Jersey Central Power & Light Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc., Intervenors

Charles D. Gray, with whom Paul Rodgers, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for amicus curiae, Nat. Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Com'rs, urging affirmance.

Robert Weinberg, with whom William I. Harkaway and Harvey Reiter, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for intervenors, Allegheny Elec. Co-op., Inc., et al.

David M. Barasch, Harrisburg, Pa., was on the brief for amici curiae, Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, et al., urging affirmance.

Daniel P. Delaney, John F. Povilaitis and Charles F. Hoffman, Harrisburg, Pa., were on the brief for amicus curiae, Pennsylvania Public Utility Com'n, urging affirmance.

Before WALD, Chief Judge, ROBINSON, MIKVA, EDWARDS, RUTH B. GINSBURG, BORK, SCALIA,* STARR, SILBERMAN and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BORK.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARR.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA, with whom Chief Judge WALD and Circuit Judges SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III and HARRY T. EDWARDS join.

Jersey Central Power and Light Company petitions for review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders modifying the electric utility's proposed rate schedules and requiring the company to file reduced rates. Jersey Central charges that it alleged facts which, if proven, show that the reduced rates are confiscatory and violate its statutory and constitutional rights as defined by the Supreme Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944). Though it is probable that the facts alleged, if true, would establish an invasion of the company's rights, the Commission refused the company a hearing and reduced its rates summarily.

Throughout the extensive proceedings before both the Commission and this court, the Commission has steadfastly maintained that its summary dismissal of Jersey Central's filing was justified by prior Commission precedent. Faced with the claim that the rate order was inconsistent with the Commission's statutory responsibility to provide just and reasonable rates and with the constitutional prohibition against uncompensated takings, the Commission briefs advance a legal theory which, if adopted by this court, would immunize virtually all rate orders from this type of challenge. The Commission's theory flies in the face of every Supreme Court decision that addresses this subject, and we are bound to reject it.

The intervenors, customers of Jersey Central, advance a quite different rationale for affirming the Commission. They attempt to justify the denial of a hearing with the argument that Jersey Central followed the wrong procedures and therefore lost the opportunity to have its substantive claims heard. Thus, it is said, it was the company's fault, not the Commission's, that no hearing was held.

That reasoning provides no basis for affirming the Commission. It fails to come to grips with the character of the Commission decision we review. That decision does not rest on adjective law. The Commission in fact reached and peremptorily decided the merits of the utility's claim. The substantive Hope Natural Gas issue is, therefore, squarely before us and cannot be avoided by faulting the utility for employing defective tactics. The Commission ruled that Jersey Central's allegations and proffered testimony would not support a higher rate. That substantive ruling means that a hearing would have been pointless. The ruling is inconsistent with Hope as well as with other controlling precedent of the Supreme Court and of this court. Reversal and remand for a hearing are thus required.

Though the fact that the Commission reached the merits renders irrelevant the intervenors' procedural rationale, it should be noted that if procedural fault is to be assigned, it should be laid at the Commission's doorstep. In dealing with Jersey Central's rate filings, the Commission applied unclear rules arbitrarily. Moreover, the Commission made plain, contrary to the intervenors' rationale, that no procedure could have been followed that would have guaranteed the hearing sought. The explanation for what has taken place in these convoluted proceedings appears to be less that Jersey Central followed incorrect procedures than that the Commission resists "end result" examination at the agency level, and is deeply antagonistic to court review of ratemaking under the guidelines laid down by Hope.

The decision of the Commission is vacated and the case remanded for a hearing at which Jersey Central may finally have its claim addressed.

This case has already prompted two opinions from this court, both of which we have since vacated. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 816 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("Jersey Central I "); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 768 F.2d 1500 (D.C.Cir.1985) ("Jersey Central II "). The case has now been reheard en banc, and the court has had the benefit of supplemental briefing and oral argument from the parties, the intervenors, and several amici curiae.1

On March 31, 1982, Jersey Central filed proposed rate schedules with the Commission for wholesale service to six customers. Jersey Central divided its filing into two separate rate increases designated Phase A and Phase B. Phase A has gone into effect, and Phase B is the subject of this litigation.

At issue is the utility's proposed treatment of the $397 million investment lost when it suspended construction of its nuclear generating station at Forked River, New Jersey. The Forked River project was initiated about a decade and a half ago, when federal and state agencies were encouraging utilities to commit substantial amounts of capital to nuclear generating plants that required lead times of eight to twelve years. The consensus prediction was of substantial and steady increases in the demand for electricity and substantial and continued increases in the price of oil due to the operation of an international oil cartel. Regulated public utilities are under statutory obligations to plan and build the facilities necessary to meet the projected needs of their customers. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. Sec. 824a(g) (1982); N.J.Stat.Ann. 48:3-3 (West 1969). If firms and households were not to face catastrophic energy prices in the future, it was thought essential that nuclear generating plants be built. All parties agree that Jersey Central's investment at Forked River was prudent when made.

The forecasts of both demand and supply proved wrong. Due to conservation, demand did not rise nearly as much as expected, and, with the collapse of the international cartel, the oil market has experienced a world-wide glut and a dramatic decline in prices. Furthermore, the protracted litigation and political controversy which attended the construction of nuclear power projects resulted in extensive delays and dramatic increases in their ultimate cost. Thus, many investments which were prudent, indeed considered essential, when made, have now by necessity been cancelled. Forked River was one, and in 1980 Jersey Central abandoned it, having concluded "that it must devote whatever resources it had available to ... less capital intensive and more politically acceptable alternatives." Testimony of Dennis Baldassari at 7, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 34.

Jersey Central sought to recover the cost of the Forked River investment by amortizing the $397 million over a fifteen-year period, a proposal to which the Commission agreed. Jersey Central also requested, however, that the unamortized portions be included in the rate base, with a rate of return sufficient to cover the carrying charges on the debt and the preferred stock portions of that unamortized investment. Jersey Central expressly did not seek a return on that portion of the unamortized investment allocable to its common equity investors.

In support of its proposal, Jersey Central submitted to the Commission the testimony of Dennis Baldassari, its Vice-President and Treasurer. J.A. at 28-39. Baldassari sought to demonstrate that the financial problems faced by Jersey Central made necessary earnings and revenues at the level contemplated by its filing. Baldassari characterized the utility's financial condition as "delicate." Testimony of Dennis Baldassari at 9, J.A. at 36. Jersey Central was wholly dependent for short-term credit, he explained, on a Revolving Credit Agreement which was subject to termination at any time. The only long-term securities it was able to issue were themselves subject to mandatory repurchase by the utility should the short-term credit then available to it be for any reason terminated. Jersey Central's credit standing was, therefore, predictably low. Standard & Poor's Corporation rated its senior debt securities "BB-", i.e., "regarded, on-balance, as predominantly speculative with respect to capacity to pay interest and repay principal in accordance with the terms of the obligation." Moody's Investors Service had also downgraded Jersey Central's rating, classifying its securities "Ba", i.e., "judged to have speculative elements; their future cannot be considered as well-assured. Often the protection of interest and principal payments may be very moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded during both good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of position characterizes bonds in this class." Id. at 4, J.A. at 31.

Jersey Central's lack of access to long-term capital, and the precariousness of its short-term credit, placed it in serious financial difficulty. Baldassari described the rate increase requested as "the minimum amount necessary to restore the financial integrity of the Company thereby providing the means by which Jersey Central will be able to meet its obligation to provide safe and dependable service in the future." Testimony of Dennis Baldassari at 12, J.A. at 39. The focus of his testimony, therefore, was on the overall rate necessary to preserve his company's access to capital markets and its financial integrity.

The Commission responded by issuing an order summarily excluding the unamortized portion of the investment from the rate base. Order Accepting for Filing and Suspending Revised Rates, Granting Interventions, Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions for Summary Disposition, and Establishing Procedures, 19 F.E.R.C. (CCH) p 61,208 (May 28, 1982). No discussion or analysis accompanied this portion of the order. The Commission simply noted that "consistent with Commission precedent ... unamortized investment in cancelled plants must be excluded from rate base." Id. at 61,403 (footnote omitted). The precedent to which the Commission referred was New England Power Co., 8 F.E.R.C. (CCH) p 61,054 (July 19, 1979), aff'd sub nom. NEPCO Municipal Rate Comm. v. FERC, 668 F.2d 1327 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. New England Power Co. v. FERC, 457 U.S. 1117, 102 S.Ct. 2928, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329 (1982) ("NEPCO "). The utility in NEPCO had been permitted to recover the costs of its failed investment by amortizing it over a five-year period, but was denied its request to include the unamortized portion in the rate base.

NEPCO's proposal differed from that later made by Jersey Central in several respects. NEPCO's requested amortization period was only one-third as long as that proposed by Jersey Central; NEPCO proposed a full return on the unamortized portion of the investment, including that allocable to common equity, as opposed to simply a return sufficient to cover the carrying charges on debt and preferred stock portions; and NEPCO never alleged that its financial integrity and its ability to maintain access to capital markets depended upon the rate it was requesting.

Upon receiving the Commission's order, Jersey Central filed an Application for Rehearing, J.A. at 99-135, seeking a full evidentiary hearing in which its proposal, and the factual foundation supporting it, could be examined. Jersey Central argued that NEPCO did not control because the allocation of risk in Jersey Central's proposal was different from, and more favorable to consumers than, the allocation proposed and rejected in NEPCO. Jersey Central argued as well that more recent Commission precedent on the treatment of abandoned investments in gas pipeline facilities provided support for its proposal. Finally, Jersey Central advanced a position that became the central issue briefed and argued in this appeal. It is axiomatic that the end result of Commission rate orders must be "just and reasonable" to both consumers and investors, and that, in achieving this balance, the Commission must consider the impact of its rate orders on the financial integrity of the utility. Jersey Central argued that, for these reasons, the Commission may not summarily exclude an investment from the rate base when the utility has alleged that its ability to attract capital will be seriously jeopardized as a result. Jersey Central contended that it was entitled to a hearing at which it would have the opportunity to prove its allegations and demonstrate that the end result of the Commission's orders violated the applicable statutory and constitutional standards, a hearing that would create a record through which the Commission's effort to balance the relevant consumer and investor interests would be subject to judicial review.

Alternatively, since Jersey Central's concern was with the end result of the rate order, it requested an evidentiary hearing at which it could justify a rate of return higher than that included in its original filing to compensate for the rate base limitation that the agency claimed was necessitated by Commission precedent. The rate allowed a utility is the sum of (1) its cost of service, and (2) its rate base multiplied by its rate of return. Since the Commission's order had excluded Forked River from the rate base, Jersey Central suggested that the necessary rate could be achieved through raising the rate of return.

The Commission again refused to grant Jersey Central a hearing. The Commission explained, somewhat cryptically:

We recognize that, in accord with Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, it is the "end result" which must be just and reasonable. Nonetheless, the reasonableness of that end result cannot be evaluated without regard to the individual components which comprise a rate....

... JCP & L's argument that our decision to exclude cancelled project costs from rate base is not mandated by Commission precedent is ... without merit. Furthermore, the argument that a hearing is required in order to implement this policy determination, is erroneous. Since Opinion No. 49, the Commission has consistently resolved this issue through summary disposition.

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Application for Rehearing, 20 F.E.R.C. (CCH) p 61,083, at 61,181-82 (July 23, 1982) (footnote omitted). The Commission then denied the request for a hearing on the alternative proposal of a higher rate of return, on the grounds that modifying the filing at that stage would unfairly present the Commission and the intervenors with a "moving target," and, further, that Jersey Central's "case-in-chief contain[ed] no testimony or exhibits which would support a higher return." Id. at 61,182. When the Commission denied Jersey Central's Application for Rehearing and Reconsideration as well, this appeal was filed.

A unanimous panel of this court affirmed the Commission. The utility claimed that the Commission's orders were not the product of reasoned decisionmaking because they were inconsistent with the gas pipeline cases and because application of the NEPCO precedent to the facts of this case was irrational. The utility also claimed that it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in which it could justify its alternative request for a higher rate of return. All these claims were rejected. We then turned to Jersey Central's contention that Hope Natural Gas required that there be a hearing to ensure that the "end result" of the rate order was "just and reasonable." The path we took in resolving this issue was later challenged by both parties:

Jersey Central argues that, as a result of the Commission's orders, its rate of return overall will be too low to be characterized as "just and reasonable." In denying rehearing, however, the Commission responded that "the reasonableness of that end result cannot be evaluated without regard to the individual components which comprise a rate." Commission Order at 61,181. This is a rather terse explanation and we wish that in the future the Commission would share its undoubted expertise with us a bit more generously. We understand the Commission to be saying, however, that the end result is to be judged by the rate of return allowed on items for which a rate of return is allowable, the Forked River expenditure is not such an item, and the rates are just and reasonable as to those cost items that are properly in the rate base. The dispute thus boils down to the question of whether the end result test is to be applied to a utility overall or only to those assets which valid Commission rules permit to be included in the rate base.

Jersey Central I, 730 F.2d at 823. Having thus defined the dispute, we accepted what we thought to be the Commission's position and concluded that the end result test applied only "to those assets which valid Commission rules permit to be included in the rate base."

In its petition for rehearing before this court, Jersey Central stated that we had mischaracterized the "end result" test by focusing not on the result of the rate order but on the determination of the rate base, which is only one component of that order. We asked the Commission for a response, and it provided one we found incomprehensible:

In the Commission's view the Court characterized the "end result" test more narrowly than the Commission would have; and, accordingly, it believes it would be appropriate for the Court to amend this aspect of its opinion. Nevertheless, the Commission believes the Court properly affirmed the Commission's orders in this case, since it is well-settled that the end-result test only has application to items which are legitimately included in the rate base as "used and useful."

Response of Respondent FERC to Petition for Rehearing at 2. Since this response seemed both to reject and accept our reasoning, the Commission had still not offered us any guidance as to how it construed Hope 's "end result" test. Dissatisfied, the court entered a further order which read, in pertinent part:

[W]e direct the Commission to elaborate on its cryptic comment that, "[i]n the Commission's view the Court characterized the 'end result' test more narrowly than the Commission would have; and, accordingly, it believes it would be appropriate for the Court to amend this aspect of its opinion." Response at 2. This statement is unhelpful. The Commission should explain how and why it believes that the opinion should be amended. We therefore order that the Commission provide further explanation of its position in the brief we have today directed it to file. Throughout these proceedings the court has found the Commission's submissions singularly terse and uninformative.

Order of July 16, 1984. The Commission filed a second response in which it now agreed with Jersey Central that the end result test does not only apply to those assets which valid Commission rules permit to be included in the rate base. Brief for Respondent FERC in Response to the Court's Order of July 16, 1984, at 4. The second response described the "end result" test as "simply an expression for broadly gauging whether, based on all the facts before it, the Commission's orders in a particular case produce a reasonable result." Id. at 5. The Commission nevertheless suggested that the end result test was not a standard under which a court was authorized to set aside an unjust end result, but rather "was designed to accord the Commission broad discretion over all aspects of rate-making methodology." Id. at 6.

This response meant that the "end result" test applied to the overall situation produced by the Commission's action but that the Commission not only refused to hold a hearing on that subject but also believed its refusal to be virtually immune from judicial review. Finding no support for the arresting proposition that the Commission was immune from challenges in court over rate orders alleged to violate statutory and constitutional guarantees explicated by the Supreme Court, the panel--now divided--vacated its prior decision. Jersey Central had alleged that "for four years [it] had been unable to pay any dividends on its common stock"; that in part as a consequence of the Commission's orders it had been "repeatedly on the edge of being forced into bankruptcy"; and that since 1979 it

has had no access to the long-term capital markets and has been wholly dependent upon a short-term revolving credit agreement which was subject to termination at a moment's notice. [The company] has been allowed sufficient cash flow to enable [it] to avoid bankruptcy (but not to provide earnings [sufficient] to enable [it] to attract capital or maintain credit).

Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Hearing En Banc at 14. Since the Commission had never held a hearing, there was no way of knowing whether these allegations were true, but we noted that if they were, it "would suggest that FERC's actions were illegal under the end result test of Hope Natural Gas," Jersey Central II, 768 F.2d at 1502, because the Commission might well have failed to achieve "a reasonable balancing of investor and consumer interests in keeping with the requirement that rates be 'reasonable, just, and non-discriminatory.' " Id. at 1503. We therefore remanded the case to the Commission for a hearing at which Jersey Central would have the opportunity to present its evidence on the inadequacy of the rates allowed it. Jersey Central II was vacated when a majority of the court voted to rehear this case en banc.II.

The parties offer radically differing views of the Commission's obligations under Hope Natural Gas, a decision in which the Supreme Court set forth the applicable standard of judicial review when rates ordered by an agency are challenged in court as failing to meet the statutory requirement that they be "just and reasonable." The Hope Court was construing the Natural Gas Act of 1938, Secs. 4(a), 5(a), 52 Stat. 821, 822, 823-24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. Secs. 717c(a), 717d(a) (1982)). The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 824d(a) (1982), the source of the claim in this case, also requires that rates be "just and reasonable," and courts rely interchangeably on cases construing each of these Acts when interpreting the other. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 2925, 2930 n. 7, 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981). Since the Court had previously indicated that "the Congressional standard prescribed by this statute coincides with that of the Constitution," FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586, 62 S.Ct. 736, 743, 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942), the Hope test defines the point at which a rate becomes unconstitutionally confiscatory as well.

In these proceedings the Commission itself has never stated what the "end result" test of Hope Natural Gas requires of it or of a reviewing court. In Jersey Central I and II, the Commission's appellate counsel offered us only the vague statements of the Commission's duties already quoted. As to the reviewing court's power under Hope, counsel told the panel in those proceedings essentially that the reviewing court had little, if any, function to perform. However, at oral argument before the court en banc, counsel finally advanced the novel proposition that the "end result" test empowers a court to set aside a rate order on the utility's petition only if the order would put the utility into bankruptcy. In order to show how dramatically at odds with the law that position is, we review the history of the doctrine at issue.

Hope Natural Gas reaffirmed a doctrinal shift, begun in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 62 S.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942), away from the more exacting and detailed standard of judicial review exemplified by Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 185 S.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819 (1898). Under Smyth v. Ames, courts had meticulously scrutinized rate orders to ensure that investors received the "fair value" of the property dedicated to public use. The "fair value" standard required courts to estimate the current market value of the property, and rates that provided anything less were deemed confiscatory. The governing theory required that consumers pay the market value of the property they were using because the property was regarded as having been taken. Recovery was therefore required only on property "used and useful" to the public, for property that was not being used could not be considered to have been taken. The Supreme Court cases of the 1940's eliminated the requirement that the market value of the property be recovered, and regulated industries now collect rates calculated to generate a reasonable return on the original cost of the investment. The companies are still generally permitted to include in the rate base only property considered used and useful, but with the demise of "fair value," "used and useful" ceased to have any constitutional significance, and the Commission has at times departed from this standard. It is now simply one of several permissible tools of ratemaking, one that need not be, and is not, employed in every instance. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C.Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952, 71 S.Ct. 571, 95 L.Ed. 686 (1951).

In setting aside the rigorous judicial scrutiny that had previously characterized review of rate orders, the Supreme Court substituted a far more deferential standard of review:

Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of due process have been overstepped. If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and reviewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.

FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586, 62 S.Ct. at 743. This new emphasis--on whether the order "viewed in its entirety" was the product of "proper findings" and was not "arbitrary"--evolved two years later into the "end result" test of Hope Natural Gas.

The Hope Court made clear that when a rate was claimed to be beyond "just and reasonable" boundaries, the focus of analysis was to be the end result of that order:

[I]t is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling.... It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.... And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.

320 U.S. at 602, 64 S.Ct. at 287 (citations omitted). Judging a rate order's consequences, the Court held, necessarily required a "balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." Id. at 603, 645 S.Ct. at 288. The legitimate investor interest, which is the interest Jersey Central claims received inadequate attention in the proceedings before the Commission, was defined in Hope to include:

the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock.

Id. The return, therefore, "should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." Id.

Thus, in reviewing the rate order challenged in Hope, the Court considered the detailed findings made by the Commission concerning the financial condition of Hope Natural Gas Company. 320 U.S. at 603-05, 64 S.Ct. 288-89. After examining all of the relevant figures, the Commission had concluded that "[t]he company's efficient management, established markets, financial record, affiliations, and its prospective business place it in a strong position to attract capital upon favorable terms when it is required." 44 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1, 33 (1942), quoted in Hope, 320 U.S. at 605, 64 S.Ct. at 289. After summarizing the Commission's findings and conclusions concerning the company's financial health, the Court held:

In view of these various considerations we cannot say that an annual return of $2,191,314 is not "just and reasonable" within the meaning of the Act. Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called "fair value" rate base.

320 U.S. at 605, 64 S.Ct. at 289.

In Hope Natural Gas, the rate was challenged as too low to account adequately for the legitimate interests of the investor. In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C.Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952, 71 S.Ct. 571, 95 L.Ed. 686 (1951), this court heard a challenge by a consumer who claimed that a rate increase approved by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia was too high to account adequately for the legitimate interests of the purchaser. The court applied the same analytical framework. Because the local public utilities commission was governed by the same standard as the Federal Power Commission, 188 F.2d at 14, Judge Bazelon's opinion examined the rate order under the rule set forth in Hope Natural Gas:

So long as the public interest--i.e., that of investors and consumers--is safeguarded, it seems that the Commission may formulate its own standards. But there are limits inherent in the statutory mandate that rates be "reasonable, just, and nondiscriminatory." Among those limits are the minimal requirements for protection of investors outlined in the Hope case. And from the earliest cases, the end of public utility regulation has been recognized to be protection of consumers from exorbitant rates. Thus, there is a zone of reasonableness within which rates may properly fall. It is bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and at the other by the consumer interest against exorbitant rates.

Id. at 15 (footnotes omitted). The court then set aside the rate order and remanded for further proceedings, on the ground that the Commission had not made sufficiently detailed findings of fact concerning the financial health of the company involved to support the reasonableness of its rate increase. "Despite the broad limits allowed the Commission, it remains imperative that its findings, under whatever formula adopted, be based upon substantial evidence in the record." Id. (footnote omitted). In that case, this court also indicated that the Commission was not obligated to exclude from the rate base all property not presently "used and useful," but was free to include prudent but cancelled investments. Id. at 19.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the "end result" standard of Hope Natural Gas. See, e.g., FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, 411 U.S. 458, 474, 93 S.Ct. 1723, 1732, 36 L.Ed.2d 426 (1973) ("under Hope Natural Gas rates are 'just and reasonable' only if consumer interests are protected and if the financial health of the pipeline in our economic system remains strong"); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,