C.D. by and Through M.D. v. Natick Public School District
U.S. Court of Appeals5/22/2019
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1794
C.D., by and through her Parents and Next Friends, M.D. and
P.D.; M.D.; P.D.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
NATICK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
APPEALS,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Benjamin J. Wish, with whom Todd & Weld, LLP, Laurie R.
Martucci, and Martucci Law Associates were on brief, for
appellants.
Selene Almazan-Altobelli and Ellen Saideman on brief for
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc., amicus curiae.
Ira A. Burnim, Lewis Bossing, Elizabeth B. McCallum, Paul E.
Poirot, William T. DeVinney, and Baker Hostetler, LLP on brief for
the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
Association of University Centers on Disabilities, Disability Law
Center, National Center for Learning Disabilities, National Center
for Youth Law, National Disability Rights Network, and National
Down Syndrome Congress, amici curiae.
Felicia S. Vasudevan, with whom Murphy, Hesse, Toomey &
Lehane, LLP was on brief, for Natick Public School District.
Anna Rachel Dray-Siegel, Assistant Attorney General, with
whom Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief,
for Bureau of Special Education Appeals.
Michael J. Long and Long & DiPietro, LLP on brief for the
Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents, amicus
curiae.
Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Cristine M.D. Goldman, Colleen
Shea, Colby Brunt, and Stoneman, Chandler & Miller, LLP on brief
for National School Boards Association and Massachusetts
Association of School Committees, amici curiae.
May 22, 2019
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) requires that students with certain
disabilities be provided a "[f]ree appropriate public education"
(FAPE) in the "[l]east restrictive environment" (LRE) appropriate
for each student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (5). Under the IDEA
and Massachusetts law, the individualized education programs
(IEPs) of certain disabled students must also contain
postsecondary transition goals and services based on age-
appropriate assessments. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2.
Appellants are C.D., a resident of Natick,
Massachusetts, who qualified as a child with a disability under
the IDEA, and her parents. They challenge this circuit's prior
interpretations of these IDEA requirements as incomplete or as
inconsistent with the IDEA and current Supreme Court case law.
The parents seek reimbursement for at least three years of C.D.'s
education in a specialized private school. Rejecting these
challenges, we affirm the district court, which upheld a decision
of the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA)
ruling that the Natick Public School District (Natick) had complied
with the FAPE, LRE, and transition requirements in proposed IEPs
for C.D. See C.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.D. II), No. 15-
13617-FDS, 2018 WL 3510291, at *1 (D. Mass. July 20, 2018); C.D.
- 3 -
v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.D. I), No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL
3122654, at *1 (D. Mass. July 21, 2017).
I.
The IDEA offers states federal funds for the education
of children with disabilities in exchange for the states'
commitments to comply with the IDEA's directives, including its
FAPE and LRE requirements. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006).
A FAPE "comprises 'special education and related
services' -- both 'instruction' tailored to meet a child's 'unique
needs' and sufficient 'supportive services' to permit the child to
benefit from that instruction." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137
S. Ct. 743, 748–49 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26),
(29)). "The primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE is an IEP."
D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). IEPs are "comprehensive
plan[s]" that are developed by the child's "IEP Team (which
includes teachers, school officials, and the child's parents)" and
that "must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of
procedures." Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.
Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017), the services offered
in an IEP amount to a FAPE if they are "reasonably calculated to
- 4 -
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's
circumstances." Id. at 1001.
The IDEA also requires states receiving federal funds to
educate disabled children in the "[l]east restrictive environment"
appropriate for each child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). The statute
mandates at § 1412(a)(5)(A):
To the maximum extent appropriate, children
with disabilities . . . are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id. The Supreme Court has characterized this LRE mandate as
embodying a "preference" for "mainstreaming" students with
disabilities in "the regular classrooms of a public school system."
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03 (1982); see also
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 ("[T]he IDEA requires that children
with disabilities receive education in the regular classroom
'whenever possible'" (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202)). But the
IDEA's preference for mainstreaming "is not absolute." T.M. ex
rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 162 (2d Cir.
2014); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21 ("The Act's use of
the word 'appropriate' . . . reflect[s] Congress' recognition that
some settings simply are not suitable environments for . . . some
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handicapped children."). Instead, as we explained in Roland M.
v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990), "the
desirability of mainstreaming must be weighed in concert with the
Act's mandate for educational improvement."1 Id. at 993.
The final IDEA requirement at issue here is the
instruction at § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) that certain students'
IEPs "include[] . . . appropriate measurable postsecondary goals
based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to
training, education, employment, and . . . independent living
skills" along with "the transition services (including courses of
study) needed to assist the child in reaching those goals." 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)-(bb). Massachusetts has made
these transition requirements applicable starting at age fourteen.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2; see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (making this requirement applicable
"beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the
child is 16"). Because C.D. was fourteen or older when the IEPs
at issue were proposed, these requirements applied.
1 Roland M. interpreted the IDEA's predecessor statute,
see 910 F.2d at 987, but the text of the provision at issue has
not changed, compare Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 612(5), 89 Stat. 733, 781 (1975), with
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
- 6 -
II.
C.D. has borderline intellectual functioning and
significant deficits in language ability. She attended public
school in Natick through fifth grade. For middle school, she
attended McAuliffe Regional Charter Public School in Framingham,
Massachusetts, where she took all of her classes except math in a
regular classroom setting. To assist C.D., two private tutors
hired by C.D.'s parents attended C.D.'s middle school classes with
her.
The summer before C.D. entered high school, her parents
worked with Natick to develop an IEP for C.D.'s ninth grade year
at Natick High School. C.D.'s parents wanted C.D. to continue her
education in a regular classroom setting, with the help of the
same private tutors. School officials explained that only Natick
employees were allowed to teach or tutor students in Natick's
classrooms.
Natick was concerned that larger class sizes and more
advanced content in high school would make it difficult for C.D.
to access the general education curriculum. It considered placing
C.D. in replacement classes in which a modified general education
curriculum is taught by a special education teacher. Ultimately,
Natick, in its proposed IEP, chose a third option.
The school presented C.D.'s parents with a proposed
ninth grade IEP, for the 2012-2013 school year, that placed C.D.
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in regular classrooms for her elective courses but in a setting
called the ACCESS Program for her academic courses. The ACCESS
Program is a self-contained special education program located at
Natick High School and designed for students who, like C.D., have
cognitive and communication deficits. ACCESS offers a
significantly modified curriculum, and its students typically earn
certificates rather than high school diplomas.
C.D.'s parents rejected the IEP, saying that the ACCESS
Program was an overly "restricted environment" and that C.D.'s
placement there would "hinder" her academic and social growth.
They enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep School, a private school that
specializes in educating students with disabilities.
The summer before C.D. was to enter tenth grade, Natick
presented to C.D.'s parents an IEP for the 2013-2014 school year
that again placed C.D. in the ACCESS Program for her academic
classes. C.D.'s parents again rejected the IEP, giving the same
reasons, and enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep.
Before the next school year, the IEP Team reconvened,
this time with the benefit of a fresh set of assessments of C.D.
Based on these assessments and on reports of C.D.'s progress at
Learning Prep, Natick proposed a new IEP for the 2014-2015 school
year that placed C.D. in a mix of ACCESS classes, replacement
classes, and general education classes. C.D.'s parents rejected
this IEP for two reasons. As they saw it, the proposed schedule
- 8 -
left inadequate time for speech and language services. In
addition, Natick had not yet conducted a formal postsecondary
transition assessment. As to C.D.'s postsecondary transition, the
2012-2013, 2013-2014, and initial 2014-2015 IEPs had stated the
parents' goal that C.D. graduate from high school and had provided
transition and vocational services from the school's learning
center.
Natick then performed a formal transition assessment and
presented a revised 2014-2015 IEP. This final IEP proposed the
same mix of classes, but extended C.D.'s school day to allow for
speech and language therapy as well as career preparation services.
C.D.'s parents rejected this IEP, and C.D. attended Learning Prep
for the 2014-2015 school year.
In 2014, C.D.'s parents filed a complaint with the BSEA
seeking reimbursement for C.D.'s tuition at Learning Prep. To
qualify for reimbursement, the parents had to show that Natick's
IEPs for 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 "had not made a free
appropriate public education available." 2 See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). After a hearing in May 2015, a BSEA Hearing
2 The transition planning and transition assessment
requirements are procedural. Only certain procedural flaws, such
as those that result in the denial of a FAPE or "a deprivation of
educational benefits," are actionable under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,
694 F.3d 167, 195 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying this harmless error
principle to a claimed violation of the transition requirements).
- 9 -
Officer denied the parents' request for reimbursement. The
Hearing Officer concluded that the IEPs were "reasonably
calculated to provide [C.D.] with a free appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment." And the Hearing
Officer found that the facts and testimony presented did not
support the parents' arguments that the transition assessments and
plans were inadequate.3
C.D.'s parents sought review of the BSEA's decision in
federal district court. The district court denied the parents'
motion for summary judgment and their supplemental motion for
summary judgment. See C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *26; C.D. II,
2018 WL 3510291, at *4. Giving "due weight" to the decision of
the BSEA, C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *15, the district court made
three relevant rulings. First, because Endrew F. had been decided
while the parents' motion for summary judgment was pending, the
district court verified that the Hearing Officer had applied a
FAPE standard consistent with Endrew F. 4 Id. at *16 ("[T]he
standard articulated in Endrew F. is not materially different from
the standard set forth in" the First Circuit's prior cases and
"applied by the hearing officer."). Second, the district court
3 The Hearing Officer also rejected other arguments not
presented on appeal.
4 The district court first remanded in part to the BSEA
for the Hearing Officer to confirm that she had applied a standard
consistent with Endrew F.
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found it "unclear" whether the BSEA's decision had followed the
First Circuit's prior cases on the LRE mandate. Id. at *19. And
so the district court remanded to the BSEA to determine whether
the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 IEPs, which proposed to place C.D. in
the ACCESS Program for her academic courses, had provided a FAPE
in the LRE. After the BSEA responded with a clarification order,
the district court concluded that "based on the preponderance of
the evidence, the BSEA hearing officer appropriately found that
the district balanced the benefits of mainstreaming against the
restrictions associated with the [ACCESS] classes, and that
the . . . IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE in the
least restrictive environment possible." C.D. II, 2018 WL
3510291, at *4. Third, the district court agreed with the BSEA
that the 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and the final 2014-2015 5 IEPs
complied with the IDEA's transition planning and assessment
requirements. C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *19, *21.
III.
C.D.'s parents now argue that the district court applied
the wrong legal standards. They say first that Endrew F. defined
"progress appropriate" as "appropriately ambitious" and
"challenging" so that the district court was required to ask, in
5 The district court held that any challenges to the
initial 2014-2015 IEP were mooted by that IEP's replacement with
the final 2014-2015 IEP. C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *21.
- 11 -
evaluating whether a FAPE was offered, whether the IEPs contained
sufficiently "challenging objectives." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at
1000. Next, the parents urge us to adopt, and contend that the
district court should have applied, a multi-part test from Daniel
R.R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989),
to evaluate whether the IEPs placed C.D. in an overly restrictive
environment. Finally, C.D.'s parents argue that the district
court ignored the plain language of the IDEA's transition planning
and assessment requirements.
Our review of the district court on these legal issues
is de novo. See Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182, 191 (1st
Cir. 2018). We hold that the district court properly applied this
circuit's standards and that those standards are consistent with
Endrew F. and with the IDEA. The parents also raise alternative
arguments that the district court erred in applying law to fact,
and we review these fact-dominated rulings deferentially. Id.
(quoting Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 69, 76 (1st
Cir. 2016)). Finding no errors, we affirm.
A.
Until Endrew F., the Supreme Court had
"declined . . . to endorse any one standard for determining"
whether the services offered in a student's IEP amounted to a FAPE.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993. This circuit, along with several
others, said that to offer a FAPE, an IEP must be "individually
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designed" and "reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful
educational benefit." D.B., 675 F.3d at 34-35 (citing D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2010), then citing
D.F. ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595, 598
(2d Cir. 2005), and then citing Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004)). After Endrew F., this court
confirmed, in Johnson v. Boston Public Schools, 906 F.3d 182 (1st
Cir. 2018), that this "meaningful educational benefit" standard
for evaluating whether an IEP offers a FAPE "comports" with the
standard "dictated by Endrew F."6 Id. at 194-95.
C.D.'s parents say that our Johnson decision restricted
its view to Endrew F.'s language about "progress appropriate in
light of the child's circumstances," Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001,
and that we have yet to examine language in Endrew F. about
"ambitious" and "challenging" goals, id. at 1000. On the parents'
reading, after Endrew F., courts must ask not only whether an IEP
offers meaningful educational progress, but also, separately,
whether the IEP's objectives are ambitious and challenging.
6 Other circuits that use a "meaningful benefit" standard
have held the same. See L.H. v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ., 900
F.3d 779, 792 n.5 (6th Cir. 2018); Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of
Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mr. P.
v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018); K.D. ex rel.
Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir.
2018).
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The parents misread Endrew F., which did not construe
the FAPE standard as two independent tests. That decision's core
holding was that the "merely more than de minimis" educational
benefit standard that had been used by the appellate court to
evaluate Endrew's IEPs was insufficiently "demanding." Id. at
1000-01; see also id. at 997 (quoting Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F.
v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir.
2015)). Endrew F. defined a FAPE -- "an educational program
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child's circumstances," id. at
1001 -- in contrast to this rejected, "de minimis" standard. It
was in this context that the Supreme Court employed the terms
"ambitious" and "challenging." The Court explained that, for many
children with disabilities integrated into "the regular
classroom," an "appropriately ambitious" goal is "advancement from
grade to grade." Id. at 1000. And the Court stated that, for
those "not fully integrated in the regular classroom," the
particular "goals may differ, but every child should have the
chance to meet challenging objectives." Id. In short, Endrew F.
used terms like "demanding," "challenging," and "ambitious" to
define "progress appropriate in light of the child's
circumstances," not to announce a separate dimension of the FAPE
requirement. Id. at 1000-01; cf. R.F. v. Cecil Cty. Pub. Sch.,
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919 F.3d 237, 252 (4th Cir. 2019) (defining adequate progress and
"challenging objectives" under Endrew F.).
Under both Endrew F. and our precedent, a court
evaluating whether an IEP offers a FAPE must determine whether the
IEP was reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational
benefit in light of the child's circumstances. See Johnson, 906
F.3d at 195; cf. K.D. ex rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist.,
904 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2018) (equating meaningful progress and
challenging objectives). Depending on context, determining
whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to offer meaningful
progress may or may not require a sub-inquiry into how challenging
the plan is. Here, the district court did just what Endrew F. and
Johnson require in affirming the BSEA's conclusion that the 2012-
2013 and 2013-2014 IEPs offered a FAPE.7 See C.D. I, 2017 WL
3122654, at *16 (describing the standard applied by the BSEA);
C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *4 (affirming the BSEA's FAPE
conclusion).
The district court also did not err in applying that
standard to the facts in the record. The parents maintain that
C.D. would not have made appropriate progress in the ACCESS
Program, but the district court reasonably concluded that the
7 C.D.'s parents argue that, in evaluating the 2012-2013
and 2013-2014 IEPs, the BSEA misapplied the First Circuit's FAPE
standard by omitting the word "meaningful" from its analysis. But
the BSEA did not overlook that operative word.
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record supported the BSEA's finding that C.D., given her diagnosed
intellectual disability and serious language deficits, could be
expected to make meaningful progress in the ACCESS program and
general education electives. See C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3-
4.
B.
C.D.'s parents argue next that the 2012-2013 and 2013-
2014 IEPs violated the LRE mandate by proposing to place C.D. in
the ACCESS Program, which the parents view as overly restrictive.
They urge us to adopt, and argue that the district court should
have applied, the multi-step test from the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Daniel R.R. to evaluate this claim.8 See 874 F.2d at 1048-50.
We reject both arguments. Instead, we affirm the district court,
which properly relied on our decision in Roland M. in ruling that
the IEPs did not violate the LRE mandate.
Courts that use the Daniel R.R. methodology evaluate
compliance with the LRE mandate in two steps, asking first "whether
education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary
8 Natick and the BSEA argue that C.D.'s parents waived
their argument based on Daniel R.R. by neglecting to "set forth
[its] multifactor test" before the district court. But we deem
sufficient the parents' reliance on Daniel R.R. in the district
court; the parents' motions cited to and the district court quoted
from Daniel R.R. See C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3; see also
Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988)
(finding no waiver where " the district court was not left . . . to
ferret out an evanescent needle from an outsized paper haystack").
- 16 -
aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily," and, if the
child cannot be educated in the regular classroom, asking second
"whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum
extent appropriate." Id. at 1048. In answering the first
question, Daniel R.R. instructs courts to consider whether the
district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in
a regular classroom; the benefits, both academic and non-academic,
available to the child in a regular class compared to the benefits,
both academic and non-academic, available in a more restricted
class; and the effects of inclusion on other children in the
regular classroom. Id. at 1048-49; see also Oberti by Oberti v.
Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1993).
The parents frame their claim as presenting the
following question, which they say is one of first impression in
this circuit: When does a school's decision to educate a child
with disabilities in a setting other than the regular classroom
violate the IDEA's LRE mandate? Several other circuits, the
parents observe, have used the Daniel R.R. test to evaluate
parents' claims that their children should be mainstreamed.9 See
9 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the Sixth
Circuit's test from Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983), which asks "whether the services which make . . . [an
alternative] placement superior could be feasibly provided in a
non-segregated setting." Id. at 1063; see also DeVries v. Fairfax
Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Nw.
R–1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
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Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17; T.M., 752 F.3d at 161-62; L.B. ex
rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976-77 (10th Cir.
2004); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel.
Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1994). The parents'
premise is incorrect. There is no ground for distinguishing our
prior cases, like Roland M., involving parents who sought a more
restrictive placement than the one proposed in the IEP.10 Those
cases and this one in fact present the same question: Did the
IEP's proposed placement violate the IDEA's LRE mandate?
The text of § 1412(a)(5)(A) and prior precedent provide
the guidance we need to evaluate whether Natick complied with the
LRE mandate here. In eschewing the Daniel R.R. test because "[t]he
Act itself provides enough of a framework," we join the Seventh
Circuit. See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir.
2002) (declining to adopt the Daniel R.R. test).
C.D.'s parents argue that the Daniel R.R. test adds
needed "complexity" to the statute's terms. But determining an
appropriate placement for a disabled child is already a complex
task. It is one that "involves choices among educational policies
and theories -- choices which courts, relatively speaking, are
10 See, e.g., C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 287 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the district
court "supportably concluded" that public school day placement
rather than residential placement requested by parents was least
restrictive environment appropriate); Roland M., 910 F.2d at 993;
Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1983).
- 18 -
poorly equipped to make." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992; see also
C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 289
(1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging "the truism that courts should
recognize the expertise of educators with respect to the efficacy
of educational programs"). That is why the IDEA "vests" state and
school "officials with responsibility for" choosing a child's
placement. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. And it is why courts
owe respect and deference to the expert decisions of school
officials and state administrative boards. See Lessard v. Wilton-
Lyndenborough Coop. Sch. Dist. (Lessard II), 592 F.3d 267, 270
(1st Cir. 2010) ("The standard of review is thus deferential to
the educational authorities, who have 'primary responsibility for
formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and
for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's
needs.'" (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207)). There is no need to
add complexity to the LRE mandate in the form of Daniel R.R.'s
judicial gloss, and every reason not to do so.
We proceed to review the district court's decision under
§ 1412(a)(5)(A) and our cases interpreting it. Again, the IDEA
mandates, at § 1412(a)(5)(A):
To the maximum extent appropriate, children
with disabilities . . . are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the disability of a
- 19 -
child is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Our cases have "weighed" this
preference for mainstreaming "in concert with the" FAPE mandate.
Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992-93. The two requirements "operate in
tandem to create a continuum" of possible educational
environments, each offering a different mix of benefits (and costs)
for a student's academic, as well as social and emotional,
progress.11 Id. For schools, complying with the two mandates
means evaluating potential placements' "marginal benefits" and
costs and choosing a placement that strikes an appropriate balance
between the restrictiveness of the placement and educational
progress. Id.; see also Amann v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644,
650 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (phrasing the question as whether
the "IEP 'reasonably calculated' the balance between academic
progress and" restrictiveness).
The district court correctly identified this legal
framework. Quoting Roland M., the district court explained that
"'[m]ainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill substantive
educational criteria.' Rather, the benefits to be gained from
11 We have recognized that educating students with
disabilities with their nondisabled peers can have benefits for
disabled students' social and communication skills. See Lenn v.
Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1090 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1993)
(citing Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17).
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mainstreaming must be weighed against the educational improvements
that could be attained in a more restrictive (that is, non-
mainstream) environment." 12 C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Roland M., 910 F.2d at 993)).
The parents argue, again relying on applications of
Daniel R.R., that the district court erred in failing to ask
whether C.D. could have been educated in the regular classroom
considering "the whole range of supplemental aids and services."
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216. The record belies this contention. The
district court here verified that Natick and the BSEA had
considered "the nature and severity" of C.D.'s disability as well
as the impact of "supplementary aids and services." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5)(A). It noted that the BSEA and Natick had both
examined three potential placements: the regular classroom,
replacement classes, and the ACCESS Program. C.D. II, 2018 WL
3510291, at *3. Then the district court found that evidence
supported the BSEA's and Natick's conclusion that the ACCESS
Program was appropriate because of C.D.'s particular
disability -- an "intellectual disability in conjunction with
12 The parents argue that the district court "erred where
it did not even articulate the need to balance non-academic
benefits against the putative academic advantages of a
substantially separate classroom." But the district court
properly understood the balancing inquiry outlined in Roland M.
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weaknesses in receptive and expressive language."13 Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We see no error in the district court's appropriately
deferential analysis. As we have emphasized, the IDEA vests state
and local educational officials, not federal courts, with the
primary responsibility to make placement decisions consistent with
§ 1412(a)(5)(A).
C.
C.D.'s parents next argue that the district court
ignored the plain language of the IDEA in affirming the BSEA's
ruling that the IEPs complied with the statute's transition
provision. Not so.
We have previously held that the IDEA "does not require
a stand-alone transition plan." Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough
Coop. Sch. Dist. (Lessard I), 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008).
Nor does the statute require that the underlying transition
assessments take a particular form. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). Indeed, there is no restriction on the
means of gathering information about a student's interests or
abilities that may be relevant to the development of postsecondary
transition goals. See, e.g., Mass. Dep't of Elementary &
13 C.D.'s parents' dispute of a related factual finding
made by the BSEA in its initial ruling on the LRE issue is
misplaced. The district court ultimately reviewed the facts as
clarified by the BSEA.
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Secondary Educ., Transitional Assessment in the Secondary
Transition Planning Process, Technical Advisory SPED 2014-4, at 1-
3 (Apr. 9, 2014) (declining to adopt 'a restrictive approach which
might seem to imply the required use of highly specialized formal
assessments for each student").
The district court did not err in articulating or
applying these transition requirements. It discussed the
statute's assessment and planning dimensions, it cited repeatedly
to Massachusetts' guidance implementing the federal provision, and
it relied on case law correctly applying the transition
requirement. See C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *19, *21 (citing
Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg'l Sch. Dist., 774 F. Supp. 2d 393,
407 (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2012)).
The district court then reasonably applied those rules
in affirming the BSEA's ruling. The IEPs stated grade-appropriate
goals and services designed to prepare C.D. for the post-secondary
transition.14 See Lessard I, 518 F.3d at 25; see also, e.g.,
14 Specifically, C.D.'s 2012-2013 IEP stated that C.D.'s
parents hoped she would receive a high school diploma and
vocational training. The IEP outlined educational goals and
services that would have helped C.D. make progress toward that
diploma, and it also provided for vocational services from the
school's learning center. The 2013-2014 IEP was similar, and it
added opportunities to meet with the school's guidance counselor
and career specialist to discuss post-secondary plans. The final
2014-2015 IEP further proposed educational and vocational services
and set out specific goals related to job readiness, job coaching,
and independent living.
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Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Bd. of Educ., 458 F. App'x 124, 128 (3d Cir.
2011) (finding adequate an IEP that listed a transition goal and
noted available services). And the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 plans
reflected and were developed based on a transition-specific
discussion at the 2012-2013 IEP meeting and on extensive
educational and psychological evaluations done of C.D. and
provided to Natick as part of the IEP development process. The
final 2014-2015 IEP reflected and was based on assessments like
these as well as a formal transition assessment. All three IEPs
contained "appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon
age appropriate assessments." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa).
IV.
Affirmed.
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