Feeley v. Nhaocg, LLC

OPINION

This case began as a control dispute in which the managing member of Oculus Capital Group, LLC (“Oculus,” “OCG,” or the “Company”) sought to block the non-managing member from attempting to take over the managerial role. After a stipulated order and assorted rulings, the control dispute has largely been resolved. What remains are the non-managing member’s counterclaims, which seek damages from the managing member and its human controller based on the actions they took that caused the relationship between the parties to deteriorate and led to the control dispute. The plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the counterclaims. Their motion is partially granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts for purposes of the motions are drawn from the counterclaims (cited as “CC”) and the documents they incorporate by reference. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-movant.

A. A New Business Relationship

Before the events giving rise to this litigation, plaintiff Christopher J. Feeley and defendant Andrea Akel worked for NorthMarq Capital Group, Inc., where they identified and structured real estate transactions. In late 2009, Feeley and Akel wanted to strike out on their own, but they needed financing for their business. When other sources proved unavailable, Akel turned to her father, defendant George Akel, who is a successful real estate developer. George Akel had invested in other real estate projects with defendant David Newman, who joined the discussions. Newman in turn brought in defendant David Hughes, with whom Newman had invested in the past.

George Akel, Newman, and Hughes liked the idea of backing George’s daughter, but they were “not previously acquainted with Feeley” and “were concerned about going into business with an untested stranger.” CC ¶ 190. “Eventually, however, Feeley sold himself to Mr. Akel, Mr. Newman, and Mr. Hughes by convincing them that he was extremely well connected in the world of financing and that he had an extensive ‘book of business’ that he would be able to employ to seek out and secure sources of equity and debt financing.” Id. According to the counterclaims, George Akel, Newman, and Hughes nevertheless “were unwilling to commit to a long-term relationship in untested waters.” Id. ¶ 191. They allegedly insisted “that the relationship would be an experiment” and “that the entity formed by Mr. Akel, Mr. Newman, and Mr. Hughes ... would be able to end after two years if they were not satisfied with the outcome.” Id. As will be seen, the plain language of the relevant agreements does not impose a two-year time limit on the venture or give the entity formed by George Akel, Newman, and Hughes a termination right.

B. The Parties Form Oculus.

In January 2010, the parties formed Oculus as a Delaware limited liability company. The two members of Oculus are plaintiff AK-Feel, LLC (“AK-Feel” or “AFE”), a Delaware limited liability company, and defendant and counterclaim plaintiff NHAOCG, LLC (“NHA”), a New York limited liability company. AK-Feel’s two members are Feeley and Andrea Akel. NHA’s three members are entities affiliated with Newman, Hughes, and George Akel. AK-Feel and NHA each hold a 50% *654member interest in Oculus, but AK-Feel serves as the managing member. See Compl. Ex. A § 4.1(a) (the “Operating Agreement” or “OA”). As managing member, AK-Feel generally has authority to run the day-to-day business of Oculus, subject to NHA having approval rights over certain major decisions. See id. § 4.1(b).

Feeley serves as the managing member of AK-Feel. In that capacity, he controls the activities of both AK-Feel and Oculus. In addition, Feeley serves as the President and CEO of Oculus pursuant to the terms of an employment agreement. See Compl. Ex. C (the “Employment Agreement” or “EA”). The Employment Agreement mandates that any disputes arising under or relating to its terms be referred to arbitration. Id. § 9.

C. The Parties’ Relationship Sours.

NHA alleges that “Feeley failed miserably” in his managerial roles at Oculus and that his “vaunted ‘book of business’ and his supposed acumen as a financier proved to be illusory.” CC ¶¶ 209-10. According to NHA, “Feeley identified few projects over the two-year period, and one of the only ones he arguably ‘found’ — The Gatherings project in Florida — ended in disaster due to Feeley’s gross negligence.” Id. ¶210. NHA asserts that after the failed Gatherings project, Feeley began “negotiating student housing deals for his own account” instead of presenting them to NHA for consideration by Oculus. Id. ¶ 225.

The Gatherings project fell through in November 2011. Oculus had signed a contract to acquire the property during the summer which called for Oculus to tender a deposit payment in a specific amount and stated that time was of the essence. Fee-ley tendered less than what the contract specified. The seller declared a default and cancelled the contract. Oculus forfeited a portion of its deposit, became obligated to reimburse a co-investor for its investment, suffered financing penalties, and lost the fees that would have been earned had the deal closed. See id. ¶¶ 221-22. Fee-ley has offered to make NHA whole for its losses, but NHA regards that as an empty promise. See id. ¶ 223.

D. The Delaware Litigation

Dissatisfied with Feeley in general and angry about the Gatherings debacle, the principals of NHA decided to end their business relationship with Feeley and attempted to take over Oculus. On March 5, 2012, Feeley and AK-Feel filed this litigation, in which they sought to block NHA’s attempt and establish their continuing control. On March 23, the parties entered into a stipulation resolving the near-term control issues and mooting the need for an expedited trial. Dkt. 57.

After settlement discussions failed, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which NHA answered. The plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings on certain of their claims, and that motion was largely granted. See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 2012 WL 4859157 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2012). Between the March 23 stipulation and the partial judgment on the pleadings, the control dispute that sparked this litigation has been resolved.

What remains are NHA’s counterclaims, through which NHA seeks to recover damages from AK-Feel and Feeley for the failed Gatherings transaction, Feeley’s alleged diversions of real estate opportunities, and other events that caused the parties’ relationship to fracture. NHA also seeks to enforce its claimed right to end the Oculus venture after two years. AK-Feel and Feeley have moved to dismiss the counterclaims.

*655II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

When considering a motion to dismiss, all well-pled factual allegations in the counterclaims must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non-movants. See Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011). A pleading only can be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under this liberal pleading standard. See id.; Ch. Ct. R. 12(b)(6).

NHA organizes its counterclaims into five counts. Count I contends that AK-Feel breached the Operating Agreement by acting in a grossly negligent manner or engaging in willful misconduct in connection with the Gatherings transaction, by diverting investment opportunities that should have been passed along to Oculus, and by failing to perform a list of other “obligations pursuant to the OCG Operating Agreement.” CC ¶ 245. Count II alleges that Feeley aided and abetted the breaches of the Operating Agreement outlined in Count I. Count III alleges that both AK-Feel and Feeley owe “default fiduciary duties” to NHA, which they breached by engaging in the acts described in Count I. Id. ¶¶ 253, 255. Count IV is styled as a separate claim for negligence. Count V seeks a declaratory judgment that NHA has the right to cause Oculus to “cease ... business operations,” which NHA defines as “the search for business and financing opportunities.” Id. ¶ 269. NHA believes that Oculus would and, despite ostensibly “ceasing business operations” could, continue as a passive investor in its existing projects, receive distributions from those projects, and pass them along to NHA and AK-Feel.

A. Arbitration

As a threshold matter, Feeley argues that any counterclaims against him necessarily arise out of actions he took as President and CEO of Oculus, relate to his Employment Agreement, and therefore must be arbitrated. Feeley is partially correct.

Section 9 of the Employment Agreement states:

Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof which cannot be settled by mutual agreement ... shall be finally settled by arbitration as follows: Any party who is aggrieved shall deliver a notice to the other party setting forth the specific points in dispute. Any points remaining in dispute twenty (20) days after the giving of such notice shall be submitted to arbitration in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to the American Arbitration Association [sic] Association’s Arbitration Rules....

EA § 9. Section 9 confers the authority to decide substantive arbitrability on the arbitrators, so if there is a non-frivolous reason to think that the claims against Feeley could be arbitrable, the arbitrators must be allowed to decide the question of substantive arbitrability before this case proceeds any further. See GTSI Corp. v. Eyak Tech., LLC, 10 A.3d 1116, 1121 (Del. Ch.2010).

Delaware public policy favors arbitration. SBC Interactive, Inc. v. Corporate Media P’rs, 714 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 1998). “A strong presumption exists in favor of arbitration, and, accordingly, contractual arbitration clauses are generally interpreted broadly by the courts.” ÑAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related World Mkt. Ctr., LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 430 (Del.Ch. 2007). This presumption, however, “will not trump basic principles of contract interpretation.” Id. A party “cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit.” James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, *656LLC, 906 A.2d 76, 78 (Del.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court should not compel a party to arbitrate a cause of action independent of the agreement containing the arbitration provision. A cause of action is independent of an agreement if does not “touch on contract rights or contract performance” under that agreement. Parfi Hldg. AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 155 (Del.2002). Put differently, a cause of action is independent if it “could [have been] brought had the parties not signed” the contract containing the arbitration clause. Id. at 156 n. 24. Consistent with Parfi, this Court has not required arbitration of causes of action that were “not to any degree intertwined” with the contract containing the arbitration clause, NAMA, 922 A.2d at 434, or where the party could plead its affirmative claim “without ever mentioning” the contract containing the arbitration clause, Majkowslci v. American Imaging Management Services LLC, 913 A.2d 572, 583 (Del.Ch.2006).

NHA’s claims against Feeley require careful parsing. The Employment Agreement gives rise to and governs Feeley’s service in his capacities as President and CEO of Oculus, and a claim for breach of the fiduciary duties owed by Feeley in those capacities is therefore subject to arbitration. See Elf Atochem N. Am. v. Jajfari, 727 A.2d 286, 293-94 (Del.1999) (requiring arbitration of claims for breach of fiduciary duty by manager when LLC agreement giving rise to manager’s status and duties contained mandatory arbitration clause). In Parfi, however, the Delaware Supreme Court held that this Court erred by sending breach of fiduciary duty claims to arbitration when the arbitration provision appeared in a distribution agreement that neither gave rise to nor governed the defendants’ status as fiduciaries and when the claims could be asserted independent of the distribution agreement. 817 A.2d at 156-57. The Supreme Court recognized that the breach of fiduciary duty claims “arise from some or all of the same facts” that provided the basis for arbitrable breach of contract claims, but held that the common factual underpinnings did not warrant arbitration. Id. at 157. “[P]urportedly independent actions do not touch matters implicated in a contract if the independent cause of action could be brought had the parties not signed a contract.” Id. at 156 n. 24. Under Parfi, claims that could be pled against Feeley without implicating his Employment Agreement need not be referred to arbitration.

Count II asserts a cause of action against Feeley for aiding and abetting any breach by AK-Feel, and Count IV asserts a cause of action for breach of duty against Feeley in his capacity as the managing member of AK-Feel. Both causes of action would exist and could be brought even if Feeley had never signed the Employment Agreement. NHA could have and has pled its causes of action without ever mentioning the Employment Agreement. Those claims against Feeley are therefore not subject to arbitration.

Count III, however, alleges that “plaintiff Feeley, in his role as actual manager of OCG, also owes default fiduciaries to NHA” and contends that Feeley breached those duties. CC ¶¶ 253-54. There is a non-frivolous argument that by suing Fee-ley for breaches of duty “in his role as actual manager of OCG,” NHA has sued Feeley for breach of his duties as President and CEO of Oculus, a claim that arises out of his Employment Agreement. Count III therefore must be stayed as to Feeley pending the outcome of a decision by the arbitrators on the issue of substantive arbitrability and, if the arbitrators *657conclude that they have jurisdiction, the outcome of the arbitration.

B. Count I: Breach Of Contract

In Count I, NHA contends that AK-Feel breached its contractual obligations under the Oculus Operating Agreement. The count has three subsections. In the first subsection, NHA alleges that AK-Feel was grossly negligent in failing to complete the Gatherings transaction. See CC ¶¶ 239-41. AK-Feel has answered this aspect of Count I, so it is not at issue on the motion to dismiss. AK-Feel has moved to dismiss the other two subsections of Count I. With one exception, this aspect of the motion to dismiss is granted.

In the second subsection of Count I, NHA alleges that AK-Feel engaged in “self-dealing” by usurping opportunities that belonged to Oculus. See id. ¶¶ 242-44. AK-Feel responds that it could not have violated a contractual restriction on taking opportunities because it had no contractual obligation to present opportunities to Oculus. Dkt. 187 at 21 n. 6. As a matter of contract (although not as a matter of fiduciary duty), AK-Feel is correct. Only NHA undertook a contractual obligation to present opportunities to Oculus.

In Section 3.8(d) of the Operating Agreement, NHA agreed that “[f]or so long as Christopher J. Feeley is employed by the Company, NHA and its members shall refer to the Company any investment opportunity in multifamily housing or student housing identified by or presented to NHA or its members_” OA § 3.8(d). AK-Feel did not agree to a parallel obligation. Instead, AK-Feel agreed that it would not pursue any business interests whatsoever except investment opportunities that NHA did not approve for Oculus. Section 4.4 of the Operating Agreement states:

Subject to its right to pursue investment opportunities as provided below, AFE, in its role as Managing Member, shall be required to manage the Company as its sole and exclusive function and it may not have other business interests or engage in other activities in addition to those relating to the Company. In the event NHA declines to participate in an investment opportunity of the Company, AFE shall have the right to pursue such investment opportunity on its own behalf, independent of the Company or NHA, and the Company shall not have any ownership interest or other involvement with such opportunity.

Id. § 4.4 (emphasis added). For opportunities that NHA declines and AK-Feel pursues independently, Oculus remains entitled to “earn the appropriate fees” upon closing “if the Company, AFE or the member [sic] of AFE participate in the origination and sourcing of the capital or, debt for such investment.” Id. AK-Feel did not agree to present business opportunities to Oculus. Instead it agreed that the only business AK-Feel would conduct would be managing Oculus or pursuing business opportunities that NHA turned down.

Count I does not allege that AK-Feel is engaged in activities other than managing Oculus or owns other business interests. Count I only pleads that Feeley has developed investment opportunities through entities other than AK-Feel and Oculus. As discussed below, these allegations plead a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but they do not plead a claim for breach of Section 4.4. This subsection of Count I is therefore dismissed.

In the third subsection of Count I, NHA lists five additional contractual defaults that allegedly have occurred. The following quotation comprises the sum total of the allegations in the counterclaims about these additional defaults:

*658By Stipulation so-ordered by the Court on March 26, 2010, defendants, among other things, acknowledged that AFE had been and remained Managing Member of OCG, and reinstated plaintiff Fee-ley as OCG’s employee with back pay. Since that time, AFE has failed to perform its obligations pursuant to the OCG Operating Agreement in that AFE:

a) Has failed to seek out and present investment and financing opportunities to AFE.

b) Upon information and belief, has sought out such opportunities on its own behalf or on behalf of plaintiff Feeley.

c) Has failed to provide timely and complete information to NHA in response to NHA’s reasonable requests.

d) Has failed to submit a budget for OCG’s operations during 2012.

e) Has otherwise failed to provide sound management as required by the OCG operating Agreement.

CC ¶ 246.

The allegation in subparagraph (d) that Feeley has failed to submit a budget for 2012 is clear, presumed true on a motion to dismiss, and states a claim. The other allegations of paragraph 246 do not state a claim. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) repeat the allegations about diverting opportunities, are duplicative of the second subsection of Count I, and already have been addressed. Subparagraphs (c) and (e) are conclusory in the extreme and unsupported by any pled facts. As to these four alleged defaults, Count I is dismissed. Count I survives only as to the allegation in paragraph 246(d) and the first subsection, which AK-Feel chose to answer.

C. Count II: Aiding and Abetting The Breaches Of The Operating Agreement

In Count II, NHA contends that Feeley “aided and abetted plaintiff AFE in its breaches of contract as set forth in Count I of these counterclaims.” CC ¶ 249. “ ‘The elements of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) the fiduciary breached its duty, (3) a defendant, who is not a fiduciary, knowingly participated in [the] breach, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulted from the concerted action of the fiduciary and the non-fiduciary.’ ” Gotham P’rs, L.P. v. Hailwood, Realty P’rs, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 172 (Del.2002) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Cantor, 1999 WL 182573, at *1 (Del.Ch. Mar. 25,1999)).

When dealing with commercial contracts rather than entity agreements, Delaware law does not recognize the concept of aiding and abetting a breach of contract. See Gotham P’rs, L.P., 817 A.2d at 172. In Gotham Partners, however, the Delaware Supreme Court held that two individuals and a corporation who were not parties to a limited partnership agreement but who controlled the corporate general partner could be held responsible for aiding and abetting a breach of the contractual duties imposed by the limited partnership agreement on the corporate general partner. See id. The corporate general partner was a wholly owned subsidiary of Hailwood Group Incorporated (“HGI”). Two officers of HGI, Anthony Gumbiner and William Guzzetti, served on the board of directors of the corporate general partner. See id. at 164. Chancellor Strine, then Vice Chancellor, held that the corporate general partner breached a contractual duty imposed by the limited partnership agreement to act fairly towards the partnership and its limited partners, which he found was substantially equivalent to the fiduciary duty standard that otherwise would apply to an interested transaction. *659See id. at 168-69. The Chancellor held, and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed, that HGI, Gumbiner, and Guzzetti were liable on a theory of aiding and abetting: “[W]here a corporate General Partner fails to comply with a contractual standard [of fiduciary duty] that supplants traditional fiduciary duties, and the General Partner’s failure is caused by its directors and controlling stockholder, the directors and controlling stockholder remain liable.” Id. at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original); see also Fitzgerald, 1999 WL 182573, at *1-2 (“To hold that there is no claim for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty created by a contract pursuant ... would deprive a partnership and its partners of claims against those who encourage or otherwise collaborate with a partner which breaches fiduciary duties for which all partners contracted.”).

AK-Feel and Feeley do not dispute that the first subsection of Count I pleads a claim that AK-Feel breached the Operating Agreement by acting in a grossly negligent manner or engaging in willful misconduct in connection with the Gatherings transaction. Candidly, I cannot find any contractual obligation in the Operating Agreement that would require AK-Feel to exercise due care or abjure intentional wrongdoing. The Operating Agreement appears to accept that those obligations exist as fiduciary default rules independent of the Operating Agreement, and then excludes violations of those duties from the scope of the Operating Agreement’s exculpatory provision. Nevertheless, because AK-Feel and Feeley have not challenged this aspect of Count I, I will assume for purposes of the aiding and abetting count that the Operating Agreement in fact imposes contractual obligations of this kind.

Given that assumption, Count II pleads a Gotham Partners ■ claim against Feeley for aiding and abetting a breach of contract (odd as that sounds) to the same extent that a claim was pled in Count I: As the managing member and sole decision-maker of AK-Feel, Feeley made the challenged decisions and carried them out on behalf of AK-Feel. He therefore participated knowingly in the contractual breaches of duty. See, e.g., Triton Const. Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., 2009 WL 1387115, *16 (DeLCh. May 18, 2009) (equating knowledge of entity and controlling person for purposes of aiding and abetting); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 671 (Del.Ch.2006) (same). The motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

D. Count III: Breach Of Default Fiduciary Duty

In Count III of the Counterclaims, NHA contends that AK-Feel breached the “default fiduciary duties” it owed as managing member of Oculus and that Feeley breached the “default fiduciary duties” he owed as the “actual manager” of Oculus. CC ¶ 253. The latter claim has been stayed pending arbitration. See Part II.A, supra. The allegations against AK-Feel state a claim.

1. Default Fiduciary Duties Apply.

To defeat Count III, AK-Feel argues strenuously that LLCs are creatures of contract and that the managing member of an LLC owes only the duties explicitly stated in the operating agreement. AK-Feel also asserts that because NHA pled a claim for breach of contractual duties in Count I, and because AK-Feel answered a portion of that claim, NHA has conceded that only contractual duties exist.

NHA did not make a procedural concession; NHA pled in the alternative. “There is no doubt that alternative pleading, if clearly set forth as such, is permissible.” Halliburton Co. v. Highlands Ins. *660Group, Inc., 811 A.2d 277, 280 (Del.2002); see Ch. Ct. R. 8(e)(2) (authorizing pleading in the alternative). NHA squarely contends that as a matter of Delaware law, AK-Feel owes default fiduciary duties as the managing member of Oculus, unless the Operating Agreement plainly restricts or eliminates them, and that AK-Feel breached its fiduciary duties.

Numerous Court of Chancery decisions hold that the managers of an LLC owe fiduciary duties.1 Most recently, in Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC, 40 A.3d 889 (Del.Ch.2012), ajfd sub nom. Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 2012 WL 5425227 (Del.2012), Chancellor Strine explained why the managers of an LLC owe default fiduciary duties unless those duties are eliminated, restricted, or otherwise displaced by express language in the LLC operating agreement. On appeal, in affirming the Chancellor’s decision on the merits, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that the comments about default fiduciary duties were “dictum without any precedential value.” Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218, 2012 WL 5425227, at *9 (Del.2012). The high court did not rule on whether the managers of an LLC owe default fiduciary duties. Id. at 1218-19.

As the Delaware Supreme Court recognized in Gatz, the long line of Chancery precedents holding that default fiduciary duties apply to the managers of an LLC are not binding on the Supreme Court, but are appropriately viewed as stare decisis by this Court. Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218-19. Although the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Chancellor should not have reached the question of default fiduciary duties, his explanation of the ratio*661nale for imposing default fiduciary duties remains persuasive, at least to me. In citing the Chancellor’s discussion I do not treat it as precedential, but rather afford his views the same weight as a law review article, a form of authority the Delaware Supreme Court often cites. See, e.g., id. at 1220 n. 73,1222 n. 89.

For reasons that were explained at greater length by the Chancellor, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “LLC Act”) contemplates that equitable fiduciary duties will apply by default to a manager or managing member of a Delaware LLC. Section 18-1104 states that “[i]n any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity ... shall govern.” 6 Del. C. § 18-1104. Like the Delaware General Corporation Law, the LLC Act does not explicitly provide for fiduciary duties of loyalty or care; consequently, the traditional rules of law and equity govern. See Auriga, 40 A.3d at 849-56. “A fiduciary relationship is a situation where one person reposes special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another or where a special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the interests of another.” Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., 1995 WL 409015, at *2 (DeLCh. July 5, 1995) (quoting Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689, 690 (Del.Ch.1973), rev’d on other grounds 311 A.2d 870 (Del.1973)). The managing member of an LLC “is vested with discretionary power to manage the business of the LLC” and “easily fits the definition of a fiduciary.” Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850-51.

A plain reading of Section 18 — 1101(c) of the LLC Act is consistent with Section 18-1104 and confirms that default fiduciary duties apply. Section 18-1101(c) states:

To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement....

6 Del. C. § 18 — 1101(c). In his discussion in Auriga, the Chancellor reviewed the history of this provision, including the amendments adopted in response to dictum from the Delaware Supreme Court in Gotham Partners. See Auriga, 40 A.3d at 851-52. For the reasons that the Chancellor outlined in Auriga, the language and drafting history of Section 18 — 1101(c) support the existence of default fiduciary duties, because otherwise there would be nothing for the operating company agreement to expand, restrict, or eliminate. Id. at 852.

The introductory phrase “[t]o the extent that” in Section 18-1101(c) does not imply that the General Assembly was agnostic about the ontological question of whether fiduciary duties exist in limited liability companies. The same phrase appears in the parallel provision in the Delaware Limited Partnership Act (the “LP Act”), 6 Del. C. § 17-1101(d), and there has never been any serious doubt that the general partner of a Delaware limited partnership owes fiduciary duties.2 As the Chancellor ex*662plained in Amiga, the introductory phrase “makes clear that the statute does not itself impose some broader scope of fiduciary coverage than traditional principles of equity.” Auriga, 40 A.3d at 850 n. 34.

Put differently, the phrase “[t]o the extent that” embodies efficiency in drafting by the organs of the bar responsible for overseeing the alternative entity statutes and recommending changes to the General Assembly. In Section 17-1101(d), the full introductory phrase is “[t]o the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties).” Under the LP Act, there are two basic types of partners: general partners and limited partners. Compare 6 Del. C. § 17-401 (admission of general partner) and § 17-403 (general powers and liabilities of a general partner) with § 17-301 (admission of limited partner). General partners owe default fiduciary duties. Passive limited partners do not owe default fiduciary duties, but under certain circumstances, they can assume fiduciary duties if they take on an active role in the management of the entity. See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, 2000 WL 307370, at *22 (Del.Ch. Mar. 13, 2000) (imposing fiduciary duties on limited partners based on circumstances of limited partnership’s business); KE Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. 275 Madison Mgmt., 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 805, 821-22, 1993 WL 285900 (Del.Ch. July 27, 1993) (imposing fiduciary duties on limited partner who exercised discretionary authority). A “partner” thus might, or might not, owe default fiduciary duties. For Section 17 — 1101(d) to say that fiduciary duties can be restricted or eliminated “[t]o the extent that ... a partner” owes fiduciary duties recognizes these possibilities. A “person” similarly might not owe fiduciary duties to the entity, or could owe duties as an officer or employee of the partnership, as an agent, or as a party who controls an entity that serves in a fiduciary capacity. See Part II.E.2, infra. For Section 17 — 1101(d) to say that fiduciary duties can be restricted or eliminated “[t]o the extent that ... a partner or other person” owes fiduciary duties acknowledges these situationally specific possibilities and recognizes that epistemological questions about the extent to which a partner or other person owes duties will be answered by the role being played, the relationship to the entity, and the facts of the case.

The same is true for the LLC Act. Two of the three nouns that follow the phrase “[t]o the extent that” in Section 18 — 1101(c) (“member or manager or other person”) may, or may not, owe fiduciary duties depending on the situation. Under the LLC Act, there are two basic types of members: members who are also managers and exercise managerial functions in a member-managed LLC, and members who are passive investors like limited partners. Compare 6 Del. C. § 18-401 (admission of managers) and § 18^102 (management of limited liability company) with § 18-301 (admission of members). Managers and managing members owe default fiduciary duties; passive members do not. As with a limited partnership, a “person” may owe fiduciary duties depending on whether that person controls a manager of the *663LLC or otherwise has a fiduciary relationship to the LLC. The phrase “[t]o the extent that” recognizes these differing possibilities without implying that all members or all persons necessarily always or never owe default fiduciary duties.

In Auriga, the Chancellor discussed the critical role that default fiduciary duties play as an equitable gap-filler. Auriga, 40 A.3d at 858. One particular statutory feature of the LLC Act elevates the importance of the gap-filling role. Section 101(7) of the LLC Act defines a limited liability company agreement as “any agreement (whether referred to as a limited liability company agreement, operating agreement or otherwise), written, oral or implied, of the member or members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business.” 6 Del. C. § 18-101(7) (emphasis added). By authorizing oral LLC agreements, and by further authorizing “any agreement ... as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business” to be deemed an LLC agreement, the LLC Act creates myriad opportunities for LLC agreements that range from the minimalistic to the ill-formed to the simply incomplete. In authorizing this level of informality, the LLC Act resembles its partnership forebears, where agreements likewise can be formed orally or by implication and where fiduciary duties are an important part of the entity landscape. See, e.g., 6 Del C. § 15-101(12); 6 Del. C. § 17-101(12). For the LLC Act to take the same approach suggests that the General Assembly assumed that a similar backdrop of default fiduciary duties would be available to fill the potentially considerable gaps in the parties’ agreement.

The Delaware Supreme Court is of course the final arbiter on matters of Delaware law. The high court indisputably has the power to determine that there are no default fiduciary duties in the LLC context. To date, the Delaware Supreme Court has not made that pronouncement, and Gatz expressly reserved the issue. Until the Delaware Supreme Court speaks, the long line of Court of Chancery precedents and the Chancellor’s dictum provide persuasive reasons to apply fiduciary duties by default to the manager of a Delaware LLC. As the managing member of Oculus, AK-Feel starts from a legal baseline of owing fiduciary duties.

2. The Operating Agreement Does Not Limit Or Eliminate The Managing Member’s Default Fiduciary Duties

Anticipating that default fiduciary duties apply, AK-Feel argues that Section 2.10 of the Operating Agreement eliminates any fiduciary duties that the managing member might otherwise owe. That is not a reasonable reading of the provision. Section 2.10 provides Oculus’s members with exculpation against liability for certain types of claims. It does not restrict, modify, or eliminate fiduciary duties.

Section 1101(c) of the LLC Act, quoted above, empowers the drafters of a limited liability company to expand, restrict, or eliminate a member or manager’s duties, including fiduciary duties. Section 1101(e) of the LLC Act authorizes something different: the drafters of a limited liability company can leave the default duties in place, but limit or eliminate monetary liability for breach of duty:

A limited liability company agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager or other person to a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a *664limited liability company agreement; provided, that a limited liability company agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

6 Del. C. § 18-1101(e). By limiting or eliminating the prospect of liability but leaving in place the duty itself, a provision adopted pursuant to Section 1101(e) restricts the remedies that a party to the LLC agreement can seek. Monetary liability may be out, but injunctive relief, a decree of specific performance, rescission, the imposition of a constructive trust, and a myriad of other non-liability-based remedies remain in play. See Arnold v. Soc. For Sav. Bancorp., 678 A.2d 538, 541-42 (Del.1996) (interpreting effect of similar exculpatory provision under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7)); Leslie v. Telephonies Office Techs., Inc., 1993 WL 547188, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993) (same). A provision exculpating a member from liability for breach of fiduciary duty in accordance with Section 1101(e) of the LLC Act accomplishes a different result than a provision that modifies, restricts, or eliminates the underlying fiduciary duty itself, as contemplated by Section 1101(c) of the LLC Act. See Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1216-17; Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *11.

Drafters of an LLC agreement “must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.” Bay Ctr., 2009 WL 1124451, at *9. Section 2.10 states, in pertinent part:

Limited Liability of Members. Except as and to the extent required under the Delaware Act or this Agreement, no Member shall be (i) liable for the debt, liabilities, contracts or any other obligations of the Company; or (ii) liable, responsible, accountable in damages or otherwise to the Company or the other Members for any act or failure to act in connection with the Company and its business unless the act or omission is attributed to gross negligence, willful misconduct or fraud or constitutes a material breach by such Member of any term or provision of this Agreement or any agreement the Company may have with the Member.

OA § 2.10. The plain language of this portion of Section 2.10 eliminates monetary liability unless, among other things, “the act or omission is attributed to gross negligence [or] willful misconduct or fraud.... ” Section 2.10 provides limited exculpation from monetary liability as authorized by Section 1101(e). It does not limit or eliminate fiduciary duties as authorized by Section 1101(c).

Rather than eliminating fiduciary duties, the exculpatory language of Section 2.10 recognizes their continuing existence. Gross negligence is the standard for evaluating a breach of the duty of care. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Willful misconduct is one standard for evaluating whether a fiduciary breached the duty of loyalty by acting in bad faith. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del.2006). Language later in Section 2.10 requires Oculus to pay any premiums for insurance that the managing member might decide to purcha