Spruance v. Commissioner

U.S. Tax Court4/30/1973
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Preston Lea Spruance, Trustee of Trust Created by Separation Agreement Between Preston Lea and Margaret Halsey Spruance, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent; Preston Lea Spruance, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
Spruance v. Commissioner
Docket Nos. 2501-69, 4013-70
United States Tax Court
April 30, 1973, Filed
*134

Decisions will be entered under Rule 50.

Under the terms of a 1955 separation agreement between petitioner and his wife, petitioner was to transfer appreciated stock in trust; the trust was to be irrevocable; income from the stock was to go in part to the wife for her support and in part to the children while minors, the remainder to the children after the death of the surviving former spouse. The subsequent decree of divorce approved, incorporated, and directed compliance with and performance of the agreement. The agreement itself survived and was carried out. At the time of the transfer, one child was an adult. Petitioner did not report any gain in connection with the transfer; nor did he file a Federal gift tax return. The statute of limitations has run on any income tax due. Several years later, a Delaware court held that a trust had been created. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. During the taxable years 1962, 1964, and 1965, petitioner, as trustee of the trust, received distributions of General Motors divestiture stock from duPont and Christiana Securities. In reporting the income under sec. 1111, I.R.C. 1954, he used a 100-percent *135 stepped-up basis for the transferred stock. Held, petitioner is liable for the gift tax to the extent determined. Held, further, on the facts, petitioner is not liable for the addition to tax under sec. 6651(a), I.R.C. 1954. Held, further, petitioner, as trustee, is not estopped from claiming the step-up in basis. Acts done in an individual capacity cannot be used to estop one in a representative capacity. This being the case, and because respondent makes a concession on brief that is consistent with an existing revenue ruling, the basis of the stock in the hands of the trust is increased, and consequently no gain is realized under sec. 1111, I.R.C. 1954. Held, further, as a result of the above, there was no substantial omission of income in taxable year 1962, and the assessment of a deficiency for that year is barred by the statute of limitations.

David C. Moore, for the petitioner.
Alan E. Cobb, for the respondent.
Dawson, Judge.

DAWSON

*141 These two cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and opinion. In docket No. 2501-69 the respondent determined deficiencies in the trust's Federal income taxes as follows:

Taxable yearDeficiency
1962$ 2,918.54
196436,133.75
196549,223.50

*142 *136 In docket No. 4013-70 respondent determined a deficiency in Federal gift tax against petitioner Preston Lea Spruance and an addition to tax as follows:

Addition to tax
Taxable yearDeficiency1 sec. 6651(a)
1955$ 93,348.21$ 23,337.05

We must decide four issues, namely:

(1) Whether Preston Lea Spruance, petitioner in docket No. 4013-70, made a taxable gift when he transferred various stocks in trust for the benefit of his wife and children.

(2) Whether Preston Lea Spruance, petitioner in docket No. 4013-70, is liable for the addition to tax under section 6651(a) for failure to file a Federal gift tax return covering the alleged gift to his children in 1955.

(3) Whether Preston Lea Spruance, as the trustee-petitioner in docket No. 2501-69, recognized long-term capital gain in the taxable years 1962, 1964, and 1965 under section 1111 on the receipt of General Motors Corp. divestiture stock. In connection with this issue, an equitable estoppel issue was raised by the respondent in an amendment to his answer.

(4) Whether the statute of limitations bars assessment and collection of any deficiency *137 in income tax due from Preston Lea Spruance, as the trustee-petitioner in docket No. 2501-69, for the taxable year 1962.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Many of the facts have been stipulated by the parties. The stipulation and supplemental stipulation, together with the exhibits attached thereto, are incorporated herein by this reference.

Preston Lea Spruance (herein called petitioner or Lea) was a legal resident of Wilmington, Del., at the time the petitions were filed in these cases. Also the trust of which he was trustee was situated in Wilmington. As trustee he filed U.S. Fiduciary Income Tax Returns for taxable years 1962, 1964, and 1965 with the district director of internal revenue at Wilmington. He did not file a U.S. Gift Tax Return in 1955 on his own behalf.

Petitioner married Margaret Halsey Spruance (herein called Margaret) on June 25, 1932. They lived in Wilmington and acquired property as tenants by the entirety. Four children were born of their marriage. Preston Lea Spruance, Jr., was born on July 14, 1933. Margaret Grandy Spruance was born on September 20, 1935. William Halsey Spruance was born on August 20, 1938. And Alice Lea Spruance was born on June 3, 1945. As of October *138 28, 1955, they were 22, 20, 17, and 10 years of age, respectively.

*143 Lea was born on September 19, 1910, and on October 28, 1955, was 45 years old. Margaret was born on October 10, 1910, and on October 28, 1955, was also 45 years old.

In 1949, Lea made a gift of 3 shares of Christiana Securities Co. common stock to each of his four children; in 1950 he made a similar gift of 2 shares to his children. In both years he filed U.S. Gift Tax Returns covering the gifts. The value of 1 share of Christiana Securities Co. stock in 1955 was $ 14,600.

During 1953, Lea's four children had an aggregate gross income of $ 6,128.48. In 1954, their gross income amounted to $ 6,285.

On November 29, 1951, Lea and Margaret separated. Margaret then instituted an action for separate maintenance in the Court of Chancery of New Castle County, Del., to compel Lea to support her and three of the children who were minors. She asked for a monthly allowance of $ 2,500. Margaret also brought an action for divorce in the Superior Court of New Castle County, Del.

On July 25, 1955, while the above actions were pending, Lea and Margaret entered in a separation agreement resolving "all matters in controversy between *139 them and relative to their marital and property rights and support of said minor children." 2*141 Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides: "In the event the Wife files an action for divorce against the Husband and a final decree of divorce is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Husband shall make the following payments * * * [summarized below]." The last paragraph (paragraph 15) of the agreement provides: "This agreement shall become effective only if and when a final decree of divorce is granted to the Wife by a court of competent jurisdiction." The agreement also provided in part as follows:

1. Lea was to hold separately the following shares of stock:

Number ofFMV as of
sharesStock10/28/55
55Christiana Securities Co. (common)$ 803,000.00
1,137E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. (common)243,460.13
48Wilmington Trust Co. (common)8,640.00
25Christiana Securities Co. (preferred)3,475.00
1,058.575.13

*144 2. Within 5 days of the receipt of any cash dividends upon any of such shares, Lea was to pay to Margaret a sum equal to such dividend or dividends.

3. Ten percent of all such dividends payable to Margaret was payable for the support of each minor child so long as the child remained a minor; *140 accordingly, since three of the four children were minors as of October 28, 1955, 30 percent would have had to have been allocated among them as child support. As each child reached majority the amount payable to Margaret for her own support increased so that when the youngest child reached majority, all payments to Margaret were "wife support" payments.

4. If Margaret predeceased Lea, he was to pay an amount equal to the amount of any dividends received from the separately held stock in equal shares to the four children. The share of any minor child was to be placed in trust for such child until he or she reached majority. At Lea's death the separately held stock was to pass under his will to the four children in equal shares.

5. If Lea predeceased Margaret, the separately held stock was to be placed in trust and any dividends upon the stock were to be paid to Margaret during her lifetime. Upon her death the shares were to be transferred to the four children in equal shares.

6. Lea agreed to provide funds for the education of the minor children in the event that his mother failed to continue providing funds for that purpose (as she had provided in the past).

In general, the separation agreement is a highly *142 sophisticated, 15-page document that was prepared by attorneys who understood the tax laws as well as the law of trusts. The provisions calling for Lea to "continue to hold separately" the above-listed shares of stock do not clearly enunciate the parties' intention of creating thereby a trust for the benefit of Margaret and the children.

On July 28, 1955, the Superior Court of New Castle County, Del., granted Margaret, in her action for divorce, a decree nisi.

On October 28, 1955, the Superior Court granted Margaret a final divorce decree. The decree absolute reads in part as follows:

That the said Separation Agreement entered into between the parties on the 25th day of July, A.D. 1955, a copy of which is annexed hereto, hereby incorporated herein by reference, is hereby approved, and the parties hereto are hereby directed to comply with and carry out the terms and provisions thereof.

The separation agreement was not merged into the divorce decree but survived it.

Under Delaware law the divorce court did not have the power to vary the terms of the parties' separation agreement. See Spruance v. Director of Revenue, 277 A.2d 695 (Del. Super. 1971), and the authorities cited therein.

*145 On October *143 29, 1955, 1 day after the granting of the decree absolute, Margaret and Lea entered into a supplemental agreement which provided in part as follows:

1. The Husband shall, on or before December 15, 1955, designate the certificate numbers and issue stop-transfer orders revocable only with the consent of the Wife to the companies and their transfer agents so as to effectually stop any transfer of the following stocks in the following amounts:

55 shares of common stock of Christiana Securities Company.

1,137 shares of common stock of E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Inc.

48 shares of common stock of Wilmington Trust Company.

25 shares of preferred stock of Christiana Securities Company.

This agreement too is a sophisticated, tax-wise document.

Lea turned over to Margaret during the remainder of 1955 dividends of $ 14,725 that were received on the separately held stock. Lea reported these dividends and claimed an offsetting alimony deduction for an identical amount on his Federal income tax return for taxable year 1955. In addition, on the same return, he claimed a 4-percent dividends-received credit for these dividends. He did not report any gain resulting from a transfer of the separately *144 held stock. Nor did he indicate that a trust had been created by virtue of the terms of the separation agreement.

Lea's 1955 return was examined by an Internal Revenue Service agent. In connection with the examination, Lea gave the agent a copy of the separation agreement but did not supply a copy of the supplemental agreement. The agent made no adjustment to the dividends item, the alimony deduction item, or the dividends-received credit item on the return.

In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States, having found in a prior decision that E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., had violated the Clayton Act, sec. 2, 15 U.S.C. sec. 18, ruled that duPont had to divest itself of all and any interest in General Motors Corp. stock. United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). As a result of that decision, duPont and Christiana Securities Co. made distributions to their shareholders of General Motors stock in 1962, 1964, and 1965.

In 1962, Congress passed Pub. L. 87-403, 76 Stat. 4, adding section 1111 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. *145 The section grants special tax relief to the holders of duPont and Christiana Securities stock who received General Motors stock on the divestiture:

The distribution will be treated as a return of capital, and its full fair market value will reduce the basis of the stock with respect to which it is made. If, however, the fair market value of the stock distributed exceeds the basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution is made, then gain is recognized to the extent of the excess and is taxable as any other gain would be. (This is the same as the income tax treatment of distributions made by corporations which have no earnings and profits.) [S. Rept. No. 1100, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1961).]

*146 Lea's cost basis for the separately held 1,137 shares of duPont stock and 4,400 shares of Christiana Securities stock (this stock split 80 for 1 on March 10, 1961) totaled $ 92,358. The fair market value of the General Motors stock distributed in 1962, 1964, and 1965, with respect to these two separately held stocks, and other facts of interest, are reflected in the following schedule:

Cost or
StockSharesDateother
acquiredbasis
duPont1,030Feb. 20, 1930$ 2,503
Do4Mar. 5, 1948166
Do8Jan. 3, 1949365
Do12Mar. 4, 1949551
Do21Jan. 3, 19501,289
Do8Mar. 2, 1951721
Do28Jan. 2, 19522,557
Do5Mar. 7, 1952437
Do5Mar. 5, 1953474
Do10Jan. 4, 19541,065
Do6Mar. 3, 19551,040
Christiana Securities[n2]4,400Jan. 9, 193581,190
Total92,358
*146
GM sharesFMV ofReduced
StockreceivedGM stockGainbasis
1962receivedafter 1962
distribution
duPont515    $ 24,559[n1] $ 22,056
Do2    95$ 71
Do4    191174
Do6    286265
Do10 1/2501788
Do4    191530
Do14    6681,889
Do2 1/2119318
Do2 1/2119355
Do5    239826
Do3    143897
Christiana Securities[n2]1,466 2/380,392798
Total107,50322,056
Reduced
StockSharesDatebasis after
acquired1962 distribution
duPont1,030Feb. 20, 1930
Do4Mar. 5, 1948$ 71
Do8Jan. 3, 1949174
Do12Mar. 4, 1949265
Do21Jan. 3, 1950788
Do8Mar. 2, 1951530
Do28Jan. 2, 19521,889
Do5Mar. 7, 1952318
Do5Mar. 5, 1953355
Do10Jan. 4, 1954826
Do6Mar. 3, 1955897
Christiana Securities4,400Jan. 9, 1935798
Total
GMFMV ofReduced
StocksharesGM stockGainbasis after
receivedreceived1964 distribution
1964
duPont370.80    $ 29,293$ 29,293
Do1.44    11443
Do2.88    22854
Do4.32    34176
Do7.56    597$ 181
Do2.88    228302
Do10.08    7961,093
Do1.80    142176
Do1.80    142213
Do3.60    284542
Do2.16    171726
Christiana Securities1,466 2/3115,867115,069
Total148,203144,535
Reduced
Datebasis
StockSharesacquiredafter
1964 distribution
duPont1,030Feb. 20, 1930
Do4Mar. 5, 1948
Do8Jan. 3, 1949
Do12Mar. 4, 1949
Do21Jan. 3, 1950$ 181
Do8Mar. 2, 1951302
Do28Jan. 2, 19521,093
Do5Mar. 7, 1952176
Do5Mar. 5, 1953213
Do10Jan. 4, 1954542
Do6Mar. 3, 1955726
Christiana Securities4,400Jan. 9, 1935
Total
Reduced
GMFMV ofbasis
Stockshares receivedGM stockGainafter
1965received1965
distribution
duPont515    $ 49,472$ 49,472
Do2    192192
Do4    384384
Do6    576576
Do10 1/21,009828
Do4    38482
Do14    1,345252
Do2 1/224064
Do2 1/224027
Do5    480$ 62
Do3    288738
Christiana Securities1,466 2/3145,017145,017
Total199,627196,894

Respondent's *147 figure is $ 22,066.

80 for 1 stock split Mar. 10, 1961.

*147 Lea did not report on his individual returns for 1962, 1964, and 1965 any gain pursuant to section 1111 due to the receipt of General Motors divestiture stock, though he remained the owner of record of the separately held shares.

On July 31, 1962, Lea requested the district director of internal revenue in Wilmington, Del., for a ruling as to whether the separation agreement dated July 25, 1955, created a trust and as to the proper tax treatment of the receipt of the General Motors divestiture stock. In connection with his request, Lea forwarded a copy of the separation agreement. He did not forward a copy of the supplemental agreement.

In response to the ruling request, the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service, in a technical advice memorandum dated July 23, 1963, stated (1) that a trust was not created for Federal tax purposes and (2) that for purposes of determining the gain realized by Lea on the 1962 distribution of divested General Motors stock, Lea's basis in the separately held stock was his cost or other basis for such stock. In short, his basis in the stock was not stepped-up by virtue of a prior realization of *148 gain; there was no prior realization; and there had been no transfer.

Lea chose not to follow the technical advice memorandum and filed a U.S. Fiduciary Income Tax Return for 1962 reporting the dividends received on the separately held stock amounting to $ 45,396. He attached to the return a copy of the separation agreement but not a copy of the supplemental agreement. He did not report any gain on the distribution of the General Motors divestiture stock.

On February 28, 1964, Lea filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether the separation agreement created a trust and whether he, as trustee, held the separately held duPont and Christiana Securities stock in trust for the benefit of Margaret and the four children. He also sought instructions as to the disposition of the General Motors divesture stock. The Court held, on October 29, 1965, that a trust was created and that the divestiture stock should be added to the trust corpus. In his opinion, Vice Chancellor Short said:

I * * * am satisfied that the [Agreement] * * * did, in law, create a trust. I so find in spite of defendant's [Margaret's] *149 contention that no trust was intended. While it appears that the agreement was drawn by able counsel who did not see fit to use the ordinary technical terms creating a trust, it is obvious that all of the essential elements of a trust are here present. By the terms of the agreement plaintiff undertook to hold specified property for the benefit of defendant and their children. The intention was obviously to make a present transfer of the equitable estate with reservation of the legal title in plaintiff. The fact that the trust results from an agreement of the parties rather than by declaration of the plaintiff is of no moment. Neither is his subsequent conduct, *148 in the circumstances presented, sufficient to overcome the fact that a trust was created at the time the agreement was made. Whatever tax consequences may follow from plaintiff's course of conduct following the execution of the agreement is not here in issue. [Spruance v. Fulweiler, C.A. No. 1943 (dated Oct. 29, 1965).]

This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware on July 28, 1966. Noting that there was a supplemental agreement, the Supreme Court relied upon the fact that the stop-transfer *150 orders, provided for therein, prevented Lea from dealing with the separately held stock as his own property:

In the case at bar all the elements exist to create the relationship known as a trust. Lea has set aside certain securities and by stop-transfer orders has made it impossible for him to deal with them as his own property. He has obligated himself to pass on the dividends received on these securities to his former wife and children. He has obligated himself to provide by will for the ultimate vesting of title to these in his children or their issue. In short, the Agreement divests Lea of any beneficial interest in the corpus, represented by the securities separately held, and has transferred that interest to his wife and children. The fundamental elements of a trust relationship thus exist. [Fulweiler v. Spruance, 222 A.2d 555, 560 (Del. 1966).]

In a statutory notice of deficiency mailed to Lea, as trustee, respondent determined that Lea, as trustee, recognized long-term capital gain under section 1111 on the receipt of General Motors divestiture stock in the following amounts:

Additional Information

Spruance v. Commissioner | Law Study Group
YearAmount
1962