Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corporation, Robert Lathrop, Wolf Camera, Inc., and Charles Wolf

This case concerns the propriety of summary judgment in an antitrust action *1416 brought by a private plaintiff. The action alleges, among other things, violations of sections 2(a), 2(d), 2(e), and 2(f) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pat-man Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), (d), (e), and (f). The court below concluded that summary judgment was appropriate. After reviewing the record we conclude otherwise, and therefore reverse.

I.

Alan’s of Atlanta, Inc. (“AA”) was an Atlanta-based “specialty” retailer of cameras and related equipment. It had stores in Atlanta and throughout Georgia and Florida. At the start of 1979 AA had a substantial share of the Atlanta market for Minolta-brand camera sales, about 33%, and an overwhelming share of specialty store sales, about 78%. By the end of 1985 AA’s fortunes had taken a turn for the worse. Its Atlanta market share of Minolta camera sales had plummeted to about 4%. Its share of specialty store sales suffered a similar fate. During this same period AA witnessed the dramatic rise of a competing specialty camera retailer, Wolf Camera, Inc. Wolf Camera had captured the 29% of the Minolta camera market lost by AA and then some. Its share of that market rose from about 6% to about 41%. Even more dramatic was the rise in its share of specialty camera store sales, which rocketed from about 14% to over 65%. AA’s president, Alan Goodelman, could only guess at the cause of Wolf Camera’s rise and AA’s fall. He surmised that AA’s problems were caused by a faulty computer system, or perhaps by a bad management decision to expand in Florida.

In June of 1985 Goodelman was approached by Eugene Grabowski, a former Southeast Region sales manager for Minolta Corporation (“Minolta”). 1 Grabowski brought news that a price discrimination scheme may have led to AA’s woes. He told Goodelman that Minolta had market development fund (“MDF”) accounts through which benefits were disbursed by either the national director of sales or the regional sales managers. These benefits had been used prior to 1979 for the equal good of all Minolta retailers. In 1979 Robert Lathrop took over as national director of sales, however, and instituted a “key dealer” program in which the MDF benefits were to be channeled disproportionately to “key dealers” in various cities. The MDF accounts were to support a program in which these selected dealers would be given free cameras and camera equipment, free advertising, free promotions, and various other benefits not available to non-key dealers.

Grabowski alleged that the key dealer program was motivated by two rationales. First, Minolta promotions could be cheaper if limited to one retailer with a large-volume capacity. For example, instead of making 100 shipments of 100 cameras to 100 retailers during a promotion, Minolta could make 1 shipment of 10,000 cameras to one retailer, saving distribution costs. Although the program was not designed to put non-key dealers out of business, it was designed to concentrate the market and to create a market leader through whom the promotions could be handled efficiently. Second, the program was designed to create a de facto vertical integration of Minolta with selected retailers, at least in some respects. According to Grabowski, La-throp believed that after helping a retailer achieve success, he could dictate to the retailer what cameras to sell and at what price.

Key dealers were usually the highest volume dealers within a defined market area. AA was the highest volume dealer in the Atlanta market at the time the key dealer program was instituted, but it was not chosen by Minolta as the Atlanta area key-dealer. Grabowski alleged that La-throp personally disliked Goodelman, and, in any case, felt that Wolf Camera had more sales potential. Thus Wolf Camera *1417 was chosen in AA’s stead. 2

As beneficiary of the key dealer program, Wolf Camera was slated to receive over non-key dealers a price advantage on purchases. Grabowski alleged that La-throp and Charles Wolf, the owner and CEO of Wolf Camera, hashed out the range of advantage. The range settled upon was four to seven percent per purchase dollar, generally, with specific instances of up to ten percent. 3 Grabowski told Goodelman of various incidents in which he furtively conferred some of this advantage to Wolf Camera by giving it free goods, advertising, and other benefits.

According to Grabowski, the key dealer participants realized that a program imbued with such favoritism bordered on illegality. To avoid legal trouble, Minolta and Lathrop purportedly instructed the regional managers to be familiar with three contrived explanations for their actions: (1) that the favoritism was necessary to meet competitive pricing actions within the marketplace; (2) that the favoritism was necessary to meet competitive advertising actions within the marketplace; and (3) that the favoritism was necessary to compete against grey market pricing. The latter excuse could prove particularly persuasive. In the United States there clearly were grey market 4 camera equipment sellers, the identity, prices, and practices of which were rather obfuscated.

After hearing this tale Goodelman’s thinking changed about why AA had taken a bath in the marketplace. He no longer blamed the faulty computer or a bad management decision, but rather Minolta’s alleged “key dealer” scheme. Goodelman immediately obtained the services of counsel. Sometime later AA cut off its relationship with Minolta and on February 18, 1986, it filed a five-count complaint in federal court against Minolta, Lathrop, Wolf Camera, and Wolf (“the Appellees”).

The complaint, as amended, alleged in Count I that Minolta and Lathrop had violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act [hereinafter referred to simply as the RPA] by engaging in a scheme of price discrimination. Section 2(a) 5 makes it (potentially) illegal for a seller to discriminate in price between its customers where the discrimination leads to a reasonable possibility that competition in general or competition with the favored customer specifically may be adversely affected, Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742, 65 S.Ct. 961, 969, 89 L.Ed. 1320 (1945), unless the discrimination is justifiable on the basis of the seller’s *1418 costs. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44, 68 S.Ct. 822, 827, 92 L.Ed. 1196 (1948). The section does not ban price discrimination per se, but only non cost-justified price discrimination that causes the requisite injury to competition or competitors. 6

Count V alleged that Minolta and La-throp, through the same scheme, had violated RPA sections 2(d) and 2(e). Sections *1419 2(d) and (e) are not as generous to discriminating sellers as is section 2(a). Section 2(d) 7 prohibits a seller from paying a customer for “services or facilities” furnished by the customer in connection with the resale of the seller’s product, unless the opportunity to receive such a payment is available to all of the seller’s customers on “proportionally equal terms.” See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 350-53, 88 S.Ct. 904, 909-10, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1967); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 79 S.Ct. 1005, 1011, 3 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1959). The section has no “competitive injury” or “cost justification” escape clause like section 2(a). Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 79, 99 S.Ct. 925, 932, 59 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979); Simplicity Pattern, supra, 360 U.S. at 66, 70, 79 S.Ct. at 1012, 1014. To force all price discrimination to take a readily recognizable form— from whence it can be tested under the “competitive injury” and “cost justification” guidelines of section 2(a) — section 2(d) creates liability for certain indirect price discriminations related to resale programs upon the mere showing that the indirection is price discrimination, thus “nipping potentially destructive practices before they reach full bloom.” Simplicity Pattern, supra, at 68, 79 S.Ct. at 1013. Section 2(e) 8 is similar in scope and language to section 2(d), see e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra, 440 U.S. at 79, 99 S.Ct. at 932, except it bans a seller from furnishing to a customer a service or facility connected with the resale of the seller’s product (rather than paying a customer for so furnishing), unless the opportunity to receive the seller’s service or facility is available to all of the seller’s customers on “proportionally equal terms.” Simplicity Pattern, supra, 360 U.S. at 65, 79 S.Ct. at 1011.

Count II alleged the corollary of Counts I & V, that Wolf and Wolf Camera knowingly received discriminatory price advantages in violation of section 2(f) 9 of the RPA. The remaining counts alleged violations of state law: that the Appellees intentionally and tortiously interfered with AA’s business and contractual relations (Count III) and that Minolta had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing made with AA (Count IV).

Appellees answered the complaint by asserting, among other things, a defense contained in RPA section 2(b). 10 In crafting the RPA the drafters and construers of the Act saw fit to allow a seller to breach the requirements of sections 2(a), (d), and (e) if it could prove that in so doing it was merely meeting the already preva *1420 lent prices of a competitor. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 246, 71 S.Ct. 240, 248, 95 L.Ed. 239 (1951). This defense is the so-called “meeting competition” defense. It allows a seller to rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination, and therefore avoid liability, by showing that its discriminatory actions were taken in good faith to counter the actions of a competitor. Id. In effect, it gives a seller the right to economic “self-defense.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 450-51, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2880, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil, supra, 340 U.S. at 249-50, 71 S.Ct. at 249). Appellees asserted that any price discrimination on their part was economic self-defense, self-defense compelled by a competitive threat from the grey market.

Discovery ensued, but not without dispute. AA uncovered Minolta accounting evidence indicating that over the years Wolf Camera received from Minolta MDF benefits in the form of free goods worth at least $271,123 and free credit offsets for advertising and promotion worth at least $100,911, for a total value of $372,034. The discovered “numbers” also indicated that Wolf Camera received a sum of non-MDF benefits from Minolta in the amount of $26,961. 11 On April 1, 1987, in an effort to explore more of Minolta’s data, AA filed a motion to compel discovery from Minolta and Lathrop. AA sought information from certain Minolta accounts regarding discriminatory benefits provided Wolf Camera. It also sought information regarding a nationwide “key dealer” scheme and the benefits provided other “key dealers” throughout the nation. Both Minolta and Lathrop responded with motions for protective orders. They felt that discovery was better restricted to limited information regarding only AA and Wolf Camera. On October 2, 1987, the district court ruled in favor of Appel-lees, believing that “[t]he information sought is irrelevant to this litigation, overly burdensome to produce, and not likely to lead to the production of admissible evidence.” A later-filed motion for reconsideration on this issue was denied.

When discovery came to a standstill, the parties filed various motions. 12 In a written memorandum and order entered December 30, 1988 the district court dismissed all motions as moot save Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, which it granted. The court explained that summary judgment against AA was warranted because AA had failed to show that it had been harmed by anything done by the Appellees. As with other antitrust laws, private plaintiffs derive standing to sue for violations of the RPA via Clayton Act sections 4 and 16. 13 To recover under these sections a private plaintiff must show both the occurrence of an antitrust violation and *1421 the incurrence of an antitrust injury. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (Section 16); Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (Section 4). See also J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 1927, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981) (involving the RPA). The court found deficient AA’s showing in the latter regard.

In the court’s view AA had failed to produce evidence that Wolf Camera was able to draw away profits or sales from AA on account of the price advantage it received from Minolta. The evidence presented cut against AA, according to the court, showing, first, that the amount of price benefit actually received by Wolf was de minimis when compared to its total dollar volume of Minolta purchases. The court found that the most Wolf Camera could have been advantaged was an amount summing to $350,540. 14 Over the $12,891,883 of Wolf Camera’s Minolta purchases made during the period of price discrimination, this advantage translated to a mere $.03 on the dollar. Moreover, when consideration was given to the $60,458 of MDF benefits and $53,505 of net non-market development fund (“non-MDF”) benefits Minolta gave AA over its $6,983,174 of purchases, this advantage deteriorated steadily “to less than one cent for every dollar [Wolf Camera] spent on Minolta goods.” Second, even if the price difference was not de minimis, the evidence showed that price is a secondary factor in consumers’ minds. The court found that price does not influence specialty camera purchasers so the pricing advantage afforded Wolf Camera was irrelevant. Third, even if the price did matter to specialty camera consumers, it did not influence them in this case. The price advantage given Wolf was not passed on to consumers, according to the court, but was used to increase advertising and other promotions. Fourth, AA could not suffer antitrust injury because its profit margin on Minolta products was higher than its profit margins on other products. That margin stayed high during the period of discrimination, as did AA’s retail prices on Minolta goods. Fifth, the court did not think that Wolf Camera and AA were competitors in Florida, although both had stores there, yet the profit margin derived by AA on its sales of Minolta products in Florida were the same as those derived in Georgia. This showed that AA was not injured in Georgia. Sixth, Minolta products apprised only 18% of Appellants total sales, thus “minimizing” any injury AA may have suffered. Lastly, whatever loss AA suffered was due not to the price discrimination, but to other reasons, such as its faulty computer system and poor management decision to expand in Florida. All of this proved that AA had not experienced the appropriate injury. Summary judgment, therefore, was required.

The court did not rest its judgment solely on its antitrust injury analysis. It noted additional reasons why summary judgment against AA was proper. First, as to the sections 2(d) and 2(e) claims, the court concluded that the terms and services offered A A and Wolf Camera by Minolta were “proportionally equal” because AA had received from Minolta certain non-MDF benefits relating to extended financing and generous return policies. This finding mandated summary judgment. Second, as to all of the RPA claims, the court found that the Appellees had proved that the price discrimination was caused by Minolta’s need to meet competition. The court found that a grey market for Minolta products existed and that Wolf Camera had made Minolta aware that it would buy from such a market. The court felt that Minolta’s discriminatory program was a reasonable response to this grey market threat, and thus its discrimination was excusable *1422 via RPA section 2(b). This finding also mandated summary judgment. 15

II.

The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted into law in 1936. It amended the Clayton Act’s regulation of price discrimination by making its scope more inclusive and its standards much tougher. The RPA’s enactment was motivated by concerns for small, independent distributors, which in the 1930’s were threatened by the arrival of chain stores. It marked “the high-water mark of the anti-chain-store movement.” R. Posner, The Robinson-Patman Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences 26 (1976). Although the Clayton Act had prohibited certain price discriminations, it was seen as ineffective in stopping the discriminatory prices granted chain stores by virtue of their size. See H.R.Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43, 68 S.Ct. 822, 827, 92 L.Ed. 1196 (1948). So far as purchasing was concerned, this discrimination put the more normal “mom and pop” merchants of the day at a competitive disadvantage. Congress sought to alleviate the disadvantage by putting the new age retailing behemoths on a level “playing-field” with small independent merchants and businessmen. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349, 88 S.Ct. 904, 908-09, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1967); FTC v. Henry Brock & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168, 80 S.Ct. 1158, 1160, 4 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1960). The RPA was Congress’s tool for doing so, for leveling competition between these types of competitors.

As is obvious from this brief summary of the RPA’s history, “it is fairness, as Congress perceives it, that Robinson-Patman is all about.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1146-47 (D.C.Cir.1988). The Act’s goal is to abolish unwarranted favoritism among all functional competitors, big or small. 16 Its objective is to assure “that businessmen at the same functional level ... start on equal competitive footing so far as price is concerned”; FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520, 83 S.Ct. 358, 367, 9 L.Ed.2d 466 (1963); “to assure that all sellers regardless of size, competing directly for the same customers ... receive evenhanded treatment from their suppliers”; Fred Meyer, supra, 390 U.S. at 356, 88 S.Ct. at 912.

In this case, the evenhanded treatment sought by the RPA is missing. In fact, favoritism abounds. The facts show that in selling to AA and Wolf Camera Minolta clearly favored Wolf Camera. The facts establish price discrimination on Minolta’s part, for “a price discrimination within the meaning of [the RPA] is merely a price difference,” FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549, 80 S.Ct. 1267, 1274, 4 L.Ed.2d 1385 (1960), and the facts demonstrate a difference in price between what Minolta charged Wolf Camera and what Minolta charged AA. Making this clear is a comparison of ratios based on the documented benefits received from Minolta by Wolf Camera and AA in relation to their purchases. The evidence indicates that Wolf Camera received $372,034 of documented benefits in relation to $12,891,883 of purchases; thus Wolf Camera’s documented benefit/purchases ratio is .029, or about $.03 on the dollar. Using the $350,-540 figure Appellees prefer, the ratio drops to about .027. When $26,961 of non-MDF benefits received by Wolf Camera is added, these ratios are about .031 and .029, respectively. AA’s ratio, based on MDF benefits *1423 received of $60,458 and purchases of $6,983,174 is about .0087, or less than $.01 on the dollar. Thus, the competitors’ benefit/purchases ratios are not equal. They show at the very least that Wolf Camera owned a two cent per dollar advantage in purchasing. This advantage remains even under a best-case scenario for the Appel-lees, when $80,446 of non-MDF benefits purportedly received by AA are taken into account. AA’s ratio rises to about .02, still one cent per dollar behind Wolf Camera’s. When the numbers are crunched using other evidence of benefits, such as the testimony of Grabowski, the price discrimination— and Wolf Camera’s purchasing advantage — becomes embarrassingly large.

Despite this and other substantial evidence hinting of Minolta’s discrimination in favor of Wolf Camera (and, consequently, against AA), the court below granted summary judgment against AA’s claims. The court seemed to believe that in spite of the evidence indicating favoritism its reasons, based as they were on the “proportionally equal” test of RPA sections 2(d) and (e), the “meeting competition” defense of RPA section 2(b), and the “antitrust injury” test of Clayton Act section 4, were enough to support summary judgment. While in theory this certainly is true, in the reality of this case, it is not.

III.

We take the sections 2(d) and (e) issue first. The court below felt that no violation of these sections was possible because whatever Minolta provided Wolf Camera by way of benefits was available on “proportionally equal terms” to AA as well. Even though the opportunity afforded Wolf Camera to obtain certain advertising, promotional, and other benefits was not afforded AA, the court apparently felt that the two competitors had access to similar incentive programs because AA could and did participate in a Minolta program that provided AA with financial help.

Yet sections 2(d) and (e) require something more than access to different incentive programs before their “proportionally equal” standard is met. The sections’ language requires that purchasers be given an equal opportunity to participate in certain types of seller programs relating to the resale of products, such as advertising and promotional programs, and that the benefits under those programs be disbursed on equal terms to purchasers in proportion to some objective value of their participation. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 358-59, 88 S.Ct. 904, 913, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). See also FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 1 Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) 6072 (1960). Such a program may be one, for example, where an advertising fund is made available by a supplier to its retail-trade customers on a basis proportional to the dollar amount of the supplier’s goods purchased by each retailer, the fund’s monies to be expended up to each retailer’s earned limit according to the retailer’s actual resale advertising. See F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 407 (1962). But the disputed fact situation facing us here does not present such a program, or anything like it. The situation presented here is one in which AA’s ability to partake in certain schemes involving Wolf Camera was completely foreclosed: AA could not participate in advertising, promotional, and other resale schemes that funneled Wolf Camera benefits of at least $100,911. 17 This hardly seems to fulfill the “guiding ideal” that motivated the RPA: “the preservation of equality of opportunity as far as possible to all who are usefully employed in the service of distribution and production.” H.R.Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936), quoted in FTC v. *1424 Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520, 83 S.Ct. 358, 367, 9 L.Ed.2d 466 (1963) (emphasis added). It does not fulfill the mandate of sections 2(d) and (e).

Putting this opportunity problem aside, we also find the financing program in which AA participated legally incomparable to the promotion programs doled out to Wolf. “Services and facilities” falling within the scope of sections 2(d) and (e) must relate to the resale of the supplier’s goods. See Fred Meyer, supra, 390 U.S. at 355-57, 88 S.Ct. at 911-12. Generally, financing programs do not relate to the resale of the supplier’s goods and therefore are not services and facilities within the meaning of sections 2(d) and (e). Bouldis v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 711 F.2d 1319, 1328 (6th Cir.1983); L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 674 F.2d 1113, 1119 & n. 7 (5th Cir.1982); Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir.1956). Advertising and promotional programs are. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 79 S.Ct. 1005, 1011, 3 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1959); Bouldis, supra, at 1329. Where two types of programs are segregated in law and nonequivalent in fact, comparing them to determine whether the promotional programs were available on “proportionally equal terms” seems nonsensical. Moreover, comparing the two types of programs would be proper only if Wolf Camera could not participate in the financing program on proportionally equal terms with AA. This is so because AA could not participate in the promotional programs on proportionally equal terms with Wolf Camera. But there is nothing to suggest that the financing programs in which AA participated were not open and available to Wolf Camera; indeed, the evidence suggests otherwise, as Minolta gave both AA and Wolf Camera non-MDF benefits.

Even if we assume that the financing and promotional programs are legally comparable, we still encounter problems. The evidence indicates that benefits under those programs were not disbursed by Minolta on proportionally equal terms. The benefits AA derived from the programs it was allowed access to were woefully short of those derived by Wolf Camera. The minimum quantified value of benefits provided AA through Minolta’s programs (MDF: $60,458; non-MDF: $80,446) simply was not comparable with the minimum quantified value of benefits provided Wolf Camera (MDF: $372,034; non-MDF: $26,-961). On a proportional basis, i.e., per dollar of purchases, Wolf Camera received at least half again as much in the way of benefits as did AA.

On the sections 2(d) and (e) issue there seems to us, at the very least, “ ‘sufficient evidence to create a jury question.’ ” Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir.) (quoting Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 975, 71 L.Ed.2d 113 (1981)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 212, 74 L.Ed.2d 169 (1982). The lower court’s “proportionally equal terms” conclusion simply is incapable of supporting its grant of summary judgment.

That conclusion, however, was but one arrow in the court’s summary judgment quiver. The district court also concluded that the Appellees had established as a matter of law the meeting competition defense of RPA section 2(b). Of course, if the Appellees merely were meeting their competition in good faith they are entitled to summary judgment, the type and amount of their price discrimination notwithstanding.

To establish that they merely were meeting the competition, Appellees alleged that a grey market in Minolta goods existed in Atlanta, that Wolf Camera actively and regularly purchased in this market, that Wolf Camera made known to Minolta that it would buy its Minolta cameras out of this market if Minolta did not cut it special deals, and that Minolta’s action in giving Wolf Camera aeross-the-line discriminatory price concessions was a good faith effort to meet the grey market threat. AA disputed all of this, and hotly so. The district court chose to ignore AA’s disputation; it accepted Minolta’s testimony in toto. It then *1425 opined that summary judgment was appropriate.

We cannot agree with the district court’s opinion. Under summary judgment a conclusion may not be established as a matter of law unless “no genuine issue as to any material fact” exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Yet in this case plenty of these genuine issues exist. We need not at this point lose ourselves in the facts. We merely pause to note that significant questions are present concerning, among other things, the extent and impact of the grey market for Minolta goods in Atlanta and elsewhere throughout the southeast, the good faith nature of the alleged investigation Minolta made into grey market conditions, see FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758-59, 65 S.Ct. 971, 976, 89 L.Ed. 1338 (1945); Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 F.2d 381, 392 (8th Cir.1987), the propriety of its rather generalized response to the purported competition, see Staley Mfg., supra, 324 U.S. at 753, 758-59, 65 S.Ct. at 975, 977, and the actual purpose which lies behind its price discrimination, see Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 439, 103 S.Ct. 1282, 1291,