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*1345For nearly a century, the Anaconda Copper Smelter in Butte, Montana contaminated an area of over 300 square miles with arsenic and lead. Over the past 35 years, the Environmental Protection Agency has worked with the current owner of the smelter, Atlantic Richfield Company, to implement a cleanup plan under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. EPA projects that the cleanup will continue through 2025.
A group of 98 landowners sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability. Among other remedies, the landowners sought restoration damages, which under Montana law must be spent on rehabilitation of the property. The landowners' proposed restoration plan includes measures beyond those the agency found necessary to protect human health and the environment.
We consider whether the Act strips the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners' claim for restoration damages and, if not, whether the Act requires the landowners to seek EPA approval for their restoration plan.
I
A
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
*1346The Act directs EPA to compile and annually revise a prioritized list of contaminated sites for cleanup, commonly known as Superfund sites.
Prior to selecting a cleanup plan, EPA conducts (or orders a private party to conduct) a remedial investigation and feasibility study to assess the contamination and evaluate cleanup options.
The Act prescribes extensive public consultation while a cleanup plan is being developed. It requires an opportunity for public notice and comment on proposed cleanup plans. ยงยง 9613(k), 9617. It requires "substantial and meaningful involvement by each State in initiation, development, and selection" of cleanup actions in that State. ยง 9621(f )(1). And, in most instances, it requires that remedial action comply with "legally applicable or relevant and appropriate" requirements of state environmental law. ยง 9621(d)(2)(A).
But once a plan is selected, the time for debate ends and the time for action begins. To insulate cleanup plans from collateral attack, ยง 113(b) of the Act provides federal district courts with "exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under" the Act, and ยง 113(h) then strips such courts of jurisdiction "to review any challenges to removal or remedial action," except in five limited circumstances. ยงยง 9613(b), (h).
B
Between 1884 and 1902, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company built three copper smelters 26 miles west of the mining town of Butte, Montana. The largest one, the Washoe Smelter, featured a 585-foot smoke stack, taller than the Washington Monument. The structure still towers over the area today, as part of the Anaconda Smoke Stack State Park. Together, the three smelters refined tens of millions of pounds of copper ore mined in Butte, the "Richest Hill on Earth," to feed burgeoning demand for telephone wires and power lines. M. Malone, The Battle for Butte 34 (1981). "It was hot. It was dirty. It was dangerous. But it was a job for thousands." Dunlap, A Dangerous Job That Gave Life to a Town: A Look Back at the Anaconda Smelter, Montana Standard (Aug. 8, 2018). From 1912 to 1973, Anaconda Company payrolls totaled over $2.5 billion, compensating around three-quarters of Montana's work force.
Bust followed boom. By the 1970s, the falling price of copper, an ongoing energy crisis, and the nationalization of Anaconda's copper mines in Chile and Mexico squeezed Anaconda. But what others saw as an ailing relic, Atlantic Richfield saw as a turnaround opportunity, purchasing the Anaconda Company for the discount price of $700 million. Unfortunately, Atlantic Richfield was unable to revive Anaconda's *1347fortunes. By 1980 Atlantic Richfield had closed the facility for good, and by 1984 Fortune had dubbed the purchase one of the "Decade's Worst Mergers." Fisher, The Decade's Worst Mergers, Fortune, Apr. 30, 1984, p. 262.
Atlantic Richfield's troubles were just beginning. After Congress passed the Superfund statute in 1980, Atlantic Richfield faced strict and retroactive liability for the many tons of arsenic and lead that Anaconda had spewed across the area over the previous century. In 1983, EPA designated an area of more than 300 square miles around the smelters as one of the inaugural Superfund sites.
More work remains. As of 2015, EPA's plan anticipated cleanup of more than 1,000 additional residential yards, revegetation of 7,000 acres of uplands, removal of several waste areas, and closure of contaminated stream banks and railroad beds. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7-8 (citing EPA, Fifth Five-Year Review Report: Anaconda Smelter Superfund Site, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, Montana, Table 10-1 (Sept. 25, 2015), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/08/1549381.pdf ). EPA projects that remedial work will continue through 2025.
C
In 2008, a group of 98 owners of property within the Superfund site filed this lawsuit against Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, asserting trespass, nuisance, and strict liability claims under state common law. The landowners sought restoration damages, among other forms of relief.
Under Montana law, property damages are generally measured by the "difference between the value of the property before and after the injury, or the diminution in value." Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc. ,
To collect restoration damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has "reasons personal" for restoring the property and that his injury is temporary and abatable, meaning "[t]he ability to repair [the] injury must be more than a theoretical possibility." Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 ,
The landowners here propose a restoration plan that goes beyond EPA's own cleanup plan, which the agency had found "protective of human health and the environment." EPA, Community Soils Operable Unit, Record of Decision (1996), App. 62. See also
The landowners estimate that their cleanup would cost Atlantic Richfield $50 to $58 million. Atlantic Richfield would place that amount in a trust and the trustee would release funds only for restoration work.
In the trial court, Atlantic Richfield and the landowners filed competing motions for summary judgment on whether the Act precluded the landowners' claim for restoration damages.
The Montana Supreme Court rejected Atlantic Richfield's argument that ยง 113 stripped the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners' claim for restoration damages. The court recognized that ยง 113 strips federal courts (and, it was willing to assume, state courts) of jurisdiction to review challenges to EPA cleanup plans. But the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the landowners' plan was not such a challenge because it would not "stop, delay, or change the work EPA is doing."
The Montana Supreme Court also rejected Atlantic Richfield's argument that the landowners were potentially responsible parties (sometimes called PRPs) prohibited from taking remedial action without EPA approval under ยง 122(e)(6) of the Act. The Court observed that the landowners had "never been treated as PRPs for any purpose-by either EPA or [Atlantic Richfield]-during the entire thirty-plus years" since the designation of the Superfund site, and that the statute of limitations for a claim against the landowners had run.
Justice Baker concurred, stressing that on remand Atlantic Richfield could potentially defeat the request for restoration damages on the merits by proving that the restoration plan conflicted with EPA's cleanup plan.
*1349We granted certiorari. 587 U. S. ----,
II
We begin with two threshold questions: whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court and, if so, whether the Montana courts have jurisdiction over the landowners' claim for restoration damages.
A
Congress has authorized this Court to review "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State."
But the Montana Supreme Court exercised review in this case through a writ of supervisory control. Under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal. Mont. Const., Art. VII, ยงยง 2 (1)-(2); Mont. Rules App. Proc. 6(6), 14(1), 14(3) (2019). Thus we have held that a "writ of supervisory control issued by the Montana Supreme Court is a final judgment within our jurisdiction." Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont. ,
The landowners protest that our precedents only support reviewing supervisory writ proceedings that are limited to jurisdictional questions. But the scope of our jurisdiction to review supervisory writ proceedings is not so restricted. When the Montana Supreme Court issues a writ of supervisory control, it initiates a separate lawsuit. It is the nature of the Montana proceeding, not the issues the state court reviewed, that establishes our jurisdiction.
B
We likewise find that the Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. It deprives state courts of jurisdiction over claims brought under the Act. But it does not displace state court jurisdiction over claims brought under other sources of law.
Section 113(b) of the Act provides that "the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter," so state courts lack jurisdiction over such actions.
*1350
Atlantic Richfield takes a different view, arguing that ยง 113(h) implicitly broadens the scope of actions precluded from state court jurisdiction under ยง 113(b). Section 113(h) states that "[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332 of title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action" selected under the Act.
The company's argument proceeds in five steps. Step one: Section 113(h) removes federal court jurisdiction over all cleanup challenges, regardless of whether they originate in federal or state law (except for when the court is sitting in diversity). Step two: Section 113(h) can only remove jurisdiction that ยง 113(b) provides in the first place. Step three: Section 113(b) thus provides federal courts jurisdiction over all cleanup challenges, whether brought under federal or state law. Step four: The grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in ยง 113(b) is exclusive to federal courts. Step five: State courts thus do not have jurisdiction over cleanup challenges.
This interpretation faces several insurmountable obstacles. First, by its own terms, ยง 113(h) speaks of "Federal court[s]," not state courts. There is no textual basis for Atlantic Richfield's argument that Congress precluded state courts from hearing a category of cases in ยง 113(b) by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over those cases in ยง 113(h). And if that were Congress's goal, it would be hard to imagine a more oblique way of achieving it. Often the simplest explanation is the best: Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases "arising under" the Act-just as it says-while ยง 113(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over certain "challenges" to Superfund remedial actions-just as it says.
Second, the company's argument does not account for the exception in ยง 113(h) for federal courts sitting in diversity. Section 113(h) permits federal courts *1351in diversity cases to entertain state law claims regardless of whether they are challenges to cleanup plans. See DePue v. Exxon Mobil Corp. ,
That leads us to the third difficulty with Atlantic Richfield's argument. We have recognized a "deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction" over federal claims. Tafflin v. Levitt ,
It would be one thing for Atlantic Richfield to try to surmount the clear statement rule that applies to the uncommon, but not unprecedented, step of stripping state courts of jurisdiction over federal claims. But Atlantic Richfield's position requires a more ambitious step: Congress stripping state courts of jurisdiction to hear their own state claims. We would not expect Congress to take such an extraordinary step by implication. Yet the only provision Atlantic Richfield invokes addresses "[f]ederal court[s]" without even mentioning state courts, let alone stripping those courts of jurisdiction to hear state law claims.
Finally, the Government, supporting Atlantic Richfield, emphasizes that the opening clause of ยง 113(b) excepts ยง 113(h) from its application. See
We reject the premise and with it the conclusion. "Thousands of statutory provisions use the phrase 'except as provided in ...' followed by a cross-reference in order to indicate that one rule should prevail over another in any circumstance in which the two conflict." Cyan , Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund , 583 U. S. ----, ----,
The actions referred to in ยง 113(h) do not fall entirely within ยง 113(b). Challenges to remedial actions under federal statutes other than the Act, for example, are precluded by ยง 113(h) but do not fall within ยง 113(b). To cite another example, ยง 113(h) addresses state law challenges to cleanup plans in federal court, although those actions also do not fall within ยง 113(b).
Sections 113(b) and 113(h) thus each do work independent of one another. The two provisions overlap in a particular type of case: challenges to cleanup plans in federal court that arise under the Act. In such cases, the exceptions clause in ยง 113(b) instructs that the limitation of ยง 113(h) prevails. It does nothing more.
III
Although the Montana Supreme Court answered the jurisdictional question correctly, the Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and therefore did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. Section 122(e)(6), titled "Inconsistent response action," provides that "[w]hen either the President, or a potentially responsible party ... has initiated a remedial investigation and feasibility study for a particular facility under this chapter, no potentially responsible party may undertake any remedial action at the facility unless such remedial action has been authorized by the President."
To determine who is a potentially responsible party, we look to the list of "covered persons" in ยง 107, the liability section of the Act. ยง 9607(a). "Section 107(a) lists four classes of potentially responsible persons (PRPs) and provides that they 'shall be liable' for, among other things, 'all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government.' " Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. ,
The landowners and Justice GORSUCH argue that even if the landowners were once potentially responsible parties, they are no longer because the Act's six-year limitations period for recovery of remedial costs has run, and thus they could not be held liable in a hypothetical lawsuit.
This argument collapses status as a potentially responsible party with liability for the payment of response costs. A property owner can be a potentially responsible party even if he is no longer subject to suit in court. As we have said, "[E]ven parties not responsible for contamination may fall within the broad definitions of PRPs in ยงยง 107(a)(1)-(4)."
*1353United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. ,
Interpreting "potentially responsible parties" to include owners of polluted property reflects the Act's objective to develop, as its name suggests, a "Comprehensive Environmental Response" to hazardous waste pollution. Section 122(e)(6) is one of several tools in the Act that ensure the careful development of a single EPA-led cleanup effort rather than tens of thousands of competing individual ones.
Yet under the landowners' interpretation, property owners would be free to dig up arsenic-infected soil and build trenches to redirect lead-contaminated groundwater without even notifying EPA, so long as they have not been sued within six years of commencement of the cleanup.
Justice GORSUCH argues that equating "potentially responsible parties" with "covered persons" overlooks the fact that the terms "use different language, appear in different statutory sections, and address different matters." Post , at 1365 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). He contends that "potentially responsible party" as used in ยง 122(e)(6) should be read as limited to the settlement context, and that if Congress intended the phrase to have broader reach-to refer more generally to those potentially liable under ยง 107(a)-then Congress would have used the term "covered person." Post , at 1360 - 1361.
But there is no reason to think Congress used these phrases to refer to two distinct groups of persons. Neither phrase appears among the Act's list of over 50 defined terms.
Turning from text to consequences, the landowners warn that our interpretation of ยง 122(e)(6) creates a permanent easement on their land, forever requiring them "to get permission from EPA in Washington if they want to dig out part of their backyard to put in a sandbox for their grandchildren." Tr. of Oral Arg. 62. The grandchildren of Montana can rest easy: The Act does nothing of the sort.
Section 122(e)(6) refers only to "remedial action," a defined term in the Act encompassing technical actions like "storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials," and so forth.
The landowners and Justice GORSUCH alternatively argue that the landowners are not potentially responsible parties because they did not receive the notice of settlement negotiations required by ยง 122(e)(1). Under a policy dating back to 1991, EPA does not seek to recover costs from residential landowners who are not responsible for contamination and do not interfere with the agency's remedy. EPA, Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, OSWER Directive #9834.6 (July 3, 1991), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/policy-owner-rpt.pdf. EPA views this policy as an exercise of its "enforcement discretion in pursuing potentially responsible parties."
But EPA's nonenforcement policy does not alter the landowners' status as potentially responsible parties. Section 107(a) unambiguously defines potentially responsible parties and EPA does not have authority to alter that definition. See, e.g. , Sturgeon v. Frost , 587 U. S. ----, ----, n. 3,