Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.

Appellants, plaintiffs below, seek review of the district court's decision dismissing their antitrust action against Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas"). See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 597 F.Supp. 217 (D.D.C.1984). Appellants are five present and three former agents of Atlas. For convenience, we will frequently refer to them by the name of the first-named appellant, Rothery Storage & Van Co. ("Rothery"). Rothery claims that Atlas and several of the carrier agents affiliated with Atlas adopted a policy constituting a "group boycott" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (1982), which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy ... in restraint of trade." The trial court granted Atlas' motion for summary judgment on several alternative grounds. See infra pp. 213-14. Because we find that Atlas' policy is designed to make the van line more efficient rather than to decrease the output of its services and raise rates, we affirm.

Atlas operates as a nationwide common carrier of used household goods under authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It contracts to provide moving services to individuals and to businesses transferring employees. Like most national moving companies, Atlas exercises its interstate authority by employing independent moving companies throughout the country as its agents. These companies execute a standard agency contract with Atlas, agreeing to adhere, when making shipments on Atlas' authority, to such things as standard operating procedures, maintenance and painting specifications, and uniform rates. Typically, such an agreement will contain a provision barring an agent affiliated with a particular van line from dealing with any other line. The agency agreement is supplemented by Atlas' bylaws, rules, and regulations governing the agents' interstate operations.

Some of these independent moving companies, the "non-carrier agents," have no interstate authority of their own and can move goods interstate only on Atlas' authority. Until recently, other companies, the "carrier agents," possessed their own interstate authority and could move goods to the extent of that independent authority as principals for their own accounts. Both types of agent may engage in intrastate carriage without Atlas' permission or governance. A carrier agent, however, could act in interstate commerce both as an agent of the van line it serves and as a competitor of that van line. The carrier agents could, and some did, use Atlas equipment, training, and the like for interstate carriage under their own authorities and pay Atlas nothing.

A van line and its agents constitute an enterprise on a scale not easily obtainable by a single carrier. Atlas, which is the sixth largest van line in the nation, provides a network of 490 agents capable of carrying household goods between any two points in the nation. Atlas coordinates and supports the agents' operations. The use of agents spares a van line the necessity of obtaining enormous amounts of capital to perform the same services and, quite possibly, avoids diseconomies of scale, i.e., the inefficiencies of a single management large and complex enough to perform all the functions that are now divided between the van line and its agents. The agents find customers and do the packing, loading, hauling, and storage. Atlas sets the rates, dispatches shipments, chooses routes, arranges backhauls so the agent's truck need not return empty, arranges services at the origin and destination of shipments, collects all revenues and pays the agents, establishes uniform rules for the appearance and quality of equipment, trains salespeople and drivers, purchases and finances equipment for use by the agents, and maintains insurance on all shipments made under Atlas' authority. In addition, Atlas conducts national advertising and promotional forums. With the assistance of agents, it handles customer claims. In short, Atlas, and its agents make up an enterprise or firm intergrated by contracts, one which is indistinguishable in economic analysis from a complex partnership.

The ability of the carrier agents to exercise their independent authority traditionally has been governed by "pooling agreements" that dictate the business relationship between a van line and a carrier agent affiliated with it. The van line could, of course, set the rates at which its agents carried goods on its authority. ICC regulations required that carrier agents use the same rates as their van line principal when carrying shipments under independent authority. Because the relationship between a carrier agent and a van line constitutes an agreement between competitors, Congress provided antitrust immunity for any such relationship governed by a pooling agreement approved by the ICC. See 49 U.S.C. Secs. 11341-11342 (1982). In 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10934(d) (1982), Congress also allowed agents to sit on the boards of their van lines without antitrust liability.

The deregulation of the moving industry, beginning in 1979, produced changes that had a profound impact on the relationship between van lines and their agents. Prior to the regulatory changes, independent moving companies had little ability to obtain their own interstate transportation authority. The ICC's Policy Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation, 44 Fed.Reg. 60,296 (1979), and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L.No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, greatly increased the ability of common carriers to obtain interstate moving authority. In 1981, moreover, the ICC repealed its requirement that carrier agents charge the same rate for agency shipments and shipments carried on their own accounts. See North American Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 666 F.2d 1087, 1094-96 (7th Cir.1981). Thus, agents could obtain interstate authority and could cut prices to attract business for their own accounts that otherwise might have constituted agency shipments for the van line's account.

This increased potential for the diversion of interstate business to its carrier agents posed two potential problems for Atlas. Each of these problems is a version of what has been called the "free ride." A free ride occurs when one party to an arrangement reaps benefits for which another party pays, though that transfer of wealth is not part of the agreement between them. The free ride can become a serious problem for a partnership or joint venture because the party that provides capital and services without receiving compensation has a strong incentive to provide less, thus rendering the common enterprise less effective. The first problem occurs because, by statute, a van line incurs strict liability for acts of its agents exercising "actual or apparent authority." 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10934(a) (1982). Thus, an increase of shipments made on the agents' independent authority, but using Atlas' equipment, uniforms, and services would create the risk of increased liability for Atlas although Atlas received no revenue from those shipments. Second, because carrier agents could utilize Atlas services and equipment on non-Atlas interstate shipments, the possible increase of such shipments meant that Atlas might make large outlays for which it received no return. We return to the free-ride problem in Part IV of this opinion.

To meet these problems, Atlas could have amended its pooling agreement to redefine the terms on which it allowed its carrier agents to compete with the principal company. Had Atlas chosen this course and obtained ICC approval of its amended pooling agreement, the new agreement would have enjoyed antitrust immunity under 49 U.S.C. Secs. 11341-11342 (1982). Instead, on February 11, 1982, Atlas announced that it would exercise its statutory right to cancel its pooling agreement and would terminate the agency contract of any affiliated company that persisted in handling interstate carriage on its own account as well as for Atlas. Under the new policy, any carrier agent already affiliated with Atlas could continue to exercise independent interstate authority only by transferring its independent interstate authority to a separate corporation with a new name. These new entities could not use the facilities or services of Atlas or any of its affiliates.

Because Atlas and its affiliates refuse to deal with any carrier agent that does not comply, several Atlas carrier agents, appellants here, charged that Atlas' new policy constitutes a "group boycott." They filed this action, and after the completion of discovery on the issue of liability, both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment to Atlas on alternative grounds. First, relying on Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2741 n. 15, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), the court held that, because the challenged policy was promulgated by Atlas' board of directors, the plurality of actors essential to a finding of conspiracy did not exist. See 597 F.Supp. at 225. The court rejected Rothery's argument that Copperweld did not apply because some of the directors represented carrier agents and, therefore, might have a separate interest in adopting the new policy. See id. at 227-29; see also Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir.1974) (stating that when a corporation's officers have an "independent personal stake in achieving the corporation's illegal objective," it constitutes an exception to the rule that a corporation cannot conspire with its own officers) (citations omitted).

Second, the court rested on 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10934(d)(4)(1982), which provides antitrust immunity for "discussions or agreements between a motor common carrier ... and its agents ... related solely to ... ownership of a motor common carrier ... by an agent or membership on the board of directors of any such motor common carrier by an agent." See 597 F.Supp. at 226. Because the "[d]iscussions, voting, and agreement" leading up to the challenged policy involves the terms under which Atlas agents themselves can own independent motor common carriers in interstate service, the court found that policy immune from antitrust liability. See id. at 227-28.

The court's third reason went to the merits of the antitrust claim. In the absence of " '[c]onsiderable' and 'unambiguous' " experience with relationships between carrier agents and van lines and the impact of deregulation on those relationships, the court declined to treat the Atlas policy as illegal per se. See 597 F.Supp. at 231. Shifting to a rule-of-reason analysis, the court held that Atlas acted reasonably in adopting a policy that ended the carrier agents' ability to benefit from the "diversion" of Atlas' "business infrastructure" to shipments made on their own accounts. See id. at 233. The court found it significant that Atlas adopted the less restrictive alternative of forcing affiliated carrier agents to exercise their independent authority through a separate company, rather than prohibiting any exercise of such authority by carrier agents. See id. at 234. The court also noted that any reduction in competition between Atlas and its carrier agents had to be weighed against procompetitive effects the new policy would have on inter-brand competition. See id. at 235.

While we do not agree that the challenged arrangement lacks the elements of a horizontal agreement, we uphold the trial judge's conclusion that Atlas' new policy does not offend the antitrust laws. The challenged restraint is ancillary to the economic integration of Atlas and its agents so that the rule of per se illegality does not apply. Neither are the other tests of the rule of reason offended since Atlas' market share is far too small for the restraint to threaten competition or to have been intended to do so. Because the reasonableness of the restraint is so clear, we do not reach the question of whether the challenged arrangement falls within the statutory exemption from antitrust liability contained in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10934(d) (1982).

Before turning to considerations we think dispositive, we deal with arguments that Atlas and Rothery each consider decisive. Atlas contends that there is no agreement between actual or potential competitors and hence no violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Rothery argues that Atlas' policy constitutes a boycott that is per se illegal. We think neither argument well-founded.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns only those restraints of trade achieved by contracts, combinations, or conspiracies. Thus, only agreements between legally separate entities are covered. The argument that the Atlas board of directors was incapable of conspiring for Sherman Act purposes depends on the legal principle, laid down in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 725, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), that an agreement within a single enterprise is not an agreement contemplated by the Act. That principle is inapplicable here.

When the Atlas policy challenged in this case went into effect, every agent in the system was an actual or potential competitor of Atlas. The carrier agents were actual competitors and the non-carrier agents, because of the ICC's increased willingness to grant interstate moving authority, were potential competitors. Every carrier that stayed in the Atlas network adhered to a policy of ending or lessening its competition with Atlas (by abandoning its interstate authority or transferring that authority to a separate company with a new trade name) or of not entering into full competition with Atlas (by not obtaining interstate authority). Agents required to ship on Atlas' interstate authority must, of course, abide by Atlas' rates. Thus, all of these legally separate corporations agreed to a policy that restricted competition.

The Supreme Court dealt with an analogous arrangement in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984) ("NCAA "). In order to remain members of the NCAA in good standing, universities had to adhere to the NCAA's policy with respect to the televising of football games. The Court said:

By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint--an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another.

Id. at 2959 (footnote omitted). That reasoning controls here.

If it is deemed important, it may be noted that the Atlas Board of Directors consisted of actual or potential competitors of Atlas and that is also sufficient to take this case out of the Copperweld rule. See United States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350, 87 S.Ct. 1847, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967); see also Topco Associates, Inc. v. United States, 405 U.S. 596, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972). The two non-carrier agents represented on the eleven-person Board when Atlas adopted the policy were capable of competing by acquiring interstate authority. The four carrier agents represented on the Board at the time were actual competitors of Atlas. Three of the remaining members of the board were officers of Atlas. Thus, all but two members of the board represented separate legal entities that competed in interstate commerce. This brings the case within the rule of Sealy and Topco and shows the existence of a horizontal restraint. That conclusion does not mean, however, that the restraint is illegal.

Since the restraint on competition within the Atlas system involves an agreement not to deal with those who do not comply with Atlas' policy, and so may be characterized as a boycott, or a concerted refusal to deal, Rothery contends that Supreme Court decisions require a holding of per se illegality. It cannot be denied that the Court has often enunciated that broad proposition. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 n. 15, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S.Ct. 705, 709, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959); Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468, 61 S.Ct. 703, 708, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941). Other cases, such as Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945), seem to indicate that not even the presence of a joint venture or economic integration to which the agreement against competition is ancillary can save a boycott from per se illegality.

Despite the seeming inflexibility of the rule as enunciated by the Court, it has always been clear that boycotts are not, and cannot ever be, per se illegal. To apply so rigid and simplistic an approach would be to destroy many common and entirely beneficial business arrangements. As one commentator put it, "[a]ll agreements to deal on specified terms mean refusal to deal on other terms," and the literal application of per se illegality to any situation involving a concerted refusal to deal would mean in practical effect "that every restraint is illegal." See Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections and the Klor's Case, 45 Va.L.Rev. 1165, 1172 (1959). For that reason, "any comprehensible per se rule for [group] boycotts ... is out of the question." Id. at 1173.1 Lower courts have long agreed with that assessment. See Phil Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Advertising Association, 672 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir.1982) (excluding an auto dealer from membership in an advertising association lacking market power did not constitute a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act); United States Trotting Association v. Chicago Downs Association, Inc., 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.1981) (en banc ) (finding that it was not per se unlawful for an organization of rival harness racing operations to prevent free riding on its informational and standard-promulgation services by sanctioning members who allowed their horses to participate in events sponsored by non-affiliates of the organization); United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to apply the per se rule where membership requirements had served to foreclose plaintiff from participating with rival realtors in a service providing multiple listing of properties); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.Cir.1978) (eschewing a per se approach in a challenge to the NFL player draft because of a lack of "purpose to exclude competition"); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Committee, 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.1972) (rejecting per se analysis of the refusal of airlines to list plaintiff air tour operator in air tour manual after plaintiff failed to meet listing criteria), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 912, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Association, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.) (upholding the exclusion of a professional golfer with poor scores from tournament participation), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846, 87 S.Ct. 72, 17 L.Ed.2d 76 (1966); Molinas v. National Basketball Association, 190 F.Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.1961) (holding that a league could adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting any of its teams from employing a player suspended for gambling).2

The Supreme Court has now made explicit what had always been understood. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2613, 86 L.Ed.2d 202 (1985), the plaintiff, a stationer, challenged as per se illegal its expulsion from a wholesale purchasing cooperative for violating the group's bylaws. The Court said that "not all concerted refusals to deal should be accorded per se treatment." Id. at 2621. We analyze Pacific Stationery below at somewhat greater length. See infra pp. 228-29. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that appellants' contention about the per se illegality of all boycotts has now been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.

Appellants contend, however, that Atlas' restraints include horizontal price maintenance since the agents must ship on rates established by Atlas. We take this to be a claim that the horizontal elimination of competition within the system is illegal per se or, failing that, is nevertheless unlawful under a rule-of-reason analysis.

Before turning to the case law, we analyze the economic nature and effects of the system Atlas has created. It will be seen to be a system of a very familiar type, one commonly used in many fields of commercial endeavor.

Atlas has required that any moving company doing business as its agent must not conduct independent interstate carrier operations. Thus, a carrier agent, in order to continue as an Atlas agent, must either abandon its independent interstate authority and operate only under Atlas' authority or create a new corporation (a "carrier affiliate") to conduct interstate carriage separate from its operation as an Atlas agent. Atlas' agents may deal only with Atlas or other Atlas agents.

The result of this is an interstate system for the carriage of household goods in which legally separate companies integrate their activities by contract. In this way the participants achieve many of the same benefits or efficiencies that would be available if they were integrated through ownership by Atlas. At the outset of this opinion, supra pp. 211-12, we set out the functions performed by Atlas and by the agents and stated that the system is a contract integration, one identical, in economic terms, to a partnership formed by agreement. Analysis might begin and end with the observation that Atlas and its agents command between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market, which is the interstate carriage of used household goods.3 It is impossible to believe that an agreement to eliminate competition within a group of that size can produce any of the evils of monopoly. See, e.g., 3 J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation Sec. 8.02, at 8-34 to 8-34.2 & n. 71 (1986). A monopolist (or those acting together to achieve monopoly results) enhances its revenues by raising the market price. It can do that only if its share of the market is so large that by reducing its output of goods or services the amount offered by the industry is substantially reduced so that the price is bid up. If a group of Atlas' size reduced its output of services, there would be no effect upon market price because firms making up the other 94% of the market would simply take over the abandoned business. The only effect would be a loss of revenues to Atlas. Indeed, so impotent to raise prices is a firm with a market share of 5 or 6% that any attempt by it to engage in a monopolistic restriction of output would be little short of suicidal.

Appellants argue that Atlas' 6% national market share understates the market power of Atlas and its agents to impose an anticompetitive result because appellants introduced evidence of the existence of distinct product geographic submarkets and because of evidence that the national market "approximates a tight oligopoly." Reply Brief of Appellants at 19-20. Each of these propositions is wrong. With respect to the existence of submarkets, plaintiffs conceded the existence of a nationwide market and did not offer the district court any evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of submarkets. The district judge, therefore, had only the national market before him. Indeed, so clear is the state of the evidence that we would affirm on this basis even if we thought it was not the rationale of the district court's decision. See Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281, 77 S.Ct. 307, 308, 1 L.Ed.2d 314 (1957) (per curiam ); United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441 (D.C.Cir.1975) (Leventhal, J.); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d Sec. 2716, at 658 (1983).

The criteria for defining markets are well-known. Because the ability of consumers to turn to other suppliers restrains a firm from raising prices above the competitive level, the definition of the "relevant market" rests on a determination of available substitutes. As Professor Sullivan has stated:

To define a market in product and geographic terms is to say that if prices were appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed for the product within a given area, while demand held constant, supply from other sources could not be expected to enter promptly enough and in large enough amounts to restore the old price and volume.

L. Sullivan, Antitrust Sec. 12, at 41 (1977); see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395, 76 S.Ct. 994, 1007, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027, 104 S.Ct. 1285, 79 L.Ed.2d 688 (1984). The degree to which a similar product will be substituted for the product in question is said to measure the cross-elasticity of demand, while the capability of other production facilities to be converted to produce a substitutable product is referred to as the cross-elasticity of supply. The higher these cross-elasticities, the more likely it is that similar products or the capacity of production facilities now used for other purposes are to be counted in the relevant market.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962), introduced into merger law the concept of submarkets within the relevant market. The Supreme Court identified several "practical indicia" that may be used to delineate submarkets, such as "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." Id. at 325, 82 S.Ct. at 1524. These indicia seem to be evidentiary proxies for direct proof of substitutability. Brown Shoe said as much: "Because Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition 'in any line of commerce' (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each such economically significant submarket to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the merger will substantially lessen competition." Id. at 325, 82 S.Ct. at 1524.4 That view of submarket analysis is also mandated by the purpose of the antitrust laws: the promotion of consumer welfare. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). When submarket indicia are viewed as proxies for cross-elasticities they assist in predicting a firm's ability to restrict output and hence to harm consumers.

Under no recognized definition of submarkets did appellants offer evidence sufficient to raise an issue of material fact. Plaintiffs did not offer evidence that prices in alleged submarkets move independently of prices in surrounding areas or that, if prices were appreciably raised or volume appreciably curtailed in some areas, supply from other sources would not promptly restore the original price and volume. Nor did plaintiffs offer any evidence that any of the Brown Shoe "practical indicia" of submarkets are present. Plaintiffs offered instead only assertions that Atlas had high shares of the market in a few cities. Such testimony does not show low cross-elasticities of demand or supply. It does not serve as evidence that these cities were segregable markets in which Atlas could raise prices appreciably without attracting competitors' trucks from adjacent territories. Aside from this, plaintiffs offered only two casual remarks by carrier agents, one stating that its various offices constitute "distinct market area[s]" and the other merely alluding to "geographic and product markets and submarkets." These general comments were not evidence of anything, and, in particular, they were certainly not evidence that the industry recognized some specific submarket as a "separate economic entity."5 It is clear that these conclusory remarks, which are all plaintiffs offered, would not suffice to create an issue for a jury, and the trial judge would have to direct a verdict for defendant on the question of submarkets. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, supra, Sec. 2713.1, at 616. The plaintiffs in this case simply did not furnish any evidence " 'fairly arguable and of a substantial character,' " General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d at 442, of Brown Shoe factors indicating the existence of distinct submarkets.6

All that was before the district court, and all that is before us, therefore, is a nationwide market. Atlas, it is agreed, did 6% of the business in that market. And the relevance of this figure as a measure of market power is in no way diminished by appellants' fanciful claims of "tight oligopoly" in the national market.

Given the fact, shown in note 3, that this industry consists of 1100 to 1300 i