permitted during the proceedings below.

In its first order, entered December 23, 1981, the district court ruled that while Cowin could legally seek the appointment of a receiver for a solvent corporation in his individual capacity, he had failed to allege the “extreme circumstances showing imminent danger of great loss”-necessary to support such drastic relief. Cowin v. Bresler, No. 80-2230, mem. op. at 3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,1981); Record Excerpts (“R.E.”) at 32. The court then dismissed appellant’s common law claims because, in its view, both federal and common law required Cowin to “bring ... a derivative suit to recover damages for a decline in the value of stock” due to alleged corporate mismanagement and fraud. Id. at 35. The court would “not permit [Cowin] to elevate form over substance in order to escape the requirements of a derivative suit merely by attaching an unjustified request for the appointment of a receiver ... to his complaint.” Id. at 36.

The district court also dismissed most of appellant’s Rule 10b-5 claims. 1 Relying on Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977), the court held that the “reincorporation [into federal securities law claims] of ■[Cowin’s] common-law claims for breaches of fiduciary duties as well as the alleged ‘nondisclosures’ ... must be dismissed as unsuccessful attempts to create a 10b-5 cause of action out of claims of corporate mismanagement.” R.E. at 40. Certain other alleged securities law violations were dismissed for lack of specificity under Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). R.E. at 40 n. *, 42-43. The court did not dismiss Cowin’s section 14(a) proxy disclosure claims, however, nor did it dismiss that portion of appellant’s Rule 10b-5 claims that did not “integrally relate[] to [the] allegations of the nondisclosure of certain breaches of fiduciary duty.” R.E. at 44-45.

Appellees answered those portions of the complaint that survived the lower court’s order and moved for summary judgment on the section 14(a) claim. In its second order, entered April 21, 1983, the district court granted summary judgment for appellees on that claim, holding that Cowin had no standing to challenge, on an individual basis, the allegedly misleading nature of proxy solicitations because he had not personally relied on them. 2

This appeal followed. 3

*414 I.

A.

We agree with the district court’s holding that appellant’s common law claims for damages and injunctive relief must be pursued, if at all, on a derivative basis. 4 Both case law and sound policy support this conclusion. In Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del.1970), plaintiff shareholder charged that Getty Oil had, among other things, forced its wholly-owned subsidiary to purchase oil from Getty at an inflated price. Delaware’s highest court characterized this claim as one “seekpng] money damages for improper management” and held that such claims belonged to the corporation and not to its minority stockholders:

When an injury to corporate stock falls equally upon all stockholders, then an individual stockholder may not recover for the injury to his stock alone, but must seek recovery derivatively in behalf of the corporation.

Id. at 249 (emphasis added). The court concluded that “[mjismanagement which depresses the value of stock is a wrong to the corporation; i.e., the stockholders collectively, to be enforced by a derivative action.” Id. See also Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F.Supp. 294, 304 (D.Del.1981); Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 34 Del.Ch. 94, 98-99,100 A.2d 219, 222 (1953). 5

The logic of Bokat is compelling. Claims of corporate mismanagement must be brought on a derivative basis because no shareholder suffers a harm independent of that visited upon the corporation and the other shareholders. Because each shareholder has been injured in proportion to his equity ownership, “each will be made whole if the corporation obtains compensation or restitution from the wrongdoer.” Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir.1972). A contrary rule “would authorize multitudinous litigation and ignore the corporate entity.” Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525, 530, 170 P.2d 898, 901 (1946). See also Brooks v. Land Drilling Co., 564 F.Supp. 1518, 1521 (D.Colo.1983); 13 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia on the Law of Corporations § 5911 (Perm. ed. 1980). Requiring derivative enforcement of claims belonging in the first instance to the corporation also prevents an individual shareholder from incurring a benefit at the expense of other shareholders similarly situated. See 13 W. Fletcher, supra, § 5915, at 323.

This general rule is the law of several jurisdictions. 6 There are, however, *415 certain circumstances in which a shareholder may proceed against his company on an individual basis. In Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., the Delaware chancery court stated:

There are cases, of course, in which there is injury to the corporation and also special injury to the individual stockholder. In such cases a stockholder, if he should so desire, may proceed on his claim for the protection of his individual rights rather than in the right of the corporation. The action would then not constitute a derivative action.

34 Del.Ch. at 99, 100 A.2d at 222 (emphasis added).

A fair reading of the “special injury” eases shows that a personal cause of action is properly pursued in two situations— where the allegedly wrongful conduct violates a duty to the complaining shareholder independent of the fiduciary duties owed that party along with all other shareholders, or, where the conduct causes an injury to the shareholders distinct from any injury to the corporation itself. In cases of the first sort, the complaining shareholder may sue as an individual only because he stands, and has been injured in his relationship to the corporation, in a capacity other than that of a shareholder. In Sedeo International, S.A. v. Cory, 522 F.Supp. 254 (S.D. Iowa 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1017, 103 S.Ct. 379, 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982), for example, a shareholder was permitted to bring a personal action against the company because he was injured in his capacity as a creditor of the corporation; his status as a shareholder was irrelevant to his right to pursue a creditor’s remedy. The court found that the “right to recovery asserted is entirely independent of Carver’s status as a shareholder” and held that “his dual capacity— as creditor and shareholder — [did not] operate[ ] to cut off his rights as a creditor and vest them in the corporation itself.” 522 F.Supp. at 314. Empire Life is to a similar effect. The Fifth Circuit recognized the “established rule that if a plaintiff sues in a stockholder capacity for corporate mismanagement, he must bring the suit derivatively in the name of the corporation.” 468 F.2d at 335. In that case, however, the counterclaiming defendant had alleged not only that the plaintiff had violated fiduciary duties owed defendant as a shareholder but also that the plaintiff had violated an independent duty — as pledgee in a loan transaction with the defendant — not to deplete the value of the collateral intentionally. Id. In these circumstances, the court stated:

[T]he defendant seeks damages as a pledgor. The fact that his pledge is stock and that if the manipulated depreciation of the stock is proven would also give rise to a derivative suit by defendant as stockholder should not foreclose the suit as pledgor. The role of pledgor and stockholder are not identical and defendant may play the part he chooses ____ We find that defendant ... is entitled to bring his claim as individual pledgor.

Id. at 336 (emphasis in original). See also Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp., 397 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir.1968); 13 W. Fletcher, supra, at § 5921.

The second category of harms which may be remedied on an individual basis consists of “wrong[s] inflicted upon [the stockholder] alone ... or wrong[s] affecting ... the stockholders and not the corporation____” Elster, 34 Del.Ch. at 99, 100 A.2d at 222. Wrongful withholding of dividends, for example, gives rise to an individual cause of action. See Abelow v. Symonds, 38 Del.Ch. 572, 578, 156 A.2d 416, 419 (1959). Because dividends are an incident of stock ownership, an action to compel the payment of dividends withheld will not inure to the benefit of the corporation; the shareholders alone will gain by a judgment in their favor and, therefore, each shareholder may sue for his own account. See Knapp v. Bankers Securities *416 Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir.1956); see also Crane Co., 511 F.Supp. at 304.

Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del.Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967), is also representative of this second category. In that case, the company’s directors denied a controlling corporate shareholder its right to exercise voting control over the company. This claim was properly remedied on an individual basis because the injury was the shareholder’s alone, not shared by the corporation or other equity owners. In Condec, plaintiff had made a tender offer and received tenders for a controlling percentage of Lunkenheimer’s stock. Con-dec's control over Lunkenheimer was frustrated, however, when Lunkenheimer’s management contracted to sell its business to U.S. Industries and, in the context of that agreement, issued 75,000 additional shares of Lunkenheimer stock. The court found “the primary purpose of the [defendant’s actions] was to prevent control of Lunkenheimer from passing to Condec,” 43 Del.Ch. at 362, 230 A.2d at 775, and allowed Condec to sue, on its own behalf, for cancellation of those 75,000 shares. The court held that Condec need not prove an injury to the corporation as the defendants had argued; that would be necessary only if, for example, a stockholder was attacking, on a derivative basis, the spending of a corporation’s funds for the repurchase of its own stock. 43 Del.Ch. at 365-66, 230 A.2d at 777. Instead, the court concluded, a personal action was proper because Con-dec was “a stockholder with a contractual right to voting control being deprived of such control____” Id. (emphasis added). See generally 13 W. Fletcher, supra, at §5915 (enumeration of claims properly brought on an individual basis).

Appellant’s allegations do not fall within the “special injury” exception articulated above. Although Cowin generally argues that appellees — through their conduct — have breached fiduciary duties owed directly to the minority shareholders, he has not shown, and indeed could not show, that these duties are distinct from those owed the corporation. His claims that appellees caused the company to enter into a series of “unfair” transactions that have “involved self-dealing” and “diverting assets” are fundamentally claims belonging to the corporation and to Cowin only derivatively. See Complaint IMf 13-14, 35-36, 42, 45; R.E. at 6-7, 13, 14, 15. Cowin’s charge that the deceptive and incomplete reports issued by the company in an attempt to “artificially deflate ... the market price of [the company’s] common stock” is also an allegation of harm primarily to the corporation shared by each stockholder proportionate to their holdings. Complaint If 48; R.E. at 16. While the underlying value of the corporation’s assets may be unaffected by this wrongful act, the attractiveness of the corporation as an investment and its ability to compete for capital funds have been impaired. That these deceptive reports may have prevented the company stock from being traded in a “perfect” market causes similar injury to the corporation. In these circumstances, then, because “each [shareholder] will be made whole if the corporation obtains compensation or restitution from the wrongdoer,” Empire Life, 468 F.2d at 335, appellant must pursue his common law claims for damages and injunctive relief on a derivative basis. See also Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d at 249. 7

*417 B.

Cowin’s request for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate the company, as distinct from his state law claims for damages and injunctive relief, was properly before the district court in a personal action. See, e.g., Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 28 Del.Ch. 220, 228-32, 40 A.2d 447, 451-52 (1944); Salnita Corp. v. Walter Holding Corp., 19 Del.Ch. 426, 431, 168, A. 74, 76 (1933). The court found, however, that Cowin had failed to meet the pleading requirements necessary to support such relief. R.E. at 33. We disagree. Although a request for a court-appointed receiver “to wind up a solvent going business is rarely granted,” Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 40 Del.Ch. 509, 512, 185 A.2d 480, 482 (Sup.Ct.1962), and the court’s power to do so must “always [be] exercised with great restraint,” Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 39 Del.Ch. 244, 253,163 A.2d 288, 293 (Sup.Ct. 1960), we believe that Cowin has sufficiently plead the requisite elements to support his claim. 8

To establish the claim for a court-appointed receiver, Cowin must allege facts to show that the majority shareholders or directors of the company have engaged in, or are presently engaged in, fraudulent misconduct which puts the company at immediate risk of great loss. In Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del.Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487 (Sup.Ct.1966), the Delaware Supreme Court stated:

It is plain, we think, that for a court to order a dissolution or liquidation of a solvent corporation, the proponents must show a failure of corporate purpose, a fraudulent disregard of the minority’s rights, or some other facts which indicates an imminent danger of great loss resulting from fraudulent or absolute mismanagement.

43 Del.Ch. at 155, 221 A.2d at 491 (emphasis added). Where imminent risk of great loss is not present, or, where no illegal or fraudulent acts have occurred, a “receiver may not be appointed to liquidate [the company].” 43 Del.Ch. at 156, 221 A.2d at 491. Moreover, mere apprehension of future misconduct based upon prior mismanagement will not satisfy the “imminent danger” requirement. Campbell v. Pennsylvania Industries, Inc., 99 F.Supp. 199, 206 (D.Del.1951). A shareholder’s exclusive remedy, when his complaint is not based on any illegality, is to withdraw from the corporate enterprise. Id. 9

Case law also appears to require Cowin to allege facts showing that a court-ap *418 pointed receiver — a particularly onerous form of relief — is the only relief that will remedy appellees’ misdeeds. In Lichens Co., for example, the court stated that the “inherent power of a court of equity to appoint a receiver for a solvent corporation ... must be exercised with great caution, and only where there is real imminent danger of material loss that cannot otherwise be prevented.” 28 Del.Ch. at 231, 40 A.2d at 452. See also Vale v. Atlantic Coast & Inland Corp., 34 Del.Ch. 50, 57, 99 A.2d 396, 400 (1953) (to state a claim for the appointment of a receiver, plaintiff “must show fraud, gross mismanagement, or extreme circumstances causing imminent danger of great loss which cannot be otherwise prevented”); Pennsylvania Industries, 99 F.Supp. at 207 (same). 10

Bearing in mind the appropriate standard of review at this early stage of the litigation, see supra note 3, we think Cowin’s allegations establish the elements necessary to support his claim for a court-appointed receiver. His complaint details a series of financial misdealings which, if proven, constitute affirmative acts of misconduct by the directors and majority shareholders in breach of the fiduciary duties owed by them to the corporation and, derivatively, to the minority shareholders. This is not a case, then, like Warshaw, where the complainant could only show that the defendant-directors had organized the corporation in such a way that “prevent[edj it from taking advantage of opportunities that e[a]me its way.” 43 Del.Ch. at 155, 221 A.2d at 491. In those circumstances, the court had no power to appoint a receiver because the choice of corporate form, while “unfortunate [wa]s not illegal.” Id.

Cowin’s complaint also alleges that ap-pellees’ conduct — both in the past and present — is depriving the corporation of millions of dollars on an ongoing basis. Complaint UU14-16, 22-27, 28-32, 34-39, 42, 45-46; R.E. at 7-8, 9-11, 11-12, 13-14, 15, 16. At this preliminary stage in the pleadings, these allegations are more than sufficient to show the “imminent danger of great loss” necessary to support Cowin’s request to put the company into receivership. That the company has suffered net income losses in only one year does not support the district court’s dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact that Bresler & Reiner stock was selling, when the complaint was filed, at $4.00 per share (up from a range of $.75 to $2.25 in 1977), does not render incredible the extensive and detailed allegations in Cowin’s complaint, nor does it negate the inferences we must draw on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The district court impermissibly narrowed the scope of Cowin’s complaint by accepting these facts as controlling in the face of Cowin’s detailed allegations concerning appellees’ misuse of the corporate venture.

Finally, the allegations of Cowin’s complaint are sufficient to raise the question whether any relief short of receivership will remedy appellees’ past wrongs or deter them from further transgressions. It is undisputed that appellees beneficially control the vast majority of company stock and would retain control of the enterprise even if a shareholder’s derivative suit brought the company some measure of relief from appellees’ conduct. A derivative action, in these circumstances, might provide only stopgap relief. See Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 73 F.Supp. 37,57 (D.Mass.1947); see also Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102, 196 N.E.2d 540 (1963).

Our disposition should not be taken to suggest that we believe Cowin is entitled to put the company into receivership. Such a course, as the authority indicates, is one of “last-resort,” and the court’s power to ap *419 point a receiver to liquidate a solvent business must be exercised rarely and with great restraint. See Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 40 Del.Ch. at 512, 185 A.2d at 482; Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 39 Del.Ch. at 253, 163 A.2d at 293. As the foregoing should indicate, however, the ultimate inquiry into the propriety of a receivership is factually complex and does not especially lend itself to resolution solely on the pleadings. We note in this respect that no discovery was permitted in the lower court for two years these motions were pending and that the court, in making its decision, could not consequently take advantage of appellant’s ability (or inability) to develop through discovery the factual predicate for his request for a receiver. We believe the district court’s analysis failed to accept the full measure of Cowin’s fairly detailed pleadings and did not draw the reasonable inferences from those allegations. This portion of Cowin’s claim is remanded to the district court for discovery and further factual development.

II.

Appellant’s federal claims raise novel questions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1982). Although Cowin did not buy or sell his stock in connection with the allegedly misleading reports issued by the company, he relies upon section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 in seeking to prevent appellees from “depress[ing] the value of [his] stock and ... eliminatpng] the public market in that stock through dissemination of deceptive statements.” Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 18. In short, appellant claims not that he was wrongfully induced to buy or sell stock by appellees’ misrepresentations but rather that his stock was made less valuable by appellees’ misrepresentations to the investing public generally. He does not seek damages but an injunction requiring an end to the alleged misrepresentations and disclosure of past misrepresentations. It is clear from Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), that appellant could not maintain an action for damages under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. The question before us is whether he may bring suit for an injunction.

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits manipulation or deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security....” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The generalized prohibition of fraud in section 10(b) is made more specific by Rule 10b-5, issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. That rule makes it unlawfül for any person:

(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (emphasis added).

The Act provides no express civil remedy for a violation of section 10(b). Nor did Congress consider the potential for private enforcement when that section was enacted. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 729, 95 S.Ct. at 1922. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission did not contemplate private suits when adopting Rule 10b-5. The rule was intended to close a “loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.” SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (emphasis added), quoted in Birn-baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 343 U.S. 956, 72 S.Ct. 1051, 96 L.Ed. 1356 (1952). See also Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 766-67, 95 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Its only purpose was “to make the ... [anti-fraud] prohibitions contained in Sec *420 tion 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to purchasers as well as to sellers.” Birn-baum, 193 F.2d at 463.

Despite the existence of express remedies in the Act, it has long been settled that a private party may sue under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The threat of private suits has become a valuable adjunct to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement powers. However, the fact that a cause of action exists does not mean that any person can invoke section 10(b)’s protections. “We are dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question.” Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 749, 95 S.Ct. at 1931. This case requires us to consider one limitation on the class of potential plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5.

A.

In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court held that only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to pursue private claims for damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The only difference between that case and this is that appellant seeks only injunc-tive relief. The question is whether that difference means that plaintiff’s action survives Blue Chip. We think that it does not. 11

More than twenty years before Blue Chip, a distinguished panel of the Second Circuit concluded that section 10(b) was “directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs____” Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 343 U.S. 956, 72 S.Ct. 1051, 96 L.Ed. 1356 (1952). 12 Relying primarily on the purpose underlying the adoption of Rule 10b-5, Birnbaum held that the rule extended protection “only to the defrauded purchaser or seller,” 193 F.2d at 464, and affirmed dismissal of a complaint that failed to allege that “any of the plaintiffs fell into either class.” Id. 13

*421 After declining an earlier opportunity to rule on Birnbaum’s standing requirements, see Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 165, 169-170 n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971), the Supreme Court in Blue Chip affirmed the vitality of the Birnbaum restriction in private damage actions under Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs in Blue Chip were disappointed offerees of a registered stock offering held pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. They sued under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 alleging that they had been dissuaded from purchasing the offered shares because of their reliance on a false and misleading prospectus. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court of appeals reasoned that plaintiffs’ status as offerees pursuant to a court-ordered stock offering was the functional equivalent of having a contract right to purchase securities; since Birnbaum had been interpreted not to exclude those possessing contract rights, plaintiff was held to have standing.

The Supreme Court reversed. 14 The Court noted that virtually all courts facing the issue had reaffirmed Birnbaum’s limitation on standing and it observed that the SEC had twice sought to extend the reach of section 10(b) by introducing legislation amending the language from “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” to “in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security.” Blue Chip,