Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

T1 In this appeal, we review the court of appeals' opinion in Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, - P.3d -, 2010 WL 5099682 (Colo.App.2010). The underlying civil action involves claims brought by Professor Ward Churchill pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) after his tenured employment was terminated by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado. Churchill alleges that the Regents violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights by initiating an investigation into his academic integrity and by terminating his tenured employment in retaliation for his publication of a controversial essay. Churchill sought both compensatory and equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's termination claim on grounds that the Regents' quasi-judicial actions were entitled to absolute immunity. It also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's claim for equitable remedies because it concluded that such remedies are not available in a Section 1983 action against quasi-judicial officials. Lastly, based on its determination that allegedly retaliatory employment investiga- . tions are not actionable under Section 1983, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdiet in favor of the University on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim.

12 We affirm, albeit on slightly different grounds. First, we hold that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action functionally comparable to a judicial process. Hence, the Regents are entitled to absolute immunity concerning their decision to terminate Churchill. Second, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Churchill was not entitled to the equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay. Third, we hold that Churchill's bad faith investigation claim is barred by qualified immunity because the Regents' investigation into Churchill's academic record does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law. We remand this case to the court of appeals to be returned to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Early Events

T3 Churchill was a tenured professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder whose employment could be terminated only for cause. He was also the chair of the University's Ethnic Studies Department. In late January 2005, public furor erupted over an essay that he wrote in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. Among other provocative claims, the essay likened the civilians killed in the World Trade Center to Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi officer and convicted war criminal for his role as the primary planner of the Holocaust. In preparation for a speaking engagement by Churchill at Hamilton College in January 2005, the college's newspaper discovered his essay and publicized its contro*992versial content. Some students organized to protest Churchill's visit The story and Churchill's essay were subsequently picked up by national media outlets and quickly mushroomed into a national controversy.

{4 In response to the public outery condemning Churchill's essay, the Regents1 held a special meeting on February 3, 2005. Before and after the meeting, several of the Regents and Chancellor Phil DiStefano made statements to various media outlets suggesting that they hoped that Churchill would be dismissed as a result of his essay. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Regents unanimously voted to authorize DiStefano to create an ad hoe panel to investigate Churchill's academic works.

T5 After approximately two months, the ad hoe panel reported to DiStefano that the content of Churchill's essay, which it found did not engender imminent violence or unduly interfere with university operations, constituted protected free speech and therefore could not serve as the grounds for a for-cause dismissal of a tenured employee. During this preliminary inquiry, however, the ad hoe panel received several complaints that Churchill had engaged in repeated instances of academic misconduct in his published scholarly writings. In response to those complaints, DiStefano announced that the University would formally investigate Churchill for nine alleged instances of academic misconduct.

Investigation

1 6 DiStefano filed a formal complaint, and the University initiated a formal investigation into the academic integrity of Churchill's scholarship. During the pendency of the investigation, Churchill received his same benefits and pay, retained his tenured status, and was allowed to teach classes and speak openly to the public.

T7 As a result of DiStefano's complaint, the matter was first taken up by the University's Standing Committee on Research Misconduct, a permanent nine-member committee made up of tenured faculty members and charged with policing the academic integrity of the University's faculty. The standing committee then impaneled an inquiry committee to conduct a preliminary review to determine whether the nine allegations had potential merit.

T8 The inquiry committee reviewed Churchill's academic record, interviewed Churchill, and accepted written submissions from Churchill responding to the allegations of academic misconduct. On August 19, 2005, the inquiry committee unanimously ruled that seven of the nine allegations of academic misconduct had merit and should be further investigated.

1 9 In response to the inquiry committee's recommendation, the standing committee formed a special investigative committee in January 2006. The investigative committee comprised three tenured faculty members from the University who were not on the standing committee and two tenured faculty members from other universities The standing committee consulted with Churchill to choose the members of the investigative committee and considered whether any of the potential members had any biases or conflicts of interest. For six months, the investigative committee interviewed witnesses and reviewed hundreds of pages of documents sub*993mitted by Churchill in his defense. The investigative committee unanimously agreed that Churchill engaged in academic misconduct and submitted a 102-page report to the standing committee. Two members recommended that Churchill be suspended for two years, two members recommended that he be suspended for five years, and one member recommended that his tenure be revoked and his employment be terminated.

[ 10 The standing committee reviewed the investigative committee's report, as well as Churchill's written response to the report. On June 13, 2006, the standing committee issued its own report and recommended sanctions. Six members recommended that Churchill's employment be terminated, two members recommended that he be suspended for five years, and one member recommended that he be suspended for two years. All agreed that Churchill had committed "serious, repeated, and deliberate research misconduct."

Termination

{11 After receiving the reports from the investigative committee and the standing committee, DiStefano issued a notice of intent to seek Churchill's dismissal,. DiStefano alleged that Churchill's "pattern of serious, repeated and deliberate research misconduct falls below minimum standards of professional integrity expected of University faculty and warrants [his] dismissal from the University of Colorado.2 Churchill requested a formal hearing on the University's intent to terminate his employment, pursuant to seetion III.A.1 of Regent Policy 5-I. The Faculty Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure granted Churchill's request and set a hearing in which the University was required to prove that Churchill's academic misconduct fell below the minimum standards of professional integrity by "clear and convine-ing evidence," as set forth in section III.B.2.0 of Regent Policy 5-I.

{12 This faculty senate committee held a seven-day hearing,3 at which it considered both the evidence against Churchill and the evidence presented by his defense that the entire investigation into his academic record was a pretext to terminate his employment in retaliation for the content of his constitutionally protected free speech. Churchill was represented by an attorney and was afforded an opportunity to present an opening statement, cross-examine adverse witnesses, present expert witnesses, and submit a written closing argument, as mandated by section IILB.2 of Regent Policy 5-I. Pursuant to section IILB.2.m of Regent Policy 5-I, a complete written transcript and a video of the entire hearing were made by a court reporter and a videographer.

T13 On May 3, 2007, the faculty senate committee unanimously concluded that the University had proven by clear and convine-ing evidence that Churchill's conduct fell below the minimum standards of professional integrity. The committee compiled a report summarizing its findings, which was sent to both Churchill and DiStefano, pursuant to section III.C of Regent Policy 5-I. That report found that Churchill had committed three acts of evidentiary fabrication by gho*994stwriting and self-citation, two acts of eviden-tiary fabrication, two acts of plagiarism, and one act of falsification in his academic writings. It also stated that Churchill failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had been denied adequate due process by the standing committee or that the standing committee's finding was a pretext to punish him for his constitutionally protected free speech. Two members of the faculty senate committee recommended that Churchill's employment be terminated, and three members recommended that he be demoted to associate professor and suspended for one year.

1 14 University President Hank Brown reviewed the reports from all three committees: the reports from the investigative committee, the standing committee, and the faculty senate committee. He agreed with the numerous recommendations of committee members who opined that Churchill should be dismissed from the University and forwarded his recommendation that Churchill's employment be terminated to the Board of Regents as required by section LD of Regent Policy 5-L.

1 15 Churchill requested a hearing before the Regents as provided under section IV of Regent Policy 5-I. Before this hearing, Churchill submitted a written argument in his defense. At the hearing, the Regents considered Churchill's written argument; the reports from the investigative committee, the standing committee, and the faculty senate committee; and the recommendation of Brown. Churchill's counsel made numerous arguments in Churchill's defense to the Regents at that hearing. Ultimately, on July 24, 2007, the Regents, by a vote of eight to one, terminated Churchill's employment, de-seribing his conduct as falling below the minimum standards of professional integrity and academic honesty.

16 Churchill did not seek review of the Regents' decision to terminate his tenured employment in district court, as provided for in C.R.C.P. 106(2)(4)4

Trial

¶17 Churchill brought suit in Denver District Court under Section 1983 against the following defendants: the University, the Board of Regents as an official entity, and the individual Regents in both their individual and official capacities. He alleged that the defendants violated his constitutionally protected right to free speech by: (1) initiating an investigation into his academic integrity in retaliation for his controversial but constitutionally protected speech; and (2) terminating his employment because of his controversial but constitutionally protected free speech. Churchill sought economic and non-economic damages as well as equitable remedies in the form of reinstatement of his tenured position and front pay. Front pay is an equitable remedy. It is pay "from the judgment date until reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, until the plaintiff's earning capacity has fully recovered from the effects of [the employer's wrongful act]." Black v. Waterman, 83 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Colo.App.2003).

$18 Prior to trial, the parties agreed to simplify the proceedings by stipulating that the University, as an arm of state government, would waive its state sovereign immunity 5 in exchange for Churchill's dismissal of the Regents as individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Under the stipulation, however, the University reserved the right to raise any defenses that may have been available to the Regents in their capacity as individual defendants. One such affirmative defense raised by the University was that the Regents were absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 because their decision to terminate Church-ills employment amounted to a protected quasi-judicial action. If a party is entitled to immunity, then the case may be dismissed *995immediately. Here, however, the parties agreed to preserve the University's claim of quasi-judicial absolute immunity and wait to resolve the issue until after the jury reached a verdict 6 The full stipulation provided:

The University agrees and stipulates that it shall waive its immunity to claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution to permit the same recovery from the University that might otherwise be had against any of its officials or employees acting in their official or individual capacities, reserving to the University the ability to present the same defenses that would have been applicable to any of its officials or employees acting in their official or individual capacities.

{19 Pursuant to section 24-10-110(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. (2011), the University is required to defend and indemnify the Regents for claims arising within the seope of their public office. Thus, the University would have effectively been liable for any judgment against the Regents in this action, irrespective of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. By agreeing to this stipulation, the parties substantially reduced the complexity of the trial. In the absence of the stipulation, each of the Regents would have been entitled to be represented by separate counsel and any damages would be entered against each individual Regent, subject to indemnification by the University. As the trial court correctly stated, "asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity would not change the parties' ultimate position but would delay Professor Churchill's ability to have his claims resolved in a timely and efficient manner."

120 Churchills bad faith investigation claim and termination claim were tried to a jury during a four-week trial Throughout the trial, Churchill did little to differentiate the two claims and instead maintained that, ever since his controversial essay attracted media attention in 2005, the Regents intended to terminate his employment in retaliation for his protected free speech.

21 At the conclusion of the evidence, the University moved for a directed verdict on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim, arguing that, under Section 1988, the initiation of an employment investigation and nothing more does not by itself constitute grounds for an actionable claim. Citing federal Seetion 1983 case law that has adopted standards from federal Title VII discrimination case law, the trial court agreed and ruled that Churchill failed to prove that the University's initiation of the investigation constituted an adverse employment action. The trial court reasoned that the mere initiation of an investigation into Churchill's academic integrity neither changed the terms and conditions of his employment nor deterred other employees from engaging in free speech in the future. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict, and Churchill's bad faith investigation claim was not submitted to the jury.

1 22 Churchill's termination claim was submitted to the jury with instructions to determine whether Churchill's protected speech was a motivating factor in the Regents' decision to terminate his employment. The trial court also instructed the jury that if it found in Churchill's favor, then it was to determine the appropriate amount of economic and noneconomic damages. Whether Churchill's requested equitable relief, including reinstatement and front pay, was available and appropriate was reserved for the trial judge, as < dictated by Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 1000 (10th Cir.2005) (stating that equitable remedies are awarded by the court and not the jury). After several hours of deliberation, the jury submitted a written question asking the court if it could find in Churchill's favor but nevertheless award him no damages. After consulting with the parties and receiving no objection, the trial court answered with an additional instruction to the jury that stated: "If you find in favor of [Churchill], but do not find any actual damages, you shall none*996theless award him nominal damages in the sum of one dollar."

T 23 The jury deliberated for an additional hour before finding that Churchill's "protected speech [was] a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discharge" him from his tenured position and that the University had not "shown by a preponderance of the evidence that [Churchill] would have been dismissed for other reasons." In other words, the jury found in Churchill's favor that his employment was terminated in retaliation for his free speech. However, the jury, following the trial court's instruction, found that Churchill suffered no actual economic or noneconomic damages and awarded him nominal damages in the amount of one dollar.

124 Post-verdict, the University filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law based on its preserved but not yet ruled upon argument that the Regents were absolutely immune from suit on Churchill's termination claim because their decision to terminate Churchill's employment constituted a quasi-judicial act entitled to immunity. Churchill requested that, given the jury verdict in his favor, the trial court order reinstatement to his tenured professorship and grant front pay pursuant to the equitable remedies provided by Section 1983.

{25 The trial court ruled in favor of the University on both motions. Citing federal precedent, the trial court agreed that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment constituted a protected quasi-judicial action. Thus, the Regents were absolutely immune from Churchill's Section 1983 termination claim. The court vacated the jury verdict, including the award of one dollar.

126 Addressing Churchill's request for front pay and reinstatement, the trial court ruled that these equitable remedies were not available because Section 1983's bar on equitable remedies against judicial officers applied with equal foree to quasi-judicial officers. In the alternative, the trial court ruled that even if equitable remedies were legally permissible in this case, the reinstatement would be inappropriate given that Churchill's relationship with the University was irreparably damaged. The trial court reasoned that reinstatement would likely result in undue interference with the academic process. It would harm the integrity of the University, its faculty, and its students given the fact that Churchill committed numerous instances of academic dishonesty in his scholarship. Lastly, the trial court denied Churchill front pay because the jury found that he had suffered no actual damages as a result of being terminated and that Churchill had failed to mitigate any alleged damages by refusing to seek alternate employment following his dismissal. The trial court rejected Churchill's argument that any alleged academic misconduct was nullified by the jury finding in his favor and instead reasoned that the jury verdict merely meant that the University failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have been terminated but for his protected speech. Just because the University used the discovery of Churchill's academic misconduct as a pretext for its violation of his constitutional rights, the trial court reasoned, does not make the findings condemning his lack of academic integrity any less meritorious.

Appeal

127 Churchill appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the University's motion for directed verdict on his bad faith investigation claim; (2) ruling that the Regents were entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity and thus vacating the jury verdict finding in his favor on his termination claim; and (8) ruling that Section 1988 prohibits equitable remedies against quasi-judicial officials.

28 The court of appeals rejected each of those arguments. First, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment as a matter of law on the termination claim, relying partly on federal case law and partly on Colorado case law applying C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)7 to hold that the Regents' termi*997nation of Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action and thus entitled to absolute immunity. Second, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of equitable remedies because the trial court's ruling that Section 1983's explicit exemption of judicial officers from equitable remedies applies with equal force to quasi-judicial officers is consistent with the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed that issue. Third, the court of appeals held that the trial court was correct in entering a directed verdict on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim because under federal case law, an allegedly retaliatory investigation, standing alone, does not constitute an adverse employment action sufficient to establish an actionable claim of employment discrimination under Section 1988.

129 Churchill petitioned this court to review the court of appeals' decision, reasserting the same three issues, and we granted certiorari.8

IL. Analysis

The Pre-Trial Stipulation

30 Before analyzing the three issues presented, each of which relates to Churchill's suit against the Regents in their individual capacities, we address as a threshold matter Churchill's arguments with respect to the pre-trial stipulation. Under the stipulation, the University agreed to waive its state sovereign immunity in exchange for Churchill's dropping any and all claims against the Regents in their official and individual capacities and bringing such claims directly against the University. However, in an apparent effort to place the University in the Regents' shoes, the stipulation also provided that the University could raise any official or individual defenses that could have been asserted by the Regents had they not been dismissed from the case. Churchill argues that the stipulation is significant to our resolution of the present issues in two ways.

31 Churchill first argues that the court of appeals erred by refusing to address his claims against the Regents in their official capacities (which are now borne by the University pursuant to the stipulation). Churchill contends that because the University waived its state sovereign immunity in the pre-trial stipulation, the University cannot use state sovereign immunity in defending the Regents in his suit against them in their official capacities. We reason otherwise.

132 A public official may be sued under Section 1988 in both her official capacity and her individual eapacity. A suit against a public official in his individual capacity seeks "to impose personal lability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). To defend against a personal suit, a public official may be able to claim either absolute or qualified immunity, otherwise known as personal immunity defenses. Id. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099 ("When it comes to defenses to lability, an official in a personal capacity action may ... be able to assert personal immunity defenses."). In contrast, a suit against a public official in her official capacity "is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the [public] entity." Id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. Personal immunity defenses are unavailable *998when a public official is sued in her official capacity. See id. at 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099. Instead, "[the only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment [state sovereign immunity]." Id. As an arm of the state, the University and its employees in their official capacities are immune from suit under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

" 33 The plain meaning of the stipulation is unambiguous. The University agreed to "waive its immunity to claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution [state sovereign immunity]." With respect to the Regents, the stipulation stated that the University reserved "the ability to present the same defenses that would have been available to any of its officials or employees acting in their official or individual capacities." (Emphasis added.) Hence, the stipulation provides that although the University agreed to waive its protection as a public entity under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, the University expressly reserved the right to assert the personal immunity defenses available to the Regents in their individual capacities, including qualified or absolute immunity, as well as the official defenses available to the Regents and the Board of Regents in their official capacities As established by Graham and its progeny, such defenses to claims against public officials in their official capacities include the ability of a public official to invoke the state's sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. (Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (holding that "the only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, gua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment"). As such, this defense was not waived by the stipulation, and Churchill's suit against the Regents in their official capacities was correctly barred by the trial court pursuant to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Likewise, Churchill's claims against the Board of Regents as an entity were correctly barred under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. As an "arm of the [sltate" (as opposed to a municipal corporation), the Board of Regents is entitled to the same immunities as the state itself, Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568. Churchill apparently does not dispute this point.

%84 Churchill's second argument related to the stipulation is that the court of appeals erred in allowing the University, a public entity, to assert the Regents' personal immunity defenses. As explained above, under Graham, it is well established that personal immunity defenses are only available to individuals and not government entities. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099.

185 In this case, however, the obvious intent of the stipulation was to place the University in the shoes of the Regents in both their official and individual capacities. Because Colorado law requires the University to defend against and indemnify the Regents for any suits against them arising under the performance of their duties as regents, the parties stipulated to this legal fiction for the sake of simplicity and judicial economy. Under the stipulation, this fiction placed the University in the position to answer for any claims against the Regents but also empowered the University to raise any defenses that would have been available to the Regents prior to their dismissal from the suit. This includes the Regents' ability to defend against the suits against them in their individual capacities by asserting both absolute and qualified immunity. For these reasons, we hold that it was not error for the court of appeals to consider the Regents' personal immunity defenses that were raised by the University in defense of Churchill's claims.

Qualified and Absolute Immunity

136 As background to our discussion and analysis of the issues in this case, we set forth the law related to Section 1983 claims and the pertinent immunities that may be raised by public entities and public officials who are sued for such alleged constitutional and civil rights violations.

*999137 As briefly discussed, state sovereign immunity shields the state from suit for state actions that violate the rights of an individual. Alden, 527 U.S. at 733-35, 119 S.Ct. 2240. However, Congress passed legislation to provide injured plaintiffs with a cause of action against government officials in their individual capacities for actions taken within the course of their public duties that violate the plaintiff's federal statutory or constitutional rights. One such cause of action is a Section 1983 claim, which forms the basis of Churchill's claims here.9 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (holding that, in enacting Section 1983, Congress intended to provide a private right of action under federal law to parties deprived of their constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities by an official's abuse of his position) overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Section 1988 frequently provides redress in the employment context for plaintiffs injured by a public official's retaliation for the plaintiff's protected free speech. See generally Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1988 Litigation Claims and Defenses § 8.11 (2012) ("First Amendment Retaliation Claims").

138 The Supreme Court has recognized that public officials, in their individual capacities, may be immune from suits seeking compensatory damages under two distinct common law doctrines of immunity: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. As a threshold matter, if either level of immunity applies, then a public official is completely immune from suit seeking monetary damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (holding that the entitlement to both qualified and absolute immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability") (emphasis omitted).

1839 Qualified immunity applies to a public official's conduct when she takes a discretionary action that a reasonable person would not know violates a clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiff. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 78 L.Ed.2d 396 (2006) ("[Glovernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). In contrast, absolute immunity protects a public official's conduct that violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights even if that conduct was malicious. Although absolute immunity applies to a broader spectrum of conduct, it is available to a narrower class of public officials, those whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Some public officials, such as judges, prosecutors, and legislators, have been categorically granted absolute immunity when acting within their official capacities. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In addi tion, the doctrine of absolute immunity has also been extended to provide immunity for the quasi-judicial decision-making powers that the legislature or constitution vests in certain administrative officials. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (holding that persons performing adjudicatory functions within federal agencies are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts).

*1000140 Under Supreme Court precedent, neither absolute nor qualified immunity applies to Section 1988 actions where plaintiffs seek equitable relief.10 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (holding that "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injune-tive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity"). However, in 1996, Congress statutorily exempted judicial officers from equitable remedies sought by plaintiffs under Section 1983. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 8847. Although the Supreme Court has held that both judicial officials and certain administrative officials performing quasi-judicial functions are protected by absolute immunity, the Supreme Court has yet to clarify whether Seetion 1983's exemption for judicial officers from plaintiffs who seek equitable remedies applies with equal force to quasi-judicial officers. Compare Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that judicial immunity bars claims for equitable relief against officials serving a quasi-judicial funetion), and Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that judicial immunity from equitable relief extends to quasi-judicial officers), with Simmons v. Fabian, 743 N.W.2d 281, 289-91 (Minn.Ct.App.2007) (noting the uncertainty of the issue but holding that judicial immunity from injunctive relief is "indeed restricted to Judges' ").

Churchill's Termination Claim

$41 Churchill argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment as a matter of law on his termination claim because it incorrectly held that the Regents in their individual capacities were shielded from suit under quasi-judicial absolute immunity. Churchill contends that the Regents' decision was not functionally comparable to the role of a judge because, he argues, the Regents were biased against him, the Regents were not sufficiently insulated from political pressures, there is no evidence that the decision was based on precedent, and there was no forum in which he could seek independent, rigorous review of their decision.

$42 We review the pertinent federal absolute immunity law and apply it to the facts of Churchill's termination. A judgment as a matter of law presents a purely legal question, which we review de novo. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Colo.1995). We ultimately conclude that the Regents are entitled to absolute immunity because their role as quasi-judicial public officials was functionally comparable to the role of a judge.

T483 If a public official's action falls under the auspices of absolute immunity, then the doctrine provides that public official with complete and total immunity from suit, irrespective of how egregious or unlawful the action may have been. Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 524 (7th Cir.2001) ("Even if [the plaintiffs] suit is meritorious ... it cannot pierce the shield of absolute immunity because judicial officers are entitled to that immunity even when they act in error, mali-clously, or in exeess of their authority."). Given the harsh result that absolute immuni*1001ty can have on plaintiffs with legitimate claims, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine sparingly to include only "those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Butz, 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. 2894. "Officials who seek [absolute immunity] have the burden of showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).

"[ 44 Some officials, such as judges, prosecutors, and legislators, have been categorically granted absolute immunity when acting within their official capacities because, by definition, their positions involve highly discretionary and often politically fraught-decisions that might be compromised if subjected to the constant threat of retaliatory litigation. 4 MeceQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 12:260 n. 2 (8d ed. 2011) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. 588 ("[The nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have."). The difficult and important decisions that society asks such officials to undertake "invariably produce[ ] at least one losing party, who would 'accept anything but the soundness of the decision in explanation of the action of the judge.'" Butz, 438 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335, 348 (1871)). "[Tlo submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle,