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Full Opinion
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 17â459. Argued April 23, 2018âDecided June 21, 2018
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), nonpermanent residents who are subject to re-
moval proceedings may be eligible for cancellation of removal if,
among other things, they have âbeen physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
preceding the date of [an] applicationâ for cancellation. 8 U. S. C.
§1229(b)(1)(A). Under the stop-time rule, however, the period of con-
tinuous presence is âdeemed to end . . . when the alien is served a no-
tice to appear under section 1229(a).â §1229(d)(1)(A). Section
1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve nonciti-
zens in removal proceedings with a written â ânotice to appear,â â spec-
ifying, among other things, â[t]he time and place at which the [re-
moval] proceedings will be held.â §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Per a 1997
regulation stating that a ânotice to appearâ served on a noncitizen
need only provide âthe time, place and date of the initial removal
hearing, where practicable,â 62 Fed. Reg. 10332, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), at least in recent years, almost always
serves noncitizens with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or
date of initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it im-
practicable to include such information. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) has held that such notices trigger the stop-time rule
even if they do not specify the time and date of the removal proceed-
ings.
Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and citizen of Brazil
who came to the United States in 2000 and remained after his visa
expired. Following a 2006 arrest for operating a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol, DHS served Pereira with a document titled
ânotice to appearâ that did not specify the date and time of his initial
2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Syllabus
removal hearing, instead ordering him to appear at a time and date
to be set in the future. More than a year later, in 2007, the Immigra-
tion Court mailed Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and
time for his initial hearing, but the notice was sent to the wrong ad-
dress and was returned as undeliverable. As a result, Pereira failed
to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absen-
tia.
In 2013, Pereira was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation
and detained by DHS. The Immigration Court reopened the removal
proceedings after Pereira demonstrated that he never received the
2007 notice. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal, argu-
ing that he had been continuously present in the United States for
more than 10 years and that the stop-time rule was not triggered by
DHSâ initial 2006 notice because the document lacked information
about the time and date of his removal hearing. The Immigration
Court disagreed and ordered Pereira removed. The BIA agreed with
the Immigration Court that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time
rule, even though it failed to specify the time and date of Pereiraâs in-
itial removal hearing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
nied Pereiraâs petition for review of the BIAâs order. Applying the
framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, it held that the stop-time rule is
ambiguous and that the BIAâs interpretation of the rule was a per-
missible reading of the statute.
Held: A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific
time or place of the noncitizenâs removal proceedings is not a ânotice
to appear under §1229(a),â and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.
Pp. 7â20.
(a) The Court need not resort to Chevron deference, for the unam-
biguous statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case. Under the
stop-time rule, âany period of . . . continuous physical presenceâ is
âdeemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
section 1229(a).â 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing
§1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what ânotice
to appearâ means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of
notice âreferred to as a ânotice to appearâ â throughout the statutory
section is a âwritten notice . . . specifying,â as relevant here, â[t]he
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.â
§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, to trigger the stop-time rule, the Govern-
ment must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least,
âspecif[ies]â the âtime and placeâ of the removal hearing.
The Government and dissent point out that the stop-time rule re-
fers broadly to a notice to appear under â§1229(a)ââwhich includes
paragraph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). But that does not
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
Syllabus
matter, because only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a ânotice
to appear.â If anything, paragraph (2), which allows for a âchange or
postponementâ of the proceedings to a ânew time and place,â
§1229(a)(2)(A)(i), bolsters the Courtâs interpretation of the statute be-
cause the provision presumes that the Government has already
served a ânotice to appearâ that specified a time and place as required
by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Another neighboring provision, §1229(b)(1),
lends further support for the view that a ânotice to appearâ must
specify the time and place of removal proceedings to trigger the stop-
time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives a noncitizen âthe opportunity to
secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing dateâ by mandating
that such âhearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
after the service of the notice to appear.â For that provision to have
any meaning, the ânotice to appearâ must specify the time and place
that the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal pro-
ceedings. Finally, common sense reinforces the conclusion that a no-
tice that does not specify when and where to appear for a removal
proceeding is not a ânotice to appearâ that triggers the stop-time rule.
After all, an essential function of a ânotice to appearâ is to provide
noncitizens ânoticeâ of the information (i.e., the âtimeâ and âplaceâ)
that would enable them âto appearâ at the removal hearing in the
first place. Without conveying such information, the Government
cannot reasonably expect noncitizens to appear for their removal pro-
ceedings. Pp. 7â13.
(b) The Government and the dissent advance a litany of counterar-
guments, all of which are unpersuasive. To begin, the Government
mistakenly argues that §1229(a) is not definitional. That is wrong.
Section 1229(a) speaks in definitional terms, requiring that a notice
to appear specify, among other things, the âtime and place at which
the proceedings will be held.â As such, the dissent is misguided in
arguing that a defective notice to appear, which fails to specify time-
and-place information, is still a notice to appear for purposes of the
stop-time rule. Equally unavailing is the Governmentâs (and the dis-
sentâs) attempt to generate ambiguity in the statute based on the
word âunder.â In light of the plain language and statutory context,
the word âunder,â as used in the stop-time rule, clearly means âin ac-
cordance withâ or âaccording toâ because it connects the stop-time
trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a ânotice to appearâ that specifies the enu-
merated time-and-place information. The Government fares no bet-
ter in arguing that surrounding statutory provisions reinforce its pre-
ferred reading of the stop-time rule, as none of those provisions
supports its atextual interpretation. Unable to root its reading in the
statutory text, the Government and dissent raise a number of practi-
cal concerns, but those concerns are meritless and do not justify de-
4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Syllabus
parting from the statuteâs clear text. In a final attempt to salvage its
atextual interpretation, the Government turns to the alleged statuto-
ry purpose and legislative history of the stop-time rule. Even for
those who consider statutory purpose and legislative history, howev-
er, neither supports the Governmentâs position. Requiring the Gov-
ernment to furnish time-and-place information in a notice to appear
is entirely consistent with Congressâ stated objective of preventing
noncitizens from exploiting administrative delays to accumulate
lengthier periods of continuous precedent. Pp. 13â20.
866 F. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,
JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1
Opinion of S
Opinion the Court, J.
ofOTOMAYOR
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 17â459
_________________
WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[June 21, 2018]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Nonpermanent residents, like petitioner here, who are
subject to removal proceedings and have accrued 10 years
of continuous physical presence in the United States, may
be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as
cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). Under
the so-called âstop-time ruleâ set forth in §1229b(d)(1)(A),
however, that period of continuous physical presence is
âdeemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to
appear under section 1229(a).â Section 1229(a), in turn,
provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in
removal proceedings with âwritten notice (in this section
referred to as a ânotice to appearâ) . . . specifyingâ several
required pieces of information, including â[t]he time and
place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.â
§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1
The narrow question in this case lies at the intersection
ââââââ
1 The Court uses the term ânoncitizenâ throughout this opinion to
refer to any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.
See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3).
2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
of those statutory provisions. If the Government serves a
noncitizen with a document that is labeled ânotice to
appear,â but the document fails to specify either the time
or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the
stop-time rule? The answer is as obvious as it seems: No.
A notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and
where to appear for removal proceedings is not a ânotice to
appear under section 1229(a)â and therefore does not
trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text, the statutory
context, and common sense all lead inescapably and un-
ambiguously to that conclusion.
I
A
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009â546,
the Attorney General of the United States has discretion
to âcancel removalâ and adjust the status of certain non-
permanent residents. §1229b(b). To be eligible for such
relief, a nonpermanent resident must meet certain enu-
merated criteria, the relevant one here being that the
noncitizen must have âbeen physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years immediately preceding the date of [an] applicationâ
for cancellation of removal. §1229b(b)(1)(A).2
IIRIRA also established the stop-time rule at issue in
this case. Under that rule, âany period of . . . continuous
physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to
end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
section 1229(a) of this title.â3 §1229b(d)(1)(A). Section
ââââââ
2 Lawful permanent residents also may be eligible for cancellation of
removal if, inter alia, they have continuously resided in the United
States for at least seven years. §1229b(a)(2).
3 The period of continuous physical presence also stops if and when
âthe alien has committedâ certain enumerated offenses that would
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
Opinion of the Court
1229(a), in turn, provides that âwritten notice (in this
section referred to as a ânotice to appearâ) shall be given
. . . to the alien . . . specifyingâ:
â(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien.
â(B) The legal authority under which the proceed-
ings are conducted.
â(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of
law.
â(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory
provisions alleged to have been violated.
â(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and
the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure
counsel under subsection (b)(1) of this section and (ii)
a current list of counsel prepared under subsection
(b)(2) of this section.
â(F)(i) The requirement that the alien must imme-
diately provide (or have provided) the Attorney Gen-
eral with a written record of an address and telephone
number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted
respecting proceedings under section 1229a of this
title.
â(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide
the Attorney General immediately with a written rec-
ord of any change of the alienâs address or telephone
number.
â(iii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
this title of failure to provide address and telephone
information pursuant to this subparagraph.
â(G)(i) The time and place at which the [re-
moval] proceedings will be held.
â(ii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
this title of the failure, except under exceptional cir-
ââââââ
constitute grounds for removal or inadmissibility. §1229b(d)(1)(B).
That provision is not at issue here.
4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
cumstances, to appear at such proceedings.â
§1229(a)(1) (boldface added).
The statute also enables the Government to âchange or
postpon[e] . . . the time and place of [the removal] proceed-
ings.â §1229(a)(2)(A). To do so, the Government must give
the noncitizen âa written notice . . . specifying . . . the new
time or place of the proceedingsâ and âthe consequences
. . . of failing, except under exceptional circumstances, to
attend such proceedings.â Ibid. The Government is not
required to provide written notice of the change in time or
place of the proceedings if the noncitizen is ânot in deten-
tionâ and âhas failed to provide [his] addressâ to the Gov-
ernment. §1229(a)(2)(B).
The consequences of a noncitizenâs failure to appear at a
removal proceeding can be quite severe. If a noncitizen
who has been properly served with the âwritten notice
required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)â
fails to appear at a removal proceeding, he âshall be or-
dered removed in absentiaâ if the Government âestablishes
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
written notice was so provided and that the alien is re-
movable.â §1229a(b)(5)(A). Absent âexceptional circum-
stances,â a noncitizen subject to an in absentia removal
order is ineligible for some forms of discretionary relief for
10 years if, âat the time of the notice described in para-
graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),â he âwas provided oral
notice . . . of the time and place of the proceedings and of
the consequencesâ of failing to appear. §1229a(b)(7). In
certain limited circumstances, however, a removal order
entered in absentia may be rescindedâe.g., when the
noncitizen âdemonstrates that [he] did not receive notice
in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).â
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
B
In 1997, shortly after Congress passed IIRIRA, the
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
Opinion of the Court
Attorney General promulgated a regulation stating that a
ânotice to appearâ served on a noncitizen need only provide
âthe time, place and date of the initial removal hearing,
where practicable.â 62 Fed. Reg. 10332 (1997). Per that
regulation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
at least in recent years, almost always serves noncitizens
with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or date of
initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it
impracticable to include such information. See Brief for
Petitioner 14; Brief for Respondent 48â49; Tr. of Oral Arg.
52â53 (Governmentâs admission that âalmost 100 percentâ
of ânotices to appear omit the time and date of the pro-
ceeding over the last three yearsâ). Instead, these notices
state that the times, places, or dates of the initial hearings
are âto be determined.â Brief for Petitioner 14.
In Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011), the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed whether
such notices trigger the stop-time rule even if they do not
specify the time and date of the removal proceedings. The
BIA concluded that they do. Id., at 651. It reasoned that
the statutory phrase ânotice to appear âunder section
[1229](a)â â in the stop-time rule âmerely specifies the
document the DHS must serve on the alien to trigger the
âstop-timeâ rule,â but otherwise imposes no âsubstantive
requirementsâ as to what information that document must
include to trigger the stop-time rule. Id., at 647.
C
Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and
citizen of Brazil. In 2000, at age 19, he was admitted to
the United States as a temporary ânon-immigrant visitor.â
App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. After his visa expired, he re-
mained in the United States. Pereira is married and has
two young daughters, both of whom are United States
citizens. He works as a handyman and, according to
submissions before the Immigration Court, is a well-
6 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
respected member of his community.
In 2006, Pereira was arrested in Massachusetts for
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
On May 31, 2006, while Pereira was detained, DHS served
him (in person) with a document labeled âNotice to Ap-
pear.â App. 7â13. That putative notice charged Pereira as
removable for overstaying his visa, informed him that
âremoval proceedingsâ were being initiated against him,
and provided him with information about the â[c]onduct of
the hearingâ and the consequences for failing to appear.
Id., at 7, 10â12. Critical here, the notice did not specify
the date and time of Pereiraâs removal hearing. Instead, it
ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge in
Boston âon a date to be set at a time to be set.â Id., at 9
(underlining in original).
More than a year later, on August 9, 2007, DHS filed
the 2006 notice with the Boston Immigration Court. The
Immigration Court thereafter attempted to mail Pereira a
more specific notice setting the date and time for his ini-
tial removal hearing for October 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m.
But that second notice was sent to Pereiraâs street address
rather than his post office box (which he had provided to
DHS), so it was returned as undeliverable. Because Pe-
reira never received notice of the time and date of his re-
moval hearing, he failed to appear, and the Immigration
Court ordered him removed in absentia. Unaware of that re-
moval order, Pereira remained in the United States.
In 2013, after Pereira had been in the country for more
than 10 years, he was arrested for a minor motor vehicle
violation (driving without his headlights on) and was
subsequently detained by DHS. The Immigration Court
reopened the removal proceedings after Pereira demon-
strated that he never received the Immigration Courtâs
2007 notice setting out the specific date and time of his
hearing. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal,
arguing that the stop-time rule was not triggered by DHSâ
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7
Opinion of the Court
initial 2006 notice because the document lacked infor-
mation about the time and date of his removal hearing.
The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law âquite
settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice
to Appear in order to make that document effective.â App.
to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Immigration Court therefore
concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-
presence requirement under §1229b(b), thereby render-
ing him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal,
and ordered Pereira removed from the country. The
BIA dismissed Pereiraâs appeal. Adhering to its precedent
in Camarillo, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Court
that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time rule and that
Pereira thus failed to satisfy the 10-year physical-presence
requirement and was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Perei-
raâs petition for review of the BIAâs order. 866 F. 3d 1
(2017). Applying the framework set forth in Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals first found that
the stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) is ambiguous because it
âdoes not explicitly state that the date and time of the
hearing must be included in a notice to appear in order to
cut off an alienâs period of continuous physical presence.â
866 F. 3d, at 5. Then, after reviewing the statutory text
and structure, the administrative context, and pertinent
legislative history, the Court of Appeals held that the
BIAâs interpretation of the stop-time rule was a permissi-
ble reading of the statute. Id., at 6â8.
II
A
The Court granted certiorari in this case, 583 U. S. ___
(2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on
a simple, but important, question of statutory interpreta-
tion: Does service of a document styled as a ânotice to
8 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
appearâ that fails to specify âthe items listedâ in
§1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4 Pet. for Cert. i.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question
presented by Pereira, which focuses on all âitems listedâ in
§1229(a)(1), sweeps more broadly than necessary to re-
solve the particular case before us. Although the time-
and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from
case to case, the Government acknowledges that â[m]uch
of the information Section 1229(a)(1) calls for does notâ
change and is therefore âincluded in standardized lan-
guage on the Iâ862 notice-to-appear form.â Brief for Re-
spondent 36 (referencing 8 U. S. C. §§1229(a)(1)(A)â(B),
(E)â(F), and (G)(ii)). In fact, the Governmentâs 2006 notice
to Pereira included all of the information required by
§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of
Pereiraâs removal proceedings. See App. 10â12. Accord-
ingly, the dispositive question in this case is much nar-
rower, but no less vital: Does a ânotice to appearâ that does
not specify the âtime and place at which the proceedings
will be held,â as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the
stop-time rule?5
ââââââ
4 Compare Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General United States, 817
F. 3d 78, 83â84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-
ously requires service of a ânotice to appearâ that meets §1229(a)(1)âs
requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083
(CA9 2015) (finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the BIAâs
interpretation); OâGarro v. United States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx.
951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam) (same); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch,
786 F. 3d 235, 239â240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam) (same); Gonzalez-
Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434â435 (CA6 2014) (same); Yi Di
Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 674â675 (CA7 2014) (same); Urbina v.
Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same).
5 The Court leaves for another day whether a putative notice to ap-
pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated
in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule. Contrary to the dissentâs
assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means âtantamount
to admittingâ that the Governmentâs (and dissentâs) atextual interpre-
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 9
Opinion of the Court
In addressing that narrower question, the Court need
not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have
done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous
answer to the interpretive question at hand. See 467
U. S., at 842â843 (âIf the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congressâ). A putative notice to appear that fails to
designate the specific time or place of the noncitizenâs
removal proceedings is not a ânotice to appear under
section 1229(a),â and so does not trigger the stop-time
rule.
B
The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.
Under the stop-time rule, âany period of . . . continuous
physical presenceâ is âdeemed to end . . . when the alien is
served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).â 8
U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing §1229(a),
the statute specifies where to look to find out what ânotice
to appearâ means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that
the type of notice âreferred to as a ânotice to appearâ â
throughout the statutory section is a âwritten notice . . .
specifying,â as relevant here, â[t]he time and place at
which the [removal] proceedings will be held.â
§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, based on the plain text of the
statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the
Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the
very least, âspecif[ies]â the âtime and placeâ of the removal
proceedings.
It is true, as the Government and dissent point out, that
the stop-time rule makes broad reference to a notice to
ââââââ
tation is a permissible construction of the statute. Post, at 10 (opinion
of ALITO, J.).
10 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
appear under âsection 1229(a),â which includes para-
graph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). See Brief for
Respondent 27â28; post, at 5â6 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But
the broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, be-
cause, as even the Government concedes, only paragraph
(1) bears on the meaning of a ânotice to appear.â Brief for
Respondent 27. By contrast, paragraph (2) governs the
â[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,â and
paragraph (3) provides for a system to record noncitizensâ
addresses and phone numbers. Nowhere else within
§1229(a) does the statute purport to delineate the re-
quirements of a ânotice to appear.â In fact, the term âno-
tice to appearâ appears only in paragraph (1) of §1229(a).
If anything, paragraph (2) of §1229(a) actually bolsters
the Courtâs interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2)
provides that, âin the case of any change or postponement
in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,â the Gov-
ernment shall give the noncitizen âwritten notice . . .
specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.â
§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a âchange or postpone-
mentâ of the proceedings to a ânew time or place,â para-
graph (2) presumes that the Government has already
served a ânotice to appear under section 1229(a)â that
specified a time and place as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
Otherwise, there would be no time or place to âchange or
postpon[e ].â §1229(a)(2). Notably, the dissent concedes
that paragraph (2) confirms that a notice to appear must
âstate the âtime and placeâ of the removal proceeding as
required by §1229(a)(1).â â Post, at 13. The dissent never-
theless retorts that this point is âentirely irrelevant.â Ibid.
Not so. Paragraph (2) clearly reinforces the conclusion
that âa notice to appear under section 1229(a),â
§1229b(d)(1), must include at least the time and place of
the removal proceedings to trigger the stop-time rule.
Another neighboring statutory provision lends further
contextual support for the view that a ânotice to appearâ
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 11
Opinion of the Court
must include the time and place of the removal proceed-
ings to trigger the stop-time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives
a noncitizen âthe opportunity to secure counsel before the
first [removal] hearing dateâ by mandating that such
âhearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
after the service of the notice to appear.â For §1229(b)(1)
to have any meaning, the ânotice to appearâ must specify
the time and place that the noncitizen, and his counsel,
must appear at the removal hearing. Otherwise, the
Government could serve a document labeled ânotice to
appearâ without listing the time and location of the hear-
ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-
mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes
available. Under that view of the statute, a noncitizen
theoretically would have had the âopportunity to secure
counsel,â but that opportunity will not be meaningful if,
given the absence of a specified time and place, the noncit-
izen has minimal time and incentive to plan accordingly,
and his counsel, in turn, receives limited notice and time
to prepare adequately. It therefore follows that, if a âno-
tice to appearâ for purposes of §1229(b)(1) must include
the time-and-place information, a ânotice to appearâ for
purposes of the stop-time rule under §1229b(d)(1) must as
well. After all, âit is a normal rule of statutory construc-
tion that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning.â
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 571
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).6
ââââââ
6 The dissent argues that, if a notice to appear must furnish time-and-
place information, the Government âmay be forced by the Courtâs
interpretation to guess that the hearing will take place far in the
future, only to learn shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact
imminent.â Post, at 14. In such a scenario, the dissent hypothesizes, a
noncitizen would be âlulled into a false sense of securityâ and thus
would have little meaningful opportunity to secure counsel and prepare
12 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
Finally, common sense compels the conclusion that a
notice that does not specify when and where to appear for
a removal proceeding is not a ânotice to appearâ that trig-
gers the stop-time rule. If the three words ânotice to ap-
pearâ mean anything in this context, they must mean that,
at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens
ânoticeâ of the information, i.e., the âtimeâ and âplace,â that
would enable them âto appearâ at the removal hearing in
the first place. Conveying such time-and-place infor-
mation to a noncitizen is an essential function of a notice
to appear, for without it, the Government cannot reason-
ably expect the noncitizen to appear for his removal pro-
ceedings. To hold otherwise would empower the Govern-
ment to trigger the stop-time rule merely by sending
noncitizens a barebones document labeled âNotice to
Appear,â with no mention of the time and place of the
removal proceedings, even though such documents would
do little if anything to facilitate appearance at those pro-
ceedings.7 â âWe are not willing to impute to Congress . . .
ââââââ
adequately. Ibid. But nothing in our interpretation of the statute
âforce[s]â the Government to guess when and where a hearing will take
place, ibid., nor does our interpretation prevent DHS and the Immigra-
tion Courts from working together to streamline the scheduling of
removal proceedings, see infra, at 18â19. Far from âlull[ing]â nonciti-
zens into a false sense of security, post, at 14, our reading (unlike the
Governmentâs and the dissentâs) still gives meaning to a noncitizenâs
âopportunity to secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date,â
§1229(b)(1), by informing the noncitizen that the Government is com-
mitted to moving forward with removal proceedings at a specific time
and place. Equipped with that knowledge, a noncitizen has an incen-
tive to obtain counsel and prepare for his hearing.
7 At oral argument, the Government conceded that a blank piece of
paper would not suffice to trigger the stop-time rule because (in its
view) such a hypothetical notice would fail to specify the charges
against the noncitizen. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39â40 (arguing that notice to
appear must âtell the alien what proceedings he must appear for and
why he must appear for themâ). The dissent also endorses the view
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 13
Opinion of the Court
such [a] contradictory and absurd purpose,â â United States
v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 342 (1950), particularly where
doing so has no basis in the statutory text.
III
Straining to inject ambiguity into the statute, the Gov-
ernment and the dissent advance several overlapping
arguments. None is persuasive.
A
First, the Government posits that §1229(a) âis not worded
in the form of a definitionâ and thus cannot circum-
scribe what type of notice counts as a ânotice to appearâ for
purposes of the stop-time rule. Brief for Respondent 32.
Section 1229(a), however, does speak in definitional terms,
at least with respect to the âtime and place at which the
proceedings will be heldâ: It specifically provides that the
notice described under paragraph (1) is âreferred to as a
ânotice to appear,â â which in context is quintessential
definitional language.8 It then defines that term as a
ââââââ
that a notice to appear âcan also be understood to serve primarily as a
charging document.â Post, at 14â15. But neither the Government nor
the dissent offers any convincing basis, much less one rooted in the
statutory text, for treating time-and-place information as any less
crucial than charging information for purposes of triggering the stop-
time rule. Furthermore, there is no reason why a notice to appear
should have only one essential function. Even if a notice to appear
functions as a âcharging document,â that is not mutually exclusive with
the conclusion that a notice to appear serves another equally integral
function: telling a noncitizen when and where to appear. At bottom,
the Governmentâs self-serving position that a notice to appear must
specify charging information, but not the time-and-place information,
reveals the arbitrariness inherent in its atextual approach to the stop-
time rule.
8 Congress has employed similar definitional language in other statu-
tory schemes. See, e.g., 21 U. S. C. §356(b)(1) (creating new class of
âfast track product[s]â by setting out drug requirements and providing:
âIn this section, such a drug is referred to as a âfast track productâ â);
14 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
âwritten noticeâ that, as relevant here, âspecif[ies] . . . [t]he
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be
held.â §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, when the term ânotice to
appearâ is used elsewhere in the statutory section, includ-
ing as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it
the substantive time-and-place criteria required by
§1229(a).
Resisting this straightforward understanding of the
text, the dissent posits that â§1229(a)(1)âs language can be
understood to define what makes a notice to appear com-
plete.â Post, at 10 (emphasis in original). In the dissentâs
view, a defective notice to appear is still a ânotice to ap-
pearâ even if it is incompleteâmuch like a three-wheeled
Chevy is still a car. Post, at 10â11. The statutory text
proves otherwise. Section 1229(a)(1) does not say a ânotice
to appearâ is âcompleteâ when it specifies the time and
place of the removal proceedings. Rather, it defines a
ânotice to appearâ as a âwritten noticeâ that âspecif[ies],â at
a minimum, the time and place of the removal proceed-
ings. §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Moreover, the omission of time-
and-place information is not, as the dissent asserts, some
trivial, ministerial defect, akin to an unsigned notice of
appeal. Cf. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768
(2001). Failing to specify integral information like the
time and place of removal proceedings unquestionably
would âdeprive [the notice to appear] of its essential char-
acter.â Post, at 12, n. 5; see supra, at 12â13, n. 7.9
ââââââ
§356(a)(1) (âIn this section, such a drug is referred to as a âbreak-
through therapyâ â); 38 U. S. C. §7451(a)(2) (âhereinafter in this section
referred to as âcovered positionsâ â); 42 U. S. C. §285gâ4(b) (âhereafter in
this section referred to as âmedical rehabilitationâ â).
9 The dissent maintains that Congressâ decision to make the stop-time
rule retroactive to certain pre-IIRIRA âorders to show causeâ âsheds
considerable light on the question presentedâ because orders to show
cause did not necessarily include time-and-place information. Post, at
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 15
Opinion of the Court
B
The Government and the dissent next contend that
Congressâ use of the word âunderâ in the stop-time rule
renders the statute ambiguous. Brief for Respondent 22â
23; post, at 4â5. Recall that the stop-time rule provides
that âany period of . . . continuous physical presenceâ is
âdeemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to
appear under section 1229(a).â §1229b(d)(1)(A). According
to the Government, the word âunderâ in that provision
means âsubject to,â âgoverned by,â or âissued under the
authority of.â Brief for Respondent 24. The dissent offers
yet another alternative, insisting that âunderâ can also
mean âauthorized by.â Post, at 4. Those definitions, the
Government and dissent maintain, support the BIAâs view
that the stop-time rule applies so long as DHS serves a
notice that is âauthorized by,â or âsubject to or governed
by, or issued under the authority of â §1229(a), even if the
notice bears none of the time-and-place information re-
quired by that provision. See Brief for Respondent 24;
post, at 4â5.
We disagree. It is, of course, true that â[t]he word âun-
derâ is [a] chameleon â that â âmust draw its meaning from
its context.â â Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 245 (2010)
(quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991)). But
nothing in the text or context here supports either the
Governmentâs or the dissentâs preferred definition of âun-
der.â Based on the plain language and statutory context
discussed above, we think it obvious that the word âun-
ââââââ
6â7. That argument compares apples to oranges. Even if the stop-time
rule sometimes applies retroactively to an order to show cause, that
provides scant support for the dissentâs view that, under the new post-
IIRIRA statutory regime, an entirely different document called a
ânotice to appear,â which, by statute, must specify the time and place of
removal proceedings, see §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), need not include such
information to trigger the stop-time rule.
16 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
der,â as used in the stop-time rule, can only mean âin
accordance withâ or âaccording to,â for it connects the stop-
time trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a ânotice to appearâ that
contains the enumerated time-and-place information
described in §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). See 18 Oxford English
Dictionary 950 (2d ed. 1989) (defining âunderâ as â[i]n
accordance withâ); Blackâs Law Dictionary 1525 (6th ed.
1990) (defining âunderâ as âaccording toâ). So construed,
the stop-time rule applies only if the Government serves a
ânotice to appearâ â[i]n accordance withâ or âaccording toâ
the substantive time-and-place requirements set forth in
§1229(a). See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568
U. S. 519, 530 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Far from generating any âdegree of ambiguity,â post, at 4,
the word âunderâ provides the glue that bonds the stop-
time rule to the substantive time-and-place requirements
mandated by §1229(a).
C
The Government argues that surrounding statutory
provisions reinforce its preferred reading. See Brief for
Respondent 25â27. It points, for instance, to two separate
provisions relating to in absentia removal orders:
§1229a(b)(5)(A), which provides that a noncitizen may be
removed in absentia if the Government has provided
âwritten notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 1229(a)â; and §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), which provides
that, once an in absentia removal order has been entered,
the noncitizen may seek to reopen the proceeding if, inter
alia, he âdemonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in
accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).â
According to the Government, those two provisions use the
distinct phrases ârequired underâ and âin accordance withâ
as shorthand for a notice that satisfies §1229(a)(1)âs re-
quirements, whereas the stop-time rule uses the phrase
âunder section 1229(a)â to encompass a different type of
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 17
Opinion of the Court
notice that does not necessarily include the information
outlined in §1229(a)(1). See Brief for Respondent 25â26.
That logic is unsound. The Government essentially argues
that phrase 1 (âwritten notice required under paragraph
(1) . . . of section 1229(a)â) and phrase 2 (ânotice in accord-
ance with paragraph (1) . . . of section 1229(a)â) can refer
to the same type of notice even though they use entirely
different words, but that phrase 3 (ânotice to appear under
section 1229(a)â) cannot refer to that same type of notice
because it uses words different from phrases 1 and 2. But
the Government offers no convincing reason why that is
so. The far simpler explanation, and the one that com-
ports with the actual statutory language and context, is
that each of these three phrases refers to notice satisfying,
at a minimum, the time-and-place criteria defined in
§1229(a)(1).
Equally unavailing is the Governmentâs invocation of
§1229a(b)(7). Brief for Respondent 26â27. Under that
provision, a noncitizen who is ordered removed in absentia
is ineligible for various forms of discretionary relief for a
10-year period if the noncitizen, âat the time of the notice
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of [Title
8], was provided oral notice . . . of the time and place of the
proceedingsâ and âof the consequences . . . of failing, other
than because of exceptional circumstances,â to appear.
§1229a(b)(7). The Government argues that the express
reference to âthe time and place of the proceedingsâ in
§1229a(b)(7) shows that, when Congress wants to attach
substantive significance to whether a noncitizen is given
information about the specific âtime and placeâ of a re-
moval proceeding, it knows exactly how to do so. Brief for
Respondent 26â27. But even if §1229a(b)(7) may impose
harsher consequences on noncitizens who fail to appear at
removal proceedings after having specifically received oral
notice of the time and place of such proceedings, that
reveals nothing about the distinct question hereâi.e.,
18 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
whether Congress intended the stop-time rule to apply
when the Government fails to provide written notice of the
time and place of removal proceedings. As to that ques-
tion, the statute makes clear that Congress fully intended
to attach substantive significance to the requirement that
noncitizens be given notice of at least the time and place of
their removal proceedings. A document that fails to in-
clude such information is not a ânotice to appear under
section 1229(a)â and thus does not trigger the stop-time
rule.
D
Unable to find sure footing in the statutory text, the
Government and the dissent pivot away from the plain
language and raise a number of practical concerns. These
practical considerations are meritless and do not justify
departing from the statuteâs clear text. See Burrage v.
United States, 571 U. S. 204, 218 (2014).
The Government, for its part, argues that the âadminis-
trative realities of removal proceedingsâ render it difficult
to guarantee each noncitizen a specific time, date, and
place for his removal proceedings. See Brief for Respond-
ent 48. That contention rests on the misguided premise
that the time-and-place information specified in the notice
to appear must be etched in stone. That is incorrect. As
noted above, §1229(a)(2) expressly vests the Government
with power to change the time or place of a noncitizenâs
removal proceedings so long as it provides âwritten notice
. . . specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedingsâ
and the consequences of failing to appear. See §1229(a)(2);
Tr. of Oral Arg. 16â19. Nothing in our decision today
inhibits the Governmentâs ability to exercise that statu-
tory authority after it has served a notice to appear specify-
ing the time and place of the removal proceedings.
The dissent raises a similar practical concern, which is
similarly misplaced. The dissent worries that requiring
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 19
Opinion of the Court
the Government to specify the time and place of removal
proceedings, while allowing the Government to change
that information, might encourage DHS to provide âarbi-
trary dates and times that are likely to confuse and con-
found all who receive them.â Post, at 8. The dissentâs
argument wrongly assumes that the Government is ut-
terly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a
notice to appear and will instead engage in âarbitraryâ
behavior. See ibid. The Court does not embrace those
unsupported assumptions. As the Government concedes,
âa scheduling system previously enabled DHS and the
immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in
some cases.â Brief for Respondent 50, n. 15; Brief for
National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 30â
31. Given todayâs advanced software capabilities, it is
hard to imagine why DHS and immigration courts could
not again work together to schedule hearings before send-
ing notices to appear.
Finally, the dissentâs related contention that including a
changeable date would âmisleadâ and âprejudiceâ nonciti-
zens is unfounded. Post, at 8. As already explained, if the
Government changes the date of the removal proceedings,
it must provide written notice to the noncitizen,
§1229(a)(2). This notice requirement mitigates any poten-
tial confusion that may arise from altering the hearing
date. In reality, it is the dissentâs interpretation of the
statute that would âconfuse and confoundâ noncitizens,
post, at 8, by authorizing the Government to serve notices
that lack any information about the time and place of the
removal proceedings.
E
In a last ditch effort to salvage its atextual interpreta-
tion, the Government invokes the alleged purpose and
legislative history of the stop-time rule. Brief for Re-
spondent 37â40. Even for those who consider statutory
20 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
Opinion of the Court
purpose and legislative history, however, neither supports
the Governmentâs atextual position that Congress intended
the stop-time rule to apply when a noncitizen has been
deprived notice of the time and place of his removal pro-
ceedings. By the Governmentâs own account, Congress
enacted the stop-time rule to prevent noncitizens from
exploiting administrative delays to âbuy timeâ during
which they accumulate periods of continuous presence.
Id., at 37â38 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 104â469, pt. 1, p. 122
(1996)). Requiring the Government to furnish time-and-
place information in a notice to appear, however, is en-
tirely consistent with that objective because, once a proper
notice to appear is served, the stop-time rule is triggered,
and a noncitizen would be unable to manipulate or delay
removal proceedings to âbuy time.â At the end of the day,
given the clarity of the plain language, we âapply the
statute as it is written.â Burrage, 571 U. S., at 218.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1
KENNEDY, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 17â459
_________________
WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[June 21, 2018]
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring.
I agree with the Courtâs opinion and join it in full.
This separate writing is to note my concern with the
way in which the Courtâs opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984), has come to be understood and applied. The appli-
cation of that precedent to the question presented here by
various Courts of Appeals illustrates one aspect of the
problem.
The first Courts of Appeals to encounter the question
concluded or assumed that the notice necessary to trigger
the stop-time rule found in 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1) was not
âperfectedâ until the immigrant received all the infor-
mation listed in §1229(a)(1). Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670
F. 3d 404, 410 (CA2 2012) (per curiam); see also Dababneh
v. Gonzales, 471 F. 3d 806, 809 (CA7 2006); Garcia-
Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 935, 937, n. 3 (CA9 2005)
(per curiam).
That emerging consensus abruptly dissolved not long
after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reached a
contrary interpretation of §1229b(d)(1) in Matter of Cama-
rillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011). After that administrative
ruling, in addition to the decision under review here, at
least six Courts of Appeals, citing Chevron, concluded that
§1229b(d)(1) was ambiguous and then held that the BIAâs
2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
KENNEDY, J., concurring
interpretation was reasonable. See Moscoso-Castellanos v.
Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083 (CA9 2015); OâGarro v. United
States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx. 951, 953 (CA11 2015)
(per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 235, 239â
240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder,
770 F. 3d 431, 434â435 (CA6 2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder,
759 F. 3d 670, 674â675 (CA7 2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745
F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014). But see Orozco-Velasquez v.
Attorney General United States, 817 F. 3d 78, 81â82 (CA3
2016). The Court correctly concludes today that those
holdings were wrong because the BIAâs interpretation
finds little support in the statuteâs text.
In according Chevron deference to the BIAâs interpreta-
tion, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis
of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of
statutory construction, Congressâ intent could be dis-
cerned, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9, and whether the BIAâs
interpretation was reasonable, id., at 845. In Urbina v.
Holder, for example, the court stated, without any further
elaboration, that âwe agree with the BIA that the relevant
statutory provision is ambiguous.â 745 F. 3d, at 740. It
then deemed reasonable the BIAâs interpretation of the
statute, âfor the reasons the BIA gave in that case.â Ibid.
This analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciaryâs
proper role in interpreting federal statutes.
The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of
these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to
other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an
agencyâs interpretation of the statutory provisions that
concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling
still. See Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 327 (2013)
(ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (âWe do not leave it to the
agency to decide when it is in chargeâ). Given the con-
cerns raised by some Members of this Court, see, e.g., id.,
at 312â328; Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)
(THOMAS, J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
KENNEDY, J., concurring
F. 3d 1142, 1149â1158 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring), it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in
an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron
and how courts have implemented that decision. The
proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining
agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should
accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles
and the function and province of the Judiciary. See, e.g.,
Arlington, supra, at 312â316 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting).
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1
ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 17â459
_________________
WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[June 21, 2018]
JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
Although this case presents a narrow and technical
issue of immigration law, the Courtâs decision implicates
the status of an important, frequently invoked, once cele-
brated, and now increasingly maligned precedent, namely,
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Under that decision, if a
federal statute is ambiguous and the agency that is au-
thorized to implement it offers a reasonable interpreta-
tion, then a court is supposed to accept that interpreta-
tion. Here, a straightforward application of Chevron
requires us to accept the Governmentâs construction of the
provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Governmentâs
interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best
reading of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court,
for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.
I
As amended, the Immigration and Nationality Act
generally requires the Government to remove nonperma-
nent resident aliens who overstay the terms of their ad-
mission into this country. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(1)(B)â
(C). But under certain circumstances, the Government
may decide to cancel their removal instead. See §1229b.
To be eligible for such relief, an alien must demonstrate
2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
that he or she âhas been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years.â
§1229b(b)(1)(A). âFor purposes of â that rule, however,
âany period of . . . continuous physical presence in the
United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is
served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this
title.â §1229b(d)(1). That language acts as a stop-time
rule, preventing the continuous-presence clock from con-
tinuing to run once an alien is served with a notice to
appear.
The question presented by this case is whether the stop-
time rule is triggered by service of a notice to appear that
is incomplete in some way. A provision of the amended
Immigration and Nationality Act requires that the Gov-
ernment serve an alien who it seeks to remove with a
notice to appear âspecifyingâ a list of things, including
â[t]he nature of the proceedings against the alien,â â[t]he
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted,â
â[t]he acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law,â
â[t]he charges against the alien and the statutory provi-
sions alleged to have been violated,â and (what is relevant
here) â[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will
be held.â §§1229(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (G)(i).
Petitioner Wescley Pereira is a Brazilian citizen who
entered the United States lawfully in 2000 but then ille-
gally overstayed his nonimmigrant visa. In 2006, the
Government caused him to be served in person with a
document styled as a notice to appear for removal proceed-
ings. Pereira concedes that he overstayed his visa and is
thus removable, but he argues that he is nonetheless
eligible for cancellation of removal because he has now
been in the country continuously for more than 10 years.
He contends that the notice served on him in 2006 did not
qualify as a notice to appear because it lacked one piece of
information that such a notice is supposed to contain,
namely, the time at which his removal proceedings were to
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3
ALITO, J., dissenting
be held. Thus, Pereira contends, that notice did not trig-
ger the stop-time rule, and the clock continued to run.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has rejected
this interpretation of the stop-time rule in the past. It has
held that â[a]n equally plausible readingâ is that the stop-
time rule âmerely specifies the document the [Govern-
ment] must serve on the alien to trigger the âstop-timeâ
rule and does not impose substantive requirements for a
notice to appear to be effective in order for that trigger to
occur.â In re Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647 (2011). It
therefore held in this case that Pereira is ineligible for
cancellation of removal.
II
A
Pereira, on one side, and the Government and the BIA,
on the other, have a quasi-metaphysical disagreement
about the meaning of the concept of a notice to appear. Is
a notice to appear a document that contains certain essen-
tial characteristics, namely, all the information required
by §1229(a)(1), so that any notice that omits any of that
information is not a ânotice to appearâ at all? Or is a
notice to appear a document that is conventionally called
by that name, so that a notice that omits some of the
information required by §1229(a)(1) may still be regarded
as a ânotice to appearâ?
Picking the better of these two interpretations might
have been a challenge in the first instance. But the Court
did not need to decide that question, for under Chevron we
are obligated to defer to a Government agencyâs interpre-
tation of the statute that it administers so long as that
interpretation is a â âpermissibleâ â one. INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424 (1999). All that is required is
that the Governmentâs view be âreasonableâ; it need not be
âthe only possible interpretation, nor even the interpreta-
tion deemed most reasonable by the courts.â Entergy
4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U. S. 208, 218 (2009).
Moreover, deference to the Governmentâs interpretation
âis especially appropriate in the immigration contextâ
because of the potential foreign-policy implications.
Aguirre-Aguirre, supra, at 425. In light of the relevant
text, context, statutory history, and statutory purpose,
there is no doubt that the Governmentâs interpretation of
the stop-time rule is indeed permissible under Chevron.
B
By its terms, the stop-time rule is consistent with the
Governmentâs interpretation. As noted, the stop-time rule
provides that âany period of . . . continuous physical pres-
ence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when
the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)
of this title.â §1229b(d)(1). A degree of ambiguity arises
from Congressâs use of the word âunder,â for as the Court
recognizes, â â[t]he word âunderâ is [a] chameleon,â â ante, at
15, having â âmany dictionary definitionsâ â and no âuni-
form, consistent meaning,â Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 531 (2013). Everyone agrees,
however, that âunderâ is often used to mean âauthorized
by.â See, e.g., Websterâs New World College Dictionary
1453 (3d ed. 1997) (âauthorized . . . byâ); American Herit-
age Dictionary 1945 (3d ed. 1992) (âWith the authorization
of â); see also Brief for Respondent 24 (agreeing that âun-
derâ can mean âsubject to,â âgoverned by,â or âissued under
the authority ofâ); Brief for Petitioner 28. And when the
term is used in this way, it does not necessarily mean that
the act done pursuant to that authorization was done in
strict compliance with the terms of the authorization. For
example, one might refer to a litigantâs disclosure âunderâ
Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even if
that disclosure did not comply with Rule 26(a) in every
respect. Or one might refer to regulations promulgated
âunderâ a statute even if a court later found those regula-
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5
ALITO, J., dissenting
tions inconsistent with the statuteâs text.
That use of the word âunderâ perfectly fits the Govern-
mentâs interpretation of the stop-time rule. The Govern-
ment served Pereira with a notice to appear âunderâ
§1229(a) in the sense that the notice was âauthorized byâ
that provision, which states that a notice to appear âshall
be givenâ to an alien in a removal proceeding and outlines
several rules governing such notices. On that reasonable
reading, the phrase âunder section 1229(a)â acts as short-
hand for the type of document governed by §1229(a).
C
That interpretation is bolstered by the stop-time ruleâs
cross-reference to âsection 1229(a).â §1229b(d)(1). Pereira
interprets that cross-reference as picking up every sub-
stantive requirement that applies to notices to appear.
But those substantive requirements are found only in
§1229(a)(1). Thus, the cross-reference to âsection 1229(a),â
as opposed to âsection 1229(a)(1),â tends to undermine
Pereiraâs interpretation, because if Congress had meant
for the stop-time rule to incorporate the substantive re-
quirements located in §1229(a)(1), it presumably would
have referred specifically to that provision and not more
generally to âsection 1229(a).â We normally presume that
â[w]hen Congress want[s] to refer only to a particular
subsection or paragraph, it [says] so,â NLRB v. SW Gen-
eral, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9), and it is
instructive that neighboring statutory provisions in this
case are absolutely riddled with such specific cross-
references.1 In the stop-time rule, however, Congress
chose to insert a broader cross-reference, one that refers to
the general process of serving notices to appear as a
ââââââ
1 See, e.g., §1229a(b)(5)(A) (âparagraph (1) . . . of section 1229(a)â);
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (same); §1229a(b)(7) (same); §1229a(b)(5)(B) (âad-
dress required under section 1229(a)(1)(F)â); see also §1229a(b)(7)
(referring to §1229(a)(1)(G)(i)âs âtime and placeâ requirement).
6 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
whole. See §1229(a). Thus, Pereira essentially âwants to
cherry pick from the material covered by the statutory
cross-reference. But if Congress had intended to refer to
the definition in [§1229(a)(1)] alone, it presumably would
have done so.â Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees
Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9).2
D
Statutory history also strongly supports the Govern-
mentâs argument that a notice to appear should trigger the
stop-time rule even if it fails to include the date and time
of the alienâs removal proceeding. When Congress enacted
the stop-time rule, it decreed that the rule should âapply
to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of
the enactment of this Act.â Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §309(c)(5), 110
Stat. 3009â627. This created a problem: Up until that
point, there was no such thing as a ânotice to appear,â so
the reference to ânotices to appear issued before . . . this
Actâ made little sense. When Congress became aware of
the problem, it responded by clarifying that the stop-time
rule should apply not only to notices to appear, but also âto
orders to show cause . . . issued before, on, or after the
dateâ of the clarifying amendmentâs enactment. Nicara-
guan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act,
§203(1), 111 Stat. 2196, as amended 8 U. S. C. §1101 note.
That clarification sheds considerable light on the question
presented here because orders to show cause did not nec-
essarily include the date or location of proceedings (even if
ââââââ
2 According to the Court, âthe broad reference to §1229(a) is of no
consequence, because, as even the Government concedes, only para-
graph (1) bears on the meaning of a ânotice to appear.â â Ante, at 10.
But that is precisely the point: If âonly paragraph (1) bears on the
meaning of a ânotice to appear,â â then Congressâs decision to refer to
§1229(a) more broadly indicates that it meant to do something other
than to pick up the substantive requirements of §1229(a)(1).
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7
ALITO, J., dissenting
they otherwise served a function similar to that now
served by notices to appear). See 8 U. S. C.
§1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed.).
That statutory history supports the Governmentâs inter-
pretation twice over. First, it demonstrates that when it
comes to triggering the stop-time rule, Congress attached
no particular significance to the presence (or absence) of
information about the date and time of a removal proceed-
ing. Congress was more than happy for the stop-time rule
to be activated either by notices to appear or by orders to
show cause, even though the latter often lacked any in-
formation about the date and time of proceedings.
Second, and even more important, the statutory history
also shows that Congress clearly thought of orders to show
cause as the functional equivalent of notices to appear for
purposes of the stop-time rule. After an initially confusing
reference to ânotices to appearâ issued before the creation
of the stop-time rule, Congress clarified that it had meant
to refer to âorders to show cause.â By equating orders to
show cause with notices to appear, Congress indicated
that when the stop-time rule refers to âa notice to appear,â
it is referring to a category of documents that do not nec-
essarily provide the date and time of a future removal
proceeding.3
E
Finally, Pereiraâs contrary interpretation leads to conse-
quences that clash with any conceivable statutory pur-
pose. Pereiraâs interpretation would require the Govern-
ment to include a date and time on every notice to appear
that it issues. But at the moment, the Government lacks
the ability to do that with any degree of accuracy. The
ââââââ
3 Although the Court charges me with âcompar[ing] apples to oranges,â
ante, at 15, n. 9, Congress was the one that equated orders to show
cause and notices to appear for purposes of the stop-time rule. By
ignoring that decision, the Court rewrites the statute to its taste.
8 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
Department of Homeland Security sends out the initial
notice to appear, but the removal proceedings themselves
are scheduled by the Immigration Court, which is part of
the Department of Justice. See 8 CFR §1003.18(a) (2018).
The Department of Homeland Security cannot dictate the
scheduling of a matter on the docket of the Immigration
Court, and at present, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity generally cannot even access the Immigration Courtâs
calendar. In re Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec., at 648; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 52â53. The Department of Homeland Security
may thus be hard pressed to include on initial notices to
appear a hearing date that is anything more than a rough
estimate subject to considerable change. See §1229(a)(2);
see also ante, at 18 (disclaiming any effect on the Govern-
mentâs ability to change initial hearing dates).
Including an estimated and changeable date, however,
may do much more harm than good. See Gonzalez-Garcia
v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434â435 (CA6 2014). It is likely
to mislead many recipients and to prejudice those who
make preparations on the assumption that the initial date
is firm. And it forces the Government to go through the
pointless exercise of first including a date that it knows
may very well be altered and then changing it once the
real date becomes clear. Such a system serves nobodyâs
interests.
Statutory interpretation is meant to be âa holistic en-
deavor,â and sometimes language âthat may seem ambig-
uous in isolationâ becomes clear because âonly one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law.â United Sav. Assn. of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S.
365, 371 (1988). The real-world effects produced by Perei-
raâs interpretationâarbitrary dates and times that are
likely to confuse and confound all who receive themâ
illustrate starkly the merits of the Governmentâs alterna-
tive construction.
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
9
ALITO, J., dissenting
III
Based on the relevant text, context, statutory history,
and statutory purpose, the Government makes a convinc-
ing case that the stop-time rule can be triggered even by a
notice to appear that omits the date and time of a removal
proceeding. But the Court holds instead that in order âto
trigger the stop-time rule, the Government must serve a
notice to appear that, at the very least, âspecif[ies]â the
âtime and placeâ of the removal proceedings.â Ante, at 9.
According to the Court, that conclusion is compelled by the
statutory text, the statutory context, and âcommon sense.â
Ante, at 12. While the Courtâs interpretation may be
reasonable, the Court goes much too far in saying that it is
the only reasonable construction.
A
Start with the text. As noted, the stop-time rule pro-
vides that âany period of . . . continuous physical presence
in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the
alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).â
§1229b(d)(1). The Court does not dispute that it is entirely
consistent with standard English usage to read this
language as the Government and I do. See ante, at 15. It
therefore follows that the stop-time rule itself does not
foreclose the Governmentâs interpretation.
That leaves only §1229(a)(1), which specifies the infor-
mation that a notice to appear must contain. The Courtâs
treatment of this provision contradicts itself. On the one
hand, the Court insists that this provision is âdefinitionalâ
and that it sets out the essential characteristics without
which a notice is not a notice to appear. Ante, at 13. But
on the other hand, the Court states that it âleaves for
another day whether a putative notice to appear that
omits any of the other categories of information enumer-
ated in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule.â Ante, at 8,
n. 5. The Court cannot have it both ways. If §1229(a)(1) is
10 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
definitional and sets out the essential characteristics of a
notice to appear, then the omission of any required item of
information makes a putative notice to appear a nullity.
So if the Court means what it saysâthat its interpretation
of §1229(a)(1)âs language leaves open the consequences of
omitting other categories of informationâthat is tanta-
mount to admitting that §1229(a)(1) itself cannot foreclose
the Governmentâs interpretation.4
In any event, the Governmentâs interpretation can
easily be squared with the text of §1229(a)(1). That provi-
sion states that a âwritten notice (in this section referred to
as a ânotice to appearâ) shall be given in person to the alien
. . . specifyingâ 10 categories of information, including the
âtime and placeâ of the removal proceeding. §1229(a)(1)
(emphasis added). According to Pereira, that language
cinches the case against the Governmentâs interpretation:
By equating a ânotice to appearâ with a âwritten notice . . .
[that] specif[ies]â the relevant categories of information,
§1229(a)(1) establishes that a notice lacking any of those
10 pieces of information cannot qualify as a ânotice to
appearâ and thus cannot trigger the stop-time rule. In
Pereiraâs eyes, §1229(a)(1) defines what a notice to appear
is, and most of the Courtâs opinion is to the same effect.
This may be a plausible interpretation of §1229(a)(1)âs
language, but it is not the only one. It is at least as rea-
sonable to read that language as simply giving a name to
the new type of notice to which that provision refers. Or
to put the point another way, §1229(a)(1)âs language can
be understood to define what makes a notice to appear
complete. See In re Camarillo, supra, at 647. Under that
ââââââ
4 Nor can the Court get away with labeling its self-contradictions as
âjudicial restraint.â Ante, at 8, n. 5. Either §1229(a)(1) sets out the
essential characteristics of a notice to appear or it does not; the Court
cannot stop at a halfway point unsupported by either text or logic while
maintaining that its resting place is âclearâ in light of the statutory
text. Ante, at 9.
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 11
ALITO, J., dissenting
interpretation, a notice that omits some of the information
required by §1229(a)(1) might still be a ânotice to appear.â
We often use language in this way. In everyday life, a
person who sees an old Chevy with three wheels in a
junkyard would still call it a car. Language is often used
the same way in the law. Consider the example of a notice
of appeal. Much like a notice to appear, a notice of appeal
must meet several substantive requirements; all notices of
appeal, for example, âmust be signed.â Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 11(a). So what happens if a notice of appeal is in-
complete in some wayâsay, because it is unsigned but
otherwise impeccable? If a court clerk wanted to point out
the lack of a signature to an attorney, the clerk is far more
likely to say, âthere is a problem with your notice of ap-
peal,â than to say, âthere is a problem with this document
you filed; itâs not signed and therefore I donât know what
to call it, but I canât call it a notice of appeal because it is
unsigned.â
Furthermore, just because a legal document is incom-
plete, it does not necessarily follow that it is without legal
effect. Consider again the notice of appeal. As a general
matter, an appeal âmay be takenâ in a civil case âonly by
filing a notice of appealâ âwithin 30 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.â Fed. Rules App. Proc.
3(a), 4(a)(1)(A). While an unsigned notice of appeal does
not meet the substantive requirements set out in Rule 11,
in Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768 (2001),
this Court unanimously held that a litigant who filed a
timely but unsigned notice of appeal still beat the 30-day
clock for filing appeals. As we explained, âimperfections in
noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment,
to which appellate court.â Id., at 767.
If Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be
read in this way, it is not unreasonable to do the same
with §1229(a)(1). And in trying to distinguish an empty
12 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
signature line on a notice of appeal as a âtrivial, ministe-
rial defect,â ante, at 14, the Court gives the game away by
once again assuming its own conclusion. Whether the
omission of the date and time certain on a notice to appear
is essential for present purposes is the central issue in this
case, and the Court gives no textually based reason to
think that it is. The Government could reasonably con-
clude that a notice to appear that omits the date and time
of a proceeding is still a notice to appear (albeit a defective
one), much in the same way that a complaint without the
e-mail address of the signer is still a complaint (albeit a
defective one, see Rule 11(a)), or a clock missing the num-
ber â8â is still a clock (albeit a defective one).
Pereira and the Court are right that §1229(a)(1) sets out
the substantive requirements for notices to appear, but
that fact alone does not control whether an incomplete
notice to appear triggers the stop-time rule.5
B
With the text of both the stop-time rule and §1229(a)(1)
irreducibly ambiguous, the Court must next look to two
neighboring provisions to support its conclusion that its
interpretation is the only reasonable one. Neither provi-
sion is sufficient.
The Court first observes that the second paragraph of
§1229(a) allows the Government to move or reschedule a
removal proceeding unilaterally and then to inform the
alien of âthe new time or place of the proceedings.â
ââââââ
5 Of course, courts should still demand that the Government justify
why whatever is left off a notice to appear does not deprive it of its
essential character as a ânotice to appear.â As the Government rightly
concedes, for example, a blank sheet of paper would not constitute a
ânotice to appear.â Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; see Brief for Respondent 35â36.
But for all the reasons the Government gives, omission of the date and
time of a future removal proceeding is not, by itself, enough to turn a
notice to appear into something else.
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 13
ALITO, J., dissenting
§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). âBy allowing for a âchange or postpone-
mentâ of the proceedings to a ânew time or place,â â the
Court reasons, âparagraph (2) presumes that the Govern-
ment has already served a ânotice to appear . . .â that speci-
fied a time and place as required.â Ante, at 10.
That is entirely correctâand entirely irrelevant. No one
doubts that §1229(a)(1) requires that a notice to appear
include the âtime and placeâ of the removal proceeding.
See §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Indeed, that is common ground
between the two parties. See Brief for Petitioner 10â11;
Brief for Respondent 3. Paragraph (2) undoubtedly as-
sumes that notices to appear will state the âtime and
placeâ of the removal proceeding as required by
§1229(a)(1), but it has nothing to say about whether the
failure to include that information affects the operation of
the stop-time rule. By suggesting otherwise, the Court is
merely reasoning backwards from its conclusion.
The other provision cited by the Court, §1229(b)(1), is no
more helpful. As the Court explains, §1229(b)(1) generally
precludes the Government from scheduling a hearing date
â âearlier than 10 days after the service of the notice to
appearâ â in order to give the alien â âthe opportunity to
secure counsel.â â Ante, at 11. Unless a notice to appear
includes the time and place of the hearing, the Court frets,
âthe Government could serve a document labeled ânotice to
appearâ without listing the time and location of the hear-
ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-
mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes
available.â Ibid. But that remote and speculative possi-
bility depends entirely on the Immigration Courtâs allow-
ing a removal proceeding to go forward only one day after
an alien (and the Government) receives word of a hearing
date. See 8 CFR §1003.18(a). Even assuming that such
an unlikely event were to come to pass, the courtâs decision
would surely be subject to review on appeal. See generally
8 CFR §1003.1, 8 U. S. C. §1252. Regardless, the Courtâs
14 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
interpretation of the stop-time rule would not prevent a
similar type of problem from arising. When the Govern-
ment sends an initial notice to appear from now on, it may
be forced by the Courtâs interpretation to guess that the
hearing will take place far in the future, only to learn
shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact imminent.
An alien lulled into a false sense of security by that initial
notice to appear will have as little meaningful â âopportun-
ity to secure counselâ â and âtime to prepare adequately,â
ante, at 11, as one who initially received a notice to appear
without any hearing date.
C
Finally, the Court turns to âcommon senseâ to support
its preferred reading of the text. According to the Court, it
should be âobviousâ to anyone that âa notice that does not
specify when and where to appear for a removal proceed-
ing is not a ânotice to appear.â â Ante, at 2, 12. But what
the Court finds so obvious somehow managed to elude
every Court of Appeals to consider the question save one.
See Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083
(CA9 2015); OâGarro v. U. S. Attorney General, 605 Fed.
Appx. 951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui
v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 235, 240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam);
Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434â435 (CA6
2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 675 (CA7
2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014).
That is likely because the Courtâs âcommon senseâ de-
pends on a very specific understanding of the purpose of a
notice to appear. In the Courtâs eyes, notices to appear
serve primarily as a vehicle for communicating to aliens
when and where they should appear for their removal
hearings. That is certainly a reasonable interpretation
with some intuitive force behind it. But that is not the
only possible understanding or even necessarily the best
one. As the Government reasonably explains, a notice to
Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 15
ALITO, J., dissenting
appear can also be understood to serve primarily as a
charging document. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39â45. Indeed,
much of §1229(a)(1) reinforces that view through the
informational requirements it imposes on notices to ap-
pear. See, e.g., §1229(a)(1)(A) (ânature of the proceed-
ingsâ); §1229(a)(1)(B) (âlegal authorityâ for âthe proceed-
ingsâ); §1229(a)(1)(C) (âacts or conduct allegedâ);
§1229(a)(1)(D) (âcharges against the alienâ); ibid. (âstatu-
tory provisions alleged to have been violatedâ). Interpreted
in this way, a notice to appear hardly runs afoul of
âcommon senseâ by simply omitting the date and time of a
future removal proceeding.6
Todayâs decision appears even less commonsensical once
its likely consequences are taken into account. As already
noted, going forward the Government will be forced to
include an arbitrary date and time on every notice to
appear that it issues. See supra, at 7â8. Such a system
will only serve to confuse everyone involved, and the Court
offers no explanation as to why it believes otherwise.
Although the Court expresses surprise at the idea that its
opinion will â âforc[e] the Governmentâ to guess when and
where a hearing will take place,â ante, at 12, n. 6, it is
ââââââ
6 The Court responds to this point in two ways. First, it faults me for
failing to offer a reason ârooted in the statutory tex[t] for treating time-
and-place information as any less crucial than charging information for
purposes of triggering the stop-time rule.â Ante, at 13, n. 7. But
exactly the same criticism can be leveled against the Courtâs own
reading, which noticeably fails to offer any reason ârooted in the statu-
tory textâ why time-and-place information should be treated as any
more crucial than charging information for purposes of triggering the
stop-time rule. Second, the Court also observes misleadingly that
âthere is no reason why a notice to appear should have only one essen-
tial function,â and that a notice to appear might thus serve the dual
purpose of both presenting charges and informing an alien âwhen and
where to appear.â Ibid. Of course it might, but it is also equally
reasonable to interpret a notice to appear as serving only one of those
functions. Under Chevron, it was the Governmentânot this Courtâ
that was supposed to make that interpretive call.
16 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
ALITO, J., dissenting
undisputed that the Government currently lacks the
capability to do anything other than speculate about the
likely date and time of future removal proceedings. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 47â49, 52â53. At most, we can hope that
the Government develops a system in the coming years
that allows it to determine likely dates and times before it
sends out initial notices to appear. But nothing in either
todayâs decision or the statute can guarantee such an
outcome, so the Court is left crossing its fingers and hop-
ing for the best. Ante, at 12, n. 6, 18â19.
* * *
Once the errors and false leads are stripped away, the
most that remains of the Courtâs argument is a textually
permissible interpretation consistent with the Courtâs
view of âcommon sense.â That is not enough to show that
the Governmentâs contrary interpretation is unreasonable.
Choosing between these competing interpretations might
have been difficult in the first instance. But under Chev-
ron, that choice was not ours to make. Under Chevron,
this Court was obliged to defer to the Governmentâs
interpretation.
In recent years, several Members of this Court have
questioned Chevronâs foundations. See, e.g., ante, at 2â3
(KENNEDY, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S.
___, ___â___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at
1â5); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3d 1142, 1149
(CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But unless the
Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has
somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law.
I respectfully dissent.