Flaum, Circuit Judge.
Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his felony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm under both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is whether the felon dispossession statutes- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) -violate the Second Amendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring an *439as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are substantially related to an important government interest. We therefore affirm the district court.
I. Background
A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes
Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemeanors are included under the statute if they are punishable by more than two years in prison.1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However, the statute excludes anyone convicted of "any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices." Id. § 921(a)(20)(A). Moreover, "[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored" is not a conviction for purposes of the statute. Id. § 921(a)(20).
Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for life, the statute includes a "safety valve" that permits individuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their firearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1, 128 S.Ct. 475, 169 L.Ed.2d 432 (2007). Specifically, the Attorney General2 may remove the prohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently establishes "that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest." 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
Since 1992, however, "Congress has repeatedly barred the Attorney General from using appropriated funds 'to investigate or act upon [relief] applications,' " rendering the provision "inoperative." Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1, 128 S.Ct. 475 (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74-75, 123 S.Ct. 584, 154 L.Ed.2d 483 (2002) ). The Committee on Appropriations eliminated funding because the restoration procedure under § 925(c) was "a very difficult task" that required ATF officials to "spend many hours investigating a particular applicant for relief." H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992). Even then, there was "no way to know with any certainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public safety." Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively "required to guess whether a convicted felon ... [could] be entrusted with a firearm." Id. Moreover, they were "forced to make these decisions knowing that a mistake could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens." Id. Ultimately, the Committee determined that "the $3.75 million and the 40 man-years annually spent investigating and acting upon these applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF in fighting violent crime." Id. The Committee addressed the funding issue again in 1995, adding that "too many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms." H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995).
*440In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession law. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm if he has "been convicted of a felony in" Wisconsin or "a crime elsewhere that would be a felony" in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)-(b).
B. Factual Background
Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the owner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco International, which did business as "Dr. Comfort," manufactured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with diabetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the shoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to individual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed to, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts that met certain thickness and hardness standards.
In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to determine whether they met those requirements. Medicare rejected Kanter's inserts because they were too thin. Kanter then submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved. However, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts while representing that they were Medicare-approved. All told, Medicare paid Kanter's company $375,000 for the noncompliant inserts.
On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the noncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341 carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day in prison and two years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reimbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.
Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal penalty, and he has not been charged with any additional criminal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is permanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal and Wisconsin law.
C. Procedural Background
Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for summary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent offender with no other criminal record meant that both statutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.
The district court granted defendants' motions and denied Kanter's motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even assuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protection, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dispossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the government's important interest in preventing gun violence. The court reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature are entitled to categorically disqualify all felons-even nonviolent felons like Kanter-because both have found that such individuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also noted that this "bright line categorical approach ... allows for uniform application and ease of administration." The district court entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for *441failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger , 838 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, "we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor." Roberts v. City of Chicago , 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). To avoid dismissal, "the complaint must 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
A. Legal Standard3
The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller , the Supreme Court identified the "core" of the Second Amendment as "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." 554 U.S. 570, 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). Accordingly, the Court concluded that Washington D.C.'s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783.
However, the Court also made clear that "the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited." Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Although the Court did not "undertake an exhaustive historical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment," it said that "nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill." Id. It described such prohibitions as "presumptively lawful regulatory measures." Id. at 627 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago , the Court "repeat[ed] [its] assurances" that felon dispossession laws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (plurality opinion).
After Heller , we developed a two-step test for Second Amendment challenges. "The threshold question is whether the regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second Amendment." Ezell v. City of Chicago , 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (" Ezell II "). "This is a textual and historical inquiry; if the government can establish that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood, then 'the regulated activity is categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.' " Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago , 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (" Ezell I ")).
However, "if the historical evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government's justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights." Id. (quoting Ezell I , 651 F.3d at 703 ). At step two, we evaluate "the regulatory means the government has chosen and the public-benefits end it seeks to achieve." Id. (quoting Ezell I , 651 F.3d at 703 ). The rigor of the review is dependent on "how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on the right." Id. (quoting Ezell I , 651 F.3d at 703 ). "Severe burdens" on this core right "require a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-end fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to the *442margins of the right, are more easily justified." Id. The government has the burden "of justifying its law under a heightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does not apply." Id. We have consistently described step two as "akin to intermediate scrutiny" and have required the government to show that the challenged statute is substantially related to an important governmental objective. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez , 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing cases).
B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges
Relying on the "presumptively lawful" language in Heller and McDonald , every federal court of appeals to address the issue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on its face. See, e.g. , United States v. Davis , 406 F. App'x 52, 53-54 (7th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Bogle , 717 F.3d 281, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore , 666 F.3d 313, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Barton , 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Binderup v. Att'y Gen. , 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); Schrader v. Holder , 704 F.3d 980, 989-91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied , 571 U.S. 989, 134 S.Ct. 512, 187 L.Ed.2d 365 (2013) ; United States v. Joos , 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Khami , 362 F. App'x 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 560 U.S. 934, 130 S.Ct. 3345, 176 L.Ed.2d 1238 (2010) ; United States v. Battle , 347 F. App'x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. McCane , 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied , 559 U.S. 970, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 179 (2010) ; United States v. Smith , 329 F. App'x 109, 110-11 (9th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Anderson , 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).
However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable. On the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitutional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their individual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stimmel v. Sessions , 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[W]e have upheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons." (citing United States v. Carey , 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 895, 131 S.Ct. 322, 178 L.Ed.2d 145 (2010) )); United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 867, 131 S.Ct. 158, 178 L.Ed.2d 95 (2010) (rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and holding that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the offense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier , 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 560 U.S. 958, 130 S.Ct. 3399, 177 L.Ed.2d 313 (2010) (concluding that "statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-fend the Second Amendment," and holding that § 922(g)(1) is "a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people," including convicted felons); United States v. Vongxay , 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 921, 131 S.Ct. 294, 178 L.Ed.2d 193 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon's as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because "felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms"); In re U.S. , 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) ("We have already rejected the notion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1)." (citing McCane , 573 F.3d at 1047 )).
*443The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges, but it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United States v. Torres-Rosario , the court rejected the defendant's as-applied challenge because he had two prior convictions for "serious drug offenses." 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied , 565 U.S. 1271, 132 S.Ct. 1766, 182 L.Ed.2d 549 (2012). However, the court noted that the Supreme Court "may be open to claims that some felonies do not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for applying a categorical ban," and "might even be open to highly fact-specific objections." Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that "such an approach, applied to countless variations in individual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems of administration, consistency and fair warning." Id.
On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the statute. See United States v. Williams , 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1092, 131 S.Ct. 805, 178 L.Ed.2d 532 (2010) ("[W]e recognize that § 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent."); Medina v. Whitaker , 913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ("We need not decide today if it is ever possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still count as a 'law-abiding, responsible citizen' " entitled to Second Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey , 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Eighth Circuit has left open the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1)" but rejected defendant's as-applied challenge because he had multiple violent felony convictions.); United States v. Pruess , 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be applied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that "there in theory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, however, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice. In fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch , 636 F. App'x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony robbery); United States v. Shields , 789 F.3d 733, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to individual who had been convicted of three violent felonies); Williams , 616 F.3d at 693-94 (holding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to individual convicted of felony robbery who "beat[ ] the victim so badly that the victim required sixty-five stitches"); United States v. Skoien , 614 F.3d 638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domestic violence misdemeanant because violence was "an element of the offense" and data suggested high rates of recidivism).
Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a fractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Circuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a misdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respectively. Binderup , 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only successful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of appeals to date-and because Kanter relies heavily *444upon it-it is worth examining the case at some length.
Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the historical justification for disarming felons was "tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry," and that "persons who have committed serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms much the way they forfeit other civil liberties." Id.