Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas

delivered the opinion of the Court,

The question before us is what happens to the property when a majority of the membership of a local church votes to withdraw from the larger religious body of which it has been a part. In this case, title to property of the local church is held by a Texas non-profit corporation originally named The Episcopal Church of the Good Shepherd (corporation or Good Shepherd). The corporation was formed as a condition of Good Shepherd’s congregation being accepted into union with the Episcopal Diocese of Northwest Texas (Diocese). When members of the congregation became divided over doctrinal positions adopted by The Episcopal Church of the United States (TEC), a majority of the parishioners voted to amend Good Shepherd’s articles of incorporation and bylaws to withdraw Good Shepherd from communion with TEC and the Diocese and revoke any trusts on the corporation’s property in favor of those entities. The corporation and the withdrawing faction of parishioners maintained possession of the property.

The Diocese and leaders of the faction of parishioners loyal to the Diocese and TEC filed suit seeking title to and possession of the property. The trial court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the loyal faction. The court of appeals affirmed.

The first issue we confront is the legal methodology to be applied. At least two are permissible under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: “deference” and “neutral principles of law” (neutral principles). The court of appeals held that Texas courts may use either. We conclude that greater predictability in this area of the law will result if Texas courts apply only one methodology. We also conclude that the neutral principles methodology should be applied because it better conforms to Texas courts’ constitutional duty to decide disputes within their jurisdiction while still respecting limitations the First Amendment places on that jurisdiction. Under the neutral principles methodology, courts decide non-ecclesiastical issues such as property ownership based on the same neutral principles of law applicable to other entities, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), while deferring to religious entities’ decisions on ecclesiastical and church polity questions. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976).

Applying neutral principles of law to the record before us, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judg*597ment and the court of appeals erred by affirming. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Episcopal Good Shepherd

In 1961 individuals purchased a tract of land in San Angelo (1961 tract) and donated it to the Northwest Texas Episcopal Board of Trustees (Trustees). The donation was for the purpose of establishing a mission church. In 1965 a group of worshipers filed an application with the Diocese to organize a mission to be named “The Episcopal Church of the Good Shepherd” (the Church). The Diocese eventually approved the application and TEC made loans and grants to the Church to assist its growth. The bishop of the Diocese ultimately approved plans for a building, presided over the groundbreaking ceremony, then formally dedicated the building. In 1969 individuals purchased another tract of land (1969 tract) that was adjacent to the 1961 tract and donated it to the Trustees.

In March 1974 the Church applied to the Diocese for parish status. It was formally accepted into union with the Diocese at the Diocese’s annual convention in April 1974. That same year, in conformance with canons of the Diocese which required parishes to be corporations, the Church incorporated under the Texas Non-Profit Corporations Act. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 1396. The corporation’s bylaws provided that the corporation would be managed by a Vestry elected by members of the parish.1 The bylaws prescribed qualifications for voting at parish meetings2 and specified that amendments to the bylaws would be by majority vote.3

In 1982 the Trustees conveyed the 1961 and 1969 tracts to the corporation by warranty deed. In 2005 two individuals sold a tract of land (the 2005 tract) to Good Shepherd. The tract was conveyed to the corporation by warranty deed with a vendors lien to secure a purchase-money note executed by the corporation. Neither the 1982 deed from the Trustees nor the 2005 deed provided for or referenced a trust in favor of TEC or the Diocese.

B. Schism

Due to doctrinal differences with TEC, some members of the parish proposed disassociating from TEC and organizing as an independent church under the name “An*598glican Church of the Good Shepherd” (withdrawing faction). The parish held a called meeting on November 12, 2006, during which four resolutions were presented. The resolutions were to (1) amend the corporate bylaws to, among other changes, remove all references to TEC and the Diocese; (2) withdraw the local congregation’s membership in and dissolve its union with TEC and the Diocese; (3) revoke any trusts that may have been imposed on any of its property by TEC, the Diocese, or the Trustees; and (4) form a new church named Anglican Church of the Good Shepherd and change the name of the corporation to that name. The resolutions passed by a vote of 53 to 30. The stated effective date of the vote was January 5, 2007. Amended articles of incorporation changing the corporate name to Anglican Church of the Good Shepherd were then filed. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 3.052-.053, 22.106 (providing procedures for amending certificate of formation of a nonprofit corporation).

After the parish vote, but before the effective date, the Diocese’s Bishop, Rev. Wallis Ohl, took the position that Good Shepherd could not unilaterally disassociate from the Diocese and that the vote did not have any effect on Good Shepherd’s relationship with the Diocese or TEC. He held a meeting with the faction of the parish loyal to TEC and the Diocese and appointed Rev. Celia Ellery as Priest-in-Charge of the Parish. Under the leadership of Rev. Ellery, the loyal faction elected a vestry and was recognized by Bishop Ohl as the “continuing Episcopal Parish operating Good Shepherd.”

The withdrawing faction continued to use the parish property, so two vestry members of the loyal faction together -with Rev. Ellery and the Diocese (collectively, Episcopal Leaders) filed suit against leaders of the withdrawing faction and the Good Shepherd corporation (collectively, Anglican Leaders). The Episcopal Leaders sought a declaratory judgment that (1) Good Shepherd’s property could not be alienated or used by the Anglican Leaders for any purpose other than the mission of TEC; (2) the continuing Parish of the Good Shepherd was represented by those persons recognized by the Bishop as the loyal faction; (3) the actions of the Anglican Leaders in seeking to sever ties between Good Shepherd, the Diocese, and TEC were void; and (4) all the parish property was held in trust for TEC and the Diocese and the Episcopal Leaders were entitled to possess and control it.4 In their pleadings the Episcopal Leaders based their claim to the property on the allegation that: “According deference to the Bishop, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to title, possession and use of all real and personal property belonging to the GOOD SHEPHERD, including the CHURCH PREMISES.”

The Anglican Leaders answered and filed a counterclaim seeking judgment quieting title to the property in the Anglican Church of the Good Shepherd, a Texas non-profit corporation, and removing any cloud to the title created by the Episcopal Leaders’ claims. The Anglican Leaders asserted that under Texas law the nonprofit corporation held unencumbered title to the property; the individual Anglican Leaders had been elected as the corporation’s vestry in accordance with the corporate Articles of Incorporation and bylaws; the Episcopal Leaders had no right or authority to act on behalf of the corporation; and the Episcopal Leaders’ claims were barred by statutes of frauds. See *599Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 26.01; Tex. Prop. Code § 112.004.

The Episcopal Leaders moved for summary judgment. They asserted that TEC is a hierarchical church; its Canons and rules provide that all property of a Parish is held in trust for use of TEC and the respective Diocese; when congregations of hierarchical churches split, Texas courts defer to the decisions of the church’s superior hierarchical authority as to which faction comprises the true church; the members loyal to TEC have been recognized by the Diocese’s Bishop as the true church; and the parish property is held in trust for TEC and the Diocese. In both their motion and reply to the Anglican Leaders’ response, the Episcopal Leaders maintained that “[t]he sole legal issue is whether or not the Episcopal Church is hierarchical.” They did not plead or assert as grounds for summary judgment that they were entitled to the property on the grounds that application of neutral principles of law mandated summary judgment in their favor, although in reply to the Anglican Leaders’ response to their motion for summary judgment, the Episcopal Leaders argued that they were entitled to the property under both deference and neutral principles analyses.

The trial court granted the Episcopal Leaders’ motion. It made several findings in its order, including a finding that TEC is a hierarchical church. The court declared and ordered that (1) “the continuing Parish of the Good Shepherd is identified as and represented by those persons recognized by the Bishop of the [Diocese]”; (2) the actions of the Anglican Leaders in seeking to withdraw Good Shepherd as a Parish of the Diocese and from TEC were void; (3) the Anglican Leaders could not “divert, alienate, or use” Parish property except for the mission of TEC; and (4) all the property of Good Shepherd is held in trust for TEC and the Diocese. The court ordered the Anglican Leaders to relinquish control of the property to the Vestry of the faction recognized by Bishop Ohl as The Episcopal Church of the Good Shepherd.

The Anglican Leaders appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. 335 S.W.3d 880. It held that Texas courts may analyze disputes such as these under either the deference or neutral principles methodologies. It analyzed the case under both and reached the same conclusion: the summary judgment should be affirmed. Id. at 892. The appeals court concluded that when the withdrawing faction voted to disaffiliate from TEC, the vote was only effective as to those parishioners who withdrew and who were free to join the Anglican community; the vote did not withdraw Good Shepherd itself from TEC, and therefore, the church property remained under the authority and control of TEC. Id. at 892-93.

In this Court the Anglican Leaders primarily argue that the proper approach to dealing with church property disputes in Texas is the neutral principles methodology because that methodology, at bottom, simply allocates decisions to the proper forum: ecclesiastical decisions are made by the church and secular decisions are made by courts. They urge that the court of appeals’ classification of this dispute as an inherently ecclesiastical question of identity — ie., which parishioners comprise the continuing Episcopal parish — ignores the fact that there is a Good Shepherd non-profit corporation controlled by its members; the Bishop of the Diocese has no authority to determine affairs of the corporation, including who its members are and who comprises its Vestry; a majority of those qualified to vote in corporate matters voted to amend the corporate governing documents and disassociate the corporation from the Diocese and TEC; *600and under Texas law and the corporate bylaws the majority vote prevails. Not wanting to put all their eggs in the neutral principles basket, the Anglican Leaders also argue that even if the case is analyzed under the deference approach, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed. They assert that the deference approach is predicated on a church organization having superior ecclesiastical tribunals with control over the specific dispute, and because neither TEC nor the Diocese have such tribunals, there is no basis to afford deference to decisions of either of those entities. Finally, the Anglican Leaders contend that the effect of the court of appeals’ decision is to deny the right of a non-profit corporation to withdraw from an association with another entity when the corporate documents do not preclude its doing so, a majority of its voting members desire to do so, and its elected leadership desires to do so. That, they argue, violates its rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Episcopal Leaders respond that Good Shepherd is bound by the Canons and Constitution of TEC because Episcopal Good Shepherd is and always has been part of TEC’s hierarchical structure. They argue that the only question to be decided by civil courts is the identity of the body of believers comprising the true faction continuing Episcopal Good Shepherd, and that question must be answered by deferring to the decision of TEC and the Diocese because it is a matter of church polity and administration. They urge that in the past Texas has embraced the “identity” approach to church property disputes involving hierarchical churches and should continue to do so. As do the Anglican Leaders, the Episcopal Leaders offer an alternative argument. They say that even under a neutral principles analysis, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed because the Constitution, Canons, and other rules of TEC and the Diocese provide that the property is held in trust for TEC and the Diocese.

Because arguments of the parties reference the organizational structure of TEC, we briefly review it.

C. Organizational Structure

TEC is a religious denomination founded in 1789. It has three tiers. The first and highest is the General Convention. The General Convention consists of representatives from each diocese and most of TEC’s bishops. It adopts and amends TEC’s Constitution and Canons, which establish the structure of the denomination and rules for how it operates. Each subordinate Episcopal affiliate must accede to and agree to be subject to the TEC Constitution and Canons.

The second tier is comprised of regional, geographically defined dioceses. Dioceses have bishops and are governed by their own conventions. Diocesan conventions adopt and amend a constitution and canons for each particular diocese.

The third tier is comprised of local congregations. Local congregations are classified as parishes, missions, or congregations. To be accepted into union with TEC they must accede to and agree to be subject to the constitutions and canons of both TEC and the diocese in which the congregation is located.

This case involves a parish. A parish is governed by a rector or priest-in-charge and a vestry comprised of lay persons elected by the parish members. Members of the vestry must meet certain qualifications, including committing to “conform to the doctrine, discipline and worship of The Episcopal Church.”

II. Who Decides What

Good Shepherd corporation’s bylaws prescribe who can vote when vestry members are elected, how the corpora*601tion’s vestry is elected, who can vote on proposed amendments to the bylaws, and how the bylaws and articles of incorporation are amended. The essential issue presented is whether either (1) the decision by Bishop Ohl to recognize the Episcopal Leaders and the loyal faction as the vestry and members of the continuing Good Shepherd Parish served to establish those vestry members as the vestry of the corporation and the loyal faction as the voters entitled to vote on corporate matters when neither the articles of incorporation nor the bylaws afforded him that authority; or (2) his decision determined who was entitled to the corporation’s property regardless of the decisions of elected leaders of the corporation and persons specified by the corporate bylaws as qualified to vote on corporate affairs. In addressing the issue we are guided by two principles. The first is that a court has no authority to decide a dispute unless it has jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g., In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex.2010). The second is that Texas courts are bound by the Texas Constitution to decide disputes over which they have jurisdiction, and absent a lawful directive otherwise they cannot delegate or cede their judicial prerogative to another entity. See Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (1933) (“We are equally clear that the power thus confided to our trial courts [by the Constitution] must be exercised by them as a matter of nondelegable duty, that they can neither with nor without the consent of parties litigant delegate the decision of any question within their jurisdiction, once that jurisdiction has been lawfully invoked, to another agency or tribunal.”) (citations omitted).

A. Jurisdiction In Church Property Disputes

The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The clause “severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes,” Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), by prohibiting civil courts from inquiring into matters concerning “ ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’ ” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)). The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).

Attempts by courts to resolve church property disputes while balancing the competing interests of property rights and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise provision have resulted in two general approaches to the issue. They are typically referred to as the “neutral principles of law” approach and the “deference” or “identity” approach. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-10, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (discussing both approaches to church property disputes). The First Amendment does not require states to follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes; rather, “a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.” Id. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 *602(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).

1. Deference

The Supreme Court recently elaborated on its decision in Watson, which is often cited as the seminal case regarding the “deference” or “identity” approach in church property dispute cases:

In [Watson], the Court considered a dispute between antislavery and proslav-ery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had recognized the antislavery faction, and this Court — applying not the Constitution but a “broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws”— declined to question that determination. Id. at 727. [The Court] explained that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.” Ibid. As [the Court] would put it later, [the] opinion in Watson “radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 [73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120] (1952).

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 694, 704, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (emphasis added); see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020. The deference approach embodies this general principle. A court applying the deference approach defers to and enforces the decision of the highest authority of the ecclesiastical body to which the matter has been carried. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604-05, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

While the deference approach is based on principles set forth in Watson, Watson itself clarified that the First Amendment does not require a court to forego application of secular legal principles when resolving church property disputes:

Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints. Conscious as we may be of the excited feeling engendered by this controversy, ... we enter upon its consideration with the satisfaction of knowing that the principles on which we are to decide so much of it as is proper for our decision, are those applicable alike to all of its class, and that our duty is the simple one of applying those principles to the facts before us.

80 U.S. at 714. As the Court elaborated in Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) and in Jones, “deference” is not a choice where ecclesiastical questions are at issue; as to such questions, deference is compulsory because courts lack jurisdiction to decide ecclesiastical questions. 443 U.S. at 602-03, 605, 99 S.Ct. 3020. But when the question to be decided is not ecclesiastical, courts are not deprived of jurisdiction by the First Amendment and they may apply another Constitutionally acceptable approach. Id.

2. Neutral Principles

In Jones v. Wolf the Supreme Court approved the neutral principles methodolo*603gy as constitutionally permissible. 443 U.S. at 604, 99 S.Ct. 8020. Jones concerned the Vineville Presbyterian Church, which was incorporated under Georgia law and was a member church of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The PCUS maintained a hierarchical form of government. Id. at 597-98, 99 S.Ct. 3020. Under the PCUS polity, the actions of local churches were subject to review and control by higher church courts. Id. at 598, 99 S.Ct. 3020. The powers and duties of each level of the church hierarchy were set out in the PCUS constitution, the Book of Church Order. Id.

At a 1973 meeting, the Vineville Church’s pastor and a majority of its members voted to separate from the PCUS and unite with the Presbyterian Church in America. Id. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the PCUS concluded that the minority faction remaining loyal to the PCUS constituted “the true congregation of Vineville Presbyterian Church.” Id. The Presbytery then withdrew “all authority to exercise office derived from the PCUS” from the majority faction and the minority sued in state court to establish their right to exclusive possession of the church property. Id. at 598-99, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

The trial court granted judgment for the majority. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the minority faction’s First Amendment challenge and holding that the trial court had correctly applied neutral principles of law. Id. at 599, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the methodology employed by the Georgia courts was not constitutionally infirm. Id. at 600, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (citing Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868, 97 S.Ct. 180, 50 L.Ed.2d 148; Presbyterian Church v. E. Heights, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658, 658-60 (1969) (Presbyterian II), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868, 97 S.Ct. 180, 50 L.Ed.2d 148 (1976)). Under the neutral principles methodology, ownership of disputed property is determined by applying generally applicable law and legal principles. That application will usually include considering evidence such as deeds to the properties, terms of the local church charter (including articles of incorporation and by laws, if any), and relevant provisions of governing documents of the general church. E.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03, 99 S.Ct. 3020; see Presbyterian II, 167 S.E.2d at 659-60. The Court held that the First Amendment precluded neither application of neutral principles of law nor a state’s adopting a presumptive rule of majority rule. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, 607, 99 S.Ct. 3020. It noted that “any rule of majority representation can always be overcome, under the neutral-principles approach, either by providing in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, that the identity of the local church is to be established in some other way ... [such as] by providing that the church property is held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it[,]” or any other method that “does not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.” Id. at 607-08, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

Since the identity of the local Vineville congregation was a matter of state law, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court. On remand the Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia applies the presumptive majority rule to church identity and nothing in Georgia’s statutes or the relevant corporate charters, deeds, and organizational constitutions of the denomination rebutted that presumption “as to the right to control the actions of the titleholder.” Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1979).

*604B. Texas

In Brown v. Clark, this Court addressed a. dispute similar to both the one the Supreme Court addressed in Jones and the one now before us. 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360 (1909). In that case, property had been conveyed by general warranty deed to “trustees named for the Cumberland Presbyterian Church [of Jefferson, Texas].” Id. at 361. The dispute in the local church arose following a vote by the majority of the presbyteries of the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America to reunite as one church. Id. at 362. This Court described the schism in the Jefferson church and resulting lawsuit as follows:

There was at all times a strong minority which opposed the reunion, and, when the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church adopted the report and declared the union completed, the dissenting commissioners in attendance upon that General Assembly held a meeting, and organized another General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. Much dissatisfaction prevailed in the churches of the Cumberland Presbyterian, and in the church at the city of Jefferson, Tex., there was a difference of opinion upon the subject of reunion among its members. Those who opposed the reunion instituted this action, claiming that they constituted the session of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Jefferson. The defendants in the action claimed to be the session of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, and were in possession of the property, and claimed that by the union the property had been transferred to the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. The case was tried before the judge without a jury, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants-those who claimed under the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. The Court of Civil Appeals of the Sixth Supreme Judicial District reversed that judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs below.

Id.

The principal issues presented were whether the General Assembly of the Cumberland Church had authority to reunite the Cumberland Church with the Presbyterian Church, and if so, how did the reunion affect the church property in Jefferson? Id. at 363-64. The Court held that the first issue was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Assembly because it was the highest court of the church, it had decided the question, and thus “there is no ground for action by this court.” Id. at 364. As to the second issue, the Court noted that the question of how the reunion affected the property was “perhaps the only question in the case” over which it had jurisdiction. Id. As opposed to the first issue, which presented no basis on which the Court could consider the merits or take action, the Court addressed the merits of the second:

The deed for the property was made to the trustees of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Jefferson, Tex. It expressed no trust nor limitation upon the title. The property was purchased by the church and paid for in the ordinary way of business, and there is not attached to that property any trust either express or implied. It follows, we think, as a natural and proper conclusion, that the church to which the deed was made still owns the property, and that whatever body is identified as being the church to which the deed was made must still hold the title. The Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Jefferson was but a member of and under the control of the larger and more important Christian organization, known as the *605Cumberland Presbyterian Church, and the local church was bound by the orders and judgments of the courts of the church. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall, at 727, 20 L.Ed. 666. The Jefferson church was not disorganized by the act of union. It remained intact as a church, losing nothing but the word ‘Cumberland’ from its name. Being a part of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, the church at Jefferson was by the union incorporated into the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. The plaintiffs in error and those members who recognize the authority of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America are entitled to the possession and use of the property sued for.

Id. at 364-65 (emphasis added). See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex.2012) (noting that the opinion of a court without jurisdiction is advisory to the extent it addresses issues other than the jurisdictional issue because the Texas Constitution does not authorize courts to make advisory decisions or issue advisory opinions); Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex.2000) (per curiam) (“Under article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, courts have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions.”); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517 n. 15 (Tex.1995).

Courts of appeals have read Brown as applying a deference approach, and generally have applied deference principles to hierarchical church property dispute cases.5 It is true that in Brown the Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the ecclesiastical questions of whether the doctrines of the two general churches were dissimilar and whether their merger was proper. But it did not simply defer to the ecclesiastical authorities with regard to the property dispute. Instead, the Court addressed the merits of the title question by examining the deed using principles of Texas law. It concluded that the deed transferred the property to trustees of the local church that was a subordinate part of the merged Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, thus the believers recognizing the authority of that body were entitled to possession and use of the property. Brown,